Cabral v. County of Maui, Office of Mayor et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SYLVIA CABRAL
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
COUNTY OF MAUI, OFFICE OF
MAYOR, ET AL.,
Defendants/Respondents.
CIV. NO. 26-00062 JMS-KJM
ORDER (1) GRANTING
APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS, ECF NO. 3;
AND (2) TO SHOW CAUSE WHY
MATTER SHOULD NOT BE
DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
ORDER (1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS, ECF NO. 3; AND (2) TO SHOW CAUSE WHY MATTER
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff/Petitioner Sylvia Cabral’s
(“Plaintiff”) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or
Costs, ECF No. 3, filed along with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint against the Maui
County Mayor’s Office, Maui Police Department, “Development Services Admin”
(“DSA”), and State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources
(“DLNR”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 1. Based on the Complaint,
Plaintiff’s claims are untimely. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the
IFP Application and ORDERS Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE in writing why this
matter should not be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
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II. IFP APPLICATION
Federal courts may authorize the commencement of any suit without
prepayment of fees or security by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a
statement of all assets the person possesses, demonstrating that she is unable to pay
such costs or give such security. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). “An affidavit in
support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot
pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees,
787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)).
When reviewing a motion pursuant to § 1915(a), the court must
determine whether a plaintiff has alleged poverty “with some particularity,
definiteness and certainty.” Id. (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938,
940 (9th Cir. 1981)). Although § 1915(a) does not require a litigant to demonstrate
“absolute[] destitut[ion],” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339, the applicant must nonetheless
show that she is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1).
The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s IFP Application and determines
that she has made the required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to proceed in
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forma pauperis (i.e., without prepayment of fees). The court therefore grants the
IFP Application.
III. BACKGROUND
The Complaint provides little factual content, but a declaration by
Plaintiff buried in the numerous documents attached to the Complaint discloses
some context:
• 	“[Plaintiff] was the lawful possessor of real property located at Grant
1388 Tax Map Key 2-2-4-8 Lots 7 & 7A aka Lots 9 & 10 aka Lots
131 & 132 at 10 Kanaio Kalama Road, Kula, Hawaiʻi, comprising
approximately three (3) acres of agriculturally zoned land (the
‘Property’), until I was wrongfully dispossessed through unlawful
government and private actions described below.”
• 	“From approximately 2003 to 2017, agents of Maui County and
private developers used my land as an access point ground zero as the
infrastructure route for a geothermal and subdivision project involving
2,000 to 9000 [sic] acres of adjacent land, without notice to me or my
consent.”
• 	“My family and I invested nearly two decades of continuous labor
into improving and maintaining the Property, including building
agricultural infrastructure and cultivating the land under lawful
agricultural use including installing a legal home bakeshop business
with $350,000 cash and years of unpaid harsh hard slave labor.”
• 	“Despite this, no condemnation proceeding was ever initiated, and I
received no compensation for the use, interference, or ultimate taking
of my land.”
• 	“I was falsely assured by attorney Thomas Leuteneker, of [Carlsmith
Ball], that I would retain my land and that legal action would be taken
on my behalf. No such protection ever materialized.”
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• 	“In one of the most egregious events, a serially convicted felon was
permitted to foreclose on the Property—by foreclosing against
himself—in what I believe was a fraudulent proceeding aided by
willful inaction from County officials and law enforcement and the
partnering of Tom Leuteneker for his own gains.”
• 	“I repeatedly alerted the Maui County Police Department, the Maui
County DSA, and other authorities to the ongoing misuse of my land
and fraudulent activity. My reports were ignored.”
• 	“As a direct result of these actions and omissions, I, along with my
family, lost our land, were forcibly removed, and suffered immense
financial, physical, traumatic shock and emotional harm from years of
hard work then homelessness.”
ECF No. 1-6 at PageID.38–39.
Specific to her § 1983 claim, Plaintiff alleges:
Several Maui County Mayors, throughout the
development, refused to consider allegations of fraud.
Every Police Chief refused to refer case to Prosecutors’
office. (who did request the case be sent to them) [sic]
DSA Development Services refused to consider
allegations of fraud, DLNR . . . failed to investigate
ownership of the land used to create subdivision roads &
allow compensation of the takings.
ECF No. 1 at PageID.4. She further alleges that “[i]n their official capacities, each
department violated Plaintiff’s civil rights,” and asserts federal question
jurisdiction, invoking: (1) “1st Amendment Right to Petition Govt”; (2) “4th
Amendment Free from Unlawful Seizure”; (3) “8th Amendment Cruel & Unusual
Punishment”; (4) “13th Amendment Forced Labor”; (5) “14th Amendment
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Procedural Due Process”; and (6) “14th Amendment Equal Protection.” See id. at
PageID.3. Plaintiff seeks $5 million for “losses & damages.” Id. at PageID.5.
IV. STATUTORY SCREENING
The court must screen each civil action commenced under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a) and order the dismissal of any complaint that is “frivolous or malicious;
. . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (stating that § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to
dismiss sua sponte an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim).
A “frivolous” case has been defined as one which is based upon an
indisputably meritless legal theory, see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or lacks “an arguable basis
either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). And a
court may dismiss a claim as frivolous based on the statute of limitations where it
is obvious from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred. See
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228–30 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that an action
may be dismissed at screening “where the defense is complete and obvious from
the face of the pleadings or the court’s own records”); Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d
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1021, 1025–27 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of prisoner case at screening
stage based on statute of limitations); Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 1991)
(determining that a complaint which states a claim that appears to have expired
under the applicable statute of limitations may be dismissed as frivolous under the
screening provision of § 1915).
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, the court liberally
construes the Complaint and resolves all doubts in her favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (explaining that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”);
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).
V. DISCUSSION
A. 	Statute of Limitations
Federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations and its
tolling provisions for personal injury tort actions to claims under § 1983. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). Hawaii’s two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims, Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 657-7,
applies to § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Bird. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 935 F.3d 738,
743 (9th Cir. 2019). And “[a]lthough state law determines the length of the
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limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.”
Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2000). Under
federal law, the “discovery rule” typically governs the accrual of § 1983 claims so
that “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of the action.” Id. (quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987,
991 (9th Cir. 1999)).
A federal court also “borrows the state’s equitable tolling rules” when
an analogous state law statute of limitation applies, “absent a reason not to do so.”
Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001);
see also Collins v. County of Alameda, 2024 WL 4893300, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
25, 2024) (applying California equitable tolling rules to a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). Thus, Hawaii’s doctrine of equitable tolling applies to Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims.
In turn, Hawaii has adopted federal equitable tolling principles: To
toll a statute of limitations for a claim filed after its expiration, a plaintiff must
demonstrate “(1) that [she] . . . has been pursuing [her] right diligently, and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way.” Off. of Hawaiian Affairs v.
State, 110 Haw. 338, 360, 133 P.3d 767, 789 (2006) (quoting Felter v. Norton, 412
F. Supp. 2d 118, 126 (D.D.C. 2006) (quotation marks omitted); see also Reyes v.
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HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 135 Haw. 407, 2015 WL 3476371, at *6 (Ct. App.
May 29, 2015) (applying federal equitable tolling principles to fraudulent
concealment); Paco v. Myers, 143 Haw. 330, 2018 WL 6177430, at *2 (Ct. App.
Nov. 27, 2018); Chun v. City & County of Honolulu, 2020 WL 3965943, at *3 (D.
Haw. July 13, 2020); Spriestersbach v. Hawaii, 622 F. Supp. 3d 948, 957 (D. Haw.
2022). “Extraordinary circumstances are circumstances that are beyond the control
of the complainant and make it impossible to file a complaint within the statute of
limitations.” Off. of Hawaiian Affairs, 110 Haw. at 360, 133 P.3d at 789. This test
“is a very high bar, and is reserved for rare cases.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751
F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014).
B. 	Application
Here, it is obvious from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff’s
claims are time-barred. First, Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to her
claims started in 1996 and continued through her “eviction through fraudulent
foreclosures . . . in 2014 until the subdivision was completed approx. 2016–2019.”
ECF No. 1 at PageID.4. But she does not allege any events that took place within
the two-year statute of limitations. Second, an exhibit list attached to the
Complaint refers to a “Timeline of Events: 1996–2024 (Land Use, Evictions,
Forced Labor, Retaliation),” see ECF No. 1-2 at PageID.19, but that timeline is not
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attached to the Complaint, see ECF No. 1. Third, Plaintiff’s declaration is dated
July 4, 2025, but she does not allege any extraordinary circumstances that made it
impossible to file her Complaint within the limitations period to justify equitable
tolling. See ECF No. 1-6 at PageID.39. Finally, Plaintiff’s “Notice of Intent to
Commence Legal Actions—Draft for U.S. District Court,” also dated July 4, 2025,
does not save her untimely claims. See ECF No. 1-9 at PageID.71. This “draft,”
even if liberally construed to be part of the Complaint, does not allege events that
occurred within the limitations period. See generally, ECF No. 1-9. And although
Plaintiff declares that she suffered injuries resulting from Defendants’ actions, “a
mere continuing impact from past violations is not actionable.” Knox v. Davis, 260
F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Grimes v. City and County of San
Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 238–39 (9th Cir. 1991)) (quotation marks omitted).
Because the Complaint does not appear timely on its face, the court
orders Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE, by March 17, 2026, why her Complaint should
not be dismissed as barred by HRS § 657-7’s two-year statute of limitations.1 If
1 “While the statute of limitation is an affirmative defense, in the absence of a
defendant’s waiver, a court may raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte.” Tierney
v. Atkin, 2013 WL 1991907, at *3 (D. Haw. May 13, 2013); see also United States v. Page, 116
F.4th 822, 825 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Though the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a
district court may sua sponte consider whether a complaint is barred by the statute of
limitations.”). Nevertheless, the court will provide Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to explain
why the action is not time barred. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001)
(continued . . . )
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Plaintiff fails to respond to this Order to Show Cause, the court will dismiss the
Complaint as untimely based on the analysis above.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated:
(1) The IFP Application, ECF No. 3, is GRANTED; and
(2) By March 17, 2026, Plaintiff must SHOW CAUSE in writing
why this matter should not be dismissed as barred by HRS § 657-7’s two-year
statute of limitations.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 24, 2026.
(“[W]hile the district court has the authority to raise the statute of limitations sua sponte and to
dismiss the petition on those grounds, that authority should only be exercised after the court
provides the petitioner with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.”); Day v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209–210 (2006) (holding that district courts may “consider, sua
sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition,” but the court “must accord the parties
fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions”).
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
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