Sandoval v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW), et al.

1:25-cv-00463Idd01.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

¹ The complaint submitted to the court is Ms. Sandoval’s Second Amended complaint. However,
Ms. Sandoval erroneously titled this complaint her “Third Amended Complaint”, and thus the
Court will refer to it as her “Third Amended Complaint.”
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
YADIRA SANDOVAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE, et al.,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00463-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the court is Plaintiff Yadira Sandoval’s Third Amended Complaint¹
(Dkt. 20) . The first two versions of the complaint were dismissed with leave to
amend due to her failure to state a claim. The present complaint will be dismissed
on identical grounds. Because Ms. Sandoval has twice failed to cure her pleading
deficiencies, the Court will not grant further leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Sandoval is a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis. She filed her
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 1 of 6
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 2
initial complaint in August of 2025. Dkt. 2. The complaint was reviewed pursuant
to the court’s screening authority in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) and
dismissed with leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Dkt. 8. Ms. Sandoval subsequently amended her complaint, which was again
dismissed with leave to amend. Dkt. 10; Dkt. 15. She has now filed her Third
Amended Complaint—the pleading at hand—seeking to cure the previous
deficiencies. Dkt. 20.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court is required to review complaints filed in forma pauperis to
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss an in
forma pauperis complaint, or any portion thereof, that states a frivolous or
malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint fails
to state a claim for relief if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are
insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 2 of 6
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 3
effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more
than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court liberally construes pro se
pleadings (see Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)), pleadings that
offer “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
ANALYSIS
Ms. Sandoval claims that Defendants violated her parental rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and detained her without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Her complaint again lacks sufficient facts to pass Rule 8’s
plausibility muster. Because this is the third time Ms. Sandoval has failed to state a
claim, the court finds that further leave to amend is not warranted.
A. 	Parental Rights Claim
Ms. Sandoval first asserts that Idaho Department of Health Welfare
employees—caseworker Anaysha Hawks and safety inspector “Jane Doe 1”—
violated her parental rights during removal proceedings in state court. For the most
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 3 of 6
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 4
part, Ms. Sandoval appears to be contesting the state court’s actions rather than
bringing a constitutional claim against the named defendants. To the extent that she
does complain of defendants’ conduct, the allegations fail to state a claim.
Parents have a “fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their
children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). However, parental rights
are neither absolute nor unrestricted. Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir.
2009). For example, minor infringements on visitation rights or custody
arrangements are not a constitutional violation. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982,
992-93 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, parental rights can be suspended due to
extenuating or exigent circumstances necessitate, like when the safety of the child
is at stake. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235-37 (9th Cir. 2018).
Here, Ms. Sandoval alleges that “Defendants Anaysha Hawks and Jane Doe
1 … deprived [her] of her parental rights, without notice and … a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.” Dkt. 20 ¶ 25. In support of this claim, she offers a
smorgasbord of irrelevant facts and vague insinuations. She alleges, for instance
that Ms. Hawks ignored her “victims compensation approval”; “failed to recognize
and take thorough notes” of her accomplishments; and did not facilitate home or
hotel visits with the children after she was “trespassed from the foster givers
home.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 25. These actions do not amount to a parental rights violation,
especially given that they occurred in the course of an apparently otherwise lawful
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 4 of 6
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 5
child protection proceeding. Ms. Sandoval’s claim remains a “naked assertion that
fails to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant[s] are
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).
B. 	Fourth Amendment Claim
Ms. Sandoval next asserts that officers from the Nampa Police Department
violated her Fourth Amendment rights by “engag[ing] in detention and
enforcement actions regarding asking questions in high risk and unsafe situations
(during traffic stops etc.) about plaintiffs at the time boyfriend.” Dkt. 20 ¶ 17. She
also states that this questioning put her “at risk from gang member retaliation.” Id.
None of these factual allegations, if true, rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment
violation. Asking questions during an otherwise lawful traffic stop is not an
unreasonable search or seizure, and the potential gang retaliation, while unsettling,
appears completely irrelevant. Ms. Sandoval’s claim again consists of legal
conclusions without the factual support required under Rule 8.
C. 	Leave to Amend
Courts should liberally grant leave to amend, particularly for pro se
complainants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
(pro se complaints are to be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers”). But the Court’s grace is not unlimited, and a party is not
entitled to amend its complaint when doing so would be futile. Mirmehdi v. United
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 5 of 6
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 6 of 6

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document21_ Filed 06/01/26 Page1of6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

YADIRA SANDOVAL,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00463-BLW
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Vv.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE, et al.,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Plaintiff Yadira Sandoval’s Third Amended Complaint’

(Dkt. 20) . The first two versions of the complaint were dismissed with leave to

amend due to her failure to state a claim. The present complaint will be dismissed

on identical grounds. Because Ms. Sandoval has twice failed to cure her pleading

deficiencies, the Court will not grant further leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Sandoval is a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis. She filed her

' The complaint submitted to the court is Ms. Sandoval’s Second Amended complaint. However,
Ms. Sandoval erroneously titled this complaint her “Third Amended Complaint’, and thus the

Court will refer to it as her “Third Amended Complaint.”

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 2
initial complaint in August of 2025. Dkt. 2. The complaint was reviewed pursuant
to the court’s screening authority in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) and
dismissed with leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Dkt. 8. Ms. Sandoval subsequently amended her complaint, which was again
dismissed with leave to amend. Dkt. 10; Dkt. 15. She has now filed her Third
Amended Complaint—the pleading at hand—seeking to cure the previous
deficiencies. Dkt. 20.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court is required to review complaints filed in forma pauperis to
determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss an in
forma pauperis complaint, or any portion thereof, that states a frivolous or
malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint fails
to state a claim for relief if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are
insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 2 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 3
effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more
than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court liberally construes pro se
pleadings (see Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)), pleadings that
offer “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
ANALYSIS
Ms. Sandoval claims that Defendants violated her parental rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and detained her without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Her complaint again lacks sufficient facts to pass Rule 8’s
plausibility muster. Because this is the third time Ms. Sandoval has failed to state a
claim, the court finds that further leave to amend is not warranted.
A. 	Parental Rights Claim
Ms. Sandoval first asserts that Idaho Department of Health Welfare
employees—caseworker Anaysha Hawks and safety inspector “Jane Doe 1”—
violated her parental rights during removal proceedings in state court. For the most
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 3 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 4
part, Ms. Sandoval appears to be contesting the state court’s actions rather than
bringing a constitutional claim against the named defendants. To the extent that she
does complain of defendants’ conduct, the allegations fail to state a claim.
Parents have a “fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their
children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). However, parental rights
are neither absolute nor unrestricted. Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir.
2009). For example, minor infringements on visitation rights or custody
arrangements are not a constitutional violation. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982,
992-93 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, parental rights can be suspended due to
extenuating or exigent circumstances necessitate, like when the safety of the child
is at stake. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235-37 (9th Cir. 2018).
Here, Ms. Sandoval alleges that “Defendants Anaysha Hawks and Jane Doe
1 … deprived [her] of her parental rights, without notice and … a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.” Dkt. 20 ¶ 25. In support of this claim, she offers a
smorgasbord of irrelevant facts and vague insinuations. She alleges, for instance
that Ms. Hawks ignored her “victims compensation approval”; “failed to recognize
and take thorough notes” of her accomplishments; and did not facilitate home or
hotel visits with the children after she was “trespassed from the foster givers
home.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 25. These actions do not amount to a parental rights violation,
especially given that they occurred in the course of an apparently otherwise lawful
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 4 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 5
child protection proceeding. Ms. Sandoval’s claim remains a “naked assertion that
fails to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant[s] are
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).
B. 	Fourth Amendment Claim
Ms. Sandoval next asserts that officers from the Nampa Police Department
violated her Fourth Amendment rights by “engag[ing] in detention and
enforcement actions regarding asking questions in high risk and unsafe situations
(during traffic stops etc.) about plaintiffs at the time boyfriend.” Dkt. 20 ¶ 17. She
also states that this questioning put her “at risk from gang member retaliation.” Id.
None of these factual allegations, if true, rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment
violation. Asking questions during an otherwise lawful traffic stop is not an
unreasonable search or seizure, and the potential gang retaliation, while unsettling,
appears completely irrelevant. Ms. Sandoval’s claim again consists of legal
conclusions without the factual support required under Rule 8.
C. 	Leave to Amend
Courts should liberally grant leave to amend, particularly for pro se
complainants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
(pro se complaints are to be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers”). But the Court’s grace is not unlimited, and a party is not
entitled to amend its complaint when doing so would be futile. Mirmehdi v. United
Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document 21 Filed 06/01/26 Page 5 of 6

Case 1:25-cv-00463-BLW Document21_ Filed 06/01/26 Page6of6

States, 662 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011). Ms. Sandoval has already had three
bites at the apple and received two rounds of guidance from the Court. The past
amendments did not cure the complaint’s deficiencies, and there is no reason to
think that another round of amendment will produce a different result.

Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 20) is DISMISSED with

prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 19) is DENIED AS MOOT.

DATED: June 1, 2026

My os i Daal

B. Lynn Winmill
U:S. District Court Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

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