CAMPBELL v. PEACH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
BARBARA L. CAMPBELL, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: 	CASE NO.
v. 	: 	5:25-CV-3 (CAR)
:
PEACH COUNTY BOARD OF 	:
COMMISSIONERS, PEACH 	:
COUNTY, and SHERIFF TERRY 	:
DEESE , 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
____________________________________
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Barbara L. Campbell’s Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court’s Order [Doc. 15] granting Defendants Peach County Board of Commissioners,
Peach County, and Sheriff Terry Deese’s Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and Georgia state law wrongful death
claims she brought after her son, Maurice Campbell, died while incarcerated in the Peach
County Jail. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s Motion [Doc. 17] is DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts, upon
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motion, to alter or amend a judgment. 1 Local Rule 7.6 cautions that “[m]otions for
reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice.”2 “[I]t is well-settled
that motions for reconsideration are disfavored and that relief under Rule 59(e) is an
extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.” 3 Accordingly, the Court should only
grant these motions in three limited circumstances: (1) there has been an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) new evidence has been discovered which was not previously
available to the parties in the exercise of due diligence; or (3) reconsideration is needed to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.4 A motion for reconsideration cannot be
used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been
raised prior to the entry of judgment.”5 Ultimately, whether to grant a motion for
reconsideration is within “the sound discretion” of the district court.6
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	demonstrate 	any 	of 	the 	limited 	circumstances 	warranting
reconsideration: She does not point to any intervening change in the law; she does not
contend any new evidence has been discovered that was not previously available to the
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
2 M.D. Ga., L.R. 7.6.
3 Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
4 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2005); McCoy v. Macon Water
Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1223 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
5 Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
6 Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 805–06 (11th Cir. 1993).
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parties at the time the original Order was entered; and she does not identify any clear
error of law or manifest injustice. Plaintiff re-states the general standards for deliberate
indifference 	claims 	and 	attempts 	to 	relitigate 	issues 	this 	Court 	comprehensively
addressed in its Order. A motion for reconsideration “is not a vehicle for rehashing
arguments already rejected by the court or for refuting the court’s prior decision.” 7
Plaintiff’s contention that a resolution on the defense of qualified immunity was
premature because there was no discovery is unpersuasive. As the Court stated in its
Order, “[a]lthough the defense of qualified immunity is typically addressed at the
summary judgment stage of a case, it may be raised and considered on a motion to
dismiss.”8 	“Unless 	the 	plaintiff’s 	allegations 	state 	a 	claim 	of 	violation 	of 	clearly
established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before
the commencement of discovery. Absent such allegations, it is appropriate for a district
court to grant the defense of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.” 9 As set
forth in the Order, Plaintiff failed to allege facts that would overcome the defense of
qualified immunity.
7 Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Nu-Cape Constr., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680, 686 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
8 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, p. 9 [Doc. 15] (citing Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2019)).
9 Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Because Plaintiff attempts to relitigate matters already decided, and because this
case does not fall into one of the three limited circumstances in which the Court may
reconsider its ruling, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. 17].
SO ORDERED, this 19th day of November, 2025.
s/ C. Ashley Royal_______________
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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