USA v. Walker

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, 	No. CR25-15-LTS-MAR
vs.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
CHASE SMITH WALKER,
Defendant.
This matter is before me on a Report and Recommendation (R&R) (Doc. 44) in
which the Honorable Mark A. Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge, recommends that
I deny defendant Chase Walker’s motion (Doc. 31) to suppress evidence. 	Walker has
filed objections (Doc. 50).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Walker is charged in an indictment (Doc. 3) with one count of possession of
ammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). 	He seeks
the exclusion of evidence obtained after an encounter with law enforcement officers on
October 6, 2023. The Government resists. Doc. 40.
Judge Roberts held an evidentiary hearing on August 26, 2025. 	Doc. 42. 	The
Government called Officer Justin Walden with the Meskwaki Nation Police Department.
Doc. 42. Walker called Michael Gorda. 	Id. Judge Roberts also admitted the following
exhibits:
• 	Videos from Walden’s body camera (Government Exhibits 1 and 2)
• 	Walker’s criminal history (Government Exhibit 3)
• 	Meskwaki Nation PD reports (Defense Exhibits A1-A10)
• 	Search warrant (Defense Exhibits B1-B15)
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• 	Videos from body camera of Officer Jones (Defense Exhibits C-C3)
• 	Photographs of vehicle (Defense Exhibits D-I)
• 	Meskwaki Nation PD seized property receipt (Defense Exhibit J)
• 	Meskwaki Nation property control receipt (Defense Exhibit K)
• 	Iowa District Court for Tama County order (Defense Exhibit L)
• 	Photographs of vehicle (Defense Exhibits M1-M7)
• 	Photographs of vehicle (Defense Exhibits N1-N5)
• 	Meskwaki Nation PD information (Defense Exhibits O1-O3)
Id. 	Judge Roberts issued his R&R (Doc. 44) on September 11, 2025, and Walker filed
his objections (Doc. 50) on October 1, 2025. 	Trial is scheduled to begin on December
15, 2025.
II. 	THE R&R
A. 	Findings of Fact
Judge Roberts made the following findings of fact:
On October 6, 2023, at approximately 1:45 a.m., Officer Walden
and his partner, Officer Nate Jones, conducted a traffic stop on Defendant’s
vehicle for failing to obey a stop sign and for speeding. 	On his initial
interaction with Defendant, Officer Walden noted that Defendant refused
to make eye contact with him and Defendant was slurring his speech.
Officer Walden asked Defendant how much alcohol he had consumed that
night, and Defendant replied “none.” 	(Doc. 39-1 at 8.) 	Officer Walden
returned to his patrol car and ran Defendant’s information.
Officer Walden approached Defendant’s vehicle on the passenger
side and spoke with Defendant about Defendant’s driving at a high rate of
speed. 	Based on Defendant’s “odd” answers, lack of eye contact, slurred
speech, and erratic driving, Officer Walden asked Defendant whether
Defendant would be willing to perform field sobriety tests or take a
breathalyzer test. 	(Id.) 	Defendant refused the tests. 	Officer Walden
returned to his patrol vehicle to write citations for Defendant.
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After writing the citations, Officer Walden returned to Defendant’s
vehicle. 	Officer Walden asked Defendant to exit the truck. 	Defendant
refused to exit the vehicle and demanded a reason to do so. 	Eventually,
Officer Walden told Defendant that he suspected Defendant of being under
the influence and needed him to step out the vehicle. 	Defendant complied
and exited the truck.
Outside 	the 	vehicle, 	Defendant 	again 	refused 	to 	perform 	field
sobriety tests or take a breath test. Officer Walden placed Defendant under
arrest for operating while intoxicated. Initially, Defendant refused to turn
around and place his hands behind his back to be handcuffed. 	Defendant
eventually acquiesced to Officer Walden’s request and was taken to Officer
Walden’s patrol car. 	Officer Walden noted the odor of alcohol coming
from Defendant’s person. Defendant was transported to Tama County Jail.
At the jail, Defendant refused to answer questions during the booking
process, refused sobriety tests, and refused to permit officers to remove his
handcuffs. Multiple law enforcement officers physically placed Defendant
on the floor of a detention cell and removed Defendant’s handcuffs at
approximately 3:06 a.m.
While Officer Walden was writing up charges for Defendant, Officer
Jones told Officer Walden that during the traffic stop, he observed a plastic
baggie containing white powder in Defendant’s vehicle. 	(Id. at 10.) 	At
approximately 4:05 a.m., Officer Walden and Officer Jones returned to
Defendant’s vehicle on the side of the highway to further investigate. Using
their flashlights, Officer Walden and Officer Jones observed the baggie on
the dashboard of Defendant’s vehicle. 	Officer Walden remarked multiple
times that it was a baggie with white powder. See Gov. Ex. 2 at 1:33 (“Bag
of white powder”); 1:48-50 (“Definitely a bag of white powder”); 2:39-44
(“What I am concerned about is the baggie of white powder”); 4:23-24
(“Baggie of white powder”); 4:50-55 (“Well, he has a huge drug history
and a baggie of white powder in there”); 7:54-59 (“I can see like white
powdery 	crystalline 	substance 	from 	like 	right 	here”). 	During 	this
investigation, the officers parked their patrol vehicle along the passenger
side of Defendant’s vehicle. 	Officer Walden stood on the bumper of the
patrol vehicle to gain a better vantage point, but he did not climb on
Defendant’s vehicle. 	The officers had the vehicle towed to the Meskwaki
Nation Police Department while they obtained a search warrant for the
truck.
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On October 6, 2023, at approximately 11:15 p.m., Officer Walden
obtained a search warrant for Defendant’s vehicle. 	The search warrant
affidavit provided in pertinent part:
On 	Friday, 	October 	6, 	2023, 	at 	1:45 	am, 	[Defendant]
was . . . stopped for a traffic violation. 	[Defendant] was
exhibiting signs of impairment and ultimately placed under
arrest for Operating While Intoxicated at 2:08 am. 	The
truck’s windows were rolled up and it was locked prior to
heading to the jail. 	The truck keys were brought to the jail.
After the arrest, Meskwaki Officer Jones notified me that
during the time of the stop he noticed a plastic baggy [sic] on
the dash that appeared to contain a white substance.
After booking, Officer Jones and I (Officer Walden) drove
back to the truck in the 1800 block of Highway 30 and looked
into the windows. 	I noticed a clear zip lock baggy [sic] on
the dash above the radio that appeared to have a white powder
residue inside of it. 	Based on my training and experience, I
know illegal narcotics are often kept in clear zip lock baggies.
Furthermore, I am also aware illegal narcotics may come in
different forms, shapes, and colors, including as a white
powdery substance.
At around 5:14 am, The truck was towed from the 1800 block
of 	Highway 	30 	back 	to 	the 	Meskwaki 	Nation 	Police
Department’s lot. 	The truck was sealed off with evidence
tape and photographed.
[Defendant’s] Criminal History reveals he has a history of
drug possession, including a charge of “Dangerous Drug
Controlled Substance Possession with Intent to Distribute”
Felony conviction out of Colorado in 2015.
(Doc. 39-2 at 5.)
At 	approximately 	11:30 	p.m., 	law 	enforcement 	searched
Defendant’s vehicle. Among other things, officers found twenty-two boxes
of 20 5.56X45mm ammunition rounds, an ammunition box containing 132
rounds of .223 ammunition, and four twenty-round boxes of 6.5 Creedmoor
rounds and an additional four rounds. Officer Walden also noted that, after
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further inspection, the baggie with the white powdery substance located on
the dashboard of Defendant’s vehicle was determined not to be narcotics.1
(Doc. 39-1 at 11.)
Defendant 	was 	released 	from 	jail 	on 	October 	6, 	2023, 	at
approximately 3:55 p.m., prior to the search of his vehicle. 	On October
14, 2023, Defendant went to the police department to retrieve his truck and
was arrested on an active arrest warrant. (Id. at 14.)
Defendant’s co-worker, Michael Gorda testified at the hearing. Mr.
Gorda testified that he and Defendant worked on a crane crew and on
October 5, 2023, they were in Iowa performing maintenance on wind
towers. 	On the evening of October 5, 2023, Mr. Gorda and Defendant
went to dinner and then to the casino, staying at the casino until the “early
morning.” 	Mr. Gorda and Defendant left the casino at the same time, but
Defendant had a head start because Mr. Gorda was tending to his dog. As
he began to drive, Mr. Gorda called Defendant and learned Defendant was
being pulled over. 	Mr. Gorda testified that he passed Defendant and took
the next exit and found a place to park to wait and see what happened with
Defendant. 	When law enforcement left the scene of the traffic stop, Mr.
Gorda drove past Defendant’s truck on the side of the road. 	Mr. Gorda
called the police station regarding Defendant and learned that he would not
be released until he appeared before a judge. Mr. Gorda asked if he could
move Defendant’s vehicle off the highway. 	After some time, Mr. Gorda
was informed that he could move the vehicle. Mr. Gorda went to the truck
but could not get into it. He called Defendant’s girlfriend for the door code
but when he returned, the truck had already been towed away.
Doc. 44 at 2-6 (footnotes omitted).
B. 	The Parties’ Arguments
Walker argues the officers seized his vehicle without probable cause and the
subsequent search warrant was also flawed because (1) it was based on information
authored either intentionally and knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth by
officers signing the application and affidavits for the search warrants and (2) lacked
1 Walker objects to this finding of fact, stating the baggie was reported to contain plastic clips
with white powder residue. Doc. 50 at 2.
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evidence of an articulable basis that criminal activity was occurring or had occurred in
Walker’s vehicle.
The Government argues the officers had probable cause to seize the truck pursuant
to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 	It also contends the search
warrant was supported by the same probable cause and that even if the court finds
probable cause was lacking, it should find the Leon2 good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies.
C. 	Recommendation
Judge Roberts recommends denying Walker’s motion to suppress. 	He concluded
there was probable cause to seize Walker’s vehicle based on officers’ observations of
signs of impairment, Walker’s criminal history and officers’ observations of a clear
baggie containing a white powdery substance on the dashboard of Walker’s vehicle. He
also determined that a Franks3 hearing was not required because Walker had failed to
make any showing that “a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and . . . the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” 	Franks, 438
U.S. at 155-56. Judge Roberts concluded that the seizure of Walker’s vehicle would also
fall under the Leon good faith exception but that the search was not justified by exigent
circumstances or community caretaking. 	Finally, to the extent that Walker sought to
suppress any statements or admissions he made during or after the search, Judge Roberts
recommends denying that aspect of the motion. 	See Doc. 44.
2 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
3 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district judge must review a magistrate judge’s R&R under the following
standards:
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve
and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations
as provided by rules of court. 	A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may
accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 	The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). 	Thus, when a party objects to
any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed
under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. 	See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d
793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court
judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 	Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under
a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed:
Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any
issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge
to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude
further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party,
under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Walker’s Objections
Walker makes the following objections:
1. 	The R&R inaccurately describes the substance that was actually in the clear
baggie (plastic clips with white powder residue), which undercuts the conclusion
that there was probable cause for seizure of Walker’s vehicle
2. 	The R&R does not account for the 18-hour delay in applying for a search
warrant and whether the delay to tow and seek a warrant undermines the “ready
mobility” rationale of the automobile exception.
3. 	Contrary to the R&R, the evidence suggests the incriminating nature of the
baggie was not immediately apparent and combined with the unexplained delay in
towing 	and 	seeking 	a 	warrant, 	undermines 	the 	automobile 	and 	plain 	view
justifications
5.4 The conclusion that officers had probable cause to seize the vehicle based
on events that occurred after the initial stop and shortly before Gorda’s arrival
6. 	The conclusion that Walden concluded the baggie could contain an illegal
narcotic based on his training and experience
7. 	The sequence of events.5
8. 	The conclusion that “both officers observed the baggie in plain view on the
dashboard.” Doc. 44 at 15.
9. 	The lack of analysis regarding the seizure of Walker’s keys
Doc. 50 at 2-11. 	He argues there was a lack of probable cause to justify seizure of his
vehicle because (1) there was no evidence that officers suspected him of drug use, (2) too
4 There is no labeled fourth objection. See Doc. 50 at 3-5.
5 Walker discusses the sequence of events but does not explain his actual objection to the R&R
with regard to this evidence, except that if the vehicle had not been improperly towed, it would
have been removed and not subject to the subsequent search warrant. 	In any event, I have
accounted for the sequence of events in addressing his other objections.
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much 	weight 	was 	given 	to 	Walker’s 	criminal 	history 	and 	(3) 	the 	circumstances
surrounding the observation of the baggie are suspect. 	Walker argues the seizure of his
vehicle and delay in obtaining a warrant were unreasonable under the circumstances,
particularly because after assuring Walker that he would be able to retrieve his vehicle
the next day, the officers seized the vehicle and then waited another 18 hours to apply
for a warrant.
B. 	Analysis
Walker’s objections focus on whether there was probable cause to seize the
vehicle, which is the same basis for the subsequent search warrant. 	His objections fall
into three categories: (1) circumstances surrounding the observations of the baggie on the
dashboard, (2) the delay in getting the search warrant after the seizure of the vehicle and
(3) other factors including the timing of events, purpose of the stop, Walker’s criminal
history and the seizure of Walker’s keys. I will discuss each category in turn.
1. 	The Baggie
Walker has several objections that relate to the officers’ observation of the clear
plastic baggie that he argues affect the probable cause analysis. These include the actual
contents of the baggie, whether the incriminating nature was immediately apparent,
whether Walden could conclude the baggie could contain an illegal narcotic based on his
training and experience and whether the officers actually made a plain view observation.
With regard to the actual contents of the baggie, Walker argues Judge Roberts’ conclusion
that officers “actually recovered a baggie with white powder,” Doc. 44 at 11, is
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inaccurate because the baggie was reported to contain “plastic clips with white powder
residue.”6
Regardless of the presence of plastic clips, the record is undisputed that there was
white powder or white powder residue within the baggie. In any event, it is not the actual
contents of the baggie that matter, but what the officers observed from outside the vehicle
and whether that was sufficient to support probable cause. 	The photos of the baggie in
Defense Exhibits D-I do not give a clear picture of what the officers observed due to the
lighting and marks on the windshield. In the video evidence, Walden can be heard saying
he could see the substance, but that it was difficult to capture on camera. Defense Exhibit
C-1. 	He described it as “a plastic baggie with what appears to be a white substance in
it.” 	Id. 	When he and Jones initially went back to the vehicle, Walden can be heard
saying “yeah, it’s a bag of white powder” and “it’s definitely a bag of white powder.”
Gov. Exhibit 2. 	He then pulled his vehicle up next to the truck to get a better view of
the dashboard and can be heard saying “it’s a baggie of white powder” and that it is
“really hard to tell what that is.” 	Id. 	Walden knew of Walker’s drug history at this
point. 	Id. 	Jones explained that he could see it better when the passenger window was
down but could not identify whether it was white powder or crystal. Id.
The evidence establishes that the officers could observe a baggie with white
powder from outside the vehicle and that the baggie recovered from the vehicle had white
powder in it. 	While the baggie may have contained other items, such as plastic clips,
that has little to no effect on the probable cause analysis that was focused on the presence
of the white powder. This objection is overruled.
Next, Walker objects to Judge Roberts’ conclusion that the incriminating nature
of the baggie was immediately apparent to Jones and Walden. He cites the body camera
6 During the hearing, Walker’s attorney suggested that the powdery substance was Gold Bond
powder, a container of which officers found in the vehicle during execution of the search warrant.
Doc. 45 at 35; Def. Ex. C-2.
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evidence from when Jones and Walden returned to the vehicle in which Jones can be
heard saying “it’s even easier to see when the window was down, when I was looking”
to which Walden responds “you for sure saw it earlier? Saw a white powder?” to which
Jones responds “yes.” Defense Exhibit C. When Walden asks if it was white crystal or
white powder, Jones responds something to the effect of “[j]ust powder. 	I don’t know.
I don’t have much experience, it was white, which is why I brought it up to you.” 	Id.
Walker emphasizes the fact that during the 21 minutes that Walden was interacting with
Walker after the initial stop, including standing at the driver’s door, he did not observe
the baggie. 	Walker also questions the plain view observation, noting that the windows
on Walker’s vehicle were unlawfully tinted, for which Walker received a citation. 	He
argues that when combined with the delay in towing, this evidence undermines the
automobile and plain view justifications.
Judge 	Roberts 	concluded 	that 	the 	incriminating 	nature 	of 	the 	baggie 	was
immediately apparent to Jones, even if he did not call it to Walden’s more expert attention
until later. 	Doc. 44 at 16-17. 	He noted that the incriminating nature of the white,
powdery substance was immediately apparent to Walden after he observed it through the
window and compared it to Jones’ observation. 	Id. 	The fact that Walden did not make
the observation during the stop does not mean that the incriminating nature of the baggie
was not immediately apparent during his subsequent observation. 	Nor does Jones’
delayed report to Walden mean the “immediately apparent” requirement was not met.
The “immediately apparent” requirement does not refer to when the observation was
made, but to whether the incriminating nature of the object was “immediately apparent”
whenever the observation was made.
Based on the video evidence, it is beyond dispute that Walden observed the white
powder. See Government Exhibit 2 (in which Walden’s body camera shows him shining
his flashlight on the dashboard of the pickup and saying “yeah, it's a bag of white
powder” and “it’s definitely a bag of white powder”). The incriminating character of an
item is immediately apparent when police have “probable cause to associate the property
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with criminal activity.” 	United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 2001)). 	“To satisfy the
‘immediately apparent’ standard, it is not necessary that a law enforcement officer know
with certainty that an item is contraband or evidence of a crime.” 	United States v.
Murphy, 261 F.3d 741, 743-44 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Garner, 907 F.2d
60, 62 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted)). 	Walden testified that he has been
trained in the identification of narcotics and how they are transported, see Doc. 45 at 44-
45, and based on his observations, thought drugs could be within the baggie. 	Id. at 33-
34. Walker’s objections related to Walden’s observation of the baggie and his belief that
it could have contained illegal narcotics based on his training and experience are
overruled.
Walker’s other objections question the extent to which the officers could have
made a plain view observation based on the window tint. 	Again, the “immediately
apparent” nature does not apply to the observation itself but to whether the incriminating
nature of the object was immediately apparent. 	The fact that they had to use flashlights
and that it was difficult to see inside the vehicle due to the window tint does not affect
whether the incriminating nature of the contents of the baggie was immediately apparent.
Despite the window tint, the video evidence reveals that Walden was still able to see
enough into the vehicle to make a plain view observation of the baggie of the white
powdery substance. 	He did not speculate as to whether it was white powder. 	Walker’s
objections related to whether the officers were able to make plain view observation are
overruled.
2. 	The Delay
Walker argues the R&R does not account for the 18-hour delay in applying for the
search warrant and argues that the delay to tow and seek a warrant undermines the “ready
mobility” rationale of the automobile exception. 	Part of the rationale of the automobile
exception is that because of an automobile’s “ready mobility” there may not be time to
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obtain a warrant. 	Thus, officers may seize a vehicle based on probable cause until they
can obtain a warrant. 	United States v. Soderman, 983 F.3d 369, 375 (8th Cir. 2020)
(citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1970)). Walker argues those concerns
were not present because there was no hazard or risk of removal, officers had previously
assured Walker that he would be able to get his vehicle and told his friend, Gorda, that
it could be moved.
With regard to whether or how the 18-hour delay factors into the analysis, Walker
merely questions why Walden waited 18 hours to apply for the warrant but has not cited
any law that such a delay made the search or seizure unlawful. 	While the “duration of
the seizure pending the issuance of a search warrant must still be reasonable,” see United
States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 616 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Respress, 9
F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 1993)), “[t]here is unfortunately no bright line past which a delay
becomes unreasonable.” 	Mays, 993 F.3d at 616-17 (quoting United States v. Burgard,
675 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2012)). 	Reasonableness “is measured in objective terms
by examining the totality of the circumstances.” 	Id. (quoting United States v. Farnell,
701 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 2012)). 	The court must “balance the privacy-related and
law enforcement-related concerns” implicated. 	Id. (quoting United States v. Laist, 702
F.3d 608, 613 (11th Cir. 20120). 	Private interests include considerations such as the
significance of the interference with the person’s possessory interest, the duration of the
delay, whether the person consented to the seizure and the nature of the seized property.
Id. 	Government interests to consider include the Government’s legitimate interest in
holding the property as evidence, the nature and complexity of the investigation, the
quality of the warrant application and the amount of time expected to prepare the
application and other evidence proving or disproving law enforcement’s diligence in
obtaining the warrant. Id.
Here, the stop took place at approximately 1:45 am. on October 6, 2023. 	The
stop ended in Walker’s arrest for operating while intoxicated (OWI). Walker was put in
a holding cell at approximately 3:06 a.m. 	While Walden was writing up charges, Jones
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mentioned the baggie he had observed on the dashboard of the truck during the stop. At
approximately 4:05 a.m., the officers returned to Walker’s truck where they observed
the baggie. The truck was towed to the police station at 5:00 a.m. Walden’s shift ended
at 7:00 a.m. Walker was released from custody at approximately 3:55 p.m. and Walden
obtained a search warrant for the vehicle at approximately 11:15 p.m. 	The search took
place approximately 15 minutes later. Walker went to the police department on October
14, 2023, to retrieve his truck, at which point he was arrested pursuant to warrants that
had been issued as a result of the search of his truck. Doc. 39-1 at 14.
Walker relies heavily on the fact that his interest in his vehicle was substantial, as
he is an out-of-state resident who was dependent on it for transportation to his home state
and to work in Iowa. While the interference with Walker’s possession of his vehicle may
have been significant, the duration of the delay here was not. 	Walker was not released
from custody until just before 4:00 p.m. The search took place a little over seven hours
later. While the vehicle had been in police custody since about 5:00 a.m., there is nothing
in the record explaining the delay except, perhaps, Walden’s shift schedule, which ended
at 7:00 a.m. and presumably picked up later again that day during which Walden obtained
the search warrant.
With respect to other types of property, courts have found delays extending to 12
months for search of a seized cell phone7 and up to 13 months for search of a seized
7 See United States v. Jones, No. 23-cr10125-ADB, 2024 WL 4542929, at *4-*7 (D. Mass. Oct.
22, 2024) (finding four-month delay in obtaining search warrant for seized cell phone not
unreasonable); United States v. Ortega, No. 21-CR-665, 2023 WL 2712533, at *5 (D.N.M.
Mar. 30, 2023) (nine-month delay in obtaining search warrant for seized cell phone not
unreasonable); United States v. Davis, No. 18-cr-20085-02, 2021 WL 4192045 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 15, 2021) (12-month delay in obtaining search warrant for seized cell phone not
unreasonable).
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computer8 to be reasonable. 	Vehicles are unique because they are subject to the
automobile exception, which means they may be searched without a warrant so long as
there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains articles of criminal activity.
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48. 	Here, the officers had probable cause based on their
observations of a baggie with a white powdery substance on the dashboard of the vehicle
and their knowledge of Walker’s criminal drug history. 	While this would have allowed
them to search the vehicle on the side of the road, or once it had been towed to the police
station, they opted to seize the vehicle and obtain a search warrant. 	Both methods are
reasonable. 	See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52 (“For constitutional purposes, we see no
difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate
search without a warrant. 	Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”).
However, Walker argues the delay in towing and getting a search warrant
undermines the “ready mobility” rationale of the automobile exception. I disagree. First,
there was no delay in towing the vehicle. 	The seizure of the vehicle was not based on
the initial stop. 	It was based on Jones’ report back at the police station that he had
observed a baggie with a white powdery substance during the stop and Walden’s
subsequent verification of what Jones had observed. 	The vehicle was towed within an
hour of Walden’s observation of the baggie. 	The fact that Jones did not immediately
report to Walden what he had observed during the stop does not undermine the probable
cause determination. 	The incriminating object he had observed was still present in the
vehicle when the officers returned to it on the side of the road and determined that it
8 United States v. Howe, 545 F. App’x 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2013) (13-month delay in obtaining a
search warrant for the search of a laptop computer was not unreasonable); United States v.
Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2013) (five-month delay in obtaining search warrant
for seized computer not unreasonable).
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should be towed pursuant to the automobile exception. 	Second, the record establishes
that Gorda was in the process of determining how to retrieve the vehicle around the time
it was towed. 	If he had reached it before Walden and Jones, the evidence in the vehicle
would have been lost. This is precisely why the automobile exception exists.
I do not find the approximate 18-hour delay from the seizure until the search
warrant was obtained to be unreasonable, particularly given the evidence of a shift change
during this time and the absence of any evidence that the delay was for an improper
purpose.9 See United States v. Whipple, 92 F.4th 605, 613 (6th Cir. 2024) (concluding
three-day delay between impoundment of vehicle and procurement of search warrant was
reasonable). 	The delay in obtaining a search warrant after seizing Walker’s vehicle did
not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation. 	Walker’s objections related to the delay
in obtaining the search warrant are overruled.
3. 	Other Factors
Finally, Walker objects to the R&R’s consideration (or lack thereof) of other
factors that he contends affect the probable cause determination. These include the timing
of events, the purpose of the stop, Walker’s criminal history and the circumstances
surrounding the seizure of Walker’s keys. 	Walker argues that each of these factors in
the context of the investigation undermines any probable cause to justify seizure of the
vehicle.
Walker questions the timing of the seizure of the vehicle, noting that prior to going
back to the scene, Walden had no intention to seize the vehicle. He notes Gorda testified
that someone from the Meskwaki Police Department had told him he could move the
vehicle. Walker emphasizes that there was no discussion of the baggie until after Walker
9 See Doc. 45 at 38 (“Q: Why didn’t you make application for a search warrant around 5:00 in
the morning? 	A: My shift ended at 7:00, so I imagine that had something to do with it, but I
don’t recall specifics.”).
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had been detained and booked in the jail and officers had learned of his criminal history.
He also notes he was arrested for OWI and Walden’s report does not indicate he suspected
Walker of being under the influence of anything other than alcohol. 	Walker does not
specifically address the relevance of these facts or how he believes they affect the
probable cause determination. See Doc. 50 at 7-9, 12-13. Nor does he cite any authority
that the expansion of the investigation (from OWI to a drug investigation) based on Jones’
observations was unlawful.
The Eighth Circuit has recognized that “[a]n investigative stop can grow out of a
traffic stop so long as the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to expand
his investigation, even if his suspicions were unrelated to the traffic offense that served
as the basis of the stop.” United States v. Gomez Serena, 368 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir.
2004) (citing United States v. Long, 320 F.3d 795, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2003)). 	It was
reasonable for officers to expand the scope of their investigation once Walden was made
aware of Jones’ observation during the stop and upon making the plain view observation
of the baggie from outside the vehicle. 	The drug investigation did not unreasonably
prolong the stop as the purpose of the stop (OWI investigation) had already been
accomplished and Walker had been booked into the jail. 	While the vehicle could have
been moved between the time that Walker was arrested and Jones informed Walden of
his observation, it was not. This allowed the officers to continue their investigation based
on Jones’ observation. 	Walker’s objections related to the timing of events and purpose
of the stop are overruled.
With regard to Walker’s criminal history, Walker notes that Judge Roberts
factored in Walker’s criminal history as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis
but contends that he weighed it improperly because it has to be a factor at the time of
arrest or seizure and not later investigative developments. 	See Doc. 50 at 14 (citing
Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa 1983)). He contends that the stop gave
Walden no reason to suspect Walker of any drug involvement. 	Judge Roberts reasoned
that there was probable cause to seize the vehicle based, in part, on Walker’s criminal
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history. Doc. 44 at 10. Specifically, he observed that Walker admitted to having a felony
drug conviction in Colorado and discussed this with the officers. 	Id. (citing Gov. Ex. 1
at 48:13-49:14, 53:31-54:07, 1:05:00-1:09:02; Gov. Ex. 3). 	Government Exhibit 1
demonstrates that Walden learned of Walker’s criminal history prior to seizure of the
vehicle and thus, it was appropriately considered as a factor in determining whether there
was probable cause to seize the vehicle. 	Walker’s objections related to consideration of
his criminal history in the probable cause analysis are overruled.
Finally, Walker argues the R&R ignores contradictory and irreconcilable evidence
concerning his vehicle keys. He notes that Walden testified he placed Walker’s keys into
an evidence bag at the roadside before transport to the jail, but the property receipt from
the jail does not include any keys. 	He then refers to Walden’s report, in which Walden
indicated he retrieved the keys from Walker’s property and left him a seized property
receipt. 	Without a documented chain of custody for the keys, Walker argues the
Government cannot establish that the vehicle remained sealed and was not accessed
during the 18-hour delay prior to the warrant. He contends this discrepancy undermines
Walden’s credibility and the reliability of the Government’s evidence.
This objection is unsupported and speculative. 	Walden testified that he took
Walker’s keys and put them in an evidence bag, not because they were evidence of
something but to hold them for Walker until he was released. Doc. 45 at 47-48. Walker
has submitted only a seized property receipt (Doc. 39-5) for the vehicle and a property
control report (Doc. 39-6) following the search of his vehicle. These reports do not relate
to personal property that was taken from Walker while he was booked in the jail and
Walker has not provided any such log of personal property from the jail. 	In any event,
the evidence does not suggest any nefarious conduct regarding Walker’s keys. 	It shows
that Walden put Walker’s keys in an evidence bag to take them back to the jail to keep
with his other personal belongings. 	After officers returned to the scene and made their
observations of the baggie that Jones had observed, they decided to seize the vehicle and
apply for a search warrant. 	At that point, Walden removed Walker’s keys from his
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personal belongings and left him a seized property receipt (as they were now tied to
evidence that officers were holding pending a search warrant). While that seized property
receipt is not in the record, its absence alone is insufficient to raise concerns about the
propriety of the search and certainly does not affect the probable cause analysis as to the
seizure of the vehicle. This objection is overruled.
Overall, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the officers had probable
cause to seize the vehicle for the reasons found by Judge Roberts: signs of impairment
they observed during the stop, Walker’s criminal history and the plain view observation
of the baggie. 	Additionally, while not challenged in Walker’s objections, I agree with
Judge Roberts that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the search
warrant pursuant to Leon.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein:
1. 	Walker’s objections (Doc. 50) to the Report and Recommendation (Doc.
44) are overruled;
2. 	I accept the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 44) without modification;
3. 	Pursuant to the Report and Recommendation, Walker’s motion (Doc. 31)
to suppress evidence is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of November, 2025.
__________________________
Leonard T. Strand
United States District Judge
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