Xue v. Dosanj

1:26-cv-00200Hid27.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
JUN B.X.,
Petitioner,
vs.
SHIKHA DOSANJ, in her official capacity
as Warden of the Federal Detention Center,
Honolulu, Hawai‘i,
Respondent.
Civil No. 26-00200 MWJS-RT
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A# 213-535-729
ORDER GRANTING PETITION OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Jun B.X.1 was arrested by immigration authorities on June 3, 2025. He
has been ordered removed from the United States, and the government is making
efforts to effectuate that removal. But all the while, Petitioner sits in immigration
detention. That detention has now lasted nearly eleven months.
Against this backdrop, Petitioner invokes this court’s habeas jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 2241, contending—in Count I of his petition—that his immigration detention
has become unlawfully prolonged. He notes that under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), detention beyond six months to effectuate
1 	For reasons explained in Sergio D.L.S. v. Warden, Cal. City Corr. Ctr., No. 1:26-cv-
02821-MWJS, 2026 WL 1049713, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026), only Petitioner’s first
name and the initials of his middle and last names are used in this order.
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removal is presumptively unreasonable. And he argues the government has not
overcome that presumption.
Petitioner is correct that, because he has been arrested to effectuate an order of
removal, a 90-day “removal period” applies, under which Petitioner may lawfully be
detained. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1) and (a)(2). That period may be extended beyond the 90
days under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and the language of the provision places no express
limit on the length of further extensions. But in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court rejected
the notion that § 1231(a)(6) allows “indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689. Instead,
adopting a limiting construction, the Court held that § 1231(a)(6) allows detention of a
noncitizen currently in the United States only for “a period reasonably necessary to
bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the United States.” Id. It follows that
“once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by statute.” Id. at 699.
The Zadvydas Court also provided guidance on how to apply this limiting
construction of the statute. A detention period of six months after a removal order is to
be treated as “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 701. On the other side of six months,
however, if the noncitizen “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” then the government “must
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
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This court has recently ruled on two habeas petitions brought by individuals
who, like Petitioner here, were being held in immigration detention at the Federal
Detention Center in Honolulu (the “FDC”). In each of those cases, after full rounds of
briefing, the court determined that the petitioner had provided “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,”
and that the government had not responded “with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.” Id. In the first of these cases, Vu v. Dosanj, Civ. No. 26-00013, 2026 WL
594740 (D. Haw. Mar. 3, 2026), the petitioner had been in immigration detention for
over eight months. Because the court found that the government did not offer sufficient
rebuttal evidence that removal to the petitioner’s country of origin was likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the court granted the petition. The petitioner in Malik v.
Dosanj, Civ. No. 26-00060, 2026 WL 638483 (D. Haw. Mar. 6, 2026), meanwhile, had been
in immigration custody for nearly ten months, and the court there granted the petition
because it found that the government did not offer sufficient evidence of success in
finding a third country that would accept the petitioner (his own home country not
being an option).
Given the apparent factual and legal similarities between Count I of the petition
here and the factual records that were fully developed in Malik and Vu, the court issued
an Order to Show Cause, noting that this case might be suitable for expedited
disposition, and calling on the government to identify any factual or legal issues in this
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case that distinguish Count I of the present petition from the court’s prior orders in
Malik or Vu. Dkt. No. 6. The court appreciates the government’s timely and candid
answer. Dkt. No. 7. In it, the government concurs “that this case can be determined in
an expedited manner,” acknowledges that “the legal issues in this case are not
substantively distinguishable from Malik and/or Vu,” and rests its opposition to the
petition on an “incorporat[ion] [of] the Government’s arguments set forth in those
cases.” Id. at PageID.124-25.
As there are no factual or legal issues in this case that would distinguish it from
this court’s prior orders, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas
corpus, Dkt. No. 1, is GRANTED as to Count I. 2 The court ORDERS Respondent
Shikha Dosanj, the Warden of the FDC, to immediately release Petitioner from
detention under the conditions in his preexisting order of supervision. The parties are
ORDERED to file a joint status report by May 1, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has
been released. And any fee petition must be filed within the deadlines set by the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1162 (10th Cir.
2025).
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment for
Petitioner.
2 	Because it is unnecessary to do so, the court declines to resolve the remaining
counts in the petition.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 27, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 26-00200 MWJS-RT; Jun B.X. v. Shikha Dosanj; ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
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