Sanders v. Kootenai Hospital District

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER G RANTING S UMMARY JUDGMENT – 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
CLAUDIA SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
KOOTENAI HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a
KOOTENAI HEALTH,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:24-cv-00186-AKB
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Pending before the Court is Defendant Kootenai Health’s (Kootenai) Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 37). Plaintiff Claudia Sanders, proceeding pro se, has not responded to the motion.
Having reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the facts and legal
argument are adequately presented, and that oral argument would not significantly aid its decision-
making process, and it decides the motions on the record and the parties’ briefing. Dist. Idaho Loc.
Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for
submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants Kootenai’s motion for summary judgment.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed:
Kootenai is a healthcare provider that operates a hospital in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho (Dkt. 37-
2 ¶ 1). At all relevant times, Kootenai was a public employer (Dkt. 1-2 at ¶ 1.2). Sanders is a
licensed practical nurse (LPN) and has been a nurse for approximately forty years (Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 2.2).
Kootenai employed Sanders as an LPN assigned to the Northern Idaho Crisis Center (NICC) from
March 29, 2021, until her termination on August 2, 2023 (Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 2.4, 2.51; Dkt. 37-2 at 3).
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Sanders was an at-will employee (Dkt. 37-2 at 3). Her responsibilities included triaging patients
in immediate crisis situations, conducting medical screenings, and monitoring patients (Dkt. 1-2
¶ 2.4; Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 5).
In July 2023, a Kootenai employee reported Sanders allegedly made inappropriate
statements to coworkers and clients (Dkt. 37-1 ¶ 1). Kootenai initiated an investigation, and after
interviewing several employees, it substantiated most of the allegations against Sanders (Dkt. 37-
2 ¶¶ 13–20). Examples of Sanders’ inappropriate conduct include calling patients “retarded”;
stating “women deserve it if they get beat” because they “egg it on” after treating a patient who
experienced domestic violence; telling a suicidal patient that taking such action would increase the
chance the client’s children would commit suicide; making inappropriate comments to patients
and staff about the Holocaust; referring to someone as a “perfect Aryan”; telling a coworker who
had visible tattoos that she has “a lesser IQ” because she has tattoos; frequently discussing her
religion with patients and inviting them to her church; and making other comments about patients’
race, ethnicity, and gender identity (id. ¶ 10; Dkt. 37-6 at 26–32). Of these allegations, Sanders
admitted only that: (1) she responded to “statements made about the Holocaust”; and (2) she
“prayed with a patient” at a patient’s request (Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 3.29). Based on Kootenai’s investigation,
it decided to terminate Sanders’ employment (Dkt 37-2 ¶ 22). On August 2, 2023, Sanders met
with Kootenai’s leadership, which informed her that her employment was being terminated and
provided her a Notice of Termination stating the reasons for her termination (Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 24;
Dkt. 37-8 at 12). That Notice included only the substantiated allegations that warranted termination
(Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 23). Kootenai also informed Sanders that she could initiate an administrative review
of the termination decision by a Vice President outside of her department, although she never
requested such a review (id. ¶ 25).
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show there is
“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is
genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See id.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those
portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets
its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or
discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 250 (citation modified). A nonmoving party’s failure to respond to a motion for summary
judgment does not constitute consent to the grant of said motion. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(e)(2).
Such failure, however, allows the Court to consider the uncontested material facts as undisputed
for purposes of considering the motion. Id.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Sanders brings five causes of action against Kootenai: (1) violation of her First Amendment
right to free speech and religion; (2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy;
(3) defamation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violation of her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process (Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 3.8–3.42). Kootenai moved for summary judgment
on all claims (Dkt. 37). Sanders did not file a response to the motion. Accordingly, the Court
considers all material facts alleged by Kootenai as undisputed.
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A. 	First Amendment Claims
Sanders claims that Kootenai violated her First Amendment rights when it terminated her
employment for engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution (Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 3.22–3.32). To succeed on a First Amendment
retaliation claim, Sanders must show that: (1) she engaged in protected speech; (2) Kootenai took
adverse employment action against her; and (3) her protected speech “was a ‘substantial or
motivating’ factor for the adverse employment action.” Dodge v. Evergreen Sch. Dist. #114, 56
F.4th 767, 776 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th
Cir. 2017)). If Sanders satisfies these elements, the burden shifts to Kootenai to demonstrate that
it had a legitimate interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees” that outweighed Sanders’ interest “in commenting upon matters of public concern.”
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642,
649 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding the Pickering balancing test applies to constitutional challenges to
restrictions on public employees’ religious speech).
Here, it is undisputed that Kootenai took an adverse employment action against Sanders
and that her comments about the Holocaust and instances of praying with patients in part formed
the basis for her termination. Kootenai, however, argues that (1) Sanders did not engage in
protected speech; and (2) even if she did, the balance of interests justified termination of her
employment (Dkt. 37-1 at 4, 10). The Court addresses both in turn.
1. 	Engagement in Protected Speech
Sanders alleges two incidents in which she engaged in constitutionally protected speech or
activity that were the cause of her termination. First, she maintains that on January 23, 2022, she
“discussed the Holocaust in general terms” with a Jewish patient and provided the patient a copy
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of Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning, a book written by a psychiatrist who survived the
Holocaust (Dkt. 37-4 at 16, 27; Dkt. 37-6 at 33; Dkt. 37-6 at 7). Second, she contends that she has
previously prayed with patients who asked her to pray (Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 2.35; Dkt. 37-4 at 23–24).
While a government employee does not relinquish her right to freedom of expression by
virtue of her employment, the First Amendment does not grant public employees immunity to
speak upon matters of only personal interest that would not otherwise be afforded to those not
employed by the State. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543
U.S. 77, 80 (2004). Rather, the First Amendment protects the rights of public employees, as
citizens, to speech involving matters of public concern. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 242 (2014).
Thus, a public employee engages in protected speech or activity when (1) it involves “a matter of
public concern”; and (2) the employee is speaking as a private citizen rather than as a public
employee. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). “If the answer is no, the employee has
no First Amendment cause of action based on [her] employer’s reaction to the speech. Id.
Construing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Sanders, the Court finds
Sanders has failed to present evidence demonstrating that she was engaging in protected speech.
a. 	Matter of public concern
A government employer’s personnel decisions taken in reaction to the employee’s
associational activity involving matters of private concern are not subject to review by a federal
court. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (finding judicial oversight not appropriate when employee
expression does not touch upon a matter of public concern). Public concern is something that is
newsworthy, a subject of general interest and value, or relates to government policies that are of
interest to the public at large. Roe, 543 U.S. at 83–84. Speech involves public concern when it
relates to political, social, or governmental policies that are a subject of general interest and value
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to the public at large. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. Speech that does not relate to “any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community” is not protected in the employment context.
Id. at 146. Whether speech touches upon a matter of public concern is determined using a case-by-
case inquiry into the “content, form, and context of a given statement.” Id. at 147–48; Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 (1987).
The record shows that Sanders intended to convey no message of “public concern” in her
January 23 discussion with a patient about the Holocaust. In her deposition, Sanders stated she had
a conversation with a Jewish patient about the Holocaust, in which she recommended Man’s
Search for Meaning (Dkt. 37-4 at 16, 26). The patient later reported feeling uncomfortable by
Sanders sharing her personal beliefs (id. at 26; Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 7). In an email memorializing a
discussion Sanders’ supervisor had with Sanders about the interaction, Sanders said she shared the
book with the patient “because the [patient] was Jewish, and she thought it would be helpful” (Dkt.
37-6 at 6). Clearly, Sanders was not attempting to stimulate a dialogue on the Holocaust. By her
own admission, her motive was to comfort a patient at best. Alternatively, her comments reflected
her own personal interests. See Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712,
717–18 (Md. 1992) (holding plaintiff’s comments on the Holocaust were personal and did not
concern public issues). Under either characterization, her conduct amounted to a private interest
and is not entitled to greater First Amendment protection.
Nor was Sanders’ act of praying with patients a matter of public concern. Sanders explained
that she only prayed when asked and that she never initiated prayer or broader conversation about
religion (Dkt. 37-4 at 23–24). Indeed, Sanders admitted that the topic of prayer came up often with
her because she was “looking for common grounds with people and asking about . . . what things
help them” (Dkt. 37-4 at 23). Thus, the content of her prayers was not part of a broad social or
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policy statement. Nor was she shedding light on any matter with regard to Kootenai’s operations
that would be important to the public because her prayers do not touch upon the way in which a
government institution is discharging its responsibilities. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70
(finding that criticism of school district’s allocations of funds is speech on matter of public
concern). Regardless of whether Sanders initiated the prayer, it was meant for the consumption of
the patient only. Thus, Sanders’ religious speech is not a matter of public concern.
b. 	Speech made as a private citizen or as a public employee
The First Amendment does not protect speech made pursuant to a government employee’s
official duties. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. “A person speaks in a personal capacity if he ‘had no
official duty to make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product of performing
the tasks he was paid to perform.’” Dodge, 56 F.4th at 778 (quoting Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille
Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008)) (citation modified). Here, Sanders had
no official duty to engage in prayer with patients or discuss the Holocaust. Her speech, however,
was the product of performing the tasks that she was paid to perform as a NICC triage nurse—
“ensuring the health, comfort, and safety of patients and conducting an initial medical screening
and suicide assessment” (Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 5).
Sanders admitted that she prayed with patients under the belief that such conduct fell within
her job responsibilities (Dkt. 37-4 at 23). This conduct is different than the high school football
coach in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022), who was terminated after
offering a quiet personal prayer midfield after games. There, the Court held the coach engaged in
prayer as a private citizen because he prayed silently after the game was over and the players had
left the field. Id. at 525. The Court noted that the coach’s prayer “[did] not involve leading prayers
with the team or before any other captive audience.” Id. The instant case is distinguishable because
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Sanders did not engage in silent, personal prayers—she led prayers with patients. The timing and
circumstances of her prayers confirm the point. Sanders explained that she believed engaging in
prayer was “[her] responsibility to find out what coping mechanisms [patients] use that are
successful and to encourage them in the use of those,” and that included encouraging prayer
(Dkt. 37-4 at 23). Thus, Sanders believed she was filling a responsibility imposed by her
employment by praying with patients. Because Sanders offered her prayers while acting within the
scope of her duties as a nurse, she engaged in government speech attributable to Kootenai.
Sanders’ January 23 discussion on the Holocaust with a patient also was made pursuant to
her official duties as a NICC triage nurse. While evaluating a patient who “came in highly
escalated,” Sanders made comments regarding the Holocaust and recommended a book to her,
stating generally that the Holocaust was an opportunity for people to find meaning in God (Dkt. 37-
1 at 4; Dkt. 37-4 at 16, 27). The purpose of the patient screening process is to “identify if [the
patient’s] medical needs are urgent and whether the [patient] needs to seek immediate medical
care” (Dkt. 37-6 at 29). Sanders testified that her role was to assist NICC patients in crisis by
talking with them about their problems and helping to stabilize them (Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 5). Like the
teacher in Johnson v. Poway Unified School District, 658 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2011), Sanders
“took advantage of [her] position to press [her] particular views upon the impressionable and
‘captive’ minds before [her.]” Given the context of the patient screening process and Sanders’ role
therein, her speech was reasonably viewed by patients as officially promoted by Kootenai. Because
Sanders’ speech owes its existence to her position, she spoke as an employee—not as a citizen.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Sanders did not engage in protected speech.
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2. 	Kootenai’s Administrative Interests Outweigh Sanders’ Interests
Having concluded that Sanders did not engage in protected speech, the Court does not need
to address a Pickering balance of the competing interests. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (holding the
Pickering balancing test applies only if the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public
concern). But even assuming Sanders had spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the
Court concludes that Kootenai’s interests far outweigh any conceivable countervailing interests.
In performing this balancing test, the burden shifts to the government employer to show
that the government’s interest in regulating the speech outweighs the employee’s interest in
engaging in the protected speech. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Government employers have a
legitimate interest in maintaining proper discipline over their employees and “promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id.; Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
To promote these interests, government employers are afforded wide latitude to remove employees
whose disruptive conduct threatens the mission and function of the employer’s operations.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 151–52. When weighing the interests of the parties in Connick, the Supreme
Court noted the level of workplace disruption necessary to justify a termination is based on how
much the employee’s speech involved matters of public concern. Id. The Court found, however,
that an employer does not need to wait for an employee’s speech to unfold to such an extent “that
the disruption of the office is manifest before taking action.” Id. at 152 (citation modified).
Here, Kootenai terminated Sanders after receiving numerous complaints about her speech,
including a Google review (see, e.g., Dkt. 37-2 ¶¶ 7, 16; Dkt. 37-4 at 107; Dkt. 37-6 at 13, 22, 28).
One of these complaints involved Sanders’ comments on the Holocaust, stating Sanders “forced a
conversation about the Holocaust” wherein she told the patient the “death camps were an
opportunity for people to find meaning in God” (Dkt. 37-6 at 7–8; Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 7). The patient, who
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER G RANTING S UMMARY JUDGMENT – 10
was being treated for acute suicidal ideations, stated that the conversation “was the opposite of
therapeutic” (Dkt. 37-6 at 7). Kootenai was not required to continue tolerating such disruptive
speech. This fact alone justifies its decision to terminate Sanders. See Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 681 (1994) (“As a matter of law, this potential disruptiveness was enough to outweigh
whatever First Amendment value the speech might have had.”).
Additionally, the danger to the employer’s successful functioning from the employee’s
speech increases when the employee serves a public contact role. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–91. In
Rankin, the Court found the employee’s politically charged statements to a coworker did not
adversely affect the functioning of the Constable-employer’s office because her clerical position
was administrative and did not involve contact with the public. Id. at 390–92; see also McEvoy v.
Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The more the employee’s job requires public contact,
the greater the state’s interest in firing her for expression that offends her employer.”) (citation
modified). Here, Sanders works for a public hospital, the mission of which is to provide “positive,
compassionate” healthcare services to the local community (Dkt. 37-6 at 2). As a public hospital,
Kootenai relies on its employees to maintain positive relationships with the community it serves.
Furthermore, LPNs “are solely responsible for the medical screening and monitoring of
[NICC patients]” (Dkt. 37-4 at 92). Thus, any patient who enters the NICC would necessarily
engage with an LPN like Sanders. Unlike the employee in Rankin, Sanders’ position as a NICC
LPN put her in constant contact with the public, making it more likely that her comments on the
Holocaust compromised Kootenai’s successful functioning. It is not unreasonable for Kootenai to
consider Sanders’ statements about the Holocaust, which implied that it either did not happen or
that it was a good thing (Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 18), disruptive to its ability to serve the community. That her
comments did in fact lead to disruption further bolsters Kootenai’s decision to terminate.
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Kootenai was also justified in terminating Sanders for engaging in prayer with patients.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has a compelling interest in avoiding
the appearance of taking a position on questions of religious belief when the restriction applies to
government employees engaging in religious speech while providing state-sponsored services. See
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302–06 (2000) (prohibiting prayer at football
games where prayer offered pursuant to school policy and during a school-sponsored event); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596–99 (1992) (prohibiting school sponsorship of prayer at graduation
ceremonies); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989) (“The Establishment
Clause prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief.”)
(citation modified), abrogated on separate grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565
(2014). Speech is more likely to undermine an employer’s mission when the nature of the
employee’s role involves a grant of authority, contact with the public, and access to confidential
records. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–91.
Here, Sanders engaged in religious speech while providing state-sponsored services—
praying with patients (Dkt. 37-6 at 17, 28, 30). Thus, Sanders promoted religious messages while
working with patients on Kootenai business, raising a legitimate Establishment Clause concern.
That concern is bolstered by Sanders’ admission that part of her responsibility as a NICC triage
nurse was offering a prayer with a patient who asked her to pray with them (Dkt. 37-4 at 23). This
permits the state to place a slight burden on Sanders’ speech: Sanders may not share her religious
beliefs with clients while conducting state business. Therefore, Kootenai’s need to avoid possible
violations of the Establishment Clause outweighs the restriction’s curtailment of Sanders’ religious
speech on the job.
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Therefore, the balance of interests weighs in Kootenai’s favor. Accordingly, Sanders’ First
Amendment claim cannot proceed.
B. 	Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
Sanders’ next cause of action alleges she suffered wrongful termination in violation of
public policy when she was terminated for exercising “her legal rights and privileges of speech
and religion” (Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 3.8–3.15). In Idaho, at-will employees may be terminated at any time
and for any reason that does not violate public policy. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Idaho 2012). This narrow public policy exception “is triggered only
where an employee is terminated for engaging in some protected activity, which includes:
(1) refusing to commit an unlawful act, (2) performing an important public obligation, or
(3) exercising certain legal rights and privileges.” Id. at 1271. The employee bears the burden of
establishing both that she was engaged in a protected activity and that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and her termination. See Venable v. Internet Auto Rent
& Sales, Inc., 329 P.3d 356, 361 (Idaho 2014). Here, it is undisputed that Sanders was an at-will
employee. Thus, Sanders must establish both that she engaged in a protected activity and that the
protected activity was causally connected to her termination.
“Courts have recognized that public policy expressed in the constitution and the statutes of
the state may serve as a basis for finding an exception to the employment at-will doctrine.”
Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 738 (Idaho 2003). The First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I of the Idaho Constitution prohibit the Government
from abridging freedom of speech and religion. These rights, however, are not absolute.
Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court employs a four-part test to determine whether speech is
constitutionally protected and therefore precludes an adverse employment decision that largely
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mirrors the First Amendment analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Pickering.1 Lockhart v.
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game, 903 P.2d 135, 141 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Gardner v. Evans, 719
P.2d 1185, 1195 (Idaho 1986).
As discussed above, Sanders’ speech did not touch upon matters of public concern, nor did
the balance weigh in her favor. Because Sanders’ speech fails to satisfy these threshold
requirements, the Court need not apply the remaining two factors. Accordingly, Sanders cannot
establish that Kootenai terminated her employment in violation of public policy. Therefore,
Kootenai was permitted to terminate Sanders’ at-will employment.
C. 	Defamation
Sanders’ 	next 	claim 	is 	for 	defamation, 	alleging 	that 	Kootenai 	defamed 	her 	by
communicating damaging information to others by implication that placed her in a false light
(Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 3.16–3.18). While her complaint does not specify what communication she is
referring to, Sanders stated in a deposition that her defamation claim is based on the Notice of
Termination provided to her on July 3, 2023 (Dkt. 37-1 at 30; Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 2.17). To succeed on a
defamation claim, Sanders must establish (1) Kootenai communicated information concerning
Sanders to others; (2) the information was defamatory; and (3) Sanders suffered injury because of
the communication. Clark v. The Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216, 219 (Idaho 2007). A statement
is defamatory if it “tends to harm a person’s reputation, usually by subjecting the person to public
1 	The only substantial difference is that Idaho employs a fourth step—if the employee spoke
on a matter of public concern, the balance of interests weigh in their favor, and the protected speech
was a substantial or motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision, “then the employer
is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
decision even in the absence of the protected speech.” Lockhart v. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game,
903 P.2d 135, 141 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995).
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contempt, disgrace, or ridicule, or by adversely affecting the person’s business.” Siercke v. Siercke,
476 P.3d 376, 385 (Idaho 2020).
Even where a statement is defamatory, the publisher may not be liable if the publication
was privileged. Wilson v. St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd., No. 13-CV-00122-BLW, 2014 WL
7186811, at *14 (D. Idaho Dec. 16, 2014). Relevant here is the common-interest privilege, which
“protects individuals from liability if a defamatory statement is made to someone who shares a
common interest with the speaker.” Id. This conditional privilege may be lost only if the
publication is made with “express malice.” Id. Express malice is defined as “the publication of
defamatory matter in bad faith, without belief in the truth of the matter published, or with reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the matter.” Barlow v. Int’l Harvester Co., 522 P.2d 1102, 1113
(Idaho 1974), abrogated on separate grounds by Siercke v. Siercke, 476 P.3d 376, 386 (Idaho
2020). This definition is akin to New York Times’ standard of “actual malice,” i.e., publishing a
statement “with knowledge that the statement made was false or was made with reckless disregard
of whether the statement was false or not.” Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 61 P.3d 606, 609 (Idaho
2002) (summarizing New York Times’ definition of actual malice). Express malice concerns the
speaker’s attitude towards the truth—not their attitude towards the plaintiff personally. Wilson,
2014 WL 7186811, at *14. To establish that a speaker had a reckless disregard for truth, “[t]here
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Wiemer v. Rankin, 790 P.2d 347, 356 (Idaho 1990)
(quoting Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989)).
Sanders cannot establish the requisite elements of defamation. First, Sanders has not
alleged that Kootenai distributed the Notice to anyone but her (Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 26). Moreover, there is
no evidence that any third party has ever requested the Notice or inquired into the reasons for
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Sanders’ termination (Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 26). As a result, the Court concludes that this Notice, in and of
itself, is not a defamatory communication.
Even if the Notice was communicated to another, that communication is protected by the
common-interest privilege. See Barlow, 522 P.2d at 1112–13. Moreover, Sanders cannot defeat
the privilege because she has not established that Kootenai published the information with
malice—knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth. Quite the contrary, Kootenai conducted a
thorough investigation into Sanders’ alleged misconduct, including interviewing five employees,
Sanders’ supervisor, and Sanders herself (Dkt. 37-2 ¶¶ 13, 16–17). The Notice included only
allegations that were substantiated (id. ¶ 22) (explaining allegations that had either not been
sufficiently substantiated by the investigation or did not warrant termination of employment were
not included in the Notice). Based upon these facts, the Court is unable to conclude that Kootenai
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the Notice or that it actually had a high degree of
awareness of probable falsity. There is no evidence indicating that Kootenai should have
questioned the credibility of the employees it interviewed. Therefore, the Court holds that Kootenai
did not have actual malice, and any potential communication was privileged.
D. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Sanders also alleged a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), arguing
that Kootenai terminated her employment in a manner designed to cause the maximum amount of
emotional distress (Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 3.19–3.21). To succeed on such a claim, Sanders must show that
(1) Kootenai’s conduct was intentional or reckless, (2) Kootenai’s conduct was extreme and
outrageous, (3) there exists a causal connection between Kootenai’s pertinent conduct and
Sanders’ emotional distress, and (4) Sanders’ emotional distress was severe. Nation v. Idaho Dep’t
of Corr., 158 P.3d 953, 968 (Idaho 2007). Conduct is extreme and outrageous if it “rise[s] to the
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level of ‘atrocious’ and ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency’ that would cause an average
member of the community to believe it was ‘outrageous.’” Id. Mere termination of at-will
employment “cannot constitute extreme and outrageous behavior.” Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1274.
“Summary judgment is proper when the facts allege conduct of the defendant that could not
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.” Edmondson, 75 P.3d at 741 (citation modified).
The Court concludes that although Kootenai’s conduct was intentional, it was not extreme
and outrageous. Sanders alleges that Kootenai’s conduct was extreme and outrageous because
“[t]he means and manner of Kootenai Health’s termination was intentionally designed to inflict
maximum distress on [her]” (Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 3.21). In her deposition, Sanders explained that the
decision to place a Notice of Termination in her file “marred [her] record for life” (Dkt. 37-1 at
32–33). The Court already found, however, that the contents of the Notice were not defamatory.
Additionally, Sanders was an at-will employee, so the mere fact that she was terminated cannot
constitute extreme and outrageous behavior. Kootenai’s conduct was at no point so atrocious or so
far beyond all possible bounds of decency that it could reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery for IIED. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on
Sanders’ IIED claim.
E. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Finally, Sanders alleges that Kootenai deprived her of her Fourteenth Amendment rights
by tarnishing her reputation “in a manner calculated to make it impossible for her to regain
employment” without giving her a meaningful opportunity to clear her name (Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 3.38,
3.41). A plaintiff’s liberty interest is implicated when the government makes a charge against the
plaintiff capable of severely injuring her community standing. Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068,
1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Llamas v. Butte Cnty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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Fourteenth Amendment due process protections apply in the employment termination context if
(1) the accuracy of the charge is disputed, (2) the charge is publicly disclosed, and (3) the charge
“is made in connection with the termination of employment or the alteration of some right or status
recognized by state law.” Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1129. When these conditions are met, the state must
provide a name-clearing hearing. Cox v. Roskelley, 359 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004).
The information that Kootenai placed in Sanders’ employee file is not severely harmful.
To be severely harmful, the “government’s stigmatizing statements” must “effectively exclude the
employee completely from her chosen profession.” Blantz v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 727
F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2013). A terminated employee’s reduced income and diminished reputation
do not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Additionally, the charge must be one of moral
turpitude, such as dishonesty or immorality, and not merely a difficult personality. Stretten v.
Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1976). Thus, “a liberty interest [is] not
infringed when the only loss suffered at the hands of the Government is a ‘stigma’ or damage to
reputation.” Id. at 365; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976).
Here, Sanders argues that Kootenai “inflicted an indelible stigma upon [her], damag[ing]
her career as a nurse, [and] attaching a ‘badge of infamy’ to her (Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 3.41). Though she
claims that placing the Notice in her file “[made] it impossible for her to regain employment
consistent with her experience and skills,” she in fact found employment as an LPN only three
weeks after submitting her first application (Dkt. 37-2 ¶ 27). Sanders testified that she disclosed
to her new employer the reasons Kootenai gave for her termination, yet they offered her
employment anyway (Dkt. 37-4 at 40). Thus, the statements in Sanders’ employee file did not
completely exclude her from her chosen profession as an LPN. Furthermore, any alleged damage
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER G RANTING S UMMARY JUDGMENT – 18
to her reputation as a nurse alone is insufficient to implicate a liberty interest. Therefore, summary
judgment is proper on Sanders’ due process claim.
IV. 	ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant Kootenai’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37) is GRANTED.
2. 	Plaintiff 	Claudia 	Sanders’ 	Complaint 	(Dkt. 	1-2) 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITH
PREJUDICE.
February 20, 2026
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