Williams v. Spiller et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIE WILLIAMS, #B63167, )
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSHUA A. SCHOENBECK and
JASON N. HART,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 22-cv-756-RJD
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:1
This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ various motions. For the reasons set
forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Compelling Discovery (Doc. 65) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 67) and Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 71) are DENIED. Defendants are granted an extension of time up
to February 5, 2026, to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 64).
Background
Plaintiff Willie Williams, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC),
brought this civil rights action on April 19, 2022, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
deprivations of his constitutional rights at Menard and Illinois River Correctional Centers
(Menard/Illinois River). 2 (Doc. 17). Following a preliminary review of the Second Amended
1 This case has been assigned to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings, including trial and final entry
of judgment upon the parties’ full consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73. (Doc. 35).
2 Plaintiff has since been transferred to Danville Correctional Center (Doc. 26).
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Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, Plaintiff is now proceeding on a Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process claim against Defendants Schoenbeck and Hart for Plaintiff’s disciplinary
proceedings (Count 2 of the Second Amended Complaint). (See Docs. 17 & 56).
Plaintiff alleged that on February 27, 2019, Defendant Spiller wrote him a false disciplinary
report related to his involvement in gang activities. (Doc. 17 at 7). On March 5, 2019, Defendant
Schoenbeck and the Adjustment Committee held a hearing on the ticket. Plaintiff pled not guilty,
but the disciplinary committee found him guilty of the offense and assessed three months in
segregation and restrictions on privileges. (Doc. 17 at 7). On July 27, 2020, while in segregation,
Plaintiff was served a disciplinary report that alleged he was the highest-ranking member of a gang
at Menard. The officer who presented the report recorded Plaintiff’s intention to present witnesses.
(Doc.17 at 12). On July 30, John Doe 1 came to get Plaintiff for his disciplinary hearing, but his
door was jammed. Plaintiff alleged that it took a short time for a locksmith to arrive to open the
door. By the time the door was open, John Doe 1 informed him that he should pack his property
instead, as he was being moved. A different officer informed him that they knew nothing about
the Adjustment Committee.
Plaintiff alleged that, on that same day, he was transferred to Illinois River without
attending the hearing. He alleged that he spent 45 days at Illinois River in solitary confinement
because he was labeled as a “circuit rider” and an “extreme security risk.” After inquiring for three
weeks, an officer gave him a copy of the Adjustment Committee findings from Menard, which
found him guilty based on evidence that he alleged was fabricated. The findings stated that he
refused to attend the hearing at Menard. (Doc. 17 at 15). Defendants Schoenbeck and Hart had
sentenced him to six months in segregation and restricted privileges. (Doc. 17 at 15). Defendant
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Wills approved the committee findings. Plaintiff grieved the Adjustment Committee’s findings to
the ARB. Specifically, he claimed that the Adjustment Committee hearing was unfair and was
based on uncorroborated, false, and fabricated information from confidential sources. (Doc. 17 at
16). Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Schoenbeck and Hart violated his rights by holding an
inadequate disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, reversing
the outcome of his disciplinary proceedings and expunging them from his records, and punitive
and nominal damages.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 67)
Plaintiff filed his fourth motion seeking recruitment of counsel. (See Docs. 2, 42, 48, &
67). When presented with a request to appoint counsel, the Court must make the following
inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or effectively
been precluded from doing so, and (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear
competent to litigate it himself. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).
In his prior motions, Plaintiff had attached correspondence to legal aid services
demonstrating reasonable attempts to obtain counsel on his own. (Doc. 48, pp. 3-9). However,
Plaintiff has not established that the difficulty of this case exceeds his ability to litigate it pro se.
Plaintiff alleges he is unable to represent himself due to the complexity of the legal issues involved
in this dispute, his limited access to legal resources, and his lack of legal knowledge. (Doc. 67).
However, these circumstances are not unique to Plaintiff and do not necessarily warrant
recruitment of counsel. Specifically, Plaintiff is now only proceeding on a single Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process claim against Defendants Schoenbeck and Hart for Plaintiff’s
disciplinary proceedings. This is a relatively straightforward claim that does not raise particularly
complex legal issues or require extensive discovery.
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Plaintiff is able to read, write, and understand the English language. (Doc. 2). He has
received some college education. (Id.). His filings with the Court demonstrate his ability to
construct coherent sentences and convey information to the Court (see, e.g., Doc. 17). Further, he
has successfully engaged in discovery, including requests for admission of facts and motions to
compel written discovery. Plaintiff claims that his transfer to a different facility undermines his
ability to investigate this case, including identifying witnesses, reports, and statements. However,
Plaintiff does not explain why he cannot obtain this information through the regular course of
discovery. Based on the record before it, the Court finds that the complexities of this case do not
exceed his ability to prosecute it pro se. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc.
67) is DENIED.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 71)
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which includes a statement of
Undisputed Material Facts in accordance with Local Rule 56.1. SDIL-LR 56.1(a). (Doc. 71).
However, the entirety of Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts cites solely to
Defendants’ First Set of Requested Admissions to Plaintiff. (Doc. 71, pp. 2-3). Defendants state in
a footnote that they served the requests for admissions to Plaintiff on February 4, 2025, but
Plaintiff failed to respond. (Doc. 71, p. 2). They argue that due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond, all
factual allegations should be deemed admitted. (Id.).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3), a matter in a request for admission is
deemed admitted unless the party to whom the request is directed serves a written answer or
objection within 30 days after being served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Yet, the court has discretion
under Rule 36 to shorten or extend a party’s deadline to respond to a request for admission. (Id.).
Further, the Seventh Circuit has long recognized that pro se litigants must be afforded “leniency .
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. . on procedural matters.” Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lovelace
v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1987)).
The Court finds that Defendants have not established Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the
request for admission. First, they merely state so in a footnote of their motion for summary
judgment. They have not provided an affidavit to that effect. More importantly, Defendants did
not move to have the factual allegations in their requests for admission deemed admitted. Plaintiff
has actively participated in this case, including discovery. His failure to respond to Defendants’
requests for admission may have been caused by circumstances outside his control, such as the
non-receipt of the documents. Defendants do not represent that they made any attempt to follow
up with Plaintiff regarding his failure to respond. Based on the information before it, the Court
does not deem the factual allegations contained in Defendants’ request for admission admitted.
Because Defendants’ factual allegations in their motion for summary judgment are not properly
supported, the motion is DENIED. However, due to the ongoing discovery dispute between the
parties, the Court deems it appropriate to extend the discovery and dispositive motions deadline.
Defendants are granted leave to renew their Motion for Summary Judgment, provided that the
renewed motion is supported by proper citation to the admissible record. If Defendants intend to
rely on the allegations contained in their request for admission to Plaintiff, they must first move
for those allegations to be deemed admitted.
Motion for Order Compelling Discovery (Doc. 65)
Plaintiff moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 to compel Defendant Hart to
respond to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories. (Doc. 65). Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hart’s
responses to Interrogatories ##9, 10, 11, 13, and 15 were evasive. (Id.). Defendant Hart filed a
response opposing the motion (Doc. 66), to which Plaintiff replied (Doc. 68).
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Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(1), the parties “may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” as long as
discovery is proportionate to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant
when “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37 allows a motion to compel when another party provides an insufficient
or evasive response to a discovery request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)).
Interrogatory #9
In Interrogatory #9, Plaintiff asks Defendant Hart to explain in details “whether . . . the . .
. Adjustment Committee . . . substantiated that the two confidential source[s] . . . did not violate
D.R. 504.303 and g[a]ve false information . . . .” (Doc. 65, p. 17). Subject to a relevancy objection
as to disciplinary proceedings for other individuals, Defendant Hart cited to the Adjustment
Committee Final Summary Report and further stated that the disciplinary decision was made based
on the written report. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that this response is evasive because it fails to clarify
the steps the Advisory Committee took to confirm the reliability of the informants. (Docs. 65, pp.
5-6; Doc. 68, pp. 1-3). Hart counters that Plaintiff impermissibly seeks “the confidential sources
referenced in the disciplinary ticket.” (Doc. 66, pp. 1-2.).
First, Plaintiff is correct that this interrogatory asks for the Advisory Committee’s steps to
confirm the reliability of the confidential informants, but it also impermissibly seeks the identity
of the informants. It is well established that due process does not require that prisoners be informed
of the identity of confidential informants. See Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F. 2d 1287, 1294 (7th Cir.
1985). “A prison disciplinary board may rely on information from a confidential informant, but to
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satisfy due process, the board must first find the informant reliable.” Ashby v. Davis, 82 F. App'x
467, 471 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Whitford, 63 F.3d at 535). Reliability can be established based on:
(1) the oath of the investigating officer as to the truth of his report containing
confidential information and his appearance before the disciplinary committee; (2)
corroborating testimony; (3) a statement on the record that the chairman of the
disciplinary committee that he had firsthand knowledge of the sources of
information and considered them reliable on the basis of their past record of
reliability; or (4) in camera review of material documenting the investigator's
assessment of the credibility of the confidential informant.
Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F. 2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985). Further, due process “does not require
prison disciplinary committees to state specifically on a public record the factual basis for its
finding as to the reliability of a confidential informant.” Id. at 1295. If they chose not to explain
the grounds of the confidential informants’ reliability at the hearing, the prison officials may still
“satisfy the inmate’s right to procedural due process by documenting the reliability of the
informant in a confidential report and submitting that report to the court for in camera review.” Id.
at 1294-95.
Here, Defendant Hart responded to Interrogatory #9, directing Plaintiff to the Adjustment
Committee Final Summary Report and further reciting the following excerpt from it: “Committee
finds inmate guilty based on information provided and accepts the written report to be a factual
account of the incident . . . .” (Doc. 65, p. 17, 110). The written report, which states that the
confidential informants were deemed reliable “due to the consistency of their statements,” does
not appear to have been made under oath. (Doc. 65, pp. 108-09). Further, the Adjustment
Committee Final Summary Report shows that no witnesses were called, and the chairman of the
disciplinary committee made no reference to having firsthand knowledge of the sources of
information to consider them reliable. (Doc. 65, pp. 110-11). However, the cited excerpt of the
Final Summary Report stating that Plaintiff was found guilty “based on information provided” is
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ambiguous. It may be construed to mean that the Adjustment Committee relied on information not
included in the Final Summary Report to determine the reliability of the confidential informant.
But it may also be construed to mean that the Adjustment Committee merely considered the fact
on the record. Because of this ambiguity, the Court finds that Defendant Hart’s answer is evasive
and must be clarified. To be clear, the Court does not say that Defendants shall share any out-of-
the-record information on which the Adjustment Committee potentially relied to determine the
reliability of the confidential informants. But Defendants shall clarify whether the Adjustment
Committee relied on such out-of-the-record information or not.
As a side matter, the Court further notes that it is unclear if Plaintiff was entitled to the
aforementioned procedural safeguards in this case. Disciplinary proceedings subject to formal due
process requires the following procedural safeguards: a) “advance written notice of the claimed
violation” so that a prisoner can “marshal the facts in his defense and [ ] clarify what the charges
are,” (b) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence “when [doing] so will not
be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals,” (c) an impartial decisionmaker,
and (d) “a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for
the disciplinary action taken. Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting
Rasheed–Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). “Challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence are governed by the ‘some evidence’ standard.” Boyd v. Warden, 2023 WL 130534,
at *2 (S.D.Ind.Jan. 9, 2023), quoting Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016). Under
that standard, “a hearing officer’s decision need only rest on ‘some evidence’ logically supporting
it and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary.” Ellison, 820 F.3d at 274 (7th Cir. 2016); see
Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[t]he some evidence standard ... is
satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
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disciplinary board.”). In addition, “[w]hen confidential information is the basis for a prison
disciplinary decision, there must be some indication of the reliability of the confidential sources.”
Gutierrez v. Baldwin, 2022 WL 18027527, at *6 (S.D.Ill. Dec, 30, 2022), citing Mendoza v. Miller,
779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985).
However, the Seventh Circuit recently clarified that, unlike disciplinary proceedings that
result in loss of good time or lengthen a prisoner’s sentence, those resulting in segregation require
only “informal, nonadversarial due process.” Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th Cir. 2024)
(quoting marks omitted Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681–82 (7th Cir. 2012)). Informal due
process requirements are satisfied when an inmate is provided with the following: (1) ‘notice of
the reasons for the inmate’s placement’ in segregation and (2) ‘an opportunity to present his views,’
for instance in a written statement or at a hearing.” Id. The decisionmaker must also remain
impartial. Id. at 896. Informal due process, however, does not include the right to call witnesses or
review video evidence. Id. at 895-96.
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the disciplinary proceeding at issue resulted in loss of
good time credit or otherwise extended his sentence. Rather, the liberty interests at issue are his
placement in segregation for six months and his labeling as a circuit rider.3 Without making a final
determination on the issue, Plaintiff’s allegations are more akin to a claim subject to informal due
process. See Adams,91 F.4th at 965–66 (“informal, nonadversarial due process” standard is the
3 Plaintiff alleges that he spent 45 days at Illinois River in solitary confinement because he was labeled as
a “circuit rider” and an “extreme security risk.” (Doc. 20, p. 5). During that time, he had virtually no human
contact, he was not allowed to recreate outside, and he was escorted to appointments in elevated restraints.
The restraints caused wrist and hand pain, and he was treated with pain medication on multiple occasions.
He alleges “the ‘circuit rider’ status demanded that the administration and staff at Illinois River Corr. Ctr.
couldn’t make any decisions regarding Plaintiff unless approved by IDOC’s executive administrators
(directors).” (Id.).
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correct one to apply [when the inmate] did not face disciplinary action that could affect the length
of his sentence); Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 967 (7th Cir. 2024) (discussing the different
procedural safeguards required under formal and informal due process). However, Defendants
have not raised this issue in their response, and the extent of corroboration required for confidential
information in that setting has not been fully briefed.
Accordingly, based on the record before it, the Court finds that procedural steps taken to
confirm the reliability of the confidential informants are relevant to Plaintiff’s due process claims,
and it is the crux of Plaintiff’s Interrogatory #9. Because the cited record in Defendant’s response
is ambiguous as to whether the Adjustment Committee considered information out of the record
to confirm the reliability of the confidential informants, Defendant Hart shall supplement his
answer to Interrogatory #9 to clarify so.
Interrogatory #10
Plaintiff’s Interrogatory #10 asks Defendant to explain how the Adjustment Committee
“noted and conducted” the hearing without Plaintiff’s in-person appearance. (Doc. 65, p. 18).
Citing the Adjustment Committee Final Summary Report, Defendant Hart responded that
“offender refused to appear before the adjustment committee to present a defense on his behalf”
and “Committee [found] inmate guilty based on information provided and accept[ed] the written
report to be a factual account of the incident and [] satisfied the violations occurred as reported.”
(Id.). In his motion, Plaintiff questioned the validity of Defendant’s response and cited an Illinois
Administrative Code section about Adjustment Committee Hearing Procedures. (Id., pp. 7–8). He
argues that his disciplinary record did not disclose the evidence relied upon or whether it was
assessed for reliability. Id. However, as Defendant correctly points out, this was not what the
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request asked for. Because Defendant’s response to Interrogatory #10 was not evasive or
incomplete. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to Interrogatory #10 is DENIED.
Interrogatory #11
In Interrogatory #11, Plaintiff asks Defendant to “state yes or no, whether Defendant has
produced to Plaintiff in Discovery all notes, papers, documents, records” that the Adjustment
Committee relied upon in finding Plaintiff guilty, and if not, to state the reasons for the non-
disclosure. (Doc. 65, p. 18). Defendant responded, directing Plaintiff to the Committee’s Final
Summary Report. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that this response is evasive. Defendant counters that
Interrogatory #11 is rhetorical because it only attempts to make an argument that Defendant did
not produce all the documents related to his disciplinary hearing. The Court disagrees with
Defendant. Interrogatory #11 asks whether all “notes, papers, documents, records” that the
Committee relied upon in reaching its decision on July 30, 2020, have been produced. Defendant
cites documents produced in discovery, but it is unclear whether those documents were produced
through Defendants’ initial disclosures or in response to a specific request for production of
documents. In any case, these were documents in Defendant’s custody, possession, and control at
the time of discovery. Interrogatory #11 is broader in that it possibly encompasses documents that
were not in Defendant’s custody and control at the time of discovery but on which the Committee
relied in its determination. Accordingly, Defendant shall confirm whether, based on his knowledge
and belief, “he has produced to Plaintiff in Discovery all notes, papers, documents, records” that
the Adjustment Committee relied upon in finding Plaintiff guilty, and if not, to state the grounds
for the non-disclosure. (Doc. 65, p. 18).
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Interrogatory #13
Interrogatory #13 asks Defendant to identify “who appeared in person . . . as witnesses
against Plaintiff on 7/30/[20]20 . . .” (Doc. 65, p. 19). Citing to the Committee’s Final Summary
Report, Defendant answered that “witness[es] were not called due [to] the fact that proper
identification were not provided and the Statement is irrelevant or cumulative.” (Id.). Plaintiff
argues the answer is evasive because it only refers to the witnesses Plaintiff requested for the
hearing. The Court disagrees. Defendant clearly stated that no witnesses were called at the hearing.
Defendant further verified that his answers to Plaintiff’s interrogatories were true, correct, and
complete to the best of his knowledge and belief. The Court understands Defendant’s answer to
mean what it says: no witnesses were called at the hearing. Because Defendant’s response is not
evasive, Plaintiff’s motion to compel on that ground is DENIED.
Interrogatory #15
Interrogatory #15 asks Defendant to identify the person who “completed the Refusal form.”
(Doc. 65, p. 20). The Adjustment Committee Final Summary Report included the Refusal Form,
which bore the staff member's signature. (Id. at 103). In response, Defendant produced the 7AM
to 3PM roster for July 30, 2020, to assist Plaintiff in identifying the full name of the staff member
who signed the form. (Id. at 20 & 23–64). The roster contains the location where each staff member
was posted. Defendant argues that Plaintiff can easily identify which staff member he interacted
with on July 30, 2020, based on where he was housed. He further argues that he does not have
independent recollection of who handed him the Refusal Form, and that he cannot further assist in
verifying the individual who signed it because he has since resigned from the IDOC. Plaintiff
counters that he cannot identify the staff member based on the provided roster because the
signature on the Refusal From is illegible and does not contain a badge/and or identification
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number. He further argues, consistently with his allegations in the Complaint, that he was never
offered or refused to sign a refusal form, and that in any case, he was placed in a cell without a
working light and officers did not have their tags on display.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d) allows a party to produce business records “if the
burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either party.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 33(d). Given Defendant’s resignation from the IDOC and lack of independent
recollection about the identity of the officer at issue, the Court finds Defendant has sufficiently
established that the burden for him to identify the name of the officer who served Plaintiff with
the Refusal Form is the same, if not greater, than Plaintiff’s respective burden. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to Interrogatory #15 is DENIED.
Motion for Order Compelling Discovery (Doc. 64)
Plaintiff further filed a motion to compel Defendants’ supplemental response to his Request
for Production of Documents. (Doc. 64). Plaintiff argues that Defendants partially refused
production of documents, raising several objections. Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the
objections raised in Requests for Production ##1-5 and 8. He further claims that he attempted to
resolve this matter without the Court’s intervention but never received a response from defense
counsel. Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s supplemental production of documents was
filed the same day as Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant Hart’s answer to his First Set of
Interrogatories. (Docs. 64 & 65). Defendants, who have actively and diligently participated in this
case, timely responded to the latter but failed to respond to the former. Accordingly, the Court
finds it appropriate to allow Defendants an extension of time up to February 4, 2026, to respond
to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 64). Absent extraordinary circumstances, no further
extensions of time will be granted.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Compelling Discovery (Doc. 65) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Hart shall provide his supplemental
responses in accordance with this order by February 18, 2026. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint
Counsel (Doc. 67) and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 71) are DENIED.
Defendants are granted an extension of time up to February 5, 2026, to respond to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel (Doc. 64). Absent extraordinary circumstances, no further extensions of time
will be granted.
The current discovery and dispositive motions deadlines, as well as the trial setting, are
VACATED and will be reset in a separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 21, 2026
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
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