Pamela Williams

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE: 	: 	CASE NUMBER:
:
PAMELA WILLIAMS, 	: 	24-62693-LRC
aka Pamela Stewart 	:
aka Pamela Graham 	:
aka Pamela Loraine Stewart 	:
aka Pamela Loraine Williams 	: 	CHAPTER 13
:
Debtor. 	:
ORDER
On October 16, 2025, the Court entered an order denying the Motion to Strike
Unauthorized Pleadings, Disregard Improper Appearances, and for Related Relief (the
“Motion to Strike,” Doc. 103), filed by Pamela Williams (“Debtor”). 	See Doc. 104, the
“Order”). 	In the Motion to Strike, Debtor asked the Court to strike from the record
pleadings and arguments presented by attorney John Taylor Weitz, arguing that Mr. Weitz
never made a proper appearance in the case because he did not file a notice of appearance
_______________________________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below:
_____________________________________
Lisa Ritchey Craig
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Date: October 30, 2025
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and, without a proper appearance, Mr. Weitz’ clients (the “Clients”) lacked standing and
their participation was unauthorized. 	In the Order, the Court reasoned that, under the
Court’s local rule, Mr. Weitz had made a proper appearance by filing a written response to
Debtor's Amended Motion to Reinstate and Extend the Automatic Stay (Doc. 19, the
“Motion to Reinstate”) and the Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 54, the “Motion
to Reconsider”). 	And, even if he had not done so, the remedy under Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9010(b) for failure to make a proper appearance is not to strike
pleadings filed or arguments made after the fact, but to bar the attorney “from representing
the party at trial or in any other proceeding,” BLR 9010-4(a), and no further matters were
pending in this case, which stands dismissed. Accordingly, the Court denied the Motion.
On October 24, 2025, Debtor filed a motion to reconsider the Order (Doc. 106, the
“Motion”). In the Motion, Debtor argues that the Court should have struck the pleadings
and arguments made by Mr. Weitz because the Clients lacked standing and were not parties
in interest, within the meaning of § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,1 when they appeared
in opposition to the Motion to Reinstate and the Motion to Reconsider. Debtor asserts that
only entities that have a “title interest” or a secured claim, or who appear on the creditor
matrix are entitled to notice and to participate in a bankruptcy case.2 That is not the law.
1 In this Chapter 13 case, § 1109(b)’s definition of “party in interest” does not, technically, apply. See 11 U.S.C. §
1109(b) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders'
committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on
any issue in a case under this chapter.”) (emphasis added).
2 For authority on this point, Debtor cites White v. Bank of America, 291 Ga. 367 (2012). The Court was unable to
locate this case. 	The citation appears to be incorrect and, perhaps, is the product of an artificial intelligence
“hallucination.” 	See In re Martin, 670 B.R. 636, 649 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2025) (stating that “blindly relying on
generative AI and citing fake cases” violated Bankruptcy Rule 9011 “and will be sanctioned”; sanctioning lawyer and
his law firm $5,500); In re Richburg, 671 B.R. 918, 919 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2025); In re Ford, Case No. 25-57617-SMS,
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Debtor sought imposition of a stay for the purpose of preventing the Clients from regaining
possession of property in which they asserted an ownership interest. Regardless of whether
Debtor added them to the creditor matrix, they were proper respondents to the Motion to
Reinstate and the Motion to Reconsider and, as such, were entitled to appear and protect
their property interest. A defendant need not establish standing. 	In re Moore, 2018 WL
1057834, at *5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2018). Debtor has failed to raise any basis upon
which the Court could reconsider the Order.
In the Motion, Debtor also requests a declaration that a foreclosure sale of Debtor’s
property was void ab initio as having been conducted in violation of the automatic stay.
Although Debtor acknowledges in the Motion that no automatic stay arose in this case,
pursuant to § 362(c)(4), Debtor argues that the Court erred when it refused to impose a stay
and, had such a stay been imposed, it would have had retroactive effect. 	In this regard,
Debtor essentially requests reconsideration of the Court’s order entered on February 12,
2025 (Doc. 51, the “Stay Denial Order”), which Debtor appealed on February 24, 2025
(see Doc. 63). As the appeal remains pending, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider
the Stay Denial Order. 	See In re Wylie, 664 B.R. 351, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2024)
(noting that it would lack authority to rule on a Rule 9024 motion that was filed after a
timely notice of appeal was filed); In re Baldwin, 2024 WL 4378990, at *1 (Bankr. D. Or.
Oct. 1, 2024) (holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion to
Doc. 58 (Aug. 1, 2025) (setting a show cause order as to why a pro se debtor should not be sanctioned under Rule
9011 for filing motions with “hallucinated” case law).
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reconsider filed after a timely notice of appeal).3 For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.
END OF DOCUMENT
Distribution List
Pamela Williams
950 Eagles Landing Parkway, Suite 629
Stockbridge, GA 30281
Melissa J. Davey
Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
Suite 2250
233 Peachtree Street NE
Atlanta, GA 30303
3 To the extent the Motion is considered a “timely” motion within the meaning of Rule 8008, the Court denies the
motion on the basis that it fails to state a basis to reconsider the legal conclusions made in the Stay Denial Order.
From the beginning, Debtor has acknowledged that she was not seeking retroactive imposition of a stay. See Doc. 83
(noting that, during the hearing on the Motion to Extend, Debtor “acknowledged that, if the Court granted the Motion
for Stay, imposition of the stay would come too late to ‘undo’ the foreclosure sale”). Further, the statute is clear that
a stay imposed under § 362(c)(4) is not retroactive. 	See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(C) (“[A] stay imposed under
subparagraph (B) shall be effective on the date of the entry of the order allowing the stay to go into effect.”).
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