Spriestersbach v. State of Hawaii

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JOSHUA SPRIESTERSBACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII, 	CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU, OFFICER
ABRAHAM K. BRUHN, 	DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, 	OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER, NIETZSCHE LYNN
TOLAN, MICHELLE MURAOKA, LESLIE
MALOIAN, JACQUELINE ESSER, JASON
BAKER, MERLINDA GARMA, SETH
PATEK, DR. JOHN COMPTON, DR.
MELISSA VARGO, DR. SHARON TISZA,
HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL, DR.
ALLISON GARRETT, 	JOHN/JANE DOES
1-20,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 21-00456 LEK-RT
ORDER: GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; GRANTING DEFENDANT DR. SHARON TISZA’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS
DR. JOHN COMPTON AND DR. MELISSA VARGO’S SUBSTANTIVE JOINDER
IN DEFENDANT DR. SHARON TISZA’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
On March 14, 2022, Defendant City and County of
Honolulu (“the City”) filed its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (“City Motion”), and Defendant Dr. Sharon Tisza
(“Dr. Tisza”) filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint (“Tisza
Motion”). 	[Dkt. nos. 79, 80.] 	On March 17, 2022, Defendants
Dr. John Compton (“Dr. Compton”) and Dr. Melissa Vargo
(“Dr. Vargo”) filed a substantive joinder in the Tisza Motion
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(“Compton/Vargo Joinder”). 1 	[Dkt. no. 84.] 	On April 14, 2021,
Plaintiff Joshua Spriestersbach (“Spriestersbach”) filed his
opposition to the Tisza Motion and the Compton/Vargo Joinder
(“Examiners Opposition”) and his opposition to the City Motion
(“City Opposition”). 2 	[Dkt. nos. 105, 106.] 	On April 28, 2022,
the City and Dr. Tisza filed their respective replies (“City
Reply” and “Tisza Reply”), [dkt. nos. 110, 111,] and
Drs. Compton and Vargo filed their reply and an errata thereto, 3
[dkt. nos. 112, 113]. 	The Court finds these matters suitable
for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.1(c) of
the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”). 	For the reasons set
forth below, the City Motion is granted in part and denied in
part, and the Tisza Motion and the Compton/Vargo Joinder are
1 On March 22, 2022 Defendants Jason Baker, Jacqueline
Esser, Merlinda Garma, Leslie Maloian, Michelle Muraoka, Office
of the Public Defender, Seth Patek, and Nietzsche Lynn Tolan
(“PD Defendants”) filed statements of no position as to the City
Motion, the Tisza Motion, and the Compton/Vargo Joinder. 	[Dkt.
nos. 89, 90, 91.] 	Dr. Tisza filed a statement of no opposition
to the City Motion on March 24, 2022. 	[Dkt. no. 94.] 	On
April 14, 2021, Defendant Dr. Allison Garrett (“Dr. Garrett”)
filed a statement of no position as to the Tisza Motion and the
Compton/Vargo Joinder and a statement of no position as to the
City Motion. 	[Dkt. nos. 103, 104.]
2 Dr. Tisza, Dr. Compton, and Dr. Vargo will be referred to
collectively as “the Examiner Defendants.”
3 Docket numbers 112 and 113 will be referred to
collectively as the “Compton/Vargo Reply.”
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granted. 	Judgment on the pleadings is granted in favor of the
City as to all of Spriestersbach’s claims against it, but
Spriestersbach is granted leave to amend those claims, and all
of Spriestersbach’s claims against the Examiner Defendants are
dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The instant case arises from Spriestersbach’s May 11,
2017 arrest for crimes committed by Thomas R. Castleberry and
Spriestersbach’s subsequent detention related to that arrest
until January 17, 2020. 	See Complaint, filed 11/21/21 (dkt.
no. 1), at pg. 2, ¶ 2. 4
On October 14, 2011, when Spriestersbach was arrested
for sleeping on a stairwell, he gave the name “Castleberry,”
with no first name, to the arresting officer. 	[Id. at pgs. 11-
12, ¶ 19.] 	When the arresting officers entered the name
Castleberry into their computer, they learned of a July 2009
warrant for Thomas R. Castleberry (“Castleberry Warrant”), and
they arrested Spriestersbach for the warrant. 	Spriestersbach
later explained that William C. Castleberry was his grandfather,
and that he would occasionally use his grandfather’s name.
Spriestersbach was not required to make a court appearance in
connection with this arrest. 	[Id. at pg. 12, ¶¶ 20-23.]
4 Because there are two sets of paragraphs numbers 1 through
22, citations to those paragraphs also include page numbers.
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On January 17, 2015, Spriestersbach was approached by
police officers because he was houseless and sleeping in a City
park. 	Although he initially refused to tell them his name, he
eventually told the officers his name was Joshua Spriestersbach.
[Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.] 	The Honolulu Police Department (“HPD”)
database listed Thomas R. Castleberry as one of Joshua
Spriestersbach’s aliases. 	The officers then looked for any
outstanding warrants for either Joshua Spriestersbach or his
aliases, Thomas R. Castleberry and William C. Castleberry. 	The
officers learned about the Castleberry Warrant, but they did not
arrest Spriestersbach because his fingerprints did not match the
fingerprints on file for Thomas Castleberry. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 27-31.]
On May 11, 2017, Spriestersbach was arrested after he
fell asleep on a sidewalk while waiting in a food distribution
line. 	Spriestersbach gave his full name, birth date, and social
security number to an HPD officer, Defendant Abraham Bruhn
(“Bruhn”), and to the other HPD officers who participated in
Spriestersbach’s arrest. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.] 	One of the
officers had a copy of the Castleberry Warrant, and Bruhn,
either acting alone or together with other HPD officers, hand
wrote “Joshua Spriestersbach” on the warrant as an alias for
Thomas R. Castleberry. 	[Id. at ¶ 36.] 	Bruhn, either acting
alone or with other officers, arrested Spriestersbach for the
Castleberry Warrant and transported him to the Oahu Community
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Correctional Center (“OCCC”), which is operated by Defendant
State of Hawai`i Department of Public Safety (“DPS”).
Spriestersbach was fingerprinted and photographed at OCCC.
Spriestersbach alleges neither Bruhn, the other arresting
officers, nor any OCCC employee compared his photograph,
fingerprints, or other identifying information with Thomas
Castleberry’s identifying information. 	Spriestersbach asserts
that, if they had done so, they would have realized that he had
been misidentified as Thomas Castleberry. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 37-40.]
Before his first court hearing, Spriestersbach told
his attorney, Deputy Public Defender Nietzsche Lynn Tolan
(“Tolan”), that he was not Thomas Castleberry and that he had
not committed the crimes attributed to Thomas Castleberry.
Spriestersbach also provided Tolan with identifying information.
Tolan requested a court-ordered evaluation to determine if
Spriestersbach was mentally fit to proceed. 	The Examiner
Defendants were the panelists appointed to perform the
evaluation. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 42-44.]
The Examiner Defendants evaluated Spriestersbach on
multiple occasions, including after his transfer from OCCC to
the Hawai`i State Hospital (“HSH”). 	Spriestersbach states he
told the Examiner Defendants multiple times that he was not
Thomas Castleberry, and he asserts they had access to his legal
records and his medical records. 	However, the Examiner
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Defendants did not confirm his identity. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 46-47.]
Instead, the Examiner Defendants cited Spriestersbach’s protests
about his identity as evidence that he was not fit to proceed in
the pending criminal case. 	[Id. at ¶ 48.]
According to the Complaint, Dr. Garrett, an HSH
physician, verified in January 2020 that Spriestersbach was not
Thomas Castleberry, and Spriestersbach was released on
January 17, 2020. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 54-55.]
The Complaint alleges thirteen claims against
seventeen defendants. 	Relevant to the matters addressed in this
Order, Spriestersbach alleges the following claims:
-a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the City and the Examiner
Defendants alleging violations of Spriestersbach’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment (“Count I”);
-a § 1983 claim against the City and the Examiner Defendants
alleging violations of Spriestersbach’s due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count II”);
-a disability discrimination claim against the City, based upon
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“Count III”);
-a § 1983 claim against the City alleging abuse of process, in
violation of Spriestersbach’s rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment (“Count IV”);
-a false imprisonment claim against the Examiner Defendants
(“Count VIII”);
-a negligence claim against the Examiner Defendants
(“Count IX”);
-a medical malpractice claim against the Examiner Defendants
(“Count X”);
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-an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim
against the City and the Examiner Defendants (“Count XI”);
and
-a negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claim
against the City and the Examiner Defendants (“Count XII”).
The City seeks judgment on the pleadings as to all of
the claims against it because: the federal law claims are time-
barred; Spriestersbach has not pled sufficient factual
allegations to support any of his claims against the City; and,
as to his IIED and NIED claims, Spriestersbach has not pled
sufficient factual allegations to support his position that one
or more City employees acted with malice, which is required to
hold the City liable under respondeat superior for torts
committed by its employees. 	As to Spriestersbach’s federal law
claims, the City urges this Court to grant judgment on the
pleadings without leave to amend. 	The City does not address
whether leave to amend should be granted if the City is granted
judgment on the pleadings as to Spriestersbach’s state law
claims.
Drs. Tisza, Compton, and Vargo seek the dismissal,
with prejudice, of all of Spriestersbach’s claims against them,
based on quasi-judicial immunity.
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DISCUSSION
I. 	The City Motion
A. 	Statute of Limitations
The City first argues all of Spriestersbach’s federal
law claims against it are time-barred.
1. 	Spriestersbach’s § 1983 Claims
Spriestersbach’s § 1983 claims are governed by the
Hawai`i limitations period for personal injury actions. 	See
Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 2214, 2225 (2022). 	The Hawai`i
statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7. 	State tolling statutes are also
applied to § 1983 claims, see Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 138 S.
Ct. 594, 603 (2018), as are equitable tolling rules, “except to
the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal
law[,]” Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d
1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). 	However, “the time at which a § 1983 claim accrues is
a question of federal law, conforming in general to common-law
tort principles.” 	McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2155,
204 L. Ed. 2d 506 (2019) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). 	Courts look to “the most natural common-law analogy”
to determine when a particular § 1983 claim accrues. 	Id.
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a. 	Accrual of Spriestersbach’s § 1983 Claims
The City argues all of Spriestersbach’s § 1983 claims
against it “are based on acts or omissions by HPD officers on or
prior to May 11, 2017,” the date of his arrest, and they are
time barred because they accrued on or before that date. 5 	[Mem.
in Supp. of City Motion at 5.] 	Spriestersbach argues his § 1983
claims are most closely analogous to the common law torts of
false arrest and false imprisonment. 	The United States Supreme
Court has stated:
False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the
former is a species of the latter. 	“Every
confinement of the person is an imprisonment,
whether it be in a common prison or in a private
house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly
detaining one in the public streets; and when a
man is lawfully in a house, it is imprisonment to
prevent him from leaving the room in which he
is.” 	M. Newell, Law of Malicious Prosecution,
False Imprisonment, and Abuse of Legal Process
§ 2, p. 57 (1892) (footnote omitted). 	See also 7
S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Gans, American Law of
Torts § 27:2, pp. 940–942 (1990). 	We shall thus
refer to the two torts together as false
imprisonment. 	That tort provides the proper
analogy to the cause of action asserted against
the present respondents for the following reason:
The sort of unlawful detention remediable by the
tort of false imprisonment is detention without
legal process, see, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
5 Although the Complaint describes Spriestersbach’s arrest
and detention on October 14, 2011 and January 17, 2015,
[Complaint at pgs. 11-13,] this Court construes those factual
allegations as background for Spriestersbach’s claims arising
from his arrest on May 11, 2017 and subsequent detention. 	This
Court therefore rejects the City’s suggestion that
Spriestersbach is asserting claims based directly on the 2011
and 2015 events. 	See City Reply at 1.
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R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law
of Torts § 11, p. 54, § 119, pp. 885–886 (5th ed.
1984); 7 Speiser, supra, § 27:2, at 943–944, and
the allegations before us arise from respondents’
detention of petitioner without legal process in
January 1994. 	They did not have a warrant for
his arrest.
The running of the statute of limitations on
false imprisonment is subject to a distinctive
rule — dictated, perhaps, by the reality that the
victim may not be able to sue while he is still
imprisoned: “Limitations begin to run against an
action for false imprisonment when the alleged
false imprisonment ends.” 	2 H. Wood, Limitation
of Actions § 187d(4), p. 878 (rev. 4th ed. 1916);
see also 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899,
Comment c (1977); A. Underhill, Principles of Law
of Torts 202 (1881). 	Thus, to determine the
beginning of the limitations period in this case,
we must determine when petitioner’s false
imprisonment came to an end.
Reflective of the fact that false
imprisonment consists of detention without legal
process, a false imprisonment ends once the
victim becomes held pursuant to such process —
when, for example, he is bound over by a
magistrate or arraigned on charges. 	1 Dobbs,
supra, § 39, at 74, n.2; Keeton, supra, § 119, at
888; H. Stephen, Actions for Malicious
Prosecution 120–123 (1888). 	Thereafter, unlawful
detention forms part of the damages for the
“entirely distinct” tort of malicious
prosecution, which remedies detention
accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but
by wrongful institution of legal process.
Keeton, supra, § 119, at 885–886; see 1 F.
Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 3.9,
p. 3:36 (3d ed. 1996); 7 Speiser, supra, § 27:2,
at 943–945. 	“If there is a false arrest claim,
damages for that claim cover the time of
detention up until issuance of process or
arraignment, but not more. 	From that point on,
any damages recoverable must be based on a
malicious prosecution claim and on the wrongful
use of judicial process rather than detention
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itself.” 	Keeton, supra, § 119, at 888; see also
Heck [v. Humphrey], [512 U.S. 477,] 484 [(1994)];
8 Speiser, supra, § 28:15, at 80. 	Thus,
petitioner’s contention that his false
imprisonment ended upon his release from custody,
after the State dropped the charges against him,
must be rejected. 	It ended much earlier, when
legal process was initiated against him, and the
statute would have begun to run from that date,
but for its tolling by reason of petitioner’s
minority.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388-90 (2007) (emphases in
Wallace) (footnotes omitted).
Wallace, the petitioner, had been subjected, prior to
his formal arrest, to extended interrogations regarding a
shooting that occurred two days earlier, and had eventually
agreed to confess to the murder. 	Wallace was fifteen years old
at that time. 	He was charged and convicted of first-degree
murder. 	The state appellate courts held that Wallace had been
arrested without probable cause and that his confession was
inadmissible. 	The case was remanded for a new trial, but the
prosecutors dropped the charges against him. 	See Wallace, 549
U.S. at 386-87. 	Wallace filed a § 1983 action against the City
of Chicago and several individual police officers. 	Only the
Fourth Amendment false arrest claim was before the Supreme
Court. 	See id. at 387 & n.1.
The Supreme Court held that Wallace’s § 1983 claim
based on his improper arrest accrued when a wrongful prosecution
was instituted against him. 	See id. at 389-90. 	In the instant
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case, Spriestersbach was arrested on May 11, 2017 on the
Castleberry Warrant. 	See Complaint at ¶ 37. 6 	Unlike Wallace,
legal process was never instituted against Spriestersbach; he
was held in custody, under the name Thomas Castleberry. 	See,
e.g., id. at ¶¶ 43-45. 	This Court therefore concludes that
Spriestersbach’s § 1983 claims are most closely analogous to
false arrest/imprisonment, not malicious prosecution, and
therefore his § 1983 claims did not accrue until his release on
January 17, 2020 from HSH, where he was being held in connection
with the criminal case against Thomas Castleberry. 	See id. at
¶ 55. 	Spriestersbach’s § 1983 claims were timely filed within
two years of their accrual. 	The City Motion is therefore denied
as to the City’s argument that Spriestersbach’s § 1983 claims
are time-barred.
b. 	Tolling
For the sake of completeness, this Court will also
address Spriestersbach’s argument that the statute of
limitations was tolled, based on either Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 657-13(3) or equitable tolling. 	Section 657-13 provides that:
If any person entitled to bring any action
specified in this part (excepting actions against
the sheriff, chief of police, or other officers)
6 In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
this Court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as
true. 	See Gregg v. Hawai`i, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883,
887 (9th Cir. 2017).
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is, at the time the cause of action accrued,
either:
(1) 	Within the age of eighteen years;
(2) 	Insane; or
(3) 	Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal
court for a term less than the person’s
natural life;
such person shall be at liberty to bring such
actions within the respective times limited in
this part, after the disability is removed or at
any time while the disability exists.
This district court has concluded that the § 657-13 exception
for “the sheriff” precludes application of the statute to claims
against DPS or its employees. 	See Namauu v. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, CIV. NO. 18-00062 JMS-RLP, 2018 WL 1733978, at *3 (D.
Hawai`i Apr. 10, 2018) (citing Coles v. Eagle, 2014 WL 2214046,
at *4 (D. Haw. May 27, 2014); Rodenhurst v. Hawaii, 2010 WL
1783568, at *3 (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2010) (citing Samonte v.
Sandin, 2007 WL 461311, at *4 (D. Haw. Feb. 07, 2007))).
Similarly, this Court concludes that the exception for the
“chief of police, or other officers” precludes the application
of § 657-13 to claims against HPD, HPD’s other employees, or the
City. 7
7 This Court acknowledges that the Hawai`i Supreme Court
held that Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-13(1) applied to the City in
Kahale v. City & County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai`i 341, 349, 90
P.3d 233, 241 (2004). 	However, the plaintiffs’ claims against
(. . . continued)
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Spriestersbach also argues the doctrine of equitable
tolling applies. 	This district court has stated:
Hawaii has adopted federal equitable tolling
principles:
In order to toll a statute of limitations
for a complaint filed after its expiration,
a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that he
. . . has been pursuing his right
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way.” 	Felter v.
Norton, 412 F. Supp. 2d 118, 126 (D.D.C.
2006) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 417, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814, 161 L. Ed.
2d 669 (2005); Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.
City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d
Cir. 2003)). 	Extraordinary circumstances
are circumstances that are beyond the
control of the complainant and make it
impossible to file a complaint within the
statute of limitations. 	Id. (citing United
States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 203 (D.C.
Cir. 2000)).
Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State, 110 Haw.
338, 360, 133 P.3d 767, 789 (2006). 	See also
Reyes v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 135 Haw.
407, 2015 WL 3476371, at *6 (Haw. Ct. App.
May 29, 2015) (applying federal equitable tolling
principles to fraudulent concealment); Paco v.
Myers, 143 Haw. 330, 2018 WL 6177430, at *2 (Haw.
Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018). 	This test “is a very
high bar, and is reserved for rare cases.” 	Yow
Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir.
2014).
the City in that case did not arise from the actions and
omissions of HPD officers; the plaintiffs’ daughter was injured,
while she was in a City park, when she was attacked by the
third-party defendant’s dog. 	See id. at 343, 90 P.3d at 235.
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Chun v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, Civ. No. 18-00131 JMS-RT, 2020
WL 3965943, at *3 (D. Hawai`i July 13, 2020) (alteration in
Chun) (footnote omitted), aff’d, No. 20-16558, 2022 WL 501586
(9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022).
Accepting the factual allegations of the Complaint as
true, Spriestersbach diligently attempted to assert his rights
by, inter alia: giving his full name, birth date, and social
security number to Bruhn on May 11, 2017; see Complaint at ¶ 35;
telling his public defender, prior to his first court hearing,
that he was not Thomas Castleberry; see id. at ¶ 43; and
“continually advis[ing the psychiatrists and psychologists who
evaluated him] and other staff at H.S.H. of his real name and
identity[,]” see id. at ¶ 47. 	Spriestersbach’s arrest,
detention at OCCC, and commitment for evaluation at HSH, all
under the name of Thomas Castleberry, constitute extraordinary
circumstances that were beyond Spriestersbach’s control and that
made it impossible for him to file a complaint within the
statute of limitations. 	Thus, the instant case is one of the
rare cases where equitable tolling would apply.
Even if Spriestersbach’s § 1983 claims against the
City accrued at the time of his arrest, or shortly thereafter
when formal process was initiated against him (albeit as Thomas
Castleberry), this Court would still conclude, for purposes of
the City Motion, that Spriestersbach’s claims were timely filed.
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2. 	Spriestersbach’s ADA Claim
Spriestersbach argues he “is a member of the class of
persons protected by 42 U.S.C. § 12132[.]” 	[Complaint at ¶ 79.]
Section 12132 states that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”
“Title II of the ADA does not contain an express
statute of limitations.” 	Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 770
(9th Cir. 2015). 	This district court has stated:
Before 1990, federal courts generally borrowed
the statute of limitations provided by the
analogous state law. 	See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377–78, 124 S. Ct.
1836, 158 L. Ed. 2d 645 (2004). 	However, in
1990, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which
provides a “catchall 4–year statute of
limitations for actions arising under federal
statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.” 	Id. at
371, 124 S. Ct. 1836; Sharkey, 778 F.3d at 770;
28 U.S.C. § 1658. 	Although . . . the ADA w[as]
enacted before this date, the Supreme Court has
held that Section 1658’s statute of limitations
also applies to claims brought under amendments
to existing statutes if “the plaintiff’s claim
against the defendant was made possible by a
post–1990 enactment.” 	Id. at 382, 124 S. Ct.
1836; Sharkey, 778 F.3d at 770. 	The ADA . . .
w[as] amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
(“ADAAA”), which became effective on January 1,
2009. 	Accordingly, to determine the appropriate
statute of limitations period, the Court must
consider whether Plaintiff’s claims were “made
possible” by the ADAAA. 	See Jones, 541 U.S. at
382, 124 S. Ct. 1836.
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Toma v. Univ. of Hawai`i, 304 F. Supp. 3d 956, 960–61 (D.
Hawai`i 2018).
The City’s position is that the running of the statute
of limitations is apparent on the face of the Complaint. 	The
City Motion appears to argue the two-year limitations period for
the ADA applies, not the four-year limitations period for claims
made possible by the ADAAA. 	See Mem. in Supp. of City Motion at
4 (“All Federal Claims Against the City Are Barred By the
Applicable Two Year Statute of Limitations” (emphasis omitted)).
However, the City does not present any specific argument to
support its position that Spriestersbach’s ADA claim is time
barred. 	See generally id. at 4-5. 	Because the City has not
provided sufficient support for its position that
Spriestersbach’s ADA claim is time-barred, the City Motion is
denied as to that argument. 	The denial is without prejudice to
the City revisiting the issue in a future motion.
B. 	Liability Under § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State . . . , subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
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Section 1983 liability cannot be based on respondeat superior.
Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009).
A municipality may be held liable as a “person”
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it maintains a policy
or custom that causes the deprivation of a
plaintiff’s federally protected rights. 	Monell
[v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C.], 436 U.S.
[658,] 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018 [(1978)]. 	To state
such a claim, a plaintiff must allege either that
(1) “a particular municipal action itself
violates federal law, or directs an employee to
do so”; or (2) the municipality, through
inaction, failed to implement adequate policies
or procedures to safeguard its community members’
federally protected rights. 	Board of
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 404, 407–08, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d
626 (1997); see also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,
698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012). 	When, as
here, a plaintiff pursues liability based on a
failure to act, she must allege that the
municipality exhibited deliberate indifference to
the violation of her federally protected rights.
Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143.
Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.
2020) (emphasis in Park).
1. 	Count I - Fourth Amendment Violation
(Wrongful Arrest and Detention)
Count I is based upon Spriestersbach’s arrest and
detention in May 2017, which he asserts was unreasonable because
HPD and its officers knew or should have known that he was not
Thomas Castleberry. 	[Complaint at ¶ 65.] 	Spriestersbach does
not allege that the City, through someone authorized to act on
its behalf, expressly directed the individual HPD officers to
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arrest him on May 11 2017, nor does he allege a City policy
required them to do so. 	See generally id. at ¶¶ 64-70. 	Thus,
Count I is based upon the City’s alleged inaction and failure to
implement adequate polices.
When . . . a plaintiff pursues liability based on
a failure to act, she must allege that the
municipality exhibited deliberate indifference to
the violation of her federally protected rights.
Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143. . . .
Deliberate indifference is “a stringent
standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.” 	Brown, 520 U.S. at
410, 117 S. Ct. 1382. 	Deliberate indifference
exists when the need “for more or different”
action “is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of
existing practice] so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said
to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.” 	City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
390 & n.10, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412
(1989). 	A plaintiff can meet this standard in
one of two ways. 	In some circumstances, the
policy may be so facially deficient that any
reasonable policymaker would recognize the need
to take action. 	Brown, 520 U.S. at 409, 117 S.
Ct. 1382. 	When that is the case, a plaintiff
need point only to the policy itself to establish
that the municipality’s policymakers were on
notice that the plaintiff’s federally protected
rights would likely be violated if they failed to
act. 	See id. 	Alternatively, if the policy is
not obviously, facially deficient, a plaintiff
must ordinarily point to a pattern of prior,
similar violations of federally protected rights,
of which the relevant policymakers had actual or
constructive notice. 	Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 62, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417
(2011); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591
F.3d 1232, 1253 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on
other grounds by Castro [v. Cnty. of Los
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Angeles], 833 F.3d [1060,] 1070 [(9th Cir.
2016)].
Park, 952 F.3d at 1141–42 (alteration in Park) (footnote
omitted).
Spriestersbach alleges “[t]he City is liable for these
Fourth Amendment violations due to its customs, policies, and
practices which tolerated and allowed such conduct by H.P.D.
officers to occur and were a moving force causing the
violation.” 	[Complaint at ¶ 68.] 	This is insufficient to
allege a policy that is “so facially deficient that any
reasonable policymaker would recognize the need to take action.”
See Park, 952 F.3d at 1141. 	Even in light of the allegations
regarding Spriestersbach’s two prior arrests as Thomas
Castleberry, paragraph 68 is also insufficient to allege “a
pattern of prior, similar violations of federally protected
rights, of which the relevant policymakers had actual or
constructive notice.” 	See id. at 1142 (emphasis added). 	This
Court therefore concludes that the City is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law as to Spriestersbach’s claim against it in
Count I, and this Court grants judgment on the pleadings in
favor of the City as to that claim. 	See Gregg, 870 F.3d at 887
(“A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking
all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
However, in considering a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, a district court has discretion to grant partial
judgment on the pleadings or to grant leave to amend. 	See
Lieblong v. Abella, 503 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1021 (D. Hawai`i 2020)
(citing Curry v. Baca, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138 (C.D. Cal.
2007)). 	This Court grants Spriestersbach leave to amend his
claim against the City in Count I because it is arguably
possible for him to cure the defects in the claim by amendment.
Cf. Anderson v. Ghaly, 930 F.3d 1066, 1081 (9th Cir. 2019)
(stating, in an appeal from the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action, “[d]ismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend
is not appropriate unless it is clear on de novo review that the
complaint could not be saved by amendment” (quotation marks and
citation omitted)). 	The City Motion is therefore granted in
part and denied in part as to Count I.
2. 	Count II - Fourteenth Amendment Violation
Count II asserts Spriestersbach’s due process rights
were violated because, after his arrest on May 11, 2017, HPD
officers failed to confirm Spriestersbach’s identity and update
the information associated with the Castleberry Warrant and the
records for Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017 arrest.
Spriestersbach alleges that, if they had done so, he would not
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have remained in custody until January 2020. 	See Complaint at
¶¶ 72-74. 	Similar to Count I, Count II alleges “[t]he City is
liable for these Fourteenth Amendment violations due to its
customs, policies, and practices which tolerated and allowed
such conduct by H.P.D. officers to occur and were a moving force
causing the violation.” 	[Id. at ¶ 75.] 	For the same reasons
stated as to Count I, the City is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings as to Count II, but Spriestersbach is granted leave to
amend because it is arguably possible for him to cure the
defects in the claim by amendment. 	The City Motion is therefore
granted in part and denied in part as to Count II.
3. 	Count IV - Fourth Amendment
Violation (Abuse of Process)
Spriestersbach asserts his abuse of process claim
against Bruhn and the City. 	See Complaint at pg. 28. 	This
district court has stated:
The Ninth Circuit has not determined whether
an abuse of process claim is cognizable under
Section 1983. 	See West [v. City of Mesa], 708 F.
App’x [288,] 292 [(9th Cir. 2017)] (stating,
“[e]ven assuming an abuse of process claim is
cognizable under § 1983 in our circuit,” West
failed to plead sufficient facts to state a
claim). 	Most federal courts to consider the
issue have concluded that there is no
constitutional violation for abuse of process
under Section 1983 without conscience-shocking,
egregious wrongdoing. 	See Martin A. Schwartz,
Section 1983 Claims and Defenses, § 3.18
Malicious Prosecution; Abuse of Civil Process
(4th ed. 2018 Supp.) (collecting cases); Brown v.
Lever, 2018 WL 1903120, at *6 (D. Nev. Apr. 20,
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2018) (dismissing abuse of process claim). 	An
abuse of process claim is essentially a malicious
prosecution clam, which requires a showing that
the defendant prosecuted the plaintiff with
malice, without probable cause, and for the
purpose of denying equal protection or some other
specific constitutional right, and that the
criminal case terminated in favor of the accused.
Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Char v. Simeona, CIV. NO. 18-00303 DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 5815519, at
*4 (D. Hawai`i Nov. 6, 2018). 	However, in Awabdy v. City of
Adelanto, the Ninth Circuit noted that it “incorporated the
relevant elements of the common law tort of malicious
prosecution into [its] analysis under § 1983.” 	368 F.3d 1062,
1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828
F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
483, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994)). 	Under Hawai`i
law, the elements of an abuse of process claim are: “(1) an
ulterior purpose and (2) a wilful act in the use of the process
which is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.”
Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai`i 403, 412, 198 P.3d 666,
675 (2008) (citations omitted).
At this stage of the case, the Court need not decide
whether the Hawai`i law elements of an abuse of process claim
also constitute a § 1983 abuse of process claim or whether
egregious conduct that shocks the conscience is required. 	Under
either standard, Spriestersbach has not pled sufficient factual
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allegations to support his abuse of process claim against the
City because Count IV only makes the conclusory allegation that
the City “continued to commit multiple willful actions for the
improper purpose of prosecuting [him] for a crime he did not
commit, as more fully alleged above.” 	See Complaint at ¶ 89.
The City is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as
to Count IV, but Spriestersbach is granted leave to amend
because it is arguably possible for him to cure the defects in
the claim by amendment. 	The City Motion is therefore granted in
part and denied in part as to Count IV.
C. 	Liability under the ADA
In Count II, Spriestersbach alleges the City
discriminated against him and failed to provide reasonable
accommodations for his known disability. 	[Id. at ¶ 80.]
Spriestersbach asserts the City is a “public entity” for
purposes of the ADA. 	[Id. at ¶ 81.] 	The City denied
paragraph 81 in its entirety. 	See Defendant City and County of
Honolulu’s Answer to Complaint Filed November 21, 2021, filed
1/24/22 (dkt. no. 34), at ¶ 15. 	However, it is clear that the
City is a “public entity” for purposes of the ADA. 	See 42
U.S.C. § 12131 (“The term ‘public entity’ means - (A) any State
or local government . . . .”).
Title II of the ADA prohibits public
entities from discriminating on the basis of
disability. 	42 U.S.C. § 12132. . . . 	To state a
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prima facie case for a violation of Title II, “a
plaintiff must show: (1) he is a ‘qualified
individual with a disability’; (2) he was either
excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of a public entity’s services, programs,
or activities, or was otherwise discriminated
against by the public entity; and (3) such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination
was by reason of his disability.” 	Duvall v.
County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir.
2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11,
2001) (citation omitted). . . .
Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 737–38
(9th Cir. 2021).
The term “qualified individual with a disability”
means an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided
by a public entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 	The following ADA definitions are
relevant to this case:
(1) 	Disability
“The term “disability” means, with respect to an
individual--
(A) 	a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual;
(B) 	a record of such an impairment; or
(C) 	being regarded as having such an
impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).
(2) 	Major life activities
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(A) 	In general
For purposes of paragraph (1), major life
activities include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating, and working.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)-(2)(A).
Spriestersbach states: “[h]e developed mental health
problems and was hospitalized several times” between 1999 and
2001; [Complaint at pg. 8, ¶ 2;] he “was hospitalized for
several months at the H.S.H. in 2002 for treatment of a mental
illness”; [id. at pg. 8, ¶ 3;] in 2006, he was “treated at a
mental health facility on Hawai`i Island;” and, after moving to
Oahu, he was treated at various times by HSH or “Care Hawai`i,
an adult mental health care facility,” [id. at pg. 9, ¶ 6]. 	He
also states his disability
causes him to be confused, . . . resulting in
difficulty in locating and staying in touch with
his mother and sister and other family,
difficulty in expressing his mental health
treatment needs, and otherwise meeting his daily
medical, shelter, food, and mental health needs.
Thus his disability substantially interferes with
his ability to work, secure food, secure housing,
. . . and remain safe without reasonable
accommodation.
[Id. at ¶ 79.] 	Spriestersbach’s factual allegations, which are
accepted as true for purposes of the City Motion, are sufficient
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to support his position that he is a qualified person with a
disability for purposes of the ADA.
Spriestersbach also states his “disability and the
perception of him by those in authority makes it difficult for
his statements of fact about his identity to be trusted; [and]
makes his statements regarding his understanding of legal
proceedings to be discounted[.]” 	[Id.] 	Thus, “his disability
substantially interferes with his ability to . . . . navigate
interactions with police and persons in authority . . . .”
[Id.]
In Sheehan v. City & County of San
Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014), the
Ninth Circuit concluded, in light of the broad
manner in which it had previously interpreted
these statutory phrases, that “[t]he ADA
therefore applies to arrests” conducted by local
law enforcement agencies. 	Id. at 1232.[ 8 ] 	In a
related vein, the Sheehan court recognized that a
plaintiff may assert a claim under Title II of
the ADA for “wrongful arrest, where police
wrongly arrest someone with a disability because
they misperceive the effects of that disability
as criminal activity.” 	Id. 	Although the Ninth
Circuit has never expressly delineated the
elements of such a claim, district courts within
the Ninth Circuit have concluded that, “[t]o
prevail on a theory of wrongful arrest under the
ADA, [a plaintiff] must prove that (1) he was
8 Sheehan, 743 F.3d 1211, was affirmed in part and reversed
in part on other grounds. 	City & Cnty. of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015). 	The Supreme Court dismissed, as
improvidently granted, certiorari on the question of whether
§ 12132 “requires law enforcement officers to provide
accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in
the course of bringing the suspect into custody.” 	Id. at 608
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 610.
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disabled; (2) the officers knew or should have
known he was disabled; and (3) the officers
arrested him because of legal conduct related to
his disability.” 	Lawman v. City & County of San
Francisco, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1147 (N.D. Cal.
2016). 	Additionally, “exigent circumstances
inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA,
just as they inform the distinct reasonableness
analysis under the Fourth Amendment.” 	Sheehan,
743 F.3d at 1232.
Leibel v. City of Buckeye, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1074–75 (D.
Ariz. 2021) (some alterations in Leibel) (footnote omitted),
appeal dismissed sub nom. C.L. ex rel. Kevin v. Grossman,
No. 21-16524, 2022 WL 780439 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2022).
Thus, it is possible for a plaintiff to assert an ADA
claim against the City based on a theory that HPD officers
arrested him because of conduct related to his disability. 	As
previously noted, Spriestersbach has alleged sufficient factual
allegations to support his position that he is a qualified
person with a disability, for purposes of the ADA. 	Viewing the
Complaint as a whole, Spriestersbach appears to be alleging
that, when he was arrested on May 11, 2017 for the Castleberry
Warrant, the arresting officers disregarded his statements about
his identity because of his disability. 	In other words,
Spriestersbach alleges that, but for his disability, the
officers would have investigated his statements about his
identity, would have confirmed that he was not Thomas
Castleberry, and would not have arrested him. 	This is
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sufficient to allege that Spriestersbach was denied the benefits
of the City’s police services, or that he was subjected to
discrimination by a City agency, because of his disability.
However, Spriestersbach had not alleged sufficient
factual allegations to support his position that the arresting
officers knew or should have known about his disability.
Spriestersbach has pled factual allegations regarding his
history of mental health issues and treatment, but he does not
allege that that HPD became aware of his disability in
connection with either his October 14, 2011 arrest, his
January 17, 2015 arrest, or the events on May 11, 2017 prior to
his arrest. 	Spriestersbach’s ADA claim against the City
therefore fails as a matter of law.
The City is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as
to Count III, but Spriestersbach is granted leave to amend
because it is arguably possible for him to cure the defects in
the claim by amendment. 	The City Motion is therefore granted in
part and denied in part as to Count III.
D. 	Spriestersbach’s IIED and NIED Claims
Spriestersbach’s IIED and NIED claims against the City
appear to be based upon a theory of respondeat superior. 	See
Complaint at ¶¶ 126-33. 	This Court has stated:
“Under Hawaii law, a municipality can have
respondeat superior liability for torts
maliciously committed by an employee acting
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within the scope of his authority.”
McCormack v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 762 F.
Supp. 2d 1246, 1253 (D. Haw. 2011). 	The
employee must be motivated by malice in his
commission of the tort, and the plaintiff is
required to allege malice in the complaint.
Alexander v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 545 F.
Supp. 2d 1122, 1136 (D. Haw. 2008).
Hollandsworth [v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, Civ.
No. 19-00587 ACK-WRP], 2020 WL 913216, at *11
[(D. Hawai`i Feb. 25, 2020)]. 	Hawai`i courts use
the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 analysis
to determine whether the employee’s tortious
actions were within the scope of his employment.
See Hollandsworth, 2020 WL 913216, at *12
(quoting State v. Hoshijo ex rel. White, 102
Hawai`i 307, 320, 76 P.3d 550, 563 (2003)).
Section 228 states:
(1) 	Conduct of a servant is within the
scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) 	it is of the kind he is employed
to perform;
(b) 	it occurs substantially within the
authorized time and space limits;
(c) 	it is actuated, at least in part,
by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) 	if force is intentionally used by
the servant against another, the use of
force is not unexpectable by the
master.
(2) 	Conduct of a servant is not within the
scope of employment if it is different in
kind from that authorized, far beyond the
authorized time or space limits, or too
little actuated by a purpose to serve the
master.
Vargas v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, CIV. NO. 19-00116 LEK-WRP,
2020 WL 3547941, at *18–19 (D. Hawai`i June 30, 2020).
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Accepting the factual allegations of the Complaint as
true, Braun and other HPD officers: initiated contact with
Spriestersbach on May 11, 2017 because he was sleeping on the
sidewalk; asked Spriestersbach for his name; and arrested
Spriestersbach on the Castleberry Warrant on the ground that
that “Joshua Spriestersbach” and “Thomas Castleberry” were
aliases for the same person. 	See Complaint at ¶¶ 34-37. 	These
actions are the type of actions HPD officers are employed to
perform, these actions occurred within the authorized time and
space for HPD officers in the incident, and the officers
undertook these actions, at least in part, to serve the City.
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1)(a)-(c). 	Thus,
Spriestersbach has sufficiently alleged that Braun and the other
HPD officers involved in Spriestersbach’s arrest were acting
within the scope of their authority.
Spriestersbach asserts malice is specifically pled in
paragraph 22 of the Complaint, and that paragraph is
incorporated in his IIED and NIED claims. 	Paragraph 22 alleges
the “wrongful acts and/or omissions by any individual defendant
was done intentionally, maliciously, or with reckless disregard
for [his] rights[.]” 	This general allegation that all
individual defendants’ acts and omissions were intentional or
malicious or in reckless disregard is insufficient to support
Spriestersbach’s position that Braun and other HPD officers
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acted with malice in relation to Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017
arrest and detention.
Spriestersbach also argues malice can be inferred
because he was arrested without probable cause. 	[City Opp. at
17-18 (citing Black v. Correa, No. 07-00299 DAE-LEK, 2008 WL
3845230, at *17 (D. Haw. Aug. 18, 2008); Gaspar v. Nahale, 14
Haw. 574, 575 (1903)).] 	The district court in Correa did note,
in the context of a malicious prosecution claim, that “malice
may be inferred from a lack of probable cause[.]” 	2008 WL
3845230, at *16. 	However, Braun and the other HPD officers
arguably had probable cause to arrest Thomas Castleberry on the
outstanding warrant. 	The issue relevant here is whether Braun
and the other HPD officers acted maliciously when they
misidentified and arrested Spriestersbach as Thomas Castleberry.
Spriestersbach has not pled sufficient factual allegations to
support that position, and therefore he has not pled sufficient
factual allegations to support his position that the City is
liable, based on respondeat superior, for IIED and NIED. 	The
City is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Counts XI
and XII, and the City Motion is granted as to those claims. 9
However, Spriestersbach is granted leave to amend because it is
9 In light of this ruling, it is not necessary to reach the
City’s arguments regarding whether the factual allegations of
the Complaint sufficiently allege the elements of
Spriestersbach’s IIED and NIED claims against the City.
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arguably possible for him to cure the defects in those claims by
amendment.
E. 	Ruling
In sum, judgment on the pleadings is granted in favor
of the City as to all of Spriestersbach’s claims against it.
However, Spriestersbach is granted leave to amend as to each of
his claims against the City.
II. 	The Tisza Motion and the Compton/Vargo Joinder
A. 	Request for Judicial Notice
The Examiner Defendants ask this Court to take
judicial notice of the record in State of Hawai`i v. Thomas R.
Castleberry, Case No. 1PC-06-1-001421 (“Castleberry Criminal
Case”), filed in the State of Hawai`i Circuit Court of the First
Circuit (“state court”). 	See Mem. in Supp. of Tisza Motion at
2-3; Mem. in Supp. of Compton/Vargo Joinder at 2 n.1.
Spriestersbach does not oppose the request as to the records
attached to the Tisza Motion, and he asks this Court to take
judicial notice of additional filings in the Castleberry
Criminal Case which address his identity. 	See Examiners Opp. at
2.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, this Court takes
judicial notice of the relevant state court records from the
Castleberry Criminal Case that are electronically available.
See United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th
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Cir. 2018) (“A court may take judicial notice of undisputed
matters of public record, which may include court records
available through [the public access to court electronic records
system].” (citations omitted)). 	However, this Court “cannot
take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public
records.” 	See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d
988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 	This Court will
therefore take judicial notice of the existence of the relevant
filings in the Castleberry Criminal Case, and, where
appropriate, judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 	See
Rule 201.
B. 	Judicial Immunity
This Court has stated:
“Judges are absolutely immune from civil
liability for damages for their judicial acts.”
Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828
F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 198[7]) (citations
omitted). 	“This immunity applies even when the
judge is accused of acting maliciously or
corruptly, and it is not for the protection or
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for
the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise
their functions with independence and without
fear of consequences.” 	Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554 (1967) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). 	“Judicial immunity may be
overcome only if the judge’s actions are ‘not
taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,’ or are
‘taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.’” 	Ah Puck v. Werk, CIV. NO. 17-
00154 DKW-KJM, 2017 WL 1731685, at *3 (D. Haw.
May 2, 2017) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11-12 (1991)).
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Lapina v. Gierlach, CIV. NO. 19-00452 LEK-KJM, 2022 WL 1294568,
at *4 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 29, 2022) (some citations omitted).
“Under the doctrine of quasi-judicial
immunity, absolute judicial immunity may be
‘extended to certain others who perform functions
closely associated with the judicial process.’”
Bridge Aina Le`a, LLC v. Haw. Land Use Comm’n,
125 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1074 (D. Haw. 2015)
(quoting Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d
1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001)), aff’d, 950 F.3d 610
(9th Cir. 2020). . . .
Sullivan v. Kennedy, CIVIL NO. 21-00235 JAO-RT, 2021 WL 2383224,
at *3 (D. Hawai`i June 10, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-
16123, 2021 WL 4597834 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2021), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 789 (2022). 	Quasi-judicial immunity is a form of
absolute immunity, which “‘is an immunity from suit rather than
a mere defense to liability[.]’” 	See Chavez v. Robinson, 817
F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985)).
In Sullivan, this district court ruled that Dr. Reneau
Kennedy (“Dr. Kennedy”), who performed a court-ordered
competency examination of Leihinahina Sullivan (“Sullivan”) in
the criminal case against Sullivan, was entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity from the claims asserted in Sullivan’s civil
action arising from Dr. Kennedy’s preparation and transmission
of the competency report. 	See id. 	This district court stated:
Court-appointed psychologists and psychiatrists
who perform court-ordered evaluations enjoy
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quasi-judicial immunity. 	See Doe v. Arizona, 240
F. App’x 241 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal
of the claims against a doctor who performed
court-ordered evaluations because he was entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity (citing Burkes v.
Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam))); Xoss v. County of Los Angeles, CV 12-
1400 PSG (RZx), 2013 WL 11324011, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. May 22, 2013) (“The Ninth Circuit has held
that a court-appointed psychiatrist has quasi-
judicial immunity from damages liability for acts
committed ‘in the performance of an integral part
of the judicial process,’ such as preparing and
submitting medical reports[.]” (citations
omitted)); cf. Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for
Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.
1987) (in the Bivens context, applying absolute
quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil
rights violations to court clerks “when they
perform tasks that are an integral part of the
judicial process” (citations omitted)).
Id. (alteration in Sullivan). 	A similar immunity exists under
Hawai`i law. 	See Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 525, 631 P.2d
173, 179 (1981) (“Appellees[, court appointed psychiatrists,]
examined and reported their findings on [the defendant] to the
court. 	Thus, appellees were arms of the court and performed a
function integral to the judicial process. As arms of the court,
appellees are entitled to the absolute immunity given to judges
and other judicial officials.”).
In the Castleberry Criminal Case, the state court
issued the following orders relevant here:
-Order Granting the Appointment of Examiners to Determine
Defendant’s Fitness to Proceed and Penal Responsibility on
the Motion for Modification of the Terms and Conditions of
Probation, filed on July 12, 2017; [Tisza Motion, Decl. of
Edquon Lee (“Lee Decl.”), Exh. 3;]
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-Order Appointing Examiners to Determine Defendant’s Current
Fitness to Proceed, Likelihood to Regain Fitness, and
Dangerousness, filed on October 10, 2018; [id., Exh. 4;]
-Order Appointing Examiners to Determine Defendant’s Fitness to
Proceed, Likelihood to Regain Fitness, and Dangerousness,
filed on May 8, 2019; [id., Exh. 5;] and
-Amended Order Granting Motion for Mental Examination to
Determine Defendant’s Current Fitness to Proceed, filed
November 19, 2019, [id., Exh. 6].
The Examiner Defendants were appointed to, inter alia, “examine
and report upon the Defendant’s FITNESS TO PROCEED,” [Lee Decl.,
Exh. 3 at 2 (emphasis in original),] and “examine and report
upon the defendant’s physical and mental condition,” [id.,
Exh. 6 at 2].
Spriestersbach does not contest the fact that the
Examiner Defendants evaluated him pursuant to these orders. 	See
Examiners Opp. at 1 (stating Defendants Tisza, Compton and Vargo
“evaluated Joshua Spriestersbach”). 	He contends that the state
court ordered them to evaluate the defendant in the Castleberry
Criminal Case, i.e. Thomas Castleberry, and therefore they were
acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction. 	To the extent that
the Examiner Defendants argue they evaluated the person
presented to them as Thomas Castleberry, Spriestersbach responds
that, based on factual allegations of the Complaint, the
Examiner Defendants knew or should have known the person
presented to them was not Thomas Castleberry. 	Spriestersbach
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contends such knowledge would preclude the Examiner Defendants
from asserting quasi-judicial immunity. 	He therefore asserts
the Tisza Motion and the Compton/Vargo Joinder should be denied,
and he should be permitted to conduct discovery regarding the
extent of the Examiner Defendants’ knowledge about his identity
at the time of their evaluations.
1. 	Whether the Examiner Defendants Were
Acting Within Their Quasi-Judicial Capacity
Spriestersbach contends that, to the extent the
Examiner Defendants have quasi-judicial immunity, it is limited
to their findings regarding the issues such as fitness to
proceed or dangerousness. 	Spriestersbach argues the immunity
does not apply to the Examiner Defendants’ decisions not to
confirm his identity before conducting their respective
evaluations of him. 	In other words, he contends that, when the
Examiner Defendants made that decision, they were not acting
within their quasi-judicial capacity.
The Examiner Defendants’ reports to the state court
show that Spriestersbach told the Examiner Defendants in the
early stages of their evaluations either that his name was
Joshua Spriestersbach or that he thought he was arrested for
something someone else did. 	See Examiners Opp., Decl. of
Attorney Alphonse A. Gerhardstein (“Gerhardstein Decl.”), Exh. B
(letter dated 8/30/17 from Dr. Compton) at 2; id., Exh. E
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(letter dated 8/30/17 from Dr. Vargo) at 5; id., Exh. H (letter
dated 8/31/17 from Dr. Tisza) at 4. 	Nevertheless, the Examiner
Defendants each proceeded to evaluate Spriestersbach as Thomas
Castleberry.
The Supreme Court has stated:
This Court in Stump [v. Sparkman] made clear that
“whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one
relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a
judge, and to the expectations of the parties,
i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his
judicial capacity.” 	435 U.S. [349,] 362
[(1978)]. 	See also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
[219,] 227–229 [(1988)]. 	A judge’s direction to
court officers to bring a person who is in the
courthouse before him is a function normally
performed by a judge. 	See generally Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code Ann. §§ 128, 177, 187 (West 1982 and
Supp. 1991) (setting forth broad powers of state
judges in the conduct of proceedings). 	Waco, who
was called into the courtroom for purposes of a
pending case, was dealing with Judge Mireles in
the judge’s judicial capacity.
Of course, a judge’s direction to police
officers to carry out a judicial order with
excessive force is not a “function normally
performed by a judge.” 	Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S., at 362. 	But if only the particular act in
question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake
of a judge in excess of his authority would
become a “nonjudicial” act, because an improper
or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally
performed by a judge. 	If judicial immunity means
anything, it means that a judge “will not be
deprived of immunity because the action he took
was in error . . . or was in excess of his
authority.” 	Id., at 356. 	See also Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S., at 227 (a judicial act “does not
become less judicial by virtue of an allegation
of malice or corruption of motive”).
Accordingly, as the language in Stump indicates,
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the relevant inquiry is the “nature” and
“function” of the act, not the “act itself.” 	435
U.S., at 362. 	In other words, we look to the
particular act’s relation to a general function
normally performed by a judge . . . .
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12–13, (some alterations in Mireles)
(footnote omitted).
In the instant case, Spriestersbach was arrested on a
bench warrant and appeared in state court. 	See Lee Decl.,
Exh. 2 (docket sheet for the Castleberry Criminal Case) at
docket # 26 (entry dated 7/24/09 regarding bench warrant),
docket # 52 (entry dated 5/11/17 noting “Bench Warrant Served”).
Spriestersbach’s counsel made a motion for a mental examination,
and the state court granted the motion. 	The state court
appointed the Examiner Defendants to conduct the mental
examination. 	Thus, Spriestersbach dealt with the state court
judges in their judicial capacity, and he dealt with the
Examiner Defendants in their quasi-judicial capacity. 	Although
Spriestersbach asks this Court to focus upon the Examiner
Defendants’ decision not to confirm his identity after he made
statements denying that he was Thomas Castleberry, under
Mireles, this Court does not consider only “the act itself”; it
must consider “the nature and function of the act[.]” 	See
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Interviewing a defendant and considering the defendant’s
statements are parts of the standard process that court-
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appointed mental health professionals go through when conducting
a court-ordered mental fitness evaluation. 	Even accepting
Spriestersbach’s position that it was error for the Examiner
Defendants to evaluate him as Thomas Castleberry after he made
statements raising the issue of mistaken identity, that error
was not enough to bring their actions outside of the scope of
their quasi-judicial capacity.
2. 	Whether the Examiner Defendants Were
Acting in the Absence of All Jurisdiction
Spriestersbach next argues that, even if the Examiner
Defendants were performing actions that were quasi-judicial in
nature, they are not immune from suit because they acted “in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction,” having examined a person
other than the defendant named in the relevant court orders.
See id. at 12 (citations omitted).
“In determining judicial immunity, [the Ninth Circuit]
distinguishe[s] between acts ‘in excess of jurisdiction’ and
acts ‘in the clear absence of jurisdiction’ by looking to the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the judge: ‘[a] clear absence of
all jurisdiction means a clear lack of all subject matter
jurisdiction.’” 	Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.
2008) (some alterations in Miller) (quoting Mullis v. U.S.
Bankr. Court, Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir.
1987)).
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In Bradley [v. Fisher], the Court
illustrated the distinction between lack of
jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction with the
following examples: if a probate judge, with
jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should
try a criminal case, he would be acting in the
clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be
immune from liability for his action; on the
other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should
convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he
would merely be acting in excess of his
jurisdiction and would be immune. 	[80 U.S. 335,]
352 [(1871)].
Stump, 435 U.S. at 357. 	Under this analysis, the Examiner
Defendants were acting within the scope of their subject matter
jurisdiction; they are mental health professionals who were
performing court-ordered evaluations of a defendant facing
criminal charges in the state court.
However, Spriestersbach urges this Court to apply case
law addressing whether law enforcement officers or prison
official executing court orders are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity. 	The Ninth Circuit has stated:
It is true that “prison officials charged
with executing facially valid court orders enjoy
absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for
conduct prescribed by those orders.” 	Engebretson
v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013).
However, absolute immunity applies “only to the
fact of a prisoner’s incarceration pursuant to a
facially valid court order — i.e., the prison
official in question must act within his or her
authority and strictly comply with the order.”
Id. at 1041 (emphasis in original). 	Here,
according to Plaintiff’s allegations, Baca did
not strictly comply with the order, as it was
applied to the wrong person, and Plaintiff
challenged not just the fact of his
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incarceration, but also the lack of procedures to
prevent the misidentification. . . .
Garcia v. Cnty. of Riverside, 817 F.3d 635, 644 (9th Cir. 2016)
(first emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
The plaintiff, Mario Alberto Garcia (“Garcia”), was
arrested on November 26, 2012 by the Riverside County Sheriff’s
Department (“RCSD”) for driving under the influence. 	RCSD
officers found a warrant issued in 1994 by a Los Angeles
Superior Court for Mario L. Garcia. 	Because Garcia’s first
name, last name, and birth date matched the information
associated with the warrant, Garcia was detained on the warrant,
even though he protested that he was not Mario L. Garcia and
that he had previously been erroneously detained for that
warrant. 	When he was transferred to a Los Angeles County jail,
Garcia repeated his protests to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (“LASD”) officers. 	Id. at 638. 	According to Garcia,
LASD knew or should have known that he was not
Mario L. Garcia for several reasons: (1) their
middle names do not match; (2) their height and
weight differ considerably (Mario L. Garcia is
listed as 5’1”, 130 lbs. 	Plaintiff is 5’10”,
170 lbs.); (3) [Garcia]’s biometric identifiers,
including fingerprints and [criminal
identification and information (“CII”)] number,
did not match the subject’s; and (4) [Garcia]’s
criminal history, which was linked in the system
to his fingerprints, did not match the subject’s.
[Garcia] contends that it is the policy of LASD
to ignore CII numbers for identification
purposes, to ignore prisoners’ complaints of
misidentification, and to accept an outside
agency’s determination that an arrestee is the
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subject of a warrant rather than conduct an
independent identity check upon booking in LA
County.
Id.
Lee Baca (“Baca”), one of the individual LASD
defendants, argued on appeal that he was entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity because “[l]aw enforcement officers . . . have
no duty to ‘go behind [a] judicial order . . . to inquire into
the validity of the procedure leading up to its issuance.’” 	Id.
at 644 (quoting Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir.
1954)). 	In rejecting Baca’s argument, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[Garcia] is not challenging the validity of the
warrant itself, or its issuance in 1994; he is
claiming that it was wrongfully applied to him.
Taking simple, readily available steps to verify
that they had booked the man they sought, in the
presence of marked physical differences and
[Garcia]’s protestations of misidentification,
does not require officers to “inquire into the
validity” of a warrant or its issuance. 	Rather,
the question is whether the LASD procedures were
reasonably calculated to determine that an
arrestee was the person described in the
outstanding warrant.
Id. 	Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling that Baca was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
Id. at 644-45.
There are factual similarities between Garcia’s arrest
on Mario L. Garcia’s warrant, and Spriestersbach’s arrest on the
Castleberry Warrant. 	However, there is a significant
distinction between Baca, who was a law enforcement officer
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involved in Garcia’s incarceration because of the mistaken
arrest on the Mario L. Garcia warrant, and the Examiner
Defendants, who evaluated Spriestersbach pursuant to court
orders in a case where he was being prosecuted as Thomas
Castleberry and where he was represented by counsel. 	It is
arguably true that the Examiner Defendants “did not strictly
comply with the [court examination] order[s], as [they] w[ere]
applied to the wrong person[.]” 	See Garcia, 817 F.3d at 644.
However, Spriestersbach’s claims in this case challenge his
incarceration on the Castleberry Warrant and the lack of
procedures to prevent wrongful arrest for the warrant, which led
to the proceedings against Spriestersbach in the Castleberry
Criminal Case. 	His claims do not directly challenge the
validity of the proceedings against him in the Castleberry
Criminal Case. 	Thus, this Court concludes that the Ninth
Circuit’s holding that Baca was not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity because he had a duty to confirm Garcia’s identity as
the person named in the warrant does not create a similar duty
for the Examiner Defendants to confirm Spriestersbach’s identity
as the person named in the state court’s examination orders.
Spriestersbach’s argument that the Examiner Defendants were
acting in the absence of all jurisdiction is rejected.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Examiner Defendants
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. 	All of
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Spriestersbach’s claims against the Examiner Defendants are
therefore dismissed. 	Further, because this Court concludes that
it is clear that the defects in those claims cannot be cured by
amendment, the dismissal must be with prejudice. 	See Hoang v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not
appropriate unless it is clear on de novo review that the
complaint could not be saved by amendment.” (quotation marks and
citation omitted)). 	The Tisza Motion and the Compton/Vargo
Joinder are therefore granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, filed March 14, 2022, is HEREBY
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 	The City Motion is GRANTED
insofar as judgment on the pleadings is granted in favor of the
City as to all of Spriestersbach’s claims against it. 	The City
Motion is DENIED insofar as Spriestersbach is GRANTED leave to
amend those claims. 	If Spriestersbach chooses to amend one or
more of his claims against the City, he must file an amended
complaint by September 16, 2022. 	This Court emphasizes that
leave to amend is limited to adding further allegations to
support the claims that Spriestersbach asserted against the City
in the Complaint, and Spriestersbach does not have leave to add
new claims against the City. 	If Spriestersbach does not file an
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amended complaint by September 16, 2022, the Clerk’s Office will
terminate the City as a party on September 19, 2022, pursuant to
this Order.
In addition, Dr. Tisza’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint,
filed March 14, 2022, and Dr. Compton and Dr. Vargo’s
Substantive Joinder in Defendant Dr. Sharon Tisza’s Motion to
Dismiss Complaint, filed March 17, 2022, are HEREBY GRANTED.
All of Spriestersbach’s claims against Dr. Tisza, Dr. Compton,
and Dr. Vargo are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 	The Clerk’s Office
is DIRECTED to terminate them as parties on September 2, 2022,
unless any party files a timely motion for reconsideration of
their dismissal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, August 18, 2022.
JOSHUA SPRIESTERSBACH VS. STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL; CV 12-00456
LEK-RT; ORDER: 	GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS; GRANTING DEFENDANT DR. SHARON TISZA’S MOTION TO
DISMISS COMPLAINT; AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS DR. JOHN COMPTON AND
DR. MELISSA VARGO’S SUBSTANTIVE JOINDER IN DEFENDANT DR. SHARON
TISZA’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
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