Teton v. USA

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
RYDON CLYDE TETON,
Petitioner,
v.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
Case No. 4:24-cv-00376-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are several Motions, all filed by Defendant Rydon Clyde Teton:
Motion for Injunction (Dkt. 21), Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. 25), Motion for
Expungement of Criminal Record (Dkt. 28), Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 29),
Motion for Bidding Procedures Order (Dkt. 30), Motion to Refer to Bankruptcy (Dkt. 31),
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 32), Motion for a Warrant (Dkt. 33), and Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 34). In addition, Teton has filed several letters to the Court. Dkts.
18; 19; 20; 22; 23; 24; 26; 27; 30. The Court DENIES the Motions as frivolous and
ORDERS Petitioner Rydon Clyde Teton to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be declared
a vexatious litigant.
II. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Rydon Teton pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and use of a
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firearm during a crime of violence on August 24, 2023, and was sentenced to serve a term
of 133 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. Teton then filed this action, seeking
to vacate or set aside his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. 1. The Court denied
that Motion on April 14, 2025. Teton filed a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Dkt. 16, which was summarily dismissed on October 24,
2025, Dkt. 35.
In the five months between Teton’s Notice of Appeal and the Ninth Circuit’s
dismissal order, Teton filed 17 documents in this case. Of those, 13 documents were
simultaneously filed in Teton’s criminal case. The dual-filed motions which the Court
considered in United States v. Teton, Case No. 4:18-cr-00236-DCN, are listed below.
FIG. 1: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASE FILINGS CROSS REFERENCE
Case No. 4:24-cv-00376-DCN (this case) 	Case No. 4:18-cr-00236-DCN
Dkt. 21 	Dkt. 149
Dkt. 22 	Dkt. 150
Dkt. 23 	Dkt. 151
Dkt. 24 	Dkt. 152
Dkt. 27 	Dkt. 154
Dkt. 28 	Dkt. 155
Dkt. 29 	Dkt. 156
Dkt. 30 	Dkt. 157-2
Dkt. 31 	Dkt. 158
Dkt. 32 	Dkt. 159
Dkt. 33 	Dkt. 160
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On September 19, 2025, the Court considered Teton’s filings in his criminal case
(including several of the documents which were filed in both cases) and concluded they
were all frivolous. See generally United States v. Teton Dkt. 161. But the Court has yet to
address any of Teton’s motions here.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Frivolousness
A motion or similar filing is frivolous if it is “both baseless and made without
reasonable and competent inquiry,” or “groundless . . . with little prospect of success . . .
.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. M&M Petroleum Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir.
2011) (cleaned up). A district court has the discretion to impose sanctions under Rule
11 and under “its inherent authority to curb abusive litigation practices.” DeDios v. Int'l
Realty Invs., 641 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). However, courts should
“construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid
applying [ ] rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010).
B. Abusive Litigant Designation
Federal courts can “regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully
tailored restrictions under ... appropriate circumstances.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d
1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a), “enjoining litigants with abusive and lengthy [litigation] histories is one
such ... restriction” that courts may impose. Id. But the Ninth Circuit has cautioned:
“Restricting access to the courts is, however, a serious matter. The right of access to the
courts is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.” Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of
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Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Use of pre-filing
orders could infringe this important right. Id. at 1062. Thus, when district courts seek to
impose pre-filing restrictions, they must (1) give litigants notice and an opportunity to
oppose the order before it is entered (2) compile an adequate record for appellate review,
including a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that a
vexatious litigant order was needed; (3) make substantive findings of frivolousness or
harassment; and (4) tailor the order narrowly so as to closely fit the specific vice
encountered. Id. (quotations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit considers five substantive factors to determine “whether a party
is a vexatious litigant and whether a pre-filing order will stop the vexatious litigation or if
other sanctions are adequate:” (1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular
whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursing the litigation, e.g. does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of
prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has
caused needless expense to other parties or has posed un unnecessary burden on the courts
and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the court
and other parties.” Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
The 	Court 	today 	reaffirms 	that 	the 	above-listed 	filings 	are 	frivolous 	and
incorporates 	its 	analysis 	in 	Case 	No. 	4:18-cr-00236-DCN, 	Dkt. 	161 	by 	reference.
Accordingly, Teton’s Motions at Dkts. 21; 28; 29; 31; 32; and 33 are DENIED. To the
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extent that Dkts. 22; 23; 24; 27; and 30 seek relief, they are likewise DENIED AS
FRIVOLOUS.
After dispensing with the motions and papers the Court has already considered, two
motions (Dkts. 25 and 24) and four letters (Dkts. 18–20; 26) remain unaddressed. The
Court will consider each in turn.
A. June 2 Letter
On June 2, 2025, Teton filed Dkt. 18. The document is four pages long and
structured in the form of two two-page letters dated May 13 and May 20, 2025. The June
2 letter discusses Teton’s tensions with the other inmates and difficulty accessing the law
library. Regarding these concerns, the Court cannot order the relief Teton seeks. He must
raise his grievances with the Bureau of Prisons. Thus, the first two requests are groundless
and not reasonably calculated to succeed.
Teton also alleges that certain individuals lied to officers, and the prosecutors and
the Court used those lies against him. These allegations are frivolous for two reasons. First,
Teton’s § 2255 motion (which raised the same perjury argument) had already been
dismissed with prejudice at the time of the June 2 letter. Dkt. 14. If the Court erred in
dismissing Teton’s perjury argument, his only option was to ask the Court of Appeals to
reverse this Court’s judgment.
Second, Teton failed to show the bare minimum required to undo a conviction based
on false statements. Since the Supreme Court decided Napue v. Illinois, a convicted
defendant is entitled to a new trial if the prosecution knowingly uses false testimony, allows
the false testimony to go uncorrected, and the false testimony in any reasonable likelihood
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could have affected the judgment of the jury. Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 246
(2025). Teton does not identify which statements were untrue. He does not suggest that the
prosecutors or Court knew the unspecified statements were false. The statements were not
testimony. And Teton pleaded guilty, so there is no reasonable likelihood that correcting
the 	statements 	would 	have 	impacted 	Teton’s 	conviction. 	Teton’s 	false-statements
allegations are, therefore, frivolous. To the extent the June 2 letter seeks relief, the relief is
DENIED.
B. June 9 Letter
Teton filed another letter on June 9. Dkt. 19. Like the June 2 letter, the June 9 letter
is structured as a letter rather than a motion. The letter details Teton’s thoughts about race
relations in America. The letter seeks no relief and is not related to Teton’s § 2255 motion
at all. The letter is, therefore, found to be a frivolous filing.
C. July 25 Response
Teton next filed a document comprising two parts. The first part provides briefing-
style descriptions of the legal standards for granting an evidentiary hearing under § 2255
and for relief under Strickland. Dkt. 20, at 1-4. The second part, structured as a letter,
describes Teton’s conflict with BOP staff. Id. at 5–6. Taking the latter first, the Court cannot
grant Teton relief based on his conflicts with BOP staff; he must file administrative
complaints. Fortunately, Teton’s letter indicates he has done so.
Turning to the first part of Teton’s July 25 Response, the Court once again finds
Teton’s filing frivolous for two reasons. First, the Court had already dismissed Teton’s
§ 2255 petition and Court of Appeals proceedings were still pending. Teton was therefore
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required to explain to the Court of Appeals—not this Court—why the Court’s judgment
was wrong. Even if the Court construed the first part as a motion for reconsideration or
relief from judgment, the motion would be denied because the filing provides a legal
standard alone without any analysis.1 Accordingly, the Court finds the July 25 Response
frivolous as well.
D. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Next, Teton moved to appoint counsel. Dkt. 25. In this motion, Teton seeks an order
appointing him post-conviction relief counsel. “”[T]here is no federal constitutional right
to habeas counsel. Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court has
discretion in appointing counsel to non-capital § 2255 petitioners. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(g). “In
deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, the district court must evaluate
the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate
his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Weygandt v. Look,
718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). While Teton struggles with articulating himself at times,
his alleged grounds for relief are clear. As those grounds are frivolous, Teton is unlikely to
succeed on the merits. See Dkt. 14; Case No. 4:18-cr-00236-DCN, Dkt. 161.
1 It appears that Teton may have attempted to file a response to the Court’s order denying his § 2255 motion
piecemeal. In that case, the July 25 Response discusses the legal standard and Dkt. 23 discusses how Teton’s
counsel was ineffective. The Court is aware of no authority for accepting incomplete filings. Teton should
have held on to his earlier-drafted sections until the motion was complete and then filed it in one document.
Even if the Court were to consider the filings as a whole, however, the Court would still find them frivolous
because they argue that counsel was ineffective for failing to take certain actions (like cross examining
witnesses or seeking a 5k1.1 reduction) which would not apply in Teton’s criminal case (because he pleaded
guilty to a crime which does not involve any of the usual bases for providing substantial assistance). See
Dkt. 23.
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Teton argues that his case is similar to Stokes v. Roe, 18 F. App'x 478 (9th Cir. 2001).
There, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion in denying a
prisoner post-conviction relief counsel where the record indicated that the petitioner
suffered from schizophrenia and raised nonfrivolous claims. Id. Without addressing Teton’s
mental state, the Court distinguishes Stokes because Teton has not identified any non-
frivolous claims for post-conviction relief. See Dkt. 14; Case No. 4:18-cr-00236-DCN,
Dkt. 161.
Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED.2
E. August 15 Brief
Shortly after moving for appointment of counsel, Teton filed another brief. Dkt. 26.
This brief, like many of Teton’s other pleadings, comprises a series of block quotes from
judicial opinions without a clear bearing on this case or any evident analysis. The August
15 brief does not seek relief, but neither does it present any useful analysis supporting any
of Teton’s other claims for relief; in essence, Teton filed his research notes with the Court.
F. September 23 Motion for Summary Judgment
Finally, on September 23, Teton moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 34. The motion
argues that Teton is entitled to summary judgment based on an affirmative statute of
limitations defense, and argues that his constitutional rights are being violated in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons at the hands of “syndicate organizations.” The Motion
2 Unlike his other filings, however, this Motion is not frivolous. Teton correctly cited Weygndt v. Look as
the leading case on appointment of non-captial post-conviction relief counsel and Stokes presented a
plausible—if ultimately distinguishable—grounds for granting here.
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includes no discernable factual basis for any of its claims and consists entirely of
conclusory allegations of constitutional violations and statements of legal standards. The
Court, therefore, finds the Motion frivolous and it is DENIED.
G. Order to Show Cause
With the exception of the Motion to Appoint counsel, all of Teton’s filings are
frivolous. 	Considering 	the 	five 	Ringgold-Lockhart 	factors 	(the 	litigant’s 	history 	of
litigation, motive in pursing the litigation, pro se status, infliction of needless expense to
other parties or imposition of an unnecessary burden on the courts, and the adequacy of
alternatives), the Court finds that a prefiling order may be warranted. .” Ringgold-Lockhart,
761 F.3d at 1062. (A prefiling order restricts a party’s ability to file documents in their case
unless the party meets certain conditions first.) The Court, therefore, ORDERS Petitioner
Rydon Teton to SHOW CAUSE within 30 days why he should not be declared a vexatious
litigant subject to prefiling restrictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Teton’s filings impose an immense burden on the Court’s already packed docket. If
they presented genuine claims for relief or legal arguments, the Court would be happy to
bear that burden. But Teton’s filings do not present genuine claims or legal arguments.
VI. ORDER
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Petitioner Rydon Teton’s outstanding motions (Dkts. 21; 25; 28; 29; 31; 32; 33;
and 34) are DENIED.
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2. Petitioner Rydon Teton is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within 30 days why
he should not be declared a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. Failure
to respond may result in the Court imposing a prefiling order without further
notice.
DATED: February 4, 2026
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
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