Showers v. Pelican Investment Holdings Group, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANGELINA SHOWERS, Individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
PELICAN INVESTMENT HOLDINGS
GROUP, LLC, DIMENSION SERVICE
CORPORATION, and SING FOR
SERVICE, LLP,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:23-CV-02864-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Angelina Showers alleges that she received unsolicited and unwanted
telemarketing calls even though her number is on a national Do Not Call (“DNC”) list.
She brings this action against Defendants Pelican Investment Holdings Group, LLC
(“Pelican”), Dimension Service Corporation (“Dimension”), and Sing for Service, LLP,
d.b.a. Mepco (“Mepco”) (collectively “Defendants”) alleging claims under federal and
state law. On September 30, 2024, the Court partially granted Defendants’ motions to
dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint without prejudice. (Doc. 52). Plaintiff filed
a Second Amended Complaint on October 16, 2024. (Doc. 56). Defendants now move for
judgment on the pleadings as to the Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 80, 81).
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint advances two causes of action: violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (“TCPA”) (Count I),
and violation of the Illinois Telephone Solicitations Act, 815 ILCS 413/1, et seq. (“ITSA”)
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(Count II). Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot maintain a TCPA claim because her
phone number is associated with a cell phone and thus ineligible for registration on the
national DNC list. They also argue that their alleged use of automatic dialing technology
is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim under ITSA.
B ACKGROUND
The Court accepts the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint as
true. Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff alleges that Dimension, in concert with a company called Sunpath, Ltd. 1
(“Sunpath”), administered an “aggressive” telemarketing campaign to sell Vehicle
Service Contracts (“VSCs”) across the country, including in Illinois. (Doc. 56 ¶ 10
(Sec. Am. Compl.)). Pelican initiated and carried out these calls on Dimension’s behalf,
thus acting as Dimension’s agent in the scheme. (Id.). Mepco acted as a payment
processor, facilitating monthly premium payments from consumers for the VSCs they
purchased. (Id. ¶ 11). As such, “[a]ll Defendants acted in concert and had full knowledge
of the calling campaign, ratified it, and profited from it.” (Id. ¶ 12).
Plaintiff’s phone number (ending in 2903), which she uses for “residential
purposes,” has been on the national DNC list since 2006. (Id. ¶ 5). On August 4
and 5, 2022, however, she was contacted by Defendants (through Pelican), using an
“automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”) and told she was eligible for an
“extended warranty” on her car. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19, 20). Through aggressive sales tactics,
1 Sunpath was originally named as a Defendant in this action. Plaintiff dropped Sunpath from her Second
Amended Complaint based on defense counsel’s representation that it is no longer in business.
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including demands to make an immediate purchasing decision or lose out on the
opportunity, Defendants sold Plaintiff on a VSC, claiming it provided the “highest level”
of coverage. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22). Before ending the call, Defendants demanded that Plaintiff
make an initial payment prior to sending any documentation of the transaction. (Id. ¶ 24).
Pelican 	collected 	the 	initial 	payment 	from 	Plaintiff 	without 	her 	written 	consent;
subsequent monthly premiums were collected by Mepco. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25, 29).
Defendants allegedly did not cross-reference their call lists with the national DNC
list. (Id. ¶ 38). As such, they “routinely” placed calls to people whose numbers were on
the DNC list, including Plaintiff and the putative class members. (Id. ¶ 39).
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class of
consumers and an Illinois subclass. (Id. ¶ 30). She defines the nationwide class as:
[A]ll natural persons in the United States of America who, during the
applicable statute of limitations, received a telephone call from Defendants
that was initiated to a residential telephone subscriber who has registered
his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons
who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the
federal government. (Id. ¶ 31).
The Illinois subclass is defined as:
[A]ll natural persons in the State of Illinois who, during the applicable
statute of limitations, received a telephone call from Defendants wherein:
the live operator did not immediately state his or her name, nor the name
of the business or organization being represented; the live operator
represented that they were soliciting “Extended Warranties;” and/or the
consumer made payment over the telephone. (Id. ¶ 32).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
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pleadings.” Pleadings “include the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments
attached as exhibits.” N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452
(7th Cir. 1998).
“The only difference between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a
motion to dismiss is timing; the standard is the same.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle
Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2020). A motion for judgment on the
pleadings may not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the nonmovant
cannot prove facts sufficient to support its position.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Columbia Ins.
Grp., Inc., 972 F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus, even with all facts and inferences viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d
333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993), “the moving party must demonstrate that there are no material
issues of fact to be resolved.” N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, 163 F.3d at 452.
DISCUSSION
1. 	Count I: Violation of the TCPA
Congress enacted the TCPA to address the “intrusive invasion of privacy,” caused
by “[u]nrestricted telemarketing.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs, LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012)
(quotation marks omitted). It found that “[m]any consumers [we]re outraged over the
proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers,” and that
“residential telephone subscribers consider automated or prerecorded telephone calls,
regardless of the content or the initiator of the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion
of privacy.” TCPA, § 2, ¶¶ 6, 10, 105 Stat. 2394, note following 47 U.S.C. § 227
(Congressional Findings). The TCPA thus “protect[s] residential telephone subscribers’
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privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(c)(1).
The TCPA’s core substantive provisions appear in sections 227(b) and (c) of
Title 47. As relevant here, section 227(b) prohibits people from “initiat[ing] any telephone
call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a
message without the prior express consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).
It also prohibits people from “mak[ing] any call . . . using any automatic telephone dialing
system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a
paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio
common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.”
Id. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
Subsection (c) empowers the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to
“prescribe regulations” that “protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to
avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.” Id. § 227(c)(1)-(2). To
accomplish this goal, Congress anticipated that an effective regulatory framework “may
require the establishment and operation of a single national database to compile a list of
telephone 	numbers 	of 	residential 	subscribers 	who 	object 	to 	receiving 	telephone
solicitations.” Id. § 227(c)(3). So, “[r]ather than dictating the contents of the regulations—
as Congress did in [s]ection 227(b),” section 227(c) permits the FCC to establish a national
DNC 	list 	of 	phone 	numbers 	belonging 	to 	people 	who 	did 	not 	want 	to receive
telemarketing 	calls. 	Cacho 	v. 	McCarthy 	& 	Kelly 	LLP, 	739 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	195, 201
(S.D.N.Y. 2024). And if the FCC determined that a national DNC database was necessary
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(it did), then the regulations must “prohibit any person from making or transmitting a
telephone solicitation to the telephone number of any subscriber included in such
database.” Id. § 227(c)(3)(F).
The TCPA’s implementing regulations do just that. They forbid people from
“initiat[ing] any telephone solicitation to . . . [a] residential telephone subscriber who has
registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons
who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal
Government”—i.e., the DNC list. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). The regulations also forbid
anyone from initiating “any artificial or prerecorded-voice telephone call . . . or any call
for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or
entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to
receive such calls.” Id. § 64.1200(d). And section 64.1200(e) states that these rules “are
applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls
or 	text 	messages 	to 	wireless 	telephone 	numbers 	to 	the 	extent 	described 	in 	the
Commission’s Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02–278, FCC 03–153, ‘Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991’” (the “2003
Report and Order”). The 2003 Report and Order conveys the FCC’s finding that “it is
more consistent with the overall intent of the TCPA to allow wireless subscribers to
benefit from the full range of TCPA protections.” In re Rules and Regs. Implementing the
Tel. Cons. Prot. Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14039 (2003). It further provides:
As a practical matter, since determining whether any particular wireless
subscriber is a “residential subscriber” may be more fact-intensive than
making the same determination for a wireline subscriber, we will presume
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wireless subscribers who ask to be put on the national do-not-call list to be
“residential subscribers.” Such a presumption, however, may require a
complaining wireless subscriber to provide further proof of the validity of
that presumption should we need to take enforcement action. Id.
Any person who receives more than one telemarking call in violation of the
implementing regulations over a 12-month period may bring an action for injunctive and
monetary relief. Id. § 227(c)(5). Plaintiff advances such an action under section 227(c) and
the implementing regulations based on Defendants’ calls to her and other phone numbers
on the DNC list.
Defendants’ dispositive argument turns on the phrase “residential telephone
subscriber.” As noted, the implementing regulations prohibit calls to “[a] residential
telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-
not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is
maintained by the Federal Government.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s phone number (ending in 2903), however, is assigned to a cell phone—not a
“landline.” 2 Defendants point to section 227(b)’s express distinction between calls placed
to a number assigned to a “cellular telephone service” (section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)) and those
placed to a “residential telephone line” (section 227(b)(1)(B)) to argue that Congress was
aware of the difference between “residential” and “cell” phones and chose to regulate
them differently. And because section 64.1200(c)(2), in turn, limits the DNC list to
“residential telephone subscriber[s],” it must, according to Defendants, exclude cell phone
2 The Court assumes for purposes of Defendants’ motion that the number in question is indeed linked to a
cell phone. Plaintiff did not dispute this characterization in her response brief.
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numbers, like Plaintiff’s.
The 	implementing 	regulations 	are 	clear 	in 	their 	scope. 	While 	subsection
64.1200(c)(2) forbids calls to numbers on the DNC list, subsection (e) extends that
prohibition to “any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls
or text messages to wireless telephone numbers.” These regulations were not drafted in
a vacuum. Congress gave the FCC explicit directives to “prescribe regulations” that
“protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone
solicitations to which they object.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)-(2). And as the FCC executed its
regulatory mandate, it found that “it is more consistent with the overall intent of the
TCPA to allow wireless subscribers to benefit from the full range of TCPA protections.”
2003 Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. at 14039. It also concluded that “wireless subscribers
may participate in the national do-not-call list.” Id.
A departure from these considered findings is not appropriate here. It is true that
section 227(b) distinguishes calls based on the phone technology they target. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B). Section 227(b)(1)(A) prohibits calls “using any automatic
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” to certain phone types (e.g.,
emergency telephone lines and numbers assigned to a “cellular telephone service”).
Section 227(b)(1)(B), on the other hand, prohibits calls “to any residential telephone line
using an artificial or prerecorded voice.” Thus, section 227(b) “forbids the use of artificial
and prerecorded messages to enumerated categories of phone technologies.” Lirones v. Leaf
Home 	Water 	Sols., 	LLC, 	No. 	5:23-cv-02087, 	2024 	WL 	4198134, 	at 	*6 	(N.D. 	Ohio
Sept. 16, 2024) (emphasis added).
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But section 227(c) “provides protections to a certain type of phone user, regardless
of the technology.” Id. (emphasis added). It directs the FCC to craft regulations that
“protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone
solicitations to which they object.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1). The FCC did exactly that by
creating the DNC list and making it unlawful to initiate telemarketing calls to “residential
telephone subscriber[s]” whose numbers are on it. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). Defendants’
argument overlooks this critical distinction. In their view, section 227(b)’s differential
treatment of a “cellular telephone service” and a “residential telephone line” means that
only residential “lines”—i.e., landlines—are eligible for the DNC list, irrespective of
section 227(c)’s concern for “subscribers” whose privacy it seeks to protect. This
argument is hard to square with the text and structure of the TCPA, as the Southern
District of New York recognized:
Cellular telephones—like telephone lines, paging services, radio common
carrier services, and telephone facsimile machines—are a kind of telephonic
communications technology. A “residential subscriber,” by contrast, does
not refer to the specific phone technology, but to the type or identity of the
subscriber to the technology. Thus, a “residential subscriber” and a cellular
telephone are not members of the same genus.
Cacho, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 204-05. The distinction between telephone technologies in section
227(b) and telephone subscribers in section 227(c) matters because each section contains
its own substantive requirements. And while section 227(b) distinguishes between calls
to numbers assigned to a “cellular telephone service” and calls to “residential telephone
lines,” section 227(c) contains no such distinction. Instead, section 227(c) broadly protects
“residential telephone subscribers” whose numbers are on the DNC list. Congress’s use of
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the phrase “residential telephone line” in section 227(b)(1)(B) indeed suggests that that
section concerns itself with a “fixed line dedicated to a particular location”—i.e., a
landline. Cacho, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 205. But it is also notable that section 227(b)(1)(B) is the
only provision in the TCPA that uses that phrase. “Had Congress wished to limit section
227(c) to specified telephone technologies rather than specified telephone subscribers, it
would have indicated somewhere in that section that the [Do Not Call] registry is limited
to a ‘residential telephone line,’ as Congress used that term in the preceding subsection.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Congress’s deliberate choice to address “residential telephone line[s]” exclusively
in section 227(b)(1)(B) thus suggests that “residential telephone subscribers” under
section 227(c) are entitled to their own protections. Indeed, section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) shows
that Congress knew how to separate cell phones from other phone technologies. The fact
that it did not do so in section 227(c) supports the FCC’s conclusion that the TCPA extends
to “wireless subscribers” who use their cell phones for residential purposes—as Plaintiff
did here. See Chennette v. Porch.com, Inc., 50 F.4th 1217, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2022) (Bress J.,
concurring) (endorsing FCC’s statutory interpretation); accord Wilson v. Hard Eight Nutr.
LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 1784815, at *4 (D. Or. June 27, 2025) (“argu[ment]
that a cell phone is not a residential telephone under the TCPA . . . relies on a strained
apples-to-apples comparison of [s]ections 227(b) and 227(c)”); Lirones, 2024 WL 4198134,
at *6 (holding that “omission of the word ‘line’ and use of the word ‘subscriber’ in § 227(c)
. . . refers to the type of subscriber and the function for which the subscriber uses the
phone rather than the type of technology.”).
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Defendants rely principally on cases from the Northern District of Illinois and the
Eastern District of Wisconsin to claim that “[c]ourts within the Seventh Circuit adhere to
the position that cellular telephones do not qualify as residential phones for purposes of
establishing liability under the TCPA.” (Def. Br., p. 9 (Doc. 80)). The first of these cases,
Moore v. Triump CSR Acquisition, LLC, No. 23-cv-4659, 2023 WL 8601528, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 12, 2023), recognized that “[c]ourts widely hold that a cell phone is not a ‘residential
telephone line’ within the meaning of subsection 227(b)(1)(B).” The plaintiff, however,
alleged that she had received prerecorded telemarketing calls on her cell phone. Id. at *1.
The court held that this allegation could not support a claim under section 227(b)(1)(B).
Id. at *2. The problem was not that the plaintiff had no claim under the TCPA at all (as
Defendants appear to suggest here); it was that her chosen theory of liability under
subsection 227(b)(1)(B) required her to show that she had been called on a “residential
telephone line.” Id. Indeed, the plaintiff had previously dropped a claim under section
227(c)(5), alleging that the defendant had disregarded the DNC list. Id. at *1. So, by
invoking subsection 227(b)(1)(B), the plaintiff exposed her claim to the requirement that
the calls in question reached her via a “residential telephone line.” Plaintiff’s claims in
this case, however, arise under 227(c) and its associated implementing regulations. Moore
is thus not inconsistent with this Court’s holding that people can register their cell phone
numbers on the DNC list as “residential telephone subscribers” and invoke the
protections of section 227(c) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) when telemarketers disregard
their inclusion on the list.
The second case Defendants cite from within this circuit, Kapp v. E. Wis. Water
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Cond. Co., No. 20-CV-286, 2021 WL 778168, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 1, 2021), also does not
help them. There, the defendants moved to strike a putative class action plaintiff’s class
definitions because he sought to represent a class of plaintiffs who received calls on their
cell phones even though he had only received calls on his residential landline. Id. The
defendants argued that the plaintiff was not an appropriate class representative for the
cell phone class because the TCPA treated calls to him differently than those to people’s
cell phones. Id. The court recognized this distinction: “While the defendants cite many
cases that support the proposition that cell phones and residential landlines are distinct
under the TCPA, they need not: such a distinction is clear from the text of the statute.” Id.
The Court agrees with this articulation of the law insofar as it concerns section 227(b). But
it does not support Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff may not invoke the protections
of the DNC list as a “residential telephone subscriber.” Again, while section 227(b)
distinguishes between calls to numbers assigned to “cellular telephone service[s]” and
calls to “residential telephone line[s],” section 227(c) does not—its concern is the
“residential telephone subscriber.”
Finally, the Court’s adoption of the FCC’s determination that cell phone users may
qualify as “residential telephone subscribers” under the TCPA is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). Under
Loper, judges must “exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency
has acted within its statutory authority.” Id. at 412. This requires courts to scrutinize
statutory delegations of “discretionary authority” to federal agencies to ensure that “the
agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking within th[e] 	boundaries” of its
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authority. Id. 395 (citation modified). And while “an agency’s interpretation of a statute
cannot bind a court, it may be especially informative to the extent it rests on factual
premises within the agency’s expertise.” Id. at 402 (citation modified). “[J]udges need
only fulfill their obligations under the [Administrative Procedures Act] to independently
identify and respect such delegations of authority, police the outer statutory boundaries
of those delegations, and ensure that agencies exercise their discretion consistent with the
APA.” Id. at 404.
Here, Congress’s delegation of authority is clear. The FCC was directed to
“prescribe regulations” that “protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to
avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.” 47 U.S.C § 227(c)(1)-(2).
These regulations, Congress predicted, “may require the establishment and operation of
a single national database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential
subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations.” Id. § 227(c)(3). The FCC did
as it was instructed. It created the national DNC list and, in the 2003 Report and Order,
articulated the presumption that “wireless subscribers who ask to be put on the national
do-not-call list [are] ‘residential subscribers.’” 2003 Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. at
14039. This determination “rests on factual premises within the agency’s expertise.”
Loper, 603 U.S. at 402. And while that is not dispositive under Loper, it carries a “particular
power to persuade.” Id. Here, based on the Court’s independent examination of the
TCPA, it is persuaded that the FCC got it right—cell phone users may qualify as
“residential subscribers” whose numbers may be added to the DNC list.
At this stage, the pleadings demonstrate a viable claim for relief. Discovery may
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reveal evidence that undermines Plaintiff’s assertion that she used her cell phone for
“residential purposes.” If that happens, Defendants may be able to rebut the presumption
that her cell phone is not covered by the TCPA. But for now, the Court is satisfied that
Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for relief under the TCPA.
2. 	Count II: Violation of ITSA
Defendants also contest Plaintiff’s standing to bring an ITSA claim because the
calls in question were allegedly made using an ATDS. Defendants are correct that ITSA,
by its terms and subject to a limitation that is not currently relevant, “shall not apply to
telephone calls made by an autodialer.” 815 ILCS 413/20(a). Thus, they argue that
Plaintiff pleaded herself out of court by claiming that they used an “automatic telephone
dialing system” to call her.
The problem with Defendants’ argument is that all of them have denied this
allegation in the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 60, ¶ 17 (Mepco’s Answ. to Sec. Am.
Compl.), Doc. 61 ¶ 17 (Dimension’s Answ. to Sec. Am. Compl.), Doc. 62 ¶ 17 (Pelican’s
Answ. to Sec. Am. Compl.)). “[W]hen material issues of fact are raised by the answer and
the defendant seeks judgment on the pleadings on the basis of this matter, his motion
cannot be granted.” Morse v. Raoul, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 2576434, at *2 (S.D.
Ill. Sept. 5, 2025) (quotation marks omitted). That is what happened here. By disputing
Plaintiff’s claim that they used an ATDS, Defendants put the issue in play. Discovery will
help explain whether, and if so, how, Defendants relied on technology to place their calls.
If such evidence is developed, Defendants may have a strong argument that their use of
automated dialing technology is fatal to Plaintiff’s ITSA claim. But on a Rule 12(c) motion,
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only “uncontested allegations to which a party had an opportunity to respond are taken
as true.” Flora v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 685 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis
added). Here, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants used an ATDS to call her is contested.
Thus, it cannot provide a basis for judgment on the pleadings. See Pratt Logistics, LLC v.
United Transp., Inc., No. 2:21CV148, 2022 WL 743049, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2022)
(denying motion to dismiss because whether defendant’s conduct violated statutory
definition of prohibited conduct was question of fact).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 80) is
DENIED. Mepco’s Motion in Concurrence (Doc. 81) is GRANTED insofar as the Court
has considered Mepco a proponent of the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
NEXT STEPS
With this Order, the discovery stay issued on August 18, 2025 (Doc. 90) is LIFTED.
The parties are DIRECTED to submit a proposed amended scheduling order for the case
via email to njrpd@ilsd.uscourts.gov on or before February 6, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 30, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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