Albert v. Edward William, SL

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
KEVIN S. ALBERT and
KIMBERLY LEBLANC
ALBERT, TRUSTEES OF THE
ALBERT REVOCABLE TRUST
UAD 6/3/1997 AND RESTATED
1/7/2020,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ALLIED FINANCIAL
NETWORK, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL NO. 23-00221 DKW-WRP
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
IN PART ALLIED DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART ALLIED
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Before the Court is Defendants Allied Financial Network and Steve
Bonner’s (collectively, Allied Defendants) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, filed on
September 22, 2025 (Motion). See Motion, ECF No. 322. Plaintiffs Kevin Albert
and Kimberly Albert, as Trustees of the Albert Revocable Trust UAD 6/3/1997 and
Restated 1/7/2020 (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed their Opposition on October 20,
2025. See Opposition, ECF No. 324. Allied Defendants filed their reply on
November 3, 2025. See Reply, ECF No. 326. This matter is suitable for
disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 54.2(g) of the Local Rules of
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Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii (Local
Rules). After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions and the relevant
legal authority, the Court FINDS AND RECOMMENDS that Allied Defendants’
Motion be GRANTED IN PART.1
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
This suit arises from the loss of a luxury yacht, the Nakoa. See
Second Amended Complaint (SAC), ECF No. 84 ¶¶ 12, 44. In 2022, Plaintiffs
owned the Nakoa and obtained an Insurance Policy (the Insurance Policy) for it
from Defendant ION Insurance Group, S.A. See id. ¶¶ 12, 48. The broker for the
Insurance Policy was Defendant Steve Bonner (Defendant Bonner). See id. ¶ 56.
Bonner is the president of Defendant Allied Financial Network (Defendant Allied).
See id. Together, Allied Defendants assisted Plaintiffs with obtaining the
Insurance Policy. See id.
Plaintiffs were also working with Defendant Luxury Finance Group
(Defendant LFG) to obtain financing for the purchase of the Nakoa. 	See id. ¶ 59.
Defendant LFG required that the Insurance Policy meet certain requirements with
1 Within fourteen days after a party is served with the Findings and
Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), a party may file written
objections in the United States District Court. A party must file any objections
within the fourteen-day period to preserve appellate review of the Findings and
Recommendation.
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respect to coverage of the Nakoa. See id. ¶ 68. One of the requirements was that
the Insurance Policy must contain a “breach of warranty insurance endorsement in
an amount no less than the loan amount.” See id. ¶ 69. On October 26, 2022,
Defendant LFG emailed Defendant Bonner about these requirements. See id. ¶ 68.
On the same day, Defendant Bonner gave Defendant LFG a Certificate of
Insurance for the Nakoa and sent them an email stating “[p]lease confirm received
and all in good order.” See id. ¶ 70. On October 27, 2022, Defendant LFG replied
to this email saying that the required breach of warranty endorsement was not
included in the Insurance Policy. See id. ¶ 71. This endorsement was ultimately
never included in the Insurance Policy. See id. ¶ 72.
On December 29, 2022, Noelani Yacht Charters and Jim Jones (Jones)
purchased the Nakoa for $1.45 million to be paid over fifteen (15) years. See id. ¶¶
13, 15. Then, on February 20, 2023, the Nakoa went adrift while being used by
Jones. See id. ¶¶ 28, 38. Throughout the following several weeks, the Nakoa ran
aground, became federalized by the State of Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources, and eventually sank off the coast of Maui. See id. ¶¶ 40-44.
On April 26, 2023, Defendant ION Insurance Group, S.A. declined coverage for
the loss of the Nakoa. See id. ¶ 79.
Plaintiffs asserted eight claims against Allied Defendants in the SAC
relating to the insurance policy applicable to the Nakoa: (1) Count I for Breach of
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Contract; (2) Count III for Misrepresentation; (3) Count IV for Negligence; (4)
Count VI for Breach of Fiduciary Duty2; (5) Count VII for Respondeat Superior3;
(6) Count X for Insurance Bad Faith; (7) Count XI for Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices; and (8) Count XII for Exemplary Damages. See SAC, ECF No. 84.
On April 11, 2025, Allied Defendants moved for summary judgment
as to all claims against them. See Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 262.
On August 4, 2025, Chief District Judge Derrick K. Watson granted Allied
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. See Order ECF No. 311.
On September 22, 2025, Allied Defendants filed the present Motion
for attorneys’ fees and costs, arguing that pursuant to HRS Section 607-14, Allied
Defendants are entitled to fees in the amount of $181,720.20 and costs in the
amount of $8,197.86 as the prevailing party in this matter. See Motion for
Attorney Fees, ECF No. 322. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
recommends granting in part Allied Defendants’ Motion.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
2 Plaintiffs asserted this claim solely against Defendant Bonner.
3 Plaintiffs asserted this claim solely against Defendant Allied.
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Allied Defendants argue that, as the prevailing party in this case, they
are entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to HRS Section 607-14 which governs the
award of fees for actions in the nature of assumpsit.
HRS Section 607-14 provides: “[I]n all the courts, in all actions in the
nature of assumpsit . . . there shall be taxed as attorneys’ fees, to be paid by the
losing party and to be included in the sum for which execution may issue, a fee that
the court determines to be reasonable.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14. Attorneys’ fees
awarded pursuant to Section 607-14 “shall not exceed twenty-five per cent of the
judgment.” Id.
“In order to award reasonable attorneys’ fees under [HRS Section
607-14], the court must determine whether: (1) the action is in the nature of
assumpsit . . .; (2) the moving party is the prevailing party; (3) the fees requested
are reasonable; and (4) the fees do not exceed twenty-five percent of the
judgment.” Sheehan v. Centex Homes, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (D. Haw.
2011). The Court addresses these factors below.
A. Nature of Assumpsit
“It is well settled under Hawai’i law that ‘an action in the nature of
assumpsit includes ‘all possible contract claims.’” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Est. of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 844 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Leslie v. Est. of Tavares, 93
Haw. 1, 5, 994 P.2d 1047, 1051 (2000)). “Assumpsit is a common law form of
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action which allows for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a
contract, either express or implied, written or verbal, as well as quasi contractual
obligations.” Id. (quoting Leslie, 93 Haw. at 5, 994 P.2d at 1051). “The focus of
this analysis is thus on the ‘substance’ of the action, ‘rather than [on] the formal
language employed or the form of the pleadings.’” Id. (citing Schulz v. Honsador,
Inc., 67 Haw. 433, 436, 690 P.2d 279, 282 (1984), overruled on other grounds by
Blair v. Ing, 96 Haw. 327, 31 P.3d 184 (2001)). “Hence, the mere use of tort
language in a complaint does not control the characterization of the action as either
in assumpsit or in tort.” Id. “Instead, ‘[t]he character of the action should be
determined from the facts and issues raised in the complaint, the nature of the
entire grievance, and the relief sought.’” Id. (citing Leslie, 93 Haw. at 6, 994 P.2d
at 1052).
Further, for an action to be in the nature of assumpsit, the plaintiff’s
“primary objective must be to obtain monetary relief for breach of contract.”
Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 Haw. 251, 280, 151
P.3d 732, 761 (2007). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit “requires an evaluation of
the nature of each claim when determining whether an action is in the nature of
assumpsit.” BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., No. CIV. 09-00181
LEK-KS, 2015 WL 881577, at *7 (D. Haw. Feb. 27, 2015). In a suit with mixed
claims, the existence of contract claims may result in a finding that the action is in
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the nature of assumpsit unless those “contract claims are merely decorative . . . and
not germane to the genuine dispute being litigated.” Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229
F.3d at 884. “[W]hen there is doubt as to the nature of the suit, the presumption is
that it sounds in assumpsit and not in tort.” Healy-Tibbitts Const. Co. v. Hawaiian
Indep. Refinery, Inc., 673 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1982). The party opposing the
request for fees under HRS Section 607-14 has the burden of showing that “all
claims” alleged are not in the nature of assumpsit. Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229
F.3d at 885.
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiffs do not respond to this issue in
their Opposition and therefore waive any argument with respect to whether the
action and their individual claims are in the nature of assumpsit. See Trigueros v.
Adams, 685 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2011); Gribben v. United Parcel Serv., 528
F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Court also acknowledges that several of Plaintiffs’ claims are not
in the nature of assumpsit. For example, the following claims sound in tort:
Misrepresentation (Count III); Negligence (Count IV); Respondeat Superior
(Count VIII); and Insurance Bad Faith (Count X). See Schmidt v. Allstate Ins.
Co., Civ. No. 05-00480 DAE-KSC, 2008 WL 4753276 at * 3 (D. Haw. 2008)
(citing Enoka v. AIG Hawai’i Ins. Co., Inc., 109 Hawai’i 537, 549, 128 P.3d 850,
862 (1996)); see also Au v. Funding Grp, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1271 (D.-- --- ------------------
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Haw. 2013). Plaintiffs’ claim for Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in
violation of HRS Chapter 480 (Count X) is statutory and not in the nature of
assumpsit. See Au, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim for
Exemplary Damages (Count XII) is not a cause of action and rather is a form of
relief.
Importantly, however, the following claims are in the nature of
assumpsit: Breach of Contract (Count I) and Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count VI).
See SAC, ECF No. 84 ¶ 110 (“If coverage for all the claims related to the
Grounding and the loss of the Nakoa is denied, then it is clear [Defendant Bonner]
breached his fiduciary duties to [Plaintiffs].”); see also Schmidt, 2008 WL
4753276 at * 3 (citing 808 Dev., LLC v. Murakami, 111 Hawai’i 349, 366, 141
P.3d 996, 1013 (2006)); Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229 F.3d at 866 (citing TSA Int’l
Lyd. v. Shimizu Corp., 92 Hawai’i 243, 990 P.2d 713, 733-34 (1999)) (“where a
party’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on the non-performance or breach
of contractual obligations and the complaint seeks damages flowing from that non-
performance or breach, the claim would sound in assumpsit”).4
4 Importantly, Allied Defendants were named in Plaintiffs’ breach of contract
claim. See SAC, ECF No. 84 ¶¶ 84-86. However, as noted by Chief Judge
Watson, Plaintiffs do not clearly identify the contract at issue for Allied
Defendants. See Order, ECF No. 311, n. 33 (“With respect to Count I (AFN &
Bonner), the Alberts do not clearly identify the relevant contract.”). Indeed, the
SAC indicates that the Insurance Policy is the relevant contract, while Plaintiffs’
opposition to Allied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment alludes to an
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Although this case presents a mixed bag of assumpsit and non-
assumpsit claims, the Court finds that the substance of the entire grievance is the
alleged breach of the Insurance Policy. See Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229 F.3d at
884. Plaintiffs’ primary objective in bringing their claims against Allied
Defendants was to obtain monetary relief for the alleged breach of the Insurance
Policy. See SAC, ECF No. 84 at 15-22 (where Plaintiffs request, among other
things, the amounts due under the Insurance Policy and attorneys’ fees and costs);
see also Kahala Royal Corp., 113 Haw. at 280, 151 P.3d at 761; Helfand v. Gerson,
105 F.3d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff’s prayer for attorney fees is a
significant indication that the action is in assumpsit.”).
Further, although some of the claims sound in tort, resolution of these
claims necessarily required the resolution of the breach of contract claim, and any
doubt regarding the nature of the suit is to be resolved in favor of finding that the
action is in the nature of assumpsit. See Healy-Tibbitts Const. Co., 673 F.2d at
286. Additionally, absent any argument disputing that this action or the claims are
in the nature of assumpsit, Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that all
implied quasi-contract. See id.; SAC, ECF No. 84 ¶ 85; Memorandum in
Opposition, ECF No. 284. Regardless, Plaintiffs allege Allied Defendants owed
them one or more duties pursuant to a contract and the Court will not construe this
ambiguity in favor of Plaintiffs absent any argument about the assumpsit analysis.
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claims alleged are not in the nature of assumpsit. See Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229
F.3d at 885.
Therefore, in consideration of the claims that are in the nature of
assumpsit and Plaintiffs’ failure to dispute this issue, the Court concludes that the
assumpsit claims in this case are not merely “decorative,” but are “germane” to the
genuine dispute litigated between Plaintiffs and Allied Defendants. Id. at 884.
Accordingly, the Court FINDS that this action is in the nature of assumpsit for
purposes of HRS Section 607-14.
B. Apportionment
“A court awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 607-14 must
apportion the fees claimed between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, if
practicable.” Au v. Republic State Mortg. Co., No. CIV.11-00251 JMS, 2014 WL
770291, at *3 (D. Haw. Feb. 14, 2014) (citing Blair, 6 Haw. at 332, 31 P.3d at
189). “However, if apportionment would be impracticable because the various
claims are inextricably linked to the breach of contract, then the Court may decline
to apportion attorneys’ fees between the claims.” Bruser v. Bank of Haw., No. CV
14-00387 LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 1534189, at *5 (D. Haw. Apr. 27, 2017); Blair, 96
Haw. at 333, 31 P.3d at 190 (“Because the negligence claim in this case was
derived from the alleged implied contract and was inextricably linked to the
implied contract claim by virtue of the malpractice suit, we hold that it is
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impracticable, if not impossible, to apportion the fees between the assumpsit and
the non-assumpsit claims.”).
Judgment was entered in favor of Allied Defendants on all claims,
including the breach of contract claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The
non-assumpsit claims required resolution of the contract dispute or would not have
been brought but for the assumpsit claims. For example, Plaintiffs’ negligence
claim concerned whether Allied Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty under the
Insurance Policy and as such, turned on the resolution of the breach of contract
claim. See SAC, ECF No. 84 ¶¶ 96-99. Plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim
turned on the resolution of the breach of fiduciary claim as it intended to impute
Defendant Bonner’s liability for that claim to Defendant Allied. See id. ¶¶ 120-23.
Plaintiffs’ insurance bad faith claim concerned whether Allied Defendants
“breach[ed]” their “duty of good faith and fair dealing,” which in this case,
required determining whether Allied Defendants owed this duty to Plaintiffs
pursuant to the Insurance Policy. See id. ¶¶ 127-30. Plaintiffs’ Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices claim required a determination of whether Allied
Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiffs injury, see id. ¶¶ 131-33, similar to the
breach of fiduciary duty claim, which focused on whether Allied Defendants’
actions/omissions caused Plaintiffs injury. Finally, Plaintiffs’ exemplary damages
claim is a request for damages due to the denial of coverage under the Insurance
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Policy. See id. ¶¶ 134-35. Consequently, it too required resolution of the
assumpsit claims.
Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ SAC included very few and
extremely broad allegations in support of their non-assumpsit claims, making it
difficult to distinguish the factual bases of assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims.
For example, with respect to Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claim, Chief Judge
Watson opined that Plaintiffs “seemingly cannot even identify which aspects of the
[Insurance Policy], the investigation, and/or the denial of coverage were allegedly
misrepresented.” Order, ECF No. 311 at 31.
Considering that Plaintiffs’ non-assumpsit claims required resolution
of the contract claims, that Plaintiffs did not provide adequate factual detail to
distinguish assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, and that Plaintiffs do not oppose
Allied Defendants’ argument that the claims are inextricably linked, the Court
FINDS that apportioning the non-assumpsit claims is impracticable because they
are inextricably linked to the assumpsit claims.
C. Prevailing Party
“Section 607-14 states that reasonable attorneys’ fee[s] shall be taxed
in favor of the prevailing party against the losing party.” Au, 933 F. Supp. 2d at
1270. “In determining which party is the prevailing party in complex litigation,
Hawaiian courts focus on which party prevailed on the ‘disputed main issue.’” In
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re Hoopai, 581 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Food Pantry, Ltd. v.
Waikiki Bus. Plaza, Inc., 58 Haw. 606, 620, 575 P.2d 869, 879 (1978)). “The
‘disputed main issue,’ in turn, is identified by looking to the ‘principal issues raised
by the pleadings and proof in a particular case.’” Id. (citing Fought & Co. v. Steel
Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Haw. 37, 53, 951 P.2d 487, 502-03 (1998)). “Thus, the
‘prevailing party’ is the party that succeeds on the issue or issues that are (1) the
‘principal’ issues raised in the litigation and (2) disputed by the parties.’” Id.
The Court FINDS that Allied Defendants are the prevailing parties
because judgment was entered in their favor on all of Plaintiffs’ claims against
them. See Au, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (citing MFD Partners v. Murphy, 9 Haw.
App. 509, 514, 850 P.2d 713, 716 (1992) (stating that Hawaii courts have noted
that “a party in whose favor judgment is rendered by the district court is the
prevailing party in that court.”)).
II. 	Attorneys’ Fees
A. Allied Defendants’ Request for Attorneys’ Fees
Allied Defendants request attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$181,720.20 for work performed by counsel in litigating this matter beginning on
June 29, 2023. See Memorandum in Support of Motion, ECF No. 322-1 at 1;
Exhibit 1 to Motion, ECF No. 322-4 at 3.
Timekeeper 	Hours 	Hourly Rate 	Total Requested
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Donna A.O.
Yoshimoto, Esq.
98.1 	$145.00 	$14,224.50
Jason H. Fieman,
Esq.
119.3 	$145.00 	$17,298.50
Maya A.
VanDrunnen, Esq.
20.4 	$120.005 $2,448.00
Mia D. Obciana,
Esq.
291.4 	$275.00 	$80,135.00
Kristen A.
Yamamoto, Esq.
205.8 	$275.00 	$56,595.00
Elise C. Anderson,
Esq.
28.6 	$240.00 	$6,864.00
Jessica Rich 	15.5 	$112.00 	$1,736.00
Julius Goodwyn 	21.6 	$112.00 	$2,419.20
Total 	$181,720.20
In their Opposition, Plaintiffs re-argue the merits of their action. See
Opposition, ECF No. 324 at 2-4. These arguments are not rooted in any of the
factors applicable to awarding fees and, given that Allied Defendants were the
prevailing party in this action, the Court declines to consider additional arguments
on the merits in determining this fee request.
B. Reasonable Fees
HRS Section 607-14 requires that the Court determine the
reasonableness of the fees requested. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14. An award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees is generally based on the traditional “lodestar”
5 The chart provided to the Court had “20.4” as the rate, which appears to be a
mistake. The Court, however, observed that other portions of Exhibit 1 stated that
Ms. VanDrunnen’s hourly rate was $120.00. See, e.g., Exhibit 1 to Motion, ECF
No. 322-4 at 13.
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calculation set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). See
Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). A reasonable fee is
determined by multiplying (1) “the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation” by (2) “a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34.
i. 	Reasonable Hourly Rate
A reasonable hourly rate is determined by assessing the prevailing
market rate in the relevant community for similar work performed by attorneys of
comparable skill, experience, and reputation. See Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 938
F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2019). The relevant community is the forum in
which the district court sits. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973,
979 (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). The Court may
also rely on its own knowledge and experience in determining a reasonable hourly
rate. See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding district
court did not abuse its discretion by relying on its own knowledge and experience
to determine reasonable hourly rate for attorney fees).
Ms. Donna A.O. Yoshimoto, Esq. from Yoshimoto Law Group,
LLLC (Yoshimoto) was admitted to practice law in Hawaii in 1994. See
Declaration of Donna A.O. Yoshimoto, ECF No. 322-3 at 1. She has “represented
numerous clients in insurance defense litigation.” Id. Her regular hourly billing
rate for non-insurance clients is approximately $450. Id. Based on the evidence
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provided in support of Ms. Yoshimoto’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and
experience of the prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms.
Yoshimoto’s rate of $145 per hour is reasonable.
Mr. Jason H. Fieman, Esq. from Yoshimoto was admitted to practice
law in Hawaii in 2013. Id. at 2. He has approximately twelve (12) years of
experience litigating insurance defense cases. Id. Based on the evidence provided
in support of Mr. Fieman’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience of the
prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Mr. Fieman’s rate of $145
per hour is reasonable.
Ms. Maya A. VanDrunnen, Esq. from Yoshimoto was admitted to
practice law in Hawaii in 2022. Id. She has approximately two (2) years of
experience litigating insurance defense cases. Id. Based on the evidence provided
in support of Ms. VanDrunnen’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience of
the prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms. VanDrunnen’s
rate of $120 per hour is reasonable.
Ms. Mia D. Obciana, Esq. from Gordon Rees Sully Mansukhani, LLP
(GRSM) was admitted to practice law in Hawaii in 2005. See Declaration of Mia
D. Obciana, ECF No. 322-2 at 1. She has “represented numerous clients in
insurance defense litigation.” Id. at 2. Her regular hourly billing rate for non-
insurance clients is approximately $450. Id. Based on the evidence provided in
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support of Ms. Obciana’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience of the
prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms. Obciana’s rate of
$275 per hour is reasonable.
Ms. Kristen A. Yamamoto. Esq. from GRSM was admitted to practice
law in Hawaii in 2010. Id. She has fifteen (15) years of experience in litigation
and four (4) years of experience litigating insurance defense cases. Id. Her regular
hourly billing rate for non-insurance clients is $300. Id. Based on the evidence
provided in support of Ms. Yamamoto’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and
experience of the prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms.
Yamamoto’s rate of $275 per hour is reasonable.
Ms. Elise C. Anderson, Esq. from GRSM was admitted to practice
law in Hawaii in 2023. Id. at 3. She has approximately three (3) years of
experience litigating insurance defense cases. Id. at 2. Her regular hourly billing
rate for non-insurance clients is $275. Id. at 3. Based on the evidence provided in
support of Ms. Anderson’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience of the
prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms. Anderson’s rate of
$240 per hour is reasonable.
Ms. Jessica Rich from GRSM is a paralegal. Id. She has
approximately seven (7) years of experience in litigation and in insurance defense
cases. Id. She also is a law student at Lewis and Clark Law School. Id. Based on
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the evidence provided in support of Ms. Rich’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and
experience of the prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms.
Rich’s rate of $112 per hour is reasonable.
Mr. Julius Goodwyn from GRSM is a paralegal. Id. He has
approximately seven (7) years of experience in litigation and in insurance defense
cases. Id. He also is a graduate of the William S. Richardson School of Law. Id.
Based on the evidence provided in support of Mr. Goodwyn’s rate and the Court’s
knowledge and experience of the prevailing rates in the community, the Court
FINDS that Mr. Goodwyn’s rate of $112 per hour is reasonable.
ii. 	Hours Reasonably Expended
Allied Defendants bear the burden of proving the fees requested are
associated with the relief requested and reasonably necessary to achieve the results
obtained. See Tirona v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D.
Haw. 1993). Time expended on work deemed “excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary” will not be compensated. See Gates v. Duekmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,
1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34). The Court will further
strike or reduce block billed entries, incomplete entries that do not provide enough
information to evaluate the legal services provided, or other entries that do not
comply with the Local Rule 54.2:
(3) Description of Services Rendered. The party seeking
an award of fees must describe adequately the services
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rendered, so that the reasonableness of the requested fees
can be evaluated. In describing such services, counsel
should 	be 	sensitive 	to 	information 	protected 	by 	the
attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product
doctrine, but must nevertheless furnish an adequate non-
privileged description of the services in question. If the
time descriptions are incomplete, or if such descriptions
fail to describe adequately the services rendered, the court
may reduce the award accordingly. For example, time
entries 	for 	telephone 	conferences 	must 	include 	an
identification of all participants and the reason for the call;
entries for legal research must include an identification of
the specific issue researched and, if possible, should
identify the pleading or document for which the research
was 	necessary; 	entries 	describing 	the 	preparation 	of
pleadings 	and 	other 	documents 	must 	include 	an
identification of the pleading or other document prepared
and the activities associated with such preparation. Block
billing is not permitted, and block billed entries may be
partially or completely excluded by the court.
Local Rule 54.2(f)(3).
Plaintiffs raise numerous objections concerning the reasonableness of
the hours expended. See Opposition, ECF No. 324. First, Plaintiffs argue that “all
fees and costs incurred by Ms. Yoshimoto’s firm should not be taxed against
Plaintiffs.” Id. at 4. They claim that this firm “did little to advance the case on her
clients’ behalf.” Id. Plaintiffs, however, do not provide further argument in
support of this statement. The evidence shows that Ms. Yoshimoto’s firm handled
this complex lawsuit from June 29, 2023 through September 26, 2024. See Exhibit
1 to Motion, ECF No. 322-4. Further, the time entries appear to be reasonable.
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Without specific arguments as to why the entirety of this firm’s entries should be
stricken, the Court RECOMMENDS that this objection be overruled.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that because entries 24 and 25 on ECF No.
322-4 at PageID 4180 described work related to the Bureau of Land and Natural
Resources enforcement action (the Enforcement Action), they are not “reasonably
related” to this judgment and should not be included in the award. See Opposition,
ECF No. 324 at 4. As Allied Defendants point out, however, Plaintiffs
incorporated the Enforcement Action into the SAC and previous versions of the
Complaint. See SAC, ECF No. 84. Importantly, Plaintiffs requested damages
resulting from the Enforcement Action. See id. ¶¶ 3-4 (seeking environmental
damages and damages for the cost of salvage). Therefore, the Court finds that time
entries about the Enforcement Action are reasonably related to the instant matter
and RECOMMENDS that this objection be overruled.
Next, Plaintiffs object to entries 40, 43, and 52 on ECF No. 322-4 at
PageID.4186-87 as lacking sufficient detail to determine the legal services
provided. They argue that because the content of the research has been redacted,
“it is impossible to determine if those amounts are reasonable.” Opposition, ECF
No. 324 at 4. Allied Defendants’ sole response on this issue is that the argument
“should be disregarded because of Plaintiffs’ failure to raise these objections
during the prefiling procedures required by [Local Rule] 54.2.” Reply, ECF No.
-----
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326 at 8. Allied Defendants, however, cite no authority indicating that failure to
adhere to Local Rule 54.2 automatically results in a waiver of arguments in
opposition to the Motion. Because Allied Defendants offer no other explanation as
to why the content of the research was redacted, these entries fail to comply with
Local Rule 54.2(f)(3). The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the above entries
be stricken.
Finally, Plaintiffs object to entries 44 and 60 on ECF No. 322-4 at
PageID.4186-87 as “excessive.” See Opposition, ECF No. 324 at 5. Entry 44 at
PageID.4186 states that Mr. Fieman billed 7.00 hours for “Review, Revised and
Finalized Preliminary Evaluation Letter.” See Exhibit 1 to Motion, ECF No. 322-4
at 10. Entry 60 at PageID.4187 states that Mr. Fieman billed 9.00 hours for “Draft
Mr. Bonner and AFN’s Settlement Conference Letter to Judge Porter.” See id. at
11. The Court disagrees that these entries are “excessive.” Both the Preliminary
Evaluation Letter and the Settlement Conference Letter involve a thorough
analysis of this complex case which involves multiple years of litigation and
related pending matters, such as the Enforcement Action. Given that both of these
tasks required analysis of numerous complex issues and also resulted in a written
communication about the analysis, the Court finds that both of these entries are
reasonable and are not excessive. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that this
objection be overruled.
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While Plaintiffs raise no further objections about the reasonableness
of the hours expended, the Court FINDS that Entry 1 on ECF No. 322-4 at
PageID.4179 is inappropriately block billed. Accordingly, the Court
RECOMMENDS that this entry be stricken for failure to comply with Local Rule
54.2(f)(3).
In sum, the Court RECOMMENDS that the entries in the below table
be stricken from the award.
Date 	Timekeeper 	Hours Reduced 	Amount Reduced
6/29/2023 	DAY 	1.00 	$145.00
3/13/2024 	JHF 	6.00 	$870.00
3/20/2024 	JHF 	6.00 	$870.00
4/5/2024 	MAV 	4.10 	$492.00
TOTAL 	$2,377
Based on the Court’s analysis above, and as set forth in the table below, the
Court FINDS that the lodestar amount and apportions discussed above result in
reasonable attorneys’ fees of $179,343.20.
Timekeeper 	Hours 	Hourly Rate 	Total Requested
Donna A.O.
Yoshimoto, Esq.
98.1 	$145.00 	$14,224.50
Jason H. Fieman,
Esq.
119.3 	$145.00 	$17,298.50
Maya A.
VanDrunnen, Esq.
20.4 	$120.00 	$2,448.00
Mia D. Obciana,
Esq.
291.4 	$275.00 	$80,135.00
Kristen A.
Yamamoto, Esq.
205.8 	$275.00 	$56,595.00
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Elise C. Anderson,
Esq.
28.6 	$240.00 	$6,864.00
Jessica Rich 	15.5 	$112.00 	$1,736.00
Julius Goodwyn 	21.6 	$112.00 	$2,419.20
Sub-Total 	$181,720.20
Reduced 	$2,377
Reasonable
Attorneys’ Fees
(Sub-Total minus
Reduced)
$179,343.20
III. 	Costs
The Court is authorized to award costs pursuant to Section 607-14 and
FRCP Rule 54(d)(1). See Ko Olina Dev., LLC v. Centex Homes, No. CV. 09-
00272 DAE-LEK, 2011 WL 1235548, at *14 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2011) (citing
Fought & Co., 87 Haw. at 52, 951 P.2d at 502) (“Although Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-
14 does not expressly authorize an award of costs in addition to attorneys’ fees,
Hawaii courts award costs pursuant to § 607-14.”)).
Allied Defendants request reimbursement of costs in the amount of
$8,197.86. See Memorandum in Support of Motion, ECF No. 322-1 at 20. Allied
Defendants, however, did not submit receipts or invoices in support of their
Motion. Additionally, these costs have already been taxed. See ECF No. 319.
Therefore, the Court FINDS and RECOMMENDS that Allied Defendants’ request
for costs in the amount of $8,197.86 be DENIED.
IV. 	Total Recommended Award
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Based on the above, the Court recommends that Allied Defendants’ be
granted reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount below.
Timekeeper 	Hours 	Hourly Rate 	Total Requested
Donna A.O.
Yoshimoto, Esq.
98.1 	$145.00 	$14,224.50
Jason H. Fieman,
Esq.
119.3 	$145.00 	$17,298.50
Maya A.
VanDrunnen, Esq.
20.4 	$120.00 	$2,448.00
Mia D. Obciana,
Esq.
291.4 	$275.00 	$80,135
Kristen A.
Yamamoto, Esq.
205.8 	$275.00 	$56,595.00
Elise C. Anderson,
Esq.
28.6 	$240.00 	$6,864.00
Jessica Rich 	15.5 	$112.00 	$1,736.00
Julius Goodwyn 	21.6 	$112.00 	$2,419.20
Sub-Total 	$181,720.20
Reduced 	$2,377
Sub-Total minus
Reduced
$179,343.20
Recommended
Award of Fees
$179,343.206
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court FINDS and RECOMMENDS that
Allied Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, ECF No. 322, be
GRANTED IN PART. The Court recommends that Allied Defendants be granted
their reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $179,343.20.
6 This amount does not exceed 25% of the monetary amount at issue in the action,
as required by Section 607-14. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14; SAC, ECF No. 84.
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IT IS SO FOUND AND RECOMMENDED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 26, 2025.
Albert, et al., v. Allied Financial Network, et al., Civ. No. 23-00221 DKW-WRP;
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART ALLIED
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES.
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