Monroe et al v. Rauner et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JANIAH MONROE,
MARILYN MELENDEZ,
LYDIA HELÉNA VISION,
SORA KUYKENDALL, and
SASHA REED, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STEVEN BOWMAN,
MELVIN HINTON, and
LATOYA HUGHES,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:18-CV-00156-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to stay the preliminary
injunction issued by the Court on September 12, 2025, pending their appeal. (Doc. 1024).
For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
B ACKGROUND
The Court recounted the lengthy history of this litigation in its most recent Order.
(Doc. 1008). To summarize the most relevant aspects, Plaintiffs brought this case in
January 2018 on behalf of a putative class later certified as “all prisoners in the custody
of” the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) “who have requested evaluation or
treatment for gender dysphoria.” (Doc. 213). The named plaintiffs are transgender
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inmates currently incarcerated in Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) facilities.
The named defendants are, respectively, the IDOC Medical Director, IDOC Chief of
Mental Health, and the IDOC Director, all sued in their official capacities.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ policies and practices subject the class to a
substantial risk of serious harm and injury from inadequate and delayed evaluation and
treatment of gender dysphoria, in violation of their rights under the Eighth Amendment,
and they seek injunctive relief to remedy the flaws in IDOC’s treatment of transgender
inmates. (Doc. 1, pp. 36-38; Doc. 935). The alleged problems include the IDOC’s:
• 	use of committees comprised of unqualified officials to make decisions
regarding 	the 	medical 	treatment, 	security, 	and 	placement 	of
transgender inmates;
• 	widespread 	delays 	or 	denials 	in 	evaluating 	prisoners 	for 	gender
dysphoria and in providing hormone therapy and hormone monitoring;
• 	failure to consider or provide gender-affirming surgery as part of
medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria;
• 	failure to accommodate and facilitate social transition for individuals
with gender dysphoria, including lack of access to gender-affirming
clothing and grooming items, failing to make individualized housing
placement decisions, and permitting cross-gender strip searches; and
• 	failing to provide access to medical and mental health providers
competent to treat gender dysphoria.
The 	Court 	first 	granted 	preliminary 	injunctive 	relief 	following 	a 	two-day
evidentiary hearing in August 2019. (Docs. 186, 187, 212). The Court directed Defendants
to develop policies and procedures to ensure that qualified medical professionals would
determine inmates’ treatment for gender dysphoria; allow inmates to obtain evaluations
for gender dysphoria; ensure the provision of necessary hormone therapy; and take steps
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to train correctional staff on transgender issues. The class was certified on March 4, 2020.
(Doc. 213).
After a four-day bench trial in August 2021, the Court continued the provisions of
the 2019 preliminary injunction and set timelines related to hormone therapy and
consideration of class members’ requests to transfer to a facility matching their expressed
gender. Additionally, it directed Defendants to provide transgender inmates access to a
private shower and gender-affirming commissary items, and to allow transgender
inmates to choose the gender of the officer who would conduct a search of their person.
(Doc. 331). The Court issued its full findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with
additional injunctive measures, on February 7, 2022. (Doc. 383).
In May 2023, Defendants moved to vacate the orders for injunctive relief.
(Doc. 587). The Court denied Defendants’ motion in November 2023; they appealed.
(Docs 678, 699). While the appeal was pending, Plaintiffs asked the Court to order class
members be transferred from Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). (Docs. 705, 715).
The Court stayed consideration of that motion during the pendency of the appeal.
(Doc. 826).
On December 5, 2024, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the February
2022 injunction, concluding it had expired 90 days after its issuance, pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1996. Monroe v. Bowman, 122 F.4th 688 (7th Cir.
2024); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). After the case returned to this Court, Plaintiffs
renewed their motion to transfer class members out of Menard to another IDOC facility.
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(Docs. 873, 874). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion from May 27-30,
2025, and heard testimony from 13 witnesses.
On September 12, 2025, the Court issued its decision granting Plaintiffs’ motion
and ordered several remedial measures. (Doc. 1009). First, Defendants were to file, under
seal by September 19, 2025, a list of class members presently housed at Menard. 1 Second,
Defendants were to transfer every class member residing at Menard to another facility by
October 15, 2025. 2 The Court cautioned Defendants not to transfer any class member to
Pinckneyville Correctional Facility in light of issues with that facility discussed in prior
orders. (Doc. 680). Third, the Court directed Defendants to consider each class member’s
specific gender dysphoria condition, their gender identity, related safety issues, and
whether a transfer to a facility matching their gender identity would be appropriate in
assessing where each class member would be transferred. Fourth, Defendants were to
notify each class member of their new placement at least seven days before their transfer
and provide an explanation of the reasons for the decision. A copy of each decision also
was to be furnished to class counsel. Fifth, the Court barred Defendants from placing any
class member at Menard going forward and instructed Defendants to assign class
members to a different institution if they arrived at Menard through the intake process.
If an individual housed at Menard later is identified as a class member, they must be
transferred within 21 days. Sixth, if a class member is not moved to Logan Correctional
Center (a women’s facility) or another facility matching their gender identity, they must
1 Defendants complied with this directive at Doc. 1011-1 and Doc. 1013.
2 Defendants submitted a list of 38 individuals who were transferred from Menard as of October 16, 2025
(Doc. 1025).
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be permitted to submit a request to transfer to such facilities within 60 days of the initial
transfer. Seventh, Defendants were to provide the Court and class counsel monthly
reports on the status of class members housed at Menard and the timing and result of
any transfer decisions. Finally, Defendants were to provide a status report regarding
certain matters “in progress” as of the May 2025 evidentiary hearing, including the status
of mental health staff vacancies at Menard. 3 The Court also announced that it would hold
a subsequent evidentiary hearing within 90 days “to evaluate whether the above
injunctive relief shall be extended.” (Doc. 1008 p. 71).
Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of that decision on October 10, 2025
(Doc. 1006) and subsequently moved to stay portions of the order. (Doc. 1024). Not
surprisingly, Plaintiffs oppose the request for a stay. (Doc. 1039).
DISCUSSION
Defendants ask the Court to stay the portions of the September 2025 injunction
requiring the transfer of class members from Menard identified after that date, providing
class members relocated from Menard a right to request a transfer if they are not placed
at Logan or another facility matching their gender identity, and requiring Defendants to
report monthly on the status of transfer decisions. (Doc. 1024 p. 3). Defendants represent
that they have worked diligently to transfer all known class members housed at Menard
to other IDOC facilities by the Court’s deadline of October 15, 2025. The numbers
provided make it difficult to assess whether full compliance has been achieved. They state
3 Defendants filed this report at Doc. 1011.
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that there were 22 confirmed or potential class members housed at Menard before the
Court issued the injunction in September. That number has grown to 43, however, and
38 of those individuals were transferred to other facilities as of October 21, 2025.
According to Defendants, the near doubling in the size of class members at
Menard has created certain administrative challenges. They report that “at least 25
additional individuals” have requested evaluation for gender dysphoria. It is not clear
whether these 25 individuals are distinct from the additional class members discussed
above. Menard’s mental health providers apparently have determined that the majority
of these additional class members do not meet the criteria for gender dysphoria but
nevertheless must be transferred under the terms of the Court’s Order. Many of these
individuals are in protective custody or require restrictive housing, adding complexity to
the transfer process. Defendants state that they have reopened a wing of the Illinois River
Correctional Center that has not housed inmates in years in order to adequately address
a housing shortage caused by the Court’s Order. Defendants express concern that the
creation of a dedicated wing for class members would violate federal regulations, see
28 C.F.R. § 115.42(g), so they are relocating non-class members from other facilities to the
newly reactivated facility.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), a district court’s order for injunctive
relief is not stayed even if an appeal is taken, unless the court orders otherwise. During
the pendency of an appeal of a final judgment granting, continuing, or modifying an
injunction, a district court may “suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms
for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).
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Rule 62 works in coordination with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a), which
dictates that “[a] party must ordinarily move first in the district court for . . . an order
suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting, an injunction while an appeal is pending.”
“The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances
justify an exercise of [the Court’s] discretion” to grant the stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 433-34 (2009). In deciding whether to grant a stay pending appeal, the Court must
consider four factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that
[they are] likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken, 556 U.S.
at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)); Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc.
v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 14 F.4th 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2021); In re A & F Enters., Inc.
II, 742 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2014). The first two factors are the most critical, Nken, 556
U.S. at 434, but those two factors are weighed on a “sliding scale,” In re A & F Enters.,
742 F.3d at 766. “[T]he greater the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits, the
less heavily the balance of harms must weigh in its favor, and vice versa.” Id.
a. Defendants’ Likelihood of Success on the Merits of the Appeal
Defendants acknowledge that they must demonstrate a “strong showing” that
they likely will prevail on the merits in order to obtain a stay. First, they argue that the
preliminary injunction order fails to specifically address the constitutional defects alleged
by the class members and does not afford IDOC an adequate opportunity to remedy the
constitutional deficiencies. Second, they contend the injunction does not satisfy the
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PLRA’s requirement that injunctive relief be “narrowly drawn,” extend “no further than
necessary,” and use the “least intrusive means necessary” to address the violation. They
argue that the preliminary injunction “favors” certain facilities, like Logan, but does not
explain how those facilities meet any constitutional standard or how the disfavored
facilities fail to meet constitutional standards. Third, Defendants maintain that the
Court’s Order is untethered from the medical claims asserted by the class and privileges
individuals who wish to be transferred from Menard. Fourth, Defendants point out that
none of the named class representatives offered evidence in support of the requested
injunction and observe that there is not a sub-class certified for individuals housed at
Menard, whose interests may be adverse to those of other class members.
For their part, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have not demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success where the Court already has considered and rejected each of their
arguments. They emphasize that the Court’s September 2025 Order explained how the
ongoing harms to class members at Menard relate to the system-wide issues described in
the original and supplemental complaints and detailed how injunctive relief was
necessary to address the risk of harm of housing class members in that facility. Plaintiffs
also reject the idea that named class members need to have testified at the hearing to be
entitled to injunctive relief. They likewise push back on Defendants’ contention that class
members have adverse interests and emphasize that all share an interest in avoiding the
unconstitutional conditions at Menard. Plaintiffs also say the Court’s injunction satisfies
the PLRA’s requirement that the relief be narrowly tailored because relocating several
dozen class members is minimally burdensome, and the Order left discretion with
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Defendants on where to house each class member. They also observe that Defendants
never offered any alternative solutions.
Defendants have not shown they are likely to prevail on appeal. As Plaintiffs point
out, the Court already has considered and rejected many of Defendants’ primary
arguments. There is little reason to think that these recycled points merit a different
outcome now. The Seventh Circuit has explained that where a party seeks a stay pending
appeal and their “arguments have already been evaluated on the success scale, the
applicant must make a stronger threshold showing of likelihood of success to meet his
burden.” Matter of Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d 1294, 1301 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing
Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th
Cir. 1991)); see also Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurements Sys. Pty. Ltd., 932 F. Supp.
1147, 1149 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (explaining that a party’s “mere recitation of arguments
previously made and rejected . . . is not nearly enough”).
Defendants first contend that the Order fails to address specifically the alleged
constitutional defects alleged by the class members and does not afford IDOC an
opportunity to participate in developing solutions. Not so. In its Order, the Court
explained in detail how the conditions at Menard violated the Eighth Amendment rights
of class members to access adequate treatment for their gender dysphoria. The Court
emphasized that Defendants “have been well informed of the relevant standards for
medical and mental health care for individuals with gender dysphoria, including the
importance of social transition, which includes providing a safe environment for
transgender individuals, rather than allowing them to be targeted for mistreatment,
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misgendering, and assault.” (Doc. 1008, p. 63). Nevertheless, class members assigned to
Menard “continue[d] to report violations of these standards.” (Id. at p. 64). The Court
concluded that there was substantial, credible, and uncontroverted evidence of assaults
on class members by correctional officers and fellow inmates, delays in receiving
evaluations for gender dysphoria and medical treatment, persistent cross-gender body
searches, delays in considering transfer requests for class members seeking assignment
to a facility matching their gender identity, and a lack of access to gender-affirming
clothes and other items. (Id.). At this point in the litigation, Defendants cannot credibly
claim 	to 	be 	unaware 	of 	the 	constitutional 	deficiencies 	identified 	by 	the 	Court.
E.g., (Doc. 383, p. 68) (“[C]lass members must have timely decisions and action on
requested 	treatment 	for 	gender 	dysphoria—including 	hormone 	therapy, 	surgery
requests, placement, transfer, commissary, and search accommodations.”). Nor is it
accurate for Defendants to complain that they lacked an opportunity to participate in
developing remedies to rectify these deficiencies. The Seventh Circuit recognized that
this Court “need not forget what has happened in the last six years of litigation . . . .”
Monroe, 122 F.4th at 697. Defendants have actively participated in the implementation of
relief for class members since the beginning of this litigation. They identify no case
requiring additional consultation prior to follow-on remedial measures, provided those
measures otherwise comply with the PLRA.
Picking up on that point, Defendants argue that the PLRA forbids relief of the
scope ordered, but Defendants exaggerate the scope of the measures ordered by the
Court.
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It is true that the PLRA imposes limits on the scope of relief that may be imposed
by a federal court. See Howe v. Hughes, 74 F.4th 849, 857 (7th Cir. 2023). Preliminary
injunctions “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the
harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). “At bottom, federal courts must
ensure that ‘substantial discretion and flexibility’ remain ‘in the hands of the prison
administrators.’” Howe v. Hughes, 74 F.4th 849, 857 (quoting Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679,
685 (7th Cir. 2012)). Considering the evidentiary record before the Court regarding the
conditions faced by class members at Menard, the measures it selected are well within
the bounds of the PLRA. Each is tailored to leave substantial discretion with IDOC’s
leaders.
Defendants take aim at three provisions in particular: the requirement that class
members identified after September 12, 2025, be transferred from Menard, the ability for
Menard transferees who are not transferred to a facility that matches their gender identity
to request a transfer, and certain additional reporting requirements. Defendants should
not have been surprised by any of these measures. Their concern with the first provision
seems to be the increase in individuals who seek a gender dysphoria diagnosis. The
subtext of their argument is that some of these individuals may not have a legitimate
belief that they are a class member and may only be seeking a path out of Menard. That
is a possibility, but it is speculative at best, particularly given the evidence of mental
health care services at that facility adduced at the hearing. The evidence in the record
demonstrated that “mental health care at Menard, both psychotherapy for those with
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gender dysphoria and evaluation of those seeking diagnosis and confirmation as
transgender within the IDOC system, has been sporadic at best.” (Doc. 1008, p. 67). And
it was not apparent to the Court that these deficiencies would be rectified in a timely
fashion. Ibid.
Requiring the transfer of class members to facilities where they can access
diagnostic 	resources 	is 	a 	narrow 	remedy 	that 	is 	entirely 	appropriate 	under 	the
circumstances. If psychological services have improved at Menard during the time since
the May 2025 evidentiary hearing, Defendants are free to present such evidence at the
upcoming hearing on December 8, 2025.
The second provision contested by Defendants—the right for class members
transferred from Menard but not to Logan or another facility matching their gender
identity to submit a transfer request within 60 days—likewise is narrowly drawn and
leaves substantial discretion with IDOC. Notably, the Court did not specify that any class
member must be transferred from their new facility. The Order merely afforded such
individuals an opportunity to request a transfer. It is difficult to see how this provision
intrudes 	on 	Defendants’ 	discretion 	to 	manage 	the 	prison 	system 	as 	they 	deem
appropriate.
Finally, Defendants do not explain how the reporting requirements imposed as
part of the injunction, which focus on the whereabouts and status of the class members
once housed at Menard, intrude on their discretion or exceed the scope of permissible
relief under the PLRA. In sum, Defendants’ have not demonstrated that the preliminary
injunction violates the PLRA, and they are not likely to prevail on that argument.
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Defendants also contend that the injunction fails to address class members’
medical claims because its “applicability is limited to a class of people who want to be
transferred out of Menard.” (Doc. 1024 p.10). But as the Court explained in its Order,
relief tailored to the situation at Menard is appropriate due to the “risk of present and
future harm resulting from Defendants’ failure to adequately provide care and treatment
for individuals with gender dysphoria” for “class members who are now or may be held
at Menard.” (Doc. 1008 p. 63). Notably, class members continued to be moved to Menard
during the pendency of Plaintiffs’ motion. To put it plainly, the evidence amply
demonstrated that the class as a whole credibly might be subject to constitutionally
inadequate medical care and associated mistreatment if they were transferred to Menard.
Finally, Defendants assert Plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief because
none of the named class representatives offered evidence in support of the injunction,
and there is not a separate certified class for individual members housed at Menard,
whose interests may be adverse to those of other class members. The latter point may be
disposed of quickly. As explained above, the conditions at Menard warranted relief as to
all class members. The former argument is unpersuasive for similar reasons. The class
certified by the Court covers all prisoners in IDOC custody who have requested
evaluation or treatment for gender dysphoria. (Doc. 213). Plaintiffs alleged that IDOC
systematically failed to provide adequate treatment for that condition in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. And Plaintiffs, as was their right, adduced evidence demonstrating
particularly troublesome conditions at Menard in the manner they saw fit. It is immaterial
that none of this evidence came from the named plaintiffs. Those individuals merely are
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class representatives. Defendants do not cite any authority holding that injunctive relief
must be based in part on the testimony of class representatives. And the Court remains
satisfied that the class representatives’ claims are typical of the class and that they have
and will continue to adequately represent the class. Id. at pp. 6-9.
Although Defendants “are not required to convince this Court that it has erred or
win the Court over as to their case on the merits,” Monroe v. Bowman, No. 18-00156, 2024
WL 3673132, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2024), they nevertheless must show a strong likelihood
of success in their appeal. None of their arguments—individually or collectively—meet
that standard. Thus, the Court concludes that this factor weighs against a stay.
b. Will Defendants be Irreparably Harmed Absent a Stay?
Defendants locate irreparable harm in having to defend against further injunctive
relief in the upcoming evidentiary hearing while also litigating the propriety of the first
injunction in the court of appeals. (Doc. 1024, p. 14). This is not the first time they have
raised litigation concerns as the source of irreparable harm. (Doc. 826, pp. 9-10). The
argument did not take root previously, nor should it now. After all, it is well-settled that
the burdens of litigation ordinarily do not constitute irreparable harm. See Renegotiation
Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (“Mere litigation expense, even
substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.”); Crist v. Miller,
846 F.2d 1143, 1144 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The ordinary incidents of litigation—the time and
other resources consumed—do not constitute irreparable harm.”). The Court is sensitive
to the burden on counsel posed by this litigation but fails to see how that challenge
constitutes the sort of irreparable harm that favors a stay. It also merits observation that
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Defendants do not argue that complying with the preliminary injunction has or may
compromise prison safety or security. Nor is it apparent that complying with the Order
will put IDOC in violation of 28 C.F.R. § 115.42(g). As Plaintiffs point out, that rule, which
generally prohibits prisons from segregating LGBTQ-identifying inmates in dedicated
facilities, excepts situations where such placement is pursuant to a court order. In any
event, the Court did not order class members be placed into a dedicated facility. Absent
a stronger showing of irreparable harm, this factor weighs against a stay.
c. Will a Stay Substantially Injure Plaintiffs?
By contrast, Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed by a stay of the injunction.
Defendants insist that little harm is likely because conditions with the prison system have
improved, particularly with regard to class members’ access to medical care and
placement of many members at a female-designated facility. Defendants’ efforts are
commendable, and they are entitled to present evidence at the December 8 hearing that
the conditions at Menard now satisfy constitutional standards. But the present state of
the record does not convince the Court that a stay would be appropriate. (Doc. 1008,
p. 64). Defendants argue that a stay will preserve the status quo, but the Court found the
status quo at Menard incongruent with the Eighth Amendment rights of class members.
A stay would permit Defendants to transfer class members back into that facility and
would 	substantially 	harm 	Plaintiffs. 	Thus, 	this 	factor 	thus 	also 	weighs 	against
Defendants.
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d. Does the Public Interest Weigh in Favor of or Against a Stay?
Finally, Defendants argue the public interest favors minimal involvement by the
Court in the operation and management of the State’s prison facilities until appellate
review of the proceedings can occur. Defendants pressed this point in a prior request for
a stay, and the Court rejected it on that occasion reasoning that it made “little sense.”
(Doc. 826, p. 14).
The Seventh Circuit has held squarely that “[e]nforcing a constitutional right is in
the public interest.” Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Hill, 937 F.3d 864, 875 (7th Cir. 2019).
Here, that means the public interest is served by ensuring IDOC’s facilities uphold their
constitutional responsibility to furnish class members with adequate medical care. This
factor thus also weighs against a stay pending appeal. In short, each factor weighs against
staying any portion of the Court’s September 2025 injunction during the pendency of
Defendants’ appeal.
Defendants also ask the Court to stay “related actions, evidentiary hearings, and
any other matters that will alter the status quo while the appeal to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals is pending.” (Doc. 1024 p. 16). There is no basis for that relief.
Defendants’ desire for appellate review is obvious. What is not obvious is that such
review will be forthcoming at this juncture. Many courts have concluded that the
expiration of a preliminary injunction after the 90-day period specified by section 3626 of
the PLRA moots an appeal of that injunction. See Smith v. Edwards, 88 F.4th 1119, 1124
(5th Cir. 2023); Banks v. Booth, 3 F.4th 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2021); Norbert v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 10 F.4th 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778
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F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Victory v. Berks Cnty., 789 F. App’x 328, 333 (3d
Cir. 2019). The preliminary injunction in this case will expire on December 11, 2025.
Therefore, even if the Court accepted Defendants’ suggestion to stay the upcoming
evidentiary hearing, it appears that their appeal of the preliminary injunction will shortly
be moot. See Smith, 88 F.4th at 1124; Banks, 3 F.4th at 449.
Full appellate review of the matter is not so far off. A bench trial is scheduled for
next July. (Doc. 1000). Plaintiffs have asked the Court to reissue the preliminary
injunction, and an evidentiary hearing in support of that request is scheduled in two
weeks. (Doc. 1028). Defendants may use that opportunity to put on evidence contesting
whether such relief should issue and, in the event Plaintiffs prevail, arguments about
what form it should take.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal
(Doc. 1024) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 24, 2025
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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