Board of Trustees of the PAMCAH-UA Local 675 Pension Fund v. SMAC Hawaii, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
PAMCAH-UA LOCAL 675
PENSION FUND,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SMAC HAWAII, INC.; R&M AIR
CONDITIONING, LLC; MELVIN E.
MUNG LIM, JR., an individual;
MARGARET T. MUNG LIM, an
individual; MEGHAN M. MUNG
LIM, an individual; and DOES 1–50,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 23-00076 MWJS-KJM
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
IN PART AND DENY IN PART
PLAINTIFF BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE PAMCAH-UA
LOCAL 675 PENSION FUND’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
AND UPDATED INTEREST AND
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AWARD
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND
DENY IN PART PLAINTIFF BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PAMCAH-
UA LOCAL 675 PENSION FUND’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
AND UPDATED INTEREST AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AWARD
On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff Board of Trustees of the PAMCAH-UA Local
675 Pension Fund (“Board”) filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Updated
Interest and Liquidated Damages Award (“Motion”). ECF No. 118. On
September 9, 2025, Defendants SMAC Hawaii, Inc. (“SMAC”), R&M Air
Conditioning, LLC, Melvin E. Mung Lim, Margaret T. Mung Lim, and Meghan M.
Mung Lim (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an Opposition to the Motion
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(“Opposition”). ECF No. 129. On September 23, 2025, the Board filed a Reply.
ECF No. 130.
The Court elects to decide this matter without a hearing pursuant to Rule
7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii. After carefully considering the parties’ memoranda, applicable
law, and record in this case, the Court FINDS AND RECOMMENDS that the
district court GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART the Motion as set forth
below.
BACKGROUND
The Court and the parties are familiar with the facts and issues in this case,
which are set forth more fully in the district court’s July 18, 2025 Order Denying
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“07/18/2025 Order”). ECF No.
116, 2025 WL 2021750 (D. Haw. July 18, 2025). The Court thus recites pertinent
background facts from the 07/18/2025 Order and only provides additional relevant
details as necessary to decide the Motion.
The Board is the administrator and sponsor for the PAMCAH-UA Local 675
Pension Plan (“Plan”), which is an employee benefit pension plan. ECF No. 1. at 2
¶ 6. The Plan provides benefits for its participants, which include members of the
Plumbers & Fitters UA Local 675, formerly known as Local 675 of the United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
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Industry, AFL-CIO (“Union”). Id. at 3 ¶ 8. Contributors to the Plan’s pension
fund include employer association members and other employers who agree to be
bound by the terms of the Labor Management Agreement between the association
and the Union (“LMA”). ECF No. 84 at 9 (citations omitted).
In 1985, SMAC, an air conditioning and sheet metal company, entered into
an agreement with the Union to be a union employer and contribute to the Plan’s
pension fund. 2025 WL 2021750 at *1, 3. For three decades, SMAC made annual
payments to the pension fund. Id. at 1.
In 2012, an employee at SMAC embezzled a significant amount of money.
Id. SMAC suffered severe financial hardship and closed at the end of 2018. Id.
As SMAC was winding down, Defendant R&M Air Conditioning, LLC
(“R&M”)—a purportedly separate entity, but one with striking similarities to
SMAC—opened for business. R&M is a non-union employer and does not
contribute to any union pension fund. Id.
In September 2020, SMAC informed the Board that it had ceased operations
and was terminating its status as a signatory contractor to the Union—meaning that
it would no longer contribute to the pension fund. Id. The Board then notified
SMAC that because the pension fund was underfunded, SMAC owed withdrawal
liability of $610,255 to cover its share of the fund’s vested benefits. Id. And while
employers in the building and construction industry are generally excepted from
withdrawal liability if they cease operations in the relevant area, the Board took the
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position that SMAC was ineligible for this exception because it had effectively
continued operations as a non-union entity through R&M. Id.
The Board initiated this lawsuit to collect the withdrawal liability from
SMAC, R&M, the individual owners of these entities, and a sole proprietorship
owned by two of the individual defendants. Id. The Board and Defendants moved
for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 84, 99.
Pursuant to the 07/18/2025 Order, the district court denied Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 116. The district court also granted in
part and denied in part the Board’s motion for summary judgment. Id. More
specifically, the district court found that the Board is entitled to unpaid withdrawal
liability. Id. at 16, 48. The district court awarded the Board “$610,255.00 in
unpaid principal withdrawal liability, $123,792,95 in interest, and another
$123,792.95 in liquidated damages, for total sum of $857,810.90.” Id. at 50.
In addition, the district court directed the Board to file a motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. The district court stated that “the Board may also
make a request for additional interest (as well as any adjustment to liquidated
damages) in the same motion.” Id. The Board timely filed the Motion. The Board
seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as additional interest and
liquidated damages.
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Attorneys’ Fees
A. 	The Board’s Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
In the 07/18/2025 Order, the district court stated the following in addressing
a proper remedy:
ERISA provides that “[i]n any action under this section to compel an
employer to pay withdrawal liability, any failure of the employer to
make any withdrawal liability payment within the time prescribed
shall be treated in the same manner as a delinquent contribution . . . .”
29 U.S.C. § 1451(b). “In an action to enforce payment of delinquent
contributions, a plaintiff is entitled to recover the unpaid
contributions, interest, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs.” [Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v.]
Lindquist, [No. 10-3386 SC,] 2011 WL 2884850, at *7 [(N.D. Cal.
July 19, 2011)] (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)); see also [Operating
Eng’rs’ Pension Tr. Fund v.] Clark’s Welding [& Mach.], 688 F.
Supp. 2d [902,] 915 [(D. Haw. July 18, 2025)].
2025 WL 2021750, at *17. Regarding attorneys’ fees, the district court noted that
the LMA “specifically states that ‘[i]f it is necessary to take legal action to enforce
payment of contributions and damages from an employer, such employer shall pay
for all . . . court costs; and reasonable attorney’s fees of 25% of the total amount of
contributions and damages due.’” Id. at *18 (quoting ECF No. 88-8 at 16).
In the Motion, with additional briefing not presented to the district court on
summary judgment, the Board argues that the 25% limitation on attorneys’ fees
does not apply to this withdrawal liability case. The Board contends that because
the LMA “does not mention withdrawal liability, there is an ambiguity about
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whether the provision at issue was intended to apply to actions to collect
withdrawal liability.” ECF No. 118 at 16. The Board thus argues that the Court
must defer to the Board’s interpretation of the subject fees provision. Id. The
Court agrees that the 25% limitation on fees does not apply in this case, though for
a different reason.
“Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law.” Carpenters
Pension Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Underground Constr. Co., 31 F.3d 776, 778 (9th
Cir. 1994) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1511
(9th Cir. 1991)). In assessing whether a contract or a provision therein is
ambiguous, courts must examine the contract as a whole and determine “whether
the words are ‘reasonably susceptible’ to more than one construction or
interpretation.” Krishan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 873 F. Supp. 345, 352
(C.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting Castaneda v. Dura-Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612, 619 (9th
Cir. 1981)); Babikian v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 63 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted). “[S]ilence does not equate to an ambiguity.” Angelette, LLC v.
Bradley, 674 F. Supp. 3d 687, 697 (D. Alaska May 30, 2023) (citation omitted).
The Court finds that the LMA is not ambiguous. The subject fees provision
is set forth in Article XXVI of the LMA, which is titled, “DELIQUENT
CONTRIBUTIONS.” ECF No. 118-40 at 16. Article XXVI states, in pertinent
part:
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SECTION 59. Delinquent Contributions. Where any [of] the
employer’s contributions to the . . . pension fund . . . for a calendar
month are not paid or postmarked by the 25th day of the month
immediately following, such contributions are delinquent. An
employer responsible for such delinquent contributions shall pay as
damages the amount of 10% of such delinquent contributions to each
respective fund.
If it is necessary to take legal action to enforce payment of
contributions and damages from an employer, such employer shall
pay for all auditor’s fees and costs; court costs; and reasonable
attorney’s fees of 25% of the total amount of contributions and
damages due.
Id. at 16–17.
Article XXVI does not mention withdrawal liability. In fact, the Board
represents that there “is no mention of withdrawal liability anywhere in the LMA;
it is liability provided by statute.” ECF No. 118 at 16. The Court finds that Article
XXVI is not reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Although
ERISA law treats failure to pay withdrawal liability “in the same manner as a
delinquent contribution,” 29 U.S.C. § 1451, Article XXVI does not do the same.
The Court thus finds that Article XXVI unambiguously pertains specifically and
solely to delinquent contributions and actions to enforce payment of delinquent
contributions, not withdrawal liability.
In the Opposition, Defendants do not squarely address any of the Board’s
arguments on this issue. Rather, Defendants assert that the Board is “judicially
estopped from seeking fees and costs above 25% of the total recovery, based on its
prior express statements to the Court.” ECF No. 129 at 5. In support of this
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argument, Defendants cite to Article XXVI in the copy of the LMA that was
initially attached to the Board’s motion for summary judgment. Id. (citing ECF
No. 88-8 at 16).
Judicial estoppel “generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of
a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in
another phase.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (other
citations omitted) (quoting Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000)).
“The purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is ‘to protect the integrity of the
judicial process’ by ‘prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions
according to the exigencies of the moment.’” Legacy Carbon LLC v. Potter,
CIVIL NO. 17-00231 SOM-KJM, 2017 WL 3710787, at *9 (D. Haw. Aug. 28,
2017) (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749–50).
According to Defendants, by merely attaching a copy of the LMA to its
motion for summary judgment, the Board took the position that any award of
attorneys’ fees must be limited to 25% of any award for contributions and damages
and thus should not be allowed to reverse this position. Of course, the Board made
no such argument, express or implied, by simply submitting the LMA with its
motion for summary judgment. The Board did not brief whether, let alone take the
position that, the LMA’s fees provision applies. Accordingly, the Court rejects
Defendants’ judicial estoppel argument.
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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the 25% limitation contained in
Article XXVI of the LMA does not apply to this action for withdrawal liability.
The Board is thus not subject to a 25% limitation of attorneys’ fees. The Court
recommends that the district court award the Board reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs pursuant to § 1132(g)(2)(D).
The Board is represented by two law firms, Trucker Huss, APC (“TH”), and
Yee & Kawashima LLLP (“Y&K”). The Board’s request includes fees that were
billed on an hourly basis, as well as some that were billed on a flat-fee basis. Y&K
billed on an hourly basis. From 2022 through January 2025, TH billed on an
hourly basis. ECF No. 118 at 19–20. In February 2025, TH switched to a flat-fee
billing structure, charging for specific tasks. Id. at 20. The Court addresses these
in turn below.
B. 	Lodestar Calculation for Tasks Billed on an Hourly Basis
Reasonable attorneys’ fees are generally based on the traditional “lodestar”
calculation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “Under the lodestar
method, the district court multiplies the number of hours the prevailing party
reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Gonzalez v.
City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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1. 	Reasonable Hourly Rate
In determining the reasonableness of an hourly rate, courts consider the
experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting the fee. See Webb v.
Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “Generally, the
reasonable hourly rate should reflect the prevailing market rates in the forum
district.” Masuda-Cleveland v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., CIVIL NO. 16-00057
LEK-WRP, 2021 WL 1250318, at *3 (D. Haw. Mar. 19, 2021) (citing Camacho v.
Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008)), adopted as modified by
2021 WL 3683911 (D. Haw. Aug. 19, 2021). Where local counsel was
unavailable, however, rates outside the forum district may be applied. See Gates v.
Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees at San Francisco rates based on
its finding that Sacramento attorneys with adequate expertise were unavailable);
Masuda-Cleveland, 2021 WL 1250318, at *4 (finding that the plaintiff sufficiently
established that the court should look to California rates instead of Hawaii rates
because of California counsel’s “specialized knowledge in this type of ERISA
litigation and the unavailability of local counsel with similar expertise”). “District
courts may also use their ‘own knowledge of customary rates and their experience
concerning reasonable and proper fees.’” Sam K. ex rel. Diane C. v. Haw. Dep’t of
Educ., 788 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d
925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011)).
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"It is the responsibility of the attorney seeking fees to submit evidence to
support the reques ted hourly rate." Roberts v. City ofHonolulu, 938 F.3d 1020,
1024 (9th Cir. 2019) (other citation omitted) (citing He nsley, 46 1 U.S. at 433). In
addition to their own statements, attorneys are required to submit additional
evidence that the rate charged is reasonable. Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty. , 815 F.2d
1258, 1263 (9 th Cir. 1987); see also Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980 ("To inform and
assist the court in the exercise of its di scretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to
produce satisfactory evidence- 	in addition to the attorney' s own affidavits-that
the reques ted rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation"
(citation omitted)). 	"The party opposing the fee application has a burden of
rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the
accuracy and reasonableness of the ... facts asserted by the prevailing party in its
submitted affidavits." 	Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980 (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at
1397- 98).
The Board requests the following hourly rates:
TH
2022 	2023 	Apr.1, 2024 	Jan.1 ,2 025
Clarissa A. Kang, Esq. 	$575 	$600 	$625 	$650
Catherine L. Raegan, Es q. 	$375 	$425 	$475 	$500
Joseph Chan, Esq. 	$375 	$425
Jenna McHenry (paralegal) 	$375 	$425
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a. 	Ms. Kang and Ms. Raegan
The Board requests hourly rates of $575 to $650 for Ms. Kang, and $375 to
$500 for Ms. Raegan, for work performed from 2022 through January 2025. ECF
No. 118 at 19–20. Ms. Kang asserts that TH billed at discounted rates for this
lawsuit. ECF No. 118-1 at 7 ¶ 11.
Ms. Kang is a TH shareholder. Id. at 2 ¶ 1. Ms. Kang has 25 years of
litigation experience, 20 of which she has spent specializing in ERISA and
employee benefits litigation. Id. at 3 ¶ 4. Ms. Kang is licensed to practice in
Hawaii and California. Id. at 3–4 ¶ 4. Ms. Kang indicates that she has extensive
experience representing clients in ERISA and employee benefits matters at the
appellate and trial levels, as well as many accolades for her ERISA litigation work.
Id.
Ms. Reagan is an associate at TH, where she “handles a broad spectrum of
ERISA and employee benefit litigation cases . . . .” Id. at 4–5 ¶ 5. Ms. Reagan
graduated from law school in 2019. Id. at 5 ¶ 5.
Ms. Kang and Ms. Raegan are based in TH’s San Francisco office and thus
ask that the Court apply the prevailing market rates in San Francisco. See ECF No.
Y&K
Jared N. Kawashima, Esq. 	$275
Christin D. Kawada, Esq. 	$225
Naomi I. Gould, Esq. 	$225
Michele Sauer (paralegal) 	$105
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118 at 20–22; ECF No. 118-1 at 3 ¶ 3, 8 ¶ 14. This Court previously issued an
order awarding attorneys’ fees to the Board regarding a discovery issue
(“03/21/2024 Order”). ECF No. 53. Therein, the Court found it appropriate to
look to the prevailing rates in San Francisco to determine hourly rates for Ms.
Kang and Ms. Raegan. Id. at 7–8. The Court thus awarded Ms. Kang an hourly
rate of $600, and Ms. Raegan an hourly rate of $425, for work they performed in
January and February 2024. Id. at 7, 9.
Defendants oppose the requested rates for Ms. Kang, but not Ms. Raegan.
ECF No. 129 at 3. Despite the fact that the Court has previously awarded San
Francisco rates to Ms. Kang and Ms. Raegan, Defendants insist that “fee awards
must be based on prevailing local rates.” Id. Defendants, though, make no effort
to show why the Court should apply Hawaii rates. Nor do Defendants propose
alternative rates for the Court to apply. The Court thus finds that Defendants fail
to present a countervailing argument as to why the Court should deviate from the
03/21/2024 Order.
For the same reasons stated in the 03/21/2024 Order, the Court finds that it is
appropriate to apply San Francisco rates for Ms. Kang and Ms. Raegan. See
Masuda-Cleveland, 2021 WL 1250318, at *4. The Court further finds that the
requested hourly rates for attorneys with Ms. Kang’s and Ms. Raegan’s experience,
skill, and expertise are reasonable. See U.S. v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., Case No. 16-
cv-02120-EMC, 2024 WL 5424428, at *6, 8 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2024) (awarding
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hourly rates of $740 to an attorney with approximately 30 years’ experience and
$437.50 to an attorney with approximately six years’ experience); In re Telescopes
Antitrust Litig., Case No.20-cv-03624-EJD (VKD), 2023 WL 4983178, at *2–3
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2023) (awarding hourly rates of $1,050 to a senior partner and
$550 to a junior associate and listing cases finding range of reasonable hourly rates
for San Francisco Bay Area); Unite Here! Local 2 v. Stix Holdings, LLC, Case No.
23-cv-01498-RS, 2023 WL 5020263, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023) (awarding
$600 hourly rate to partner with approximately 14 years of experience and an
hourly rate of $400 to associate with approximately six years of experience).
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that the district court award
Ms. Kang hourly rates of $575 to $650, and Ms. Raegan hourly rates of $375 to
$500, for work performed from 2022 through January 2025.
b. 	Mr. Chan
The Board requests an hourly rate of $375 for work that Mr. Chan
performed between April and December 2024, and an hourly rate of $425 for work
Mr. Chan performed starting January 1, 2025. ECF No. 118 at 20. Defendants do
not specifically oppose the requested hourly rates for Mr. Chan.
The Court notes that, unlike Ms. Raegan, Mr. Chan was not granted pro hac
vice status for this case. The Ninth Circuit has stated:
[A]ttorneys who have not applied to appear pro hac vice may recover
fees in two circumstances: (1) if the attorney at issue “would have
certainly been permitted to appear pro hac vice as a matter of course
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had he or she applied”; or (2) if the work of the attorney “did not rise
to the level of ‘appearing’ before the district court.”
Hanrahan v. Statewide Collection, Inc., No. 21-16187, 2022 WL 3998565, at *1
(9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2022) (quoting Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556
F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the Court must first address whether the
Board can recover fees for Mr. Chan.
“An attorney who does not physically appear in court, sign pleadings, or
serve as the exclusive contact with the client or opposing counsel has not
appeared.” Waite v. Clark Cnty. Collection Serv., LLC, 606 Fed. App’x 864, 866
(9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2015) (citing Winterrowd, 556 F.3d at 825). Here, Mr. Chan did
not physically appear in court or sign pleadings. In addition, based on Mr. Chan’s
time entries and the Court’s familiarity with the case, Mr. Chan did not serve as the
exclusive contact with the Board or opposing counsel. The Court thus finds that
the Board can recover fees for Mr. Chan even though he did not apply to appear
pro hac vice.
According to Ms. Kang, Mr. Chan was a TH associate with experience in
ERISA litigation cases, including those involving multiemployer plans and
withdrawal liability. ECF No. 118-1 at 6 ¶ 7. Ms. Kang states that Mr. Chan
graduated from law school in 2022. Id. The Court notes, however, that the year
someone graduated from law school is not necessarily indicative of when a person
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was admitted to a state bar or began practicing law. Ms. Kang does not
specifically indicate when Mr. Chan began practicing law as a licensed attorney.
Because Mr. Chan worked for TH, for the same reasons set forth in the
03/21/2024 Order, the Court finds that it is appropriate to apply San Francisco
rates for Mr. Chan. “District courts in Northern California have found that rates of
. . . $300–$490 per hour for associates are reasonable.” Miletak v. AT&T Servs.,
Inc., Case No. 12-cv-05326-EMC, 2020 WL 6497925, at * (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
2020) (citations omitted). Although the requested rate for Mr. Chan falls within
this range, and the Court wishes to account for standard increases in rates over
time, the Court finds that a reduction is appropriate. Given that it is unclear how
long Mr. Chan had been practicing law when he performed the work at issued, the
Court finds that the Board fails to substantiate the requested hourly rates. The
Court thus recommends awarding reduced hourly rates of $325 for work that Mr.
Chan performed between April and December 2024, and $350 for work Mr. Chan
performed starting January 1, 2025. See TPCO US Holding, LLC v. Fussell, Case
No. 23-cv-01324-EMC, 2023 WL 5111986, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2023)
(relying on Miletak and awarding an attorney with four years’ experience the
requested hourly rate of $370).
c. 	Ms. McHenry
The Board requests an hourly rate of $375 for work that Ms. McHenry
performed between April and December 2024, and an hourly rate of $425 for work
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Ms. McHenry performed starting January 1, 2025. ECF No. 118 at 20. The Board
does not provide significant information regarding Ms. McHenry’s paralegal
experience. Ms. Kang simply states, as she does with Ms. Raegan and Mr. Chan,
that Ms. McHenry has “a broad range of experience in ERISA litigation and
employee benefits consulting matters . . . .” ECF No. 118-1 at 6 ¶ 8.
Because Ms. McHenry works for TH, for the same reasons set forth in the
03/21/2024 Order, the Court finds that it is appropriate to apply San Francisco
paralegal rates for Ms. McHenry. “An hourly rate of . . . $190 for senior paralegals
has been found to be reasonable for Bay Area ERISA specialists.” Dist. Council
16 N. Cal. Health v. Advantage Com. Servs., Inc., Case No. 21-cv-04716-TSH,
2022 WL 4137577, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2022) (citations omitted). Given that
the Motion does not contain substantial information regarding the nature or extent
of Ms. McHenry’s paralegal experience, the Board fails to substantiate the
requested hourly rates. The Court thus recommends awarding a reduced hourly
rate of $175 for work that Ms. McHenry performed between April and December
2024, and $200 for work Ms. McHenry performed starting January 1, 2025. See
Operating Eng’rs Health & Welfare Tr. Fund of N. Cal. v. Makoni Constr. Inc.,
Case No. 24-cv-07857-DMR, 2025 WL 1747220, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2025)
(citing Advantage Com., 2022 WL 4137577, at *9) (finding that an average hourly
rate of $186.35 was reasonable for a paralegal with approximately seven years of
experience), adopted by 2025 WL 1746278 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2025).
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d. 	Mr. Kawashima
The Board requests an hourly rate of $275 for Mr. Kawashima. ECF No.
118 at 20. Defendants do not oppose this request.
In the 03/21/2024 Order, the Court found that “$275 is a manifestly
reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with Mr. Kawashima’s experience, skill, and
expertise.” ECF No. 53 at 9 (citations omitted). For the same reasons stated in the
03/21/202 Order, and given that Defendants do not oppose the request, the Court
recommends that the district court award an hourly rate of $275 for Mr.
Kawashima. See MFY Fund. LLC v. Ohia Opportunities, LLC, Civil No. 21-00261
DKW-KJM, 2023 WL 8678623, at *7 (D. Haw. Oct. 25, 2023) (awarding an
attorney with approximately 30 years of experience hourly rates ranging between
$495 and $570), adopted by 2024 WL 327002 (D. Haw. Jan. 29, 2024).
e. 	Ms. Kawada and Ms. Gould
The Board requests an hourly rate of $225 for Ms. Kawada and Ms. Gould,
Y&K associates. ECF No. 118 at 20. Defendants do not oppose this request.
Ms. Kawada was admitted to the Hawaii bar in 2013. ECF No. 118-35 at
3 ¶ 4. While working for Y&K, Ms. Kawada’s “practice focus was in the areas of
collection matters for Tart-Hartley multiemployer funds, . . . regularly representing
clients in federal and state courts across Hawai‘i.” Id. At the time Ms. Kawada
performed work for this case, she had approximately ten years of experience.
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Ms. Gould has been a litigation attorney since 2018. Id. ¶ 5. “Prior to
joining [Y&K] as an associate in 2024, she operated a solo practice, primarily
specializing in Landlord/Tenant law and Collections, and spent 4 years as an
associate attorney at a large Honolulu litigation firm.” Id. At the time Ms. Gould
performed work in this case, she had approximately six years of experience.
The Court finds that $225 is a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with
Ms. Kawada’s and Ms. Gould’s experience, skill, and expertise. See WIHC LLC v.
NextGen Labs., Inc., CIV. NO. 22-00305 DKW-RT, 2023 WL 5004409, at *5 (D.
Haw. May 31, 2023) (awarding an hourly rate of $250 to an attorney with six years
of experience), adopted by 2023 WL 4364101 (D. Haw. July 6, 2023). The Court
thus recommends that the district court award an hourly rate of $225 to Ms.
Kawada and Ms. Gould.
f. 	Ms. Sauer
The Board requests an hourly rate of $105 for Ms. Sauer, a paralegal at
Y&K. ECF No. 118 at 20. Mr. Kawashima states that Ms. Sauer has ten years of
paralegal experience. ECF No. 118-35 at 3 ¶ 6. Defendants do not oppose the
requested rate for Ms. Sauer.
The Court has carefully reviewed Ms. Sauer’s time entries and finds that all
of Ms. Sauer’s requested hours were spent on clerical tasks, which are non-
compensable. “[C]lerical or ministerial costs are part of an attorney’s overhead
and are reflected in the charged hourly rate.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Ohana
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Control Sys., Inc., CIV. NO. 17-00435 SOM-RT, 2020 WL 7134090, at *6 (D.
Haw. Sept. 30, 2020), adopted by 2020 WL 6161458 (D. Haw. Oct. 21, 2020)
(citation and internal quotations marks omitted) (brackets in original). Clerical
tasks include reviewing court-generated notices, communicating with court staff,
preparing and submitting copies of filings to the court, and downloading filings.
Crawford v. Japan Airlines, Civil No. 03-00451 LEK-KSC, 2014 WL 1326576, at
*4 (D. Haw. Jan. 22, 2014) (citations omitted), adopted by 2014 WL 1326580 (D.
Haw. Mar. 28, 2014).
According to her time entries, the tasks Ms. Sauer performed fall under the
foregoing categories of clerical tasks. See ECF No. 118-36 at 2–3 (time entries for
“PL”). The Court thus finds that the Board is not entitled to recover paralegal fees
for Ms. Sauer, and the Court need not make a finding as to a reasonable hourly rate
for her.
2. 	Number of Hours Reasonably Expended
The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the hours expended and
must submit evidence in support of the hours worked. Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397
(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437). The Board therefore bears the burden of
proving that the fees requested are associated with the relief requested and are
reasonably necessary to achieve the results obtained. See Tirona v. State Farm.
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Haw. 1993) (citations omitted).
“Counsel should exclude from a request time spent that was ‘excessive, redundant,
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or otherwise unnecessary.’” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sumo-Nan LLC, CIVIL NO.
14-00520 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 810277, at *11 (D. Haw. Mar. 1, 2017) (quoting
Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1203). The party opposing the fee application has a “burden
of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence challenging the accuracy and
reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the fee applicant in its
submitted affidavits.” Seven Signatures Gen. P’ship v. Irongate Azrep BW LLC,
871 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1055 (D. Haw. 2012) (citing Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397–98).
A conclusory opposition of mere disagreement will not suffice.
The Court has its own “independent duty to review the submitted itemized
log of hours to determine the reasonableness of the hours requested in each case.”
Irwin v. Astrue, No. 3:10-CV-545-HZ, 2012 WL 707090, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 5,
2012) (citing Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001)). “In doing
so, the Court is obliged to explain how it determined a reasonable fee award, but it
need not set forth an hour by hour analysis of the fee request.” Liberty Mut. Ins.,
2017 WL 810277, at *11 (citing Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398–99). “Where the
difference between the lawyer’s request and the court’s award is relatively small, a
somewhat cursory explanation will suffice. But where the disparity is larger, a
more specific articulation of the court’s reasoning is expected.” Id. (quoting
Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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The Board requests the following hours for tasks billed on an hourly basis:
Timekeeper 	Hours Requested
Clarissa A. Kang, Esq. 	146.1
Catherine L. Raegan, Esq. 	551.2
Joseph Chan, Esq. 	49.0
Jenna McHenry (paralegal) 	30.3
Jared N. Kawashima Esq. 	5.4
Christin D.W. Kawada, Esq.,
and Naomi I. Gould, Esq. 1.1
Ms. Kang submits a declaration in support of the Motion regarding TH’s
fees. ECF No. 118-1. Ms. Kang states that she reviewed the billing records “for
this case each month before any of the time was billed to the Board” and reduced
time that she deemed unnecessary. Id. at 10 ¶ 18. In addition, TH reduced its
hours by 189.7 hours for purposes of this Motion. ECF No. 118 at 12 (citing ECF
No. 118-1 at 11–12 ¶¶ 23–24, 26; ECF No. 118-4). Mr. Kawashima also submits a
declaration in support of the Motion regarding Y&K’s fees. ECF No. 118-35.
Ms. Kang states that she took on a supervisory role for this case, and Ms.
Raegan took the primary role in drafting pleadings, drafting discovery requests and
responses, drafting motions, and taking depositions, among other things. ECF No.
118-1 at 10 ¶¶ 19–20. Ms. Kang also describes Mr. Chan’s and Ms. McHenry’s
roles in this case. Id. at 10–11 ¶ 21.
In addition, Ms. Kang asserts that the requested attorneys’ fees and costs
related to discovery were significant because of the conduct by Defendants and
their attorney, Shawn Luiz, Esq. (“Mr. Luiz”). ECF No. 118-1 at 13 ¶ 27. Ms.
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Kang provides specific examples of this conduct. First, “Defendants refused to
provide detailed financial information regarding the entities, SMAC and R&M,
necessitating third party subpoenas to banks.” Id. ¶ 28. Second, Ms. Kang asserts
that Mr. Luiz “was habitually late to the depositions and when returning from
breaks and routinely spent hours examining his own clients at their depositions.”
Id. at 14 ¶ 31; see also id. at 14–15 ¶¶ 32–34. Third, Ms. Kang asserts Defendants’
failure to disclose the existence of other related entities necessitated filing an
amended complaint, as well as additional meet-and-confer efforts. Id. at 16 ¶ 38.
Defendants make no significant effort to challenge the reasonableness of the
hours requested or Ms. Kang’s assertions. In the Opposition, Defendants assert
that the requested hours are “excessive, duplicative, or unrelated to the motion at
issue.” ECF No. 129 at 3. Defendants argue that: “1. Multiple attorneys billed for
attending the same deposition; 2. Time was spent addressing discovery issues that
Plaintiff itself contributed to; [and] 3. Tasks were billed that were not reasonably
necessary to the outcome.” Id. Defendants, however, do not offer any evidence or
affidavits—nothing more than these three conclusory arguments—to challenge the
Board’s request. The Court thus finds that Defendants fail to satisfy their burden
of rebuttal.
The Court has carefully reviewed Ms. Kang’s declaration, Mr. Kawashima’s
declaration, and the time entries attached thereto and finds the requested hours to
be reasonable. Based on the declarations and Court’s familiarity with the case, the
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Court also finds that such tasks were associated with the relief requested and
“reasonably necessary to achieve the results obtained.” Tiki Shark Art Inc. v.
Cafepress Inc., Civil No. 13-00577 JMS-RLP, 2014 WL 12613386, at *2 (D. Haw.
July 24, 2014) (citing Tirona, 821 F. Supp. at 636). The Court thus recommends
that the district court award the hours requested by the Board as stated in the chart
above.
3. 	Total Lodestar Calculation
The following is a summary of this Court’s findings as to attorneys’ fees
billed on an hourly basis:
Timekeeper 	Year 	Rate 	Hours 	Total Award
Clarissa A. Kang, Esq.
2022 	$575 	2.6 	$1,495.00
2023 	$600 	55.7 	$33,420.00
04/01/2024 	$625 	76.2 	$47,625.00
01/01/2025 	$650 	11.6 	$7,540.00
Catherine L. Reagan, Esq.
2022 	$375 	16.5 	$6,187.50
2023 	$425 	173.2 	$73,610.00
04/01/2024 	$475 	321.8 	$152,855.00
01/01/2025 	$500 	39.7 	$19,850.00
Joseph Chan, Esq. 2024 	$325 	23.2 	$7,540.00
01/01/2025 	$350 	25.8 	$9,030.00
Jenna McHenry (paralegal) 2024 	$175 	5.0 	$875.00
01/01/2025 	$200 	25.3 	$5,060.00
Jared N. Kawashima Esq. 	$275 	5.4 	$1,485.00
Christin D.W. Kawada, Esq.,
and Naomi I. Gould, Esq. $225 	1.1 	$247.50
TOTAL 	783.1 	$366,820.00
The Court finds the above amounts reasonable and declines to adjust this lodestar
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amount. The Court thus recommends that the district court award $366,820 for
attorneys’ fees billed on an hourly basis.
C. 	Attorneys’ Fees for Tasks Billed on a Flat-Fee Basis
The Board seeks fees for three tasks billed on a flat-fee basis: (1) $10,000
for drafting the opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
and reply to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) $5,000 for arguing the
hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment; and (3) $5,000 for drafting the
Motion. ECF No. 118-1 at 8 ¶ 13.
Ms. Kang, Ms. Reagan, Mr. Chan, and Ms. McHenry performed work for
these tasks. ECF No. 118 at 27. In addition, Kim Ong, Esq., a TH litigation
associate, performed work on these tasks. Id. Ms. Kang states that Ms. Ong
graduated from law school in 2024.1 ECF No 118-1 at 6 ¶ 6.
Defendants concede that a flat-fee billing structure is “not per se
unreasonable.” ECF No. 129 at 4. Defendants contend, however, that “these fees
are unsupported by detailed time records[.]” Id. Defendants’ contention is
patently false.
Exhibit 3 to the Motion contains detailed time entries for all TH
timekeepers. ECF No. 118-4. This exhibit sets forth the time entries for tasks
1 Based on Ms. Ong’s time entries, the Court finds that the work Ms. Ong
performed in this case did not rise to the level of “appearing” before the district
court. The Court thus finds that the Board can recover attorneys’ fees associated
with work performed by Ms. Ong. Hanrahan, 2022 WL 3998565, at *1.
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billed on an hourly basis, as we ll as those billed on a flat-fee basis regarding the
motions for summary judgment. The Board also summarizes the hours spent by
each timekeeper on the flat-fee tasks as follows:
Timekeeper 	MSJ Briefs 	MSJHearing 	Fees Motion
Clarissa A. Kang, Esq. 	12.6 	16.5 	7.2
Catherine L. Reagan, Esq . 	83.3 	50 .5 	46.7
Joseph Chan, Esq. 	1.9
Kim Ong , Esq . 	22.4 	23.2 	10.7
Jenna McHenry (paralegal) 	3.3 	9 .3
TOTAL HOURS 	120.2 	93.5 	73.9
ECF No. 118-1 at 27. Given the information the Board included with the Motion,
Defendants' contention that the Board's request is " un supported by detailed
records" strongly suggests their counsel failed to rev iew the Motion in detail.
This Motion present s the first instance in which the Court has seen an
arrangement where the attorney billed a flat fee per specific task. This novel
approach seems to be a good one which might mitigate fee disputes between
attorney and client, given that attorney-client expectations are made clear at the
outset. Whether the billing approach is conventional or not, the Court's duty to
determine the reasonableness of the fees requested remains the same.
The cross-motions for summary judgment required extensive briefing by
both sides, and the hearing lasted more than three hours. See ECF No. 114. The
Board receive d a favorable re sult pursuant to the 07/18/2025 Order, including an
award of attorneys' fees and costs. 	In addition, the Motion and the Reply in
26
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support of the Board’s request for attorney’s fees, costs, and updated damages is
thoroughly briefed and supported by declarations and exhibits. The Court easily
finds that the $20,000 in flat fees charged for the subject three tasks is reasonable.
The Court thus recommends that the district court award $20,000 for attorneys’
fees billed on a flat-fee basis.
II. 	Costs and Litigation Expenses
The Board requests an award of $19,147.41 for costs and other litigation
expenses. ECF No. 118 at 25; ECF No. 118-5. Section 1132(g)(2)(D) provides for
the recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D).
“The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a court can award reasonable litigation out-
of-pocket expenses (including computer-based legal research costs) that would
normally be charged to a fee paying client, as part of ‘reasonable attorney fees’
under ERISA section 502(g)(2)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D).” Oster v. Standard
Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Trs. of the Constr.
Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1259
(9th Cir. 2006)). In the Motion, the Board distinguishes between costs, which it
refers to as “taxable costs,” and expenses, which it refers to as “non-taxable costs.”
ECF No. 118 at 24–25. For consistency purposes, the Court uses the same terms.
A. 	Taxable Costs
The Board requests an award for items that are typically considered
compensable as taxable costs, such as filing fees, service fees, printing and copying
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costs, postage, and deposition transcript costs. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating
costs taxable to the prevailing party); see also Trs. of Operating Eng’rs Tr. Funds
v. Pro. Contracting & Demolition, LLC, CIVIL NO. 21-00234 JMS-WRP, 2021
WL 5513536, at *6 (D. Haw. Nov. 4, 2021) (recommending an award of the
plaintiff’s costs for “copying, postage, server fees, and filing fees” pursuant to
§ 1132(g)(2)), adopted by 2021 WL 5510216 (D. Haw. Nov. 24, 2021).
Defendants do not specifically challenge these costs, except they vaguely assert
that “[s]ome depositions exceeded the 7-hour limit” and the Board “failed to
submit receipts or vendor contracts for most items.” ECF No. 129 at 4. These
assertions are meritless.
First, Defendants do not identify which depositions exceeded the time limit.
In any case, Defendants fail to establish why the Board is not entitled to recover
transcript costs even if the deposition ran over the allotted time. Moreover, as Ms.
Kang explains in her declaration, Mr. Luiz caused unnecessary delay in each of the
depositions for this case. ECF No. 118-1 at 14–15 ¶¶ 31–34. Defendants do not
dispute this in their Opposition.
Second, Ms. Kang attaches to her declaration numerous receipts and
invoices for nearly all the requested costs. See ECF Nos. 118-6 to 118-31. Mr.
Kawashima does the same. ECF Nos. 118-37, 118-38. In addition, Exhibit 4 to
the Motion is a list of all litigation expenses incurred through TH, which includes a
“narrative” column that describes each expense. ECF No. 118-5. Defendants cite
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no legal authority stating that a party seeking costs must submit copies of vendor
contracts. The Court is thus not persuaded by Defendants’ assertions.
The Court has cross-referenced Exhibit 4, Ms. Kang’s declaration, and the
receipts and invoices submitted with the Motion (Exhibits 5 through 30) and finds
that the requested taxable costs therein are reasonable. The Court has also
reviewed Mr. Kawashima’s declaration and the attached exhibits and finds that all
items therein pertain to taxable costs (printing/photocopying, postage, and service
fees), except for the $300 pro hac vice application fee. See Kalitta Air L.L.C. v.
Cent. Tex. Airborne Sys. Inc., 741 F.3d 955, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
pro hac vice fees are not a taxable cost for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1920). The
Court finds that the requested taxable costs incurred through Y&K are reasonable.
The Court thus recommends that the district court award the Board the following
costs:
Date 	Item Description2 Amount
02/17/2023 	Complaint Filing Fee 	$402.00
01/04/2024 	Subpoena Service Fee 	$105.76
07/10/2024 	Subpoena Service Fee 	$210.47
08/27/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$1,460.30
08/29/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$1,689.30
09/01/2024 	Public Record Service Fee 	$203.00
09/04/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$2,453.35
2 For this “Item Description” column, the Court uses the same descriptions as set
forth in Exhibit 4 to the Motion. ECF No. 118-5.
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09/04/2024 	Courtesy Copy Fee3 $249.25
09/04/2024 	Subpoena Service Fee 	$169.63
09/06/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$1,926.45
09/17/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$1,098.53
10/11/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$406.28
10/21/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$585.81
11/13/2024 	Deposition Transcript Fee 	$801.94
12/18/2024 	Public Record Service Fee 	$15.00
12/30/2024 	Public Record Service Fee 	$28.50
01/31/2025 	Court Courtesy Copy Fee 	$1,367.91
Y&K Costs 	$509.68
TOTAL 	$13,683.16
B. 	Non-Taxable Costs
The Board’s remaining, non-taxable costs fall into three categories: (1) legal
research expenses; (2) third-party subpoena invoice; and (3) pro hac vice
application fee. The Court addresses each of these categories in turn below.
1. 	Legal Research Expenses
The Board requests $4,277.79 for legal research expenses. ECF No. 118-5
at 2–3. Ms. Kang states that TH billed the Board separately for these expenses.
ECF No. 118-1 at 17 ¶¶ 41 & 43–46, 21 ¶¶ 63& 65. “Under ERISA, a plaintiff
may recover as ‘attorney’s fees’ expenses that are customarily billed separately,
including expenses for computer-based research.” Fontana v. Guardian Life Ins.,
No. C 08-01231 CRB, 2009 WL 585811, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009) (citing
3 Although Exhibit 4 lists this item as a “Courtesy Copy Fee,” Ms. Kang states
that this item pertains to “service of a subpoena to Jean Claude Drui . . . .” ECF
No. 118-1 at 1 ¶ 53 (citing ECF No. 118-19).
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Redland Ins., 460 F.2d at 1258–59). Stated differently, “reasonable charges for
computerized research may be recovered . . . if separate billing for such expenses is
‘the prevailing practice in the local community.’” Redland Ins., 460 F.3d at 1259
(quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 287 n.9 (1989)).
Defendants argue that the “legal research charges are not itemized or
justified.” ECF No. 129 at 4. Defendants also argue that “Hawaii law does not
allow recovery of non-taxable costs such as online legal research . . . without
supporting documentation.” Id. Defendants again assert meritless arguments.
First, it is clear that ERISA governs this case and that § 1132(g)(2)(D) governs the
Board’s request. Defendants thus fail to establish why Hawaii law is relevant to
the Motion. Second, the Motion includes copies of invoices for legal research,
which indicate the dates on which the legal research was conducted. ECF Nos.
118-7, 118-9 to 118-12, 118-29, 118-31. In the Reply, the Board includes two
charts that link the legal research dates with corresponding attorney time entries,
thereby showing to what the legal research was related. ECF No. 130 at 17–18.
The Court thus disagrees with Defendants’ argument that the Board did not
provide supporting documentation that itemizes the requested legal research
expenses.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the requested legal research
expenses are reasonable. In addition, although Ms. Kang’s declaration does not
address whether billing clients separately for legal research fees is the prevailing
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practice in the Bay Area, courts in the Northern District of California have granted
requests for legal research fees under § 1132(g)(2). See, e.g., Barnes v. AT&T
Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 963 F. Supp. 2d 950, 972–73 (N.D.
Cal. 2013); Operating Eng’rs Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Empire
Eng’g & Constr., Inc., Case No. 22-cv-03609-JSC, 2023 WL 4035619, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2023), adopted by 2023 WL 4670299 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2023). The
Court thus recommends that the district court award the Board $4,277.79 for legal
research expenses.
2. 	Third-Party Subpoena Invoice
The Board requests $886.46 for fees paid to “Bank of Hawaii for charges
incurred to search and produce documents responsive to the Board’s subpoena for
Defendants [sic] records . . . .” ECF No. 118-1 at 18 ¶ 22 (citing ECF No. 118-18).
According to the Bank of Hawaii invoice, this amount consists of charges for 31.34
hours of research time billed at $22 per hour and 6.5 hours of research time billed
at $30 per hour. ECF No. 118-18 at 2.
The Board does not indicate what documents it requested or what documents
Bank of Hawaii produced. Nor does the Board indicate how the documents were
used in the case. Without more information, the Court is unable to determine
whether this requested non-taxable cost is reasonable. Moreover, the Board fails to
establish that it is the prevailing practice of the community to bill this sort of
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expense separately. Redland Ins., 460 F.3d at 1259. The Court thus recommends
that the district court deny this request.
3. 	Pro Hac Vice Application Fee
The Board requests $300 for Ms. Raegan’s pro hac vice application fee.
ECF No. 118-38. Mr. Kawashima states that this item was billed to the Board
through Y&K. ECF No. 118-35 at 4 ¶ 8 (citing ECF No.118-36). Defendants do
not object to this request. The Court nevertheless finds that the Board fails to
establish that it is the prevailing practice of the community to bill pro hac vice
application fees separately. Redland Ins., 460 F.3d at 1259. The Court thus
recommends that the district court deny this request.
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that the district court award
$4,277.79 for legal research and deny the Board’s remaining requested non-taxable
costs.
III. 	Additional Interest and Liquidated Damages
In the 07/18/2205 Order, the district court awarded the Board $610,255 for
unpaid withdrawal liability. 2025 WL 2021750, at *18. Pursuant to § 1132(g)(2),
the district court concluded that the Board is also entitled to interest on the unpaid
liability based on rates set by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(“PBGC”). Id. The district court awarded the Board $123,792.95 for interest that
accrued as of January 15, 2025. Id. The district court noted that Defendants did
not dispute this amount, which was calculated by the Board. Id. The district court
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also found that the Board is entitled to liquidated damages for the same amount
and awarded an additional $123,792.95 for liquidated damages that accrued as of
January 15, 2025. Id.
The district court granted the Board leave to supplement its request for
interest and liquidated damages “to reflect the time that has passed since January
15, 2025.” Id. In the Motion, the Board requests additional interest and liquidated
damages in the amount of $26,890.81 for each (total $53,781.62). ECF No. 118 at
26. The Board also requests additional accrued interest and liquidated damages
until judgment is entered, at the daily rate of $310.92 for each (total $621.84). Id.
Defendants contend that, while §1132(g)(2) permits recovery of interest and
liquidated damages, “Plaintiff has not provided: A breakdown of how these
amounts were calculated; [and] Documentation supporting the accrual rate.” ECF
No. 129. Contrary to Defendants’ contention, Appendix C and Exhibit 31 to the
Motion clearly show how the Board calculated interest through August 14, 2025.
ECF No. 118 at 30. The Court notes that Appendix C and Exhibit 31 are merely
updated versions of the chart that the Board included in its motion for summary
judgment, which Defendants did not dispute. See ECF No. 89-20. In addition,
Exhibit 32 to the Motion shows the formulas that the Board used for its
calculations, and Exhibit 33 is a copy of the PBGC’s website setting forth the
applicable interest rates. ECF No. 118-1 at 21–22 ¶¶ 67–68 (citing ECF Nos. 118-
33, 118-34). Simply put, Defendants’ contention that the Board did not provide
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supporting documentation is not supported in the record and appears to be
materially misleading. Such conduct is inconsistent with the obligations imposed
by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that all filings
be grounded in fact and law after reasonable inquiry. Defendants’ counsel is
reminded that adherence to these standards is essential to the integrity of the
judicial process.
Because Defendants fail to dispute the Board’s calculation in a meaningful
way, the Court treats the updated interest and liquidated damages amounts as
undisputed. The Court thus recommends that the district court award the Board:
(1) additional interested accrued through August 14, 2025, in the amount of
$26,890.81; (2) additional liquidated damages accrued through August 14, 2025, in
the amount of $26,890.81; and (3) additional accrued interest and liquidated
damages until judgment is entered, at the daily rate of $310.92 for each (total
$621.84).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court FINDS AND RECOMMENDS that the
district court GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART the Board’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees and Updated Interest and Liquidated Damages Award (ECF No.
118). The Court recommends that the district court grant the Board’s request for
attorneys’ fees, costs, and additional interest and liquidated damages as follows:
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(A) 	Attorneys’ Fees (Hourly) 	$366,820.00
(B) 	Attorneys’ Fees (Flat-Fee) 	$20,000.00
(C) 	Taxable Costs 	$13,683.16
(D) 	Non-Taxable Costs 	$4,277.79
(E) 	Additional Interest 	$26,890.81
(as of 08/14/2025)
(F) 	Additional Liquidated 	$26,890.81
Damages (as of 08/14/2025)
TOTAL 	$458,562.57
The Court also recommends that the district court award the Board additional
accrued interest and liquidated damages until judgment is entered, at the daily rate
of $310.92 for each (total $621.84). The Court recommends that the district court
deny the Motion in all other respects.
IT IS SO FOUND AND RECOMMENDED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, October 28, 2025.
Bd. of Trs. of the PAMCAH-UA Local 675 Pension Fund v. SMAC Haw., Inc., et al., Civil No.
23-00076 MWJS-KJM; Findings and Recommendation to Grant in Part and Deny in Part
Plaintiff Board of Trustees of the PAMCAH-UA Local 675 Pension Fund’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees and Updated Interest and Liquidated Damages Award
Case 1:23-cv-00076-MWJS-KJM Document 151 Filed 10/28/25 Page 36 of 36
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