Pitts v. Johnson et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JOSEPH PITTS,
#A0259019,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TOMMY JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 26-00182 DKW-RT
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Joseph Pitts’ Prisoner Civil Rights
Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 ECF No. 1. In the Complaint,
Pitts alleges that various prison officials, including eight named defendants and ten
Doe defendants,2 violated his rights by denying him adequate medical care (Counts
I, II, III, and IV), denying him access to the courts (Counts I and IV), denying him
due process (Counts II, III, and IV), and retaliating against him (Count IV) during
1 Pitts is currently incarcerated at Halawa Correctional Facility. See ECF No. 1 at PageID.1;
VINE, https://vinelink.vineapps.com/search/HI/Person (select “ID Number”; enter “A0259019”;
and select “Search”) (last visited Apr. 23, 2026).
2 Pitts names as defendants: (1) Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Tommy Johnson; (2) Deputy Director Melanie Martin; (3) Health Care Administrator Romey
Glidewell; (4) Clinical Services Administrator Mandy Feldt; (5) Doctor Daniel Park; (6) Daniel
T. Burns; (7) Medical Supervisor Christina Vidinha; (8) Nurse Meta; and “John/Jane Does 1 thru
10.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.1–5.
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his incarceration at Halawa Correctional Facility (HCF).3 Id. at PageID.6–12.
After conducting the required screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(a), the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend. If Pitts
wants to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted
deficiencies in his claims on or before May 22, 2026. Alternatively, instead of
filing an amended pleading, Pitts may inform the Court in writing on or before
May 22, 2026 that he would like to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a
“strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).4
I. 	BACKGROUND5
On July 31, 2025, Pitts’ prescription eyeglasses were stolen while he was
incarcerated at HCF. ECF No. 1 at PageID.7. Starting the next day, and through
February 2026, Pitts submitted at least sixteen requests to replace his glasses and to
3 Each of the Complaint’s four counts involves more than one issue. In any amended pleading
that Pitts files, he must follow the instructions on the court-approved form and include only one
issue in each count. Separate issues must be stated in different counts.
4 In general, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from filing a civil action in forma pauperis
if he or she has on three or more occasions brought an action in federal court that was dismissed
as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
5 The Complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of
screening. See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014).
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see an optometrist. Id. According to Pitts, he has “blurred vision” and cannot see
clearly more than two feet in front of him without glasses. Id.
HCF does not have an optometrist, and Pitts was repeatedly told that his
name had been added to a referral list. Id. at PageID.7–8. Pitts was also told that
the list included approximately fifty inmates’ names. Id. at PageID.8. Although
Pitts’ vision was tested at least once by Dr. Park at HCF, on March 9, 2026, he
says he has yet to see an optometrist. Id. at PageID.7–8.
Pitts also developed a “large bulge” on the back of his neck during the last
six months. Id. at PageID.9. The bulge is now approximately the size of a “large
golf ball.” Id. Dr. Park examined Pitts on an unspecified date and diagnosed the
bulge as a lipoma.6 Id. Pitts submitted multiple requests related to the bulge, and
he was referred to an outside doctor to have the lipoma removed. Id. Pitts is
waiting to see the doctor for the removal. Id.
On January 30, 2026, Pitts received written notice from Daniel Burns that an
inmate grievance form was being returned because it was duplicative of Pitts’
earlier grievances. ECF No. 10. Burns warned Pitts that filing duplicative
6 A “lipoma” is “a lump of fatty tissue that grows just under the skin. . . . Most lipoma’s aren’t
painful and don’t cause health problems so they rarely need treatment.” Cleveland Clinic,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/15008-lipomas (last visited Apr. 21, 2026)
[https://perma.cc/L3E2-4C35].
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grievances could be used against him and might result in a misconduct report and
grievance restrictions. Id.
Pitts commenced this lawsuit after signing the Complaint on April 1, 2026.
Id. at PageID.15. In the Complaint, Pitts alleges that defendants violated his rights
by denying him adequate medical care (Counts I, II, III, and IV), denying him
access to the courts (Counts I and IV), denying him due process (Counts II, III, and
IV), and retaliating against him (Count IV). 	Id. at PageID.6–12. Pitts seeks
injunctive relief and $10,000 in damages. Id. at PageID.15. The Court granted
Pitts in forma pauperis status on April 22, 2026. ECF No. 3.
II. 	STATUTORY SCREENING
The Court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints
filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018).
Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or
seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same
standard as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v.
Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a
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complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the
facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief
from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.
In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants’
pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it
appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d
at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d
1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Joinder
At this point, it is not clear that Pitts’ claims related to his vision care should
be joined with his claims related to his lipoma.
When a single defendant is named in a lawsuit, a party may bring as many
claims as it has against that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “To name different
defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy Rule 20,
governing joinder of parties.” Weeks v. Espinda, 2010 WL 2218631, at *3 (D.
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Haw. June 2, 2010). Rule 20(a)(2) allows multiple defendants to be joined in one
action only if (1) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A), (B). “Unrelated
claims involving different defendants belong in different suits.” What v. Honolulu
Police Dep’t, 2014 WL 176610, at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2014).
If Pitts decides to file an amended complaint, he may state several claims
against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18. He may also add any additional
claims against other defendants, if those claims arise from the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions as his original claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
Pitts may not, however, pursue a combination of unrelated claims in a single suit.
See Char v. Kaiser Hosp., 2019 WL 80890, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 2, 2019)
(“Unrelated claims involving different defendants must be brought in separate
actions.”). The fact that Pitts’ claims all appear to be based on events that occurred
at HCF, without more, is not enough to join them in a single lawsuit. See Woolen
v. Ramos, 2024 WL 3361116, at *4 (D. Haw. July 10, 2024). An attempt to join
claims that are not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will result in
those claims being dismissed as improperly joined. In deciding which claim or
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claims, if any, he wants to pursue in this lawsuit, Pitts must consider the following
legal standards.
B. 	Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under
color of’ law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.’” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).
At various points in the Complaint, Pitts cites policies adopted by the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at PageID.6–
10. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[, a] plaintiff must allege that
defendants violated his federal rights, not state regulations such as prison policies.
The violation of prison policies or state regulations does not necessarily violate the
federal constitution.” Gallegos v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2025 WL
1993557, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2025).
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C. 	Causation
“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that the defendant’s
conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.” Harper v. City of Los
Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Bearchild v.
Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1150 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). “To meet this causation
requirement, the plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate
causation.” Harper, 533 F.3d at 1026. A defendant’s “conduct is an actual cause
of . . . injury only if the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ that conduct.”
White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “The
proximate cause question asks whether the unlawful conduct is closely enough tied
to the injury that it makes sense to hold the defendant legally responsible for the
injury.” Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2018).
“Proximate cause is said to depend on whether the conduct has been so significant
and important a cause that the defendant should be legally responsible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he touchstone of proximate
cause in a § 1983 action is foreseeability.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
At this point, the Court cannot tell what each defendant allegedly did or
failed to do to violate Pitts’ rights. In any amended pleading that he files, Pitts
must link each defendant to an alleged violation of his rights under federal law.
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D. 	Supervisory Liability
Pitts names as defendants various supervisory officials, including Director
Johnson, Deputy Director Martin, Administrator Glidewell, and Nurse Vidinha.
ECF No. 1 at PageID.1–5.
There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Vazquez
v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020). “Because vicarious
liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 	“A supervisory official may be
held liable under § 1983 only if there exists either (1) his or her personal
involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection
between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”
Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “The requisite causal connection can be established by
setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to terminate a
series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have
known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Felarca v. Birgeneau,
891 F.3d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Thus, a supervisor may be liable in his individual capacity for his own
culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his
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subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct
that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Rodriguez v.
County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). A “claim that a supervisory official knew of unconstitutional
conditions and culpable actions of his subordinates but failed to act amounts to
acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates and is sufficient to
state a claim of supervisory liability.” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). A defendant’s supervisory position, without more, is
not enough to state a claim. See Meafou v. Hawaii, 2025 WL 3720146, at *8 (D.
Haw. Dec. 23, 2025).
E. 	Eighth Amendment – Denial of Adequate Medical Care
Pitts alleges in all four counts that he was denied adequate medical care.
ECF No. 1 at PageID.6–9.
To establish a claim of inadequate medical care, a convicted prisoner must
show both a “serious medical need” and that an official’s response to the need was
“deliberately indifferent.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir.
2019) (per curiam).
A serious medical need is present when, for example, the “‘failure to treat a
prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 785 (internal quotation marks and citations
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omitted). “Serious medical needs can relate to physical, dental and mental health.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Even with a serious medical need, the plaintiff must also allege facts
showing deliberate indifference. “To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff
must show that the course of treatment the [official] chose was medically
unacceptable under the circumstances and that the [official] chose this course in
conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health.” Id. at 786
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). This is a
“high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).
“An inadvertent or negligent failure to provide adequate medical care is
insufficient to establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment.” Edmo, 935 F.3d at
786 (citation omitted). “In other words, [m]edical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).
F. 	Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process
Pitts also appears to allege in all four counts that he was denied due process.
ECF No. 1 at PageID.6–9.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. These protections extend to prisoners, who are “entitled to
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certain due process protections when subject to disciplinary sanctions.” Brown v.
Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). To state a procedural due
process claim, a prisoner must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest,
(2) allege that the government deprived the prisoner of that interest, and (3) allege
a lack of process. Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000).
Critically, the absence of a procedure alone is insufficient to state a claim—a
plaintiff must also allege that he was deprived of a protected interest.
In the prison context, these protected interests typically “pertain[] to liberty,”
not property. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
And protected liberty interests may arise under either the federal Due Process
Clause or state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). The
federal Due Process Clause is implicated when a prisoner faces a change in
conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner.
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
493 (1980) (transfer from prison to mental hospital triggers the Due Process
Clause); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (“unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs” implicates the Due Process Clause). Less
severe changes in confinement can also trigger due process protections, so long as
the prisoner faces an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Brown, 751 F.3d at
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987 (describing factors that bear on whether a prisoner faces an atypical and
significant hardship).
G. 	First Amendment
1. 	Access to the Courts
Pitts alleges in Counts I and IV that he has been denied access to the courts.
ECF No. 1 at PageID.6, 10.
“The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of
grievances from prison authorities and ... a right of meaningful access to the
courts.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted).
Although prisoners do not have a “claim of entitlement to a grievance
procedure,” Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988) (order), “[t]he right
of meaningful access to the courts extends to established prison grievance
procedures,” Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on
other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 n.2 (2001). “This right is
subsumed under the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress
of grievances, [and] protects both the filing and content of prison grievances.”
Silverman v. Christian, No. 18-01115, 2018 WL 2149791, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9,
2018). “[I]nterference with the grievance process may, in certain circumstances,
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implicate the First Amendment.” Howell v. Lindquist, No. 2:19-cv-0612, 2019
WL 2491182, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2019).
“To establish a violation of the right of access to the courts, a prisoner must
establish that he or she has suffered an actual injury.” Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
349 (1996)). “Actual injury is a jurisdictional requirement that flows from the
standing doctrine and may not be waived.” Id. (citation omitted). “It is actual
prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to
meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The prisoner “must identify a ‘nonfrivolous,’ ‘arguable’
underlying claim” and the specific remedy he lost through “allegations in the
complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U.S. 403, 415–16 (2002) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). Failure to
allege an actual injury to a “‘non-frivolous legal claim’” is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill,
518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.4).
2. 	Retaliation
Pitts alleges in Count IV that Burns retaliated against him. ECF No. 1 at
PageID.10.
“[A] prisoner can make a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation by
alleging five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse
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action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and
that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights,
and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”
Chavez v. Robinson, 12 F.4th 978, 1001 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
H. 	Doe Defendants
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize or prohibit the use of
fictitious parties, although Rule 10 requires a plaintiff to include the names of all
parties in his complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Doe defendants are generally
disfavored, however, because it is effectively impossible for the United States
Marshal to serve an anonymous defendant. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637,
642 (9th Cir. 1980) (“As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a
defendant is not favored.” (citation omitted)).
A plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as John or Jane Doe 1, John or
Jane Doe 2, and so on, but he must allege specific facts showing how each Doe
defendant violated his rights. The plaintiff may then use the discovery process to
obtain the names of doe defendants and seek leave to amend to name those
defendants, unless it is clear that discovery will not uncover the identities, or that
the complaint will be dismissed on other grounds. See Wakefield v. Thompson,
177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642).
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Although Pitts names as Defendants “John/Jane Does 1 thru 10,” ECF No. 1
at PageID.1, he fails to allege how any specific Doe defendant violated his rights
under federal law. See Conklin v. Espinda, 2019 WL 2397802, at *6 (D. Haw.
June 6, 2019) (dismissing claims against unknown defendants where plaintiff
failed to explain how each doe defendant personally violated plaintiff's civil
rights).
IV. 	LEAVE TO AMEND
The Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Pitts must
file any amended pleading on or before May 22, 2026. Pitts may not expand his
claims beyond those already alleged herein or add new claims without explaining
how those new claims relate to the claims alleged in the Complaint. Claims that do
not properly relate to those in the Complaint are subject to dismissal.
Pitts must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local
Rules for the District of Hawaii. Local Rule 10.4 requires that an amended
complaint be complete in itself, without reference to any prior pleading. An
amended complaint must be short and plain, comply with Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and be submitted on the Court’s prisoner civil rights
form. See LR99.2(a). An amended complaint will supersede the preceding
complaint. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th
Cir. 2015). Defendants not renamed and claims not realleged in an amended
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complaint may be deemed voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey v. Maricopa County,
693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).
V. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
If Pitts fails to file an amended complaint or is unable to amend his claims to
cure their deficiencies, this dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(g). Under this “3-strikes” provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action
or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis,
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
VI. 	CONCLUSION
(1) The Court DISMISSES the Complaint, ECF No. 1, with leave to amend.
If Pitts wants to proceed with any of his claims, he must file an amended pleading
that cures the noted deficiencies in those claims on or before May 22, 2026.
(2) ALTERNATIVELY, instead of filing an amended pleading, Pitts may
inform the Court in writing on or before May 22, 2026 that he would like to
voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
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(3) Failure to comply with these deadlines may result in AUTOMATIC
DISMISSAL of this suit without further notice, and Pitts may incur a strike under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
(4) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Pitts a blank prisoner civil rights
complaint form so that he can comply with this order if he elects to file an
amended pleading.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 23, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawaiʻi.
Joseph Pitts v. Tommy Johnson, et al.; Civil No. 26-00182 DKW-RT; ORDER
DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
_______________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
/s/ Derrick K. Watson
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