BRIGHT v. MEDICAL CENTER NAVICENT HEALTH

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
MATTHEW WARREN BRIGHT, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: 	CASE NO.
v. 	: 	5:23‐CV‐447 (CAR)
:
THE MEDICAL CENTER NAVICENT :
HEALTH, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
____________________________________
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Matthew 	Warren 	Bright’s 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration of the Court’s Order [Doc. 28] granting Defendant The Medical Center
Navicent 	Health’s 	(“Navicent”) 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	on 	Plaintiff’s
employment discrimination and retaliations claims that Navicent unlawfully terminated
him based on his race for failure to comply with Navicent’s “hair height policy”—a policy
he claims resulted in a disparate impact to African Americans—and in retaliation for his
complaint the policy was discriminatory. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s
Motion [Doc. 29] is DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts, upon
Case 5:23-cv-00447-CAR Document 39 Filed 12/04/25 Page 1 of 5

2
motion, to alter or amend a judgment.1 Local Rule 7.6 cautions that “[m]otions for
reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice.”2 “[I]t is well‐settled
that motions for reconsideration are disfavored and that relief under Rule 59(e) is an
extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.” 3 Accordingly, the Court should only
grant these motions in three limited circumstances: (1) there has been an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) new evidence has been discovered which was not previously
available to the parties in the exercise of due diligence; or (3) reconsideration is needed to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.4 A motion for reconsideration cannot be
used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been
raised prior to the entry of judgment.”5 Ultimately, whether to grant a motion for
reconsideration is within “the sound discretion” of the district court. 6
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	demonstrate 	any 	of 	the 	limited 	circumstances 	warranting
reconsideration: He does not point to any intervening change in the law; he does not
contend any new evidence has been discovered that was not previously available to the
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
2 M.D. Ga., L.R. 7.6.
3 Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
4 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2005); McCoy v. Macon Water
Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1223 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
5 Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
6 Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 805–06 (11th Cir. 1993).
Case 5:23-cv-00447-CAR Document 39 Filed 12/04/25 Page 2 of 5

3
parties at the time the original Order was entered; and he does not identify any clear error
of law or manifest injustice. A motion for reconsideration “is not a vehicle for rehashing
arguments already rejected by the court or for refuting the court’s prior decision.” 7
Plaintiff seeks for this Court to reconsider its order granting Defendant summary
judgment on his retaliation claim.8 In its Order, the Court assumed Plaintiff’s January 12,
2021 complaint that the hair policy was discriminatory constituted protective activity and
found Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that his termination was
caused by his complaint as opposed to his failure to adhere to the hair policy. Navicent
warned Plaintiff on January 8, 2021, four days before Plaintiff complained that he
believed the policy was discriminatory, that he could not return to work until he
complied. Thus, because Navicent contemplated an adverse employment action before
Plaintiff engaged in protected activity, he could not rely on the temporal proximity
between his complaint on January 12, 2021, and his termination on January 18, 2021, to
establish causation. 9 And because Plaintiff pointed to no other facts establishing the cause
for his termination was anything other than his failure to bind his hair to comply with
7 Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Nu‐Cape Constr., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680, 686 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
8 Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1‐2 [Doc. 29] (“In consideration to not waste this Court’s time and
patience, the plaintiff accepts this Court’s Order granting summery judgment to Defendant regarding his
Disparate Treatment/Disparate Impact claim ONLY. Plaintiff chooses to focus his efforts on his remaining
retaliation claim and will provide sufficient evidence to support this Court’s reconsideration of its
decision.”).
9 Order, pp. 18‐19 (citing Drago v. Jene, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Cotton v. Cracker Barrel
Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006); Gooden v. Internal Revenue Serv., 679 F. App’x
958, 968 (11th Cir. 2017).
Case 5:23-cv-00447-CAR Document 39 Filed 12/04/25 Page 3 of 5

4
the policy, the Court granted summary judgment on his retaliation claim in favor of
Navicent.
Plaintiff contends this Court gave “improper significance” to Defendant’s January
8, 2021 email.10 Plaintiff contends the Court erred because the email did not explicitly state
that failure to comply with hair policy would result in his termination. But the email
stated he could not return to work unless he complied with the policy. Thus, Navicent
contemplated termination before he engaged in any protected activity.
Plaintiff also submitted additional text messages and an email in an attempt to
establish Navicent’s reasons for his termination were merely pretext for retaliation. 11
First, this evidence is not newly discovered and was available to Plaintiff well before
Navicent filed its motion for summary judgment. “[W]here a party attempts to introduce
previously unsubmitted evidence on a motion to reconsider, the court should not grant
the motion absent some showing that the evidence was not available during the
pendency of the [case].” 12 Second, even if the Court considered this evidence, it does not
change the result. As this Court stated in its Order,
[t]he record makes clear Plaintiff’s reprimand on January 8, 2021, demotion
on January 14, 2021, and termination on January 18, 2021, were not
retaliatory, 	but 	instead 	were 	consequences 	of 	his 	repeated 	and
acknowledged failure to comply with the [policy]—a policy he was aware
of, had been previously warned about, and in which he previously
10 Id. at p. 2.
11 Doc. 30‐1 at pp. 1‐7.
12 Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997).
Case 5:23-cv-00447-CAR Document 39 Filed 12/04/25 Page 4 of 5

5
complied with on multiple occasions. At the time of his termination,
Plaintiff admitted he “was not in compliance with the 	… policy” and
understood “if [he] did not bind [his] hair that [he] would be discharged.”
Plaintiff also admitted that Infection Control was beginning to pressure his
supervisor which led to the warning on January 8, 2021, that he would not
be permitted to return to work unless he complied with the hair policy.
Plaintiff admitted “this was a different approach that they had never taken
as far as telling [him] that [he] couldn’t report to work,” and he recognized
that policy violations ‘could terminate’ his employment. Because his
termination was contemplated before h[e] complained, Plaintiff cannot
maintain his retaliation claim, and Navicent is entitled to summary
judgment. 13
Because Plaintiff attempts to relitigate matters already decided, and because this
case does not fall into one of the three limited circumstances in which the Court may
reconsider its ruling, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. 29].
SO ORDERED, this 4th day of December, 2025.
s/ C. Ashley Royal_______________
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
13 Order, p. 19.
Case 5:23-cv-00447-CAR Document 39 Filed 12/04/25 Page 5 of 5