Reed v. United Steel Workers District 7

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CARLOS REED,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY,
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION
(USW), and UNITED STEELWORKERS,
DISTRICT 7,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:24-cv-00192-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Defendants United Steel, Paper and Forestry,
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union (USW) and United Steelworkers, District 7 (collectively, “the Union”). (Doc. 33).
Plaintiff Carlos Reed (“Reed”) filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 35). For the reasons
set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted.
B ACKGROUND
The Court accepts as true the following facts, which are taken from the Second
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 32). Reed, who is Black, worked at Solvay Fluorides, LLC’s
plant in Alorton, Illinois, from June 17, 1991, until his termination on March 28, 2022.
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(Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Reed became a master mechanic in 2014. (Id. at ¶ 9). He was fired for
allegedly removing scrap material from Solvay and for unauthorized entrance onto
Solvay’s premises. (Id. at ¶ 21).
While employed with Solvay, Reed was a member of the collective bargaining unit
there. (Id. at ¶ 11). The Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Solvay
effective August 1, 2019, and was the sole representative of the members of the collective
bargaining unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13). The collective bargaining agreement set forth a four-
step grievance process with the last step being a demand for arbitration that could only
be carried out by the Union. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15, 17-18). Any member of the collective
bargaining unit is permitted to file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement.
(Id. at ¶ 16).
Reed filed several grievances with the Union throughout his employment at
Solvay, including grievances concerning the terms and conditions of his employment and
minor disciplinary action taken against him. (Id. at ¶ 19). The Union did not take any of
these grievances to arbitration. (Id. at ¶ 20).
Reed filed another grievance following his termination for the alleged theft of
scrap materials and improper entry onto Solvay’s property. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22). The
grievance went through the first three steps of the process, and the Union demanded
arbitration pursuant to step four of the grievance process. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24). The grievance,
however, ultimately did not proceed to arbitration. (Id. at ¶ 25). Instead, the Union settled
the grievance and withdrew it. (Id. at ¶ 26). The settlement agreement provided that if
Reed withdrew his grievance, Solvay would not prosecute Reed for his actions and would
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provide Reed with a neutral employment recommendation. (Id. at ¶ 27). Reed was not
aware of this settlement, nor did he agree to settle or withdraw his grievance. (Id. at ¶ 28).
In fact, Reed asserts that he would not have agreed to the withdrawal of his grievance
because he believed his termination was wrongful and the result of racial discrimination.
(Id. at ¶ 29). Reed also alleges that the Union did not conduct any investigation into
whether the removal of scrap by employees was condoned by management, whether
similarly situated employees were treated differently, or whether his termination was the
result of racial discrimination. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-33). He alleges that union representatives
were present at several meetings where he alleged that he was being discriminated
against because of his race, but they did not investigate his claims. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35). Reed
also alleges that the defendants themselves have a “significant history of discriminating
against black employees” at the facility and have condoned discrimination against Black
employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37). According to Reed, Union officers made “racially derogatory
remarks” about him, but the Union took no action. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39). He also alleges that
the number of Black employees at the Solvay facility has decreased significantly in recent
years 	and 	virtually 	all 	Black 	new 	hires 	were 	“fired” 	during 	their 	probationary
employment periods, but the Union took no action. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-43).
Reed asserts the Union has a “de facto” policy of not adequately representing
Black employees on account of their race. (Id. at ¶ 50). As examples, he cites the Union’s
intervention (1) for a white employee, J.G., who was issued a notice for throwing a chair
in an occupied breakroom and ultimately was not terminated, (2) for a white employee
who was able to avoid discipline for his excessive tardiness and failure to show up for
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work, and (3) for a white employee and a Black employee who engaged in an altercation
at work. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-48). In the final situation, the white employee did not receive
discipline, but the Black employee did. (Id. ¶ 48). He also alleges that the Union refused
to grieve the termination of a Black employee who was fired while on statutorily
protected leave. (Id. at ¶ 49). That employee had requested the Union file a grievance on
his behalf, but the Union refused. (Id.). The employee endeavored to litigate the matter
himself and received a monetary settlement. (Id.).
Reed initially sued the Union in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, but
the Union removed the case to this Court on January 29, 2024. (Doc. 1). Reed then
amended his complaint to assert a claim of discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and discrimination in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). The Union
moved to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 28). Reed agreed to voluntarily dismiss his IHRA
claim in Count II, but he contested the dismissal of the § 1981 count. (Doc. 30).
On April 21, 2025, the Court issued an order granting the Union’s motion.
(Doc. 31). The Court held that Reed had not alleged any facts that would support a
conclusion that race had influenced the Union’s decision to settle and withdraw his
grievance. (Id. at p. 5). The Court also observed that a union does not have a duty to
investigate employer discrimination. (Id. at pp. 5-6). Although the Court acknowledged
that a union’s “selective inaction” to the concerns of minority employees can violate
§ 1981, it noted that Reed had not even alleged that the Union refused to investigate his
grievances but would have investigated white employee grievances. (Id. at p. 6). The
Court therefore dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice but permitted Reed
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to amend his pleading to address the deficiencies, prompting the present proceedings.
Reed filed a Second Amended Complaint on May 21, 2025, pleading only a claim under
§ 1981. (Doc. 32). The Union again moved to dismiss the complaint (Docs. 33, 34).
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant’s motion to dismiss may be granted in instances where the plaintiff’s
complaint fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual
allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To be plausible, an allegation must allow “the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The factual allegations stated in the second amended complaint will be taken as
true and interpreted in “the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash
Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not entitled
to the presumption of truth. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. This standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, it simply requires
that that the plaintiff gives “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present
a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). In
the discrimination context, the Seventh Circuit has said that “a plaintiff must advance
plausible allegations that [he] experienced discrimination because of [his] protected
characteristics.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2022).
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DISCUSSION
The Union asserts that Reed’s second amended complaint still fails to allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate that it would have handled his grievance differently had he
been white. It maintains Reed failed to explain how the Union administered its grievance
procedure more favorably for white employees where it also filed a grievance on his
behalf. The Union also argues that Reed’s claim regarding its “de facto” policy of failing
to adequately represent Black employees is conclusory and negated by the fact it
demanded arbitration for his grievance. Reed answers that his core complaint is not that
the Union failed to pursue his grievance but that the Union, on account of his race, failed
to investigate the grievance sufficiently and ultimately, at the arbitration stage, settled it
without consulting him. He argues that his claim is bolstered by his allegations that
Union officials made racially derogatory comments and specific incidents where Black
union members were treated less favorably than white members in the grievance process.
The parties by now are familiar with the legal standards governing Reed’s claim.
As the Court explained in its prior order, section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in
the “making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(b). To establish a race discrimination claim against a union under § 1981, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the union refused to process his grievances because of his race or
his earlier complaints about race. Webb v. AFSCME Council 31, No. 19-4192, 2020 WL
919260, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2020) (citing Green v. AFT/IFT Local 604, 740 F.3d 1104, 1107
(7th Cir. 2014)); see also Chapman v. AFSCME Council 31, Loc. 3477, No. 17-8125, 2019 WL
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214478, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2019) (noting that § 1981 “prohibit[s] unions from
discriminating on the basis of race in the way they represent their members”). In other
words, a racial discrimination claim under § 1981 requires a plaintiff to show that the
union would have processed his grievances had he been white. Id. (citing Green, 740 F.3d
at 1107).
In its prior order, the Court faulted Reed for failing to allege facts from which it
could be inferred that there was a connection between his race and the Union’s decision
to settle and withdraw his grievance. The Union argues that Reed’s second amended
complaint still fails on that front. The Court agrees.
To be sure, Reed’s amended pleading does add some additional details. For
instance, he relays several examples of instances when the Union did and did not
intervene on behalf of particular employees. These allegations most naturally pertain to
a theory the Union violated § 1981 based on its “selective inaction” with regard to the
grievances of minority employees. E.E.O.C. v. Pipefitters Ass’n Loc. Union 597, 334 F.3d
656, 661 (7th Cir. 2003). A union discriminates where it refuses to investigate a Black
employee’s grievance but would investigate a white employee’s grievance. Id. A union
also violates § 1981 if it “decided as a matter of policy not to grieve complaints of
discrimination by [B]lack members of the bargaining unit because the company is hostile
to such complaints and the union fears that this hostility will make it harder for the union
to succeed in its dealings with the company.” Id.
Because the Union in this case did file a grievance and obtain arbitration, the
essence of Reed’s claim is that the Union would have exercised more zeal in pursuing a
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favorable outcome had he been white. (Doc. 32 at ¶ 44). Even assuming such a theory is
viable, Reed’s allegations do not make it plausible here.
To start, he describes two instances where the Union grieved the discipline of
white employees, and those employees were not terminated. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47). However,
the fact the Union filed a grievance on behalf of white employees says little about whether
it was inattentive to the needs of Black employees. 1 Reed also describes an incident where
his employer disciplined a white employee and a Black employee after they engaged in
an altercation in the workplace. (Id. at ¶ 48). He reports that the Union filed a grievance
on behalf of both employees, and the white employee ultimately was not disciplined
while the Black employe was terminated. (Id.). However, the fact that the Union
submitted a grievance on behalf of both employees cuts against Reed’s theory of selective
inaction. To the extent Reed’s claim is that the Union had a policy of failing to
comprehensively investigate and advocate for its Black employees, he has not alleged
anything about the strength or weakness of the Union’s handling of the Black employee’s
grievance in that instance. Finally, Reed reports that a Black employee was fired while on
statutorily protected leave and requested that the Union grieve the termination, but the
Union refused. (Id. at ¶ 49). Of course, the Union did file a grievance in Reed’s case (id. at
1 A plaintiff need not allege that they were similarly situated to someone else to state a claim under § 1981.
See Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 830 (7th Cir. 2014). But if a plaintiff’s only allegation connecting
their alleged mistreatment to their protected characteristic is a comparison that “doesn’t hold up to even
the slightest scrutiny” it is not enough to survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). See Miao v. United Airlines,
Inc., 164 F.4th 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2026).
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¶ 25), so it is difficult to see how its failure to do so in another instance plausibly
demonstrates the existence of a policy of selective inaction by the Union based on race.
The only other substantive difference between Reed’s current complaint and his
prior pleading is his allegation that certain Union officers participated in “making racially
derogatory remarks” about him. (Id. ¶ 38). He does not state what these remarks were,
who made them, or when they occurred. Absent further context, this allegation is too
vague and conclusory to plausibly connect the Union’s handling of Reed’s grievance in
this instance to his race. 2 Cf. Okoro v. Cook Cnty. Health & Hosp. Sys., No. 19-06061, 2021
WL 2413152, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2021) (“Taken together, the FAC’s allegations fail to
raise Okoro’s discrimination claim against Local 73 above a speculative level.”).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Union’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 33) is GRANTED. The Second Amended
Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment accordingly and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 9, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
2 Reed also alleges that the Union has not conducted any investigation regarding the decrease in Black
employees at his former employer’s facility or the firing of almost all Black probationary employees in the
recent past. These allegations do not move the needle. As the Court explained previously, “a union does
not have an affirmative duty ‘to investigate and rectify discrimination by the employer.’” Okoro, 2021 WL
2413152 at *6 (quoting EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass’n Loc. Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2003)). Inaction is
not discrimination “in any accepted sense of the term.” Pipefitters, 334 F.3d at 660.
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