Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
T.C.T., 	:
:
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-373-CDL-CHW
: 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
Warden, STEWART DETENTION 	:
CENTER, 	:
:
Respondent. 	:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Respondent Warden Jason Streeval’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27)
Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). For the
following reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion (Doc. 27) be DENIED and that
Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief (Doc. 1) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. Based on these findings, it is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s motion for
injunctive relief (Doc. 4) be DISMISSED as moot.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Vietnam, was admitted into the United States as a refugee
on November 16, 1992. (Doc. 27-3). On January 10, 1995, Petitioner was convicted of unlawful
taking of a vehicle in the Municipal Court of San Diego, California. (Doc. 27-4). Petitioner was
sentenced to 270 days imprisonment. (Id.). Petitioner was convicted a second time on November
4, 1997, in the San Diego Municipal Court, this time for being under the influence of
methamphetamine. (Doc. 27-5). Petitioner was convicted a third time on October 26, 1998, this
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time in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego for burglary, and he was sentenced
to 365 days imprisonment. (Doc. 27-6).
Petitioner entered Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Enforcement and Removal
Operations (“ICE/ERO”) custody for the first time on March 26, 1999. (Docs. 27-1, ¶ 10; 27-7).
ICE/ERO served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear that day charging him with removability under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his drug conviction. (Doc. 27-7, p. 1). On July 7, 1999, an
Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to Vietnam. (Doc. 27-8). Petitioner subsequently
appealed that order, and on December 13, 1999, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed
Petitioner’s appeal. (Doc. 27-9). Petitioner was released from ICE custody in July 2000 on an
Order of Supervision (“OSUP”). (Doc. 27-10). A second OSUP was issued in June 2001 which
changed Petitioner’s report requirements from once a month to twice yearly. (Doc. 27-11).
Twenty-four years later, on October 17, 2025, Petitioner reported to ICE for his G-56 appointment,
at which time he was processed and taken into ICE custody. (Doc. 27-12). On October 27, 2025,
a deportation officer served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release, which informed
Petitioner that his OSUP was revoked. (Doc. 27-13). The notice also informed Petitioner that he
was entitled to an informal interview. (Id.). Petitioner refused to sign the proof of service. (Id.).
Petitioner was given an informal interview that day, during which he refused to cooperate or
provide a statement. (Doc. 27-14).
Petitioner filed this habeas action pursuant to Section 2241 on October 21, 2025. (Doc. 1).
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on November 17, 2025. (Doc. 27). Petitioner filed a response
and opposes the motion. (Doc. 32). This motion is ripe for review.
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DISCUSSION
In his Section 2241 petition, Petitioner presents seven grounds for relief. In Count One,
Petitioner alleges that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable and that his detention violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because Respondent did not have a legitimate reason
to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP. (Doc. 1, p. 26). Petitioner argues in Count Two that the revocation
of his OSUP violates due process because he was not given prior notice and an interview. (Id., pp.
28–29). In Count Three, Petitioner alleges a violation under the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”) due to Petitioner’s unlawful detention and for Respondent’s failure to provide a notice of
intent to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP. (Id., pp. 30–31). In Count Four, Petitioner alleges that
ICE/ERO’s decision to revoke his OSUP was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the APA.
(Id., pp. 31–36). Petitioner alleges in Count Five that his detention violates the APA because it is
exceeds the authority granted by 8 U.S.C. § 1236(a)(6). (Id., pp. 36–37). In Count Six, Petitioner
asserts that his detention is ultra vires because there is no source of law authorizing Respondent to
detain him. (Id., p. 37). Finally, Petitioner argues in Count Seven that Respondent violated the
Accardi Doctrine in revoking his OSUP. (Id., pp. 37–38).
Respondent argues in his motion to dismiss that Counts One, Five, and Six should be
dismissed because Petitioner failed to state a claim under Zadvydas, and Counts Two, Three, Four,
and Seven should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Alternatively, Respondent asserts that Counts Two, Three, Four, and Seven should be dismissed
because they are meritless. Respondent argues also that Counts Two and Three are moot.
As discussed below, Respondent is correct that Petitioner fails to state a claim under
Zadvydas. This case is not about ICE’s authority to detain Petitioner post-final order of removal,
but rather their authority to re-detain Petitioner who had been released on an OSUP. See 8 C.F.R.
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§ 241.13(i); see also Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass. 2025). Because 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i) applies to Petitioner, rather than Zadvydas, the burden shifts to Respondent to show
that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. Respondent
meets this standard. But the inquiry does not end there. Rather, Petitioner is still entitled to release,
as Selwyn Bunbury, a Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer and the signatory of
Petitioner’s Notice of Revocation of Release, does not have the authority to revoke release.
I. 	Counts One, Five, and Six
Respondent urges the Court to dismiss Counts One, Five, and Six, arguing that his
detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and that any claim for relief pursuant to Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) is premature. Petitioner responds with two arguments. First, the
six-month presumptively reasonable detention period does not “reset” after Petitioner was ordered
removed and was then detained, released, and detained again. As discussed below, the precedent
in this district has squarely rejected the argument Petitioner presents. Second, Petitioner argues
because Petitioner was released on an OSUP and re-detained, it is Respondent’s burden to show
“that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). As discussed below, Petitioner is correct that the burden has shifted
to Respondent, and Respondent has met this burden.
A. Petitioner’s counts would be premature under Zadvydas.
Under § 1231(a), “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove
the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). This
removal period begins on the latest of three triggering dates:
(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.
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(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the
removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order.
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process ), the
date the alien is released from detention or confinement.
Id. at §§ 1231(a)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).
Detention during this 90-day “removal period” is mandatory. Id. at § 1231(a)(2)(A). This removal
period shall be extended “and the alien may remain in detention during such extended period if the
alien fails or refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to the alien's departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal subject to an
order of removal.” Id. at § 1231(a)(1)(C). Detention may continue beyond the 90-day period if it
is “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
Although § 1231(a)(6) does not limit the length of post-final order detention, the Supreme
Court of the United States determined in Zadvydas that detention for six months is presumptively
reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Following this six-month period, “once the alien provides
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable further, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained that for an alien to
state a claim under Zadvydas, he must show “(1) that the six-month period, which commences at
the beginning of the statutory removal period, has expired when the § 2241 petition is filed; and
(2) ‘evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.’” Gozo v. Napolitano, 309 F. App’x 344, 346 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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Respondent argues that Counts One, Five, and Six should be dismissed as premature
because Petitioner has not been detained for longer than six months as of the date of Petitioner’s
filing. Respondent contends that October 17, 2025, is the triggering date of the presumptively
reasonable six-month removal period because that was the date Petitioner most recently entered
ICE custody. (Doc. 27, p. 7). If this is the applicable date, Petitioner’s habeas action, filed on
October 21, 2025, just four days later, is approximately five months and twenty-six days
premature. In such a situation, Petitioner was still being detained within the presumptively
reasonable time frame under Zadvydas, and Counts One, Five, and Six should be dismissed without
prejudice as premature.
Petitioner argues that he should be credited for his time in ICE custody from December 13,
1999, and July 10, 2000. (Doc. 32-1, p. 5). As the Court has recognized, there is support for this
argument—in other districts. J.A.S. v. Warden, Stewart Detention Center, No. 4:25-cv-244-CDL-
CHW (M.D. Ga. filed Oct. 14, 2025); see Salmon v. McAleenan, No. 4:18-cv-01978-KOB-JHE,
2020 WL 2488090, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ala. May 14, 2020). The cases from this district, however, do
not support Petitioner’s argument. Rather, precedent from this district and the Court emphasize
that the removal period did not begin until Petitioner returned to ICE custody on October 17, 2025.
J.A.S., No. 4:25-cv-244-CDL-CHW, at *6; Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of United States, No. 4:14-CV-
42-CDL, 2018 WL 1321576, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018) (“A strong argument exists that the
Zadvydas removal period did not even begin until . . . Petitioner was returned to ICE custody after
serving his criminal prison sentence.”); see also M.K. v. Warden, Stewart Det. Ctr., No. 4:23-cv-
136-CDL-MSH (M.D. Ga. filed Oct. 19, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:23-cv-
136-CDL-MSH (M.D. Ga. filed Dec. 1, 2023).
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Respondent directs the Court to its decision in M.K v. Warden, Stewart Det. Ctr. for support
that the six-month period reset when Petitioner re-entered ICE custody in October 2025. (Doc. 27,
p. 8). In M.K., the petitioner was in ICE custody for eight months in 2012 before he was released
under an order of supervision. He did not return to ICE custody until May 2023. In recommending
that the petitioner’s application be dismissed as premature, the court noted, “Finding Petitioner’s
current detention presumptively unreasonable because of a period of detention occurring over
eleven years ago would effectively eviscerate § 1231(a)’s purpose of allowing the Government
time to arrange for an alien’s removal, including contacting foreign consulates and obtaining
necessary travel documents.” Id.
In this case, there is no need to divert from this district’s precedent. Petitioner’s order of
removal became final on December 13, 2000, when appeal was dismissed. (Doc. 27-9); see 8
C.F.R. § 1241.1(b). Petitioner was released from ICE custody pursuant to an OSUP on July 10,
2000, and was not taken back into custody until October 17, 2025. (Docs. 27-10; 27-11; 27-12).
Petitioner then filed this Section 2251 petition on October 21, 2025—only four days later. (Doc.
1). Petitioner, as of the time of his petition, was still being detained within the presumptively
reasonable six-month time frame under Zadvydas. See Gozo, 309 F. App’x at *2. Petitioner was in
ICE custody for less than six months at the time of his filing, and Petitioner’s argument that the
Court should find his current detention presumptively unreasonable because of his period of
detention twenty-five years ago is not persuasive. As such, Grounds One, Five, and Six are
premature.
Petitioner argues that “restarting” the detention period could allow the Government to
release a detainee who is approaching the six-month period and then subsequently re-detain him
to restart the period. Although such a scenario might suggest bad faith and thus be distinguished
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from the Court’s previous cases, the detentions of Petitioner in this case are separated by
twenty-five years, and there is no evidence of bad faith from Respondent. In this case, it is not
reasonable that a detention period from twenty-five years ago should be counted towards his
detention today.
B. Respondent has shown a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.
Petitioner argues next that Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be denied as to Counts
One, Five, and Six because the burden has shifted to Respondent to show a significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, a burden that Petitioner argues has not been met.
Because Petitioner was released under an OSUP, 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(2) applies. See (Doc. 27-13)
(ICE/ERO Notice of Revocation of Release to Petitioner stating “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4
and 241.13, you are to remain in ICE custody at this time”). Petitioner is correct that it is
Respondent’s burden to prove a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. As explained below, Respondent has met this burden.
At issue in this case are 8 U.S.C. §§ 241.13(i)(1)–(3)1 the procedures governing revocation
of an OSUP. These subsections provide that:
(1) Violation of conditions of release. Any alien who has been released under an
order of supervision under this section who violates any of the conditions of
release may be returned to custody and is subject to the penalties described in
section 243(b) of the Act. In suitable cases, the HQPDU shall refer the case to
the appropriate U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution. The alien may be
continued in detention for an additional six months in order to effect the alien's
1 8 U.S.C. § 241.13 is titled “Determination of whether there is a significant likelihood or removing a
detained alien in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
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removal, if possible, and to effect the conditions under which the alien had been
released.
(2) Revocation for removal. The Service may revoke an alien's release under this
section 	and 	return 	the 	alien 	to 	custody 	if, 	on 	account 	of 	changed
circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood
that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Thereafter, if the alien is not released from custody following the informal
interview provided for in paragraph (h)(3) of this section, the provisions of §
241.4 shall govern the alien's continued detention pending removal.
(3) Revocation procedures. Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the
reasons for revocation of his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial
informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford
the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the
notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she
believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of
supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any
contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts
as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.
8 U.S.C. §§ 241.13(i)(1)–(3) (emphasis added).
In this case, there is no evidence that Petitioner violated his OSUP. Rather, the evidence presented
by Respondent, establishes that “ICE has determined that you can be expeditiously removed from
the United States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you.” (Doc. 27-13). As such,
the revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(2), and Respondent must
show that there are changed circumstances such that there is a significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future.
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In support of Petitioner’s impending removal are a 2008 agreement between the United
States and Vietnam (“2008 Agreement”) and a 2020 memorandum of understanding between the
United States and Vietnam (“2020 MOU”). (Docs. 1-3; 27-2). The 2008 Agreement provided for
the repatriation of Vietnamese citizens who arrived in the United States on or after July 12, 1995.
(Doc. 1-3, p. 5). The 2008 Agreement provides further than any Vietnamese citizens who entered
the United States before that date “are not subject to return to Vietnam under this agreement.” (Id.).
Because the evidence establishes clearly that Petitioner entered the United States well before July
12, 1995, Respondent would not be removed to Vietnam. Respondent contends, however, that there
are changed circumstances justifying the revoking of Petitioner’s OSUP. Respondent argues that
the 2020 MOU specifically permits the removal of Vietnamese nationals who entered the United
States before July 12, 1995. Petitioner argues that the mere existence of this MOU does not
constitute a changed circumstance sufficient to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP and remove him to
Vietnam. (Doc. 32-1, p. 9). In support of their arguments, Petitioner and Respondent direct the
Court to two recent out-of-circuit cases which, faced with similar facts, reach different conclusions.
(Id, p. 10); (Doc. 27, p. 10).
In support of his argument, Respondent directs the Court to a case from the Northern
District of Texas, Nguyen v. Noem, 797 F.Supp.3d 651 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2025). In Noem, the
petitioner, a Vietnamese native, entered the United States in 1980 and was given lawful permanent
resident status in 1982. Id. at 657. Following a 2002 drug conviction, the Department of Homeland
Security initiated removal proceedings in 2006. Id. at 658. An IJ ordered the petitioner removed in
2009, and the petitioner’s subsequent appeal was dismissed in March 2011. Id. ICE then placed
the petitioner under an OSUP. Id. The petitioner remained under this OSUP until April 2025 when
he was detained by ICE. Id. He filed a Section 2241 petition two-and-a-half months later. Id. In
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his petition, he argued that (1) the respondents violated the procedural requirements of 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3), and that violation should result in his release, and (2) the 2020 MOU did not equate
to “changed circumstances” justifying his detention and removal. Id. at 660–68. The Texas court
found that each of the petitioner’s arguments failed, as the respondent had set forth sufficiently
particular facts to support an individualized determination that the petitioner would be removed.
Id. As for the 2020 MOU, the court explained that
there is a key distinction between circumstances that are particularized and
circumstances 	that 	effect 	a 	particular 	person. 	Nguyen 	clearly 	interprets
“individualized determination” to create a requirement of the former. But there is
no reason that a broad change in circumstances that applies to a broad group of
aliens cannot have the effect of changing the circumstances of each of those
particular aliens and thus let ICE determine that there is a significant likelihood that
the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. The changed
circumstances need to be applicable to Nguyen, but that does not mean that they
must be unique to Nguyen.
Id. at 666.
In its explanation, the court noted that the respondents provided evidence that the United States
has removed Vietnamese citizens who entered the United States before July 12, 1995, and shoed
that a travel document had been issued and that the petitioner was scheduled for removal to
Vietnam within days. Id. at 658. The court then denied the petitioner’s habeas petition. Id. at 672.
Petitioner directs the Court to Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144 (D. Mass. 2025). That
petitioner had a similar background to the petitioner in Noem and Petitioner in this case. In Hyde,
the petitioner was ordered removed by an IJ following a 1992 conviction and was placed under an
OSUP. Id. at 146. His OSUP was revoked following another conviction, and he remained in INS
custody for three years until he was released on a second OSUP in March 2000. Id. He was
convicted again in 2011 and was placed under a new OSUP when he was released in 2012. Id.
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Following a new criminal proceeding and subsequent nolle prosequi in 2014, he was placed under
a fourth OSUP. Id. He remained under that OSUP until May 2025 when ICE detained him. Id. at
148–49. He filed a Section 2241 petition the following day. Id. at 149. In its order, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that the 2020 MOU alone was not
enough to show changed circumstances and that ICE had not met its burden of showing a
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 151–52. Accordingly,
that court found that the appropriate remedy was for the petitioner to be released. Id. at 152–53.2
2 Petitioner also cites to numerous out-of-circuit cases in support of his argument that Respondent has not
identified “changed circumstances.” (Doc. 32-1, pp. 7–8 n.8, 9). In addition to being out-of-circuit, and
therefore non-binding precedent, many of the cases can be distinguished on the facts. For example,
Petitioner directs the Court to Yee S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-02782 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 2879479 (D. Minn.
Oct. 9, 2025) for the proposition that a “lone assertion that [ICE] was ‘in the process of obtaining a travel
document’ fell short of showing a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
(Doc. 32-1, pp. 7–9) (quoting Yee S., 2025 WL 2879479, at *4–5). This case is distinguishable from the
present case on one very important fact: the petitioner in Yee S. was a citizen of Burma. The IJ ordered him
removed to “any country other than Burma” based on the Convention Against Torture, but ICE did not
identify any country to which they were attempting to remove the petitioner to. Yee S., 2025 WL 2879479,
at *1, 4. In this case, Petitioner is a Vietnamese citizen and ICE/ERO has clearly specified that Vietnam is
the country of removal and that Petitioner’s case was currently being reviewed by Vietnam for issuance of
a travel document. (Doc. 27-13).
Petitioner also directs the Court to Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL
1993771 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) for a similar proposition. (Doc. 32-1, p. 7 n.8). But again, the facts in
that case are distinguishable from the present case. In Hoac, the respondent had not completed a travel
document request and did not provide that court with the 2020 MOU. Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4. And
that court relied on those facts in its analysis. Id. Specifically, that court explained that the “[r]espondents’
contention that [the petitioner’s] removal is reasonably foreseeable because removals to Vietnam are in fact
occurring is unpersuasive. . . . However, [the respondents’] reliance on [a] single case does not aid the
court’s analysis . . . [when] one occasion, an individual was repatriated from the United States to Vietnam.”
Id. at *5. That court then applied the analysis of Hyde to the facts in Hoac. Id.
The court finds the analysis offered in [Hyde] applicable. In [Hyde], the court found it was
“missing some very pertinent information” including the total number of requests for
removal that were made to Vietnam. The court reasoned it might be able to gauge how
likely it is that the petitioner would be removed to Vietnam if the court knew what
percentage of the requests Vietnam accepted. For instance, the court found “[i]f DHS
submitted 350 requests and Vietnam issued travel documents for 328 individuals” then
removal was significantly likely. However, “if DHS submitted 3,500 requests and only 328
individuals received travel documents” the court noted “Respondents would not be able to
meet their burden.” Similarly, the court has no evidence regarding the percentage of
successful requests to Vietnam to demonstrate changed circumstances.
(Id.) (quoting Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 151) (internal citations omitted).
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Noem and Hyde are not contradictory, as both find that the respondent must show some
particularized evidence that the petitioner was likely to be removed, not general policies. In Hyde
the court determined that it did not have enough information to find a significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 151–52. Particularly, the respondents in Hyde
merely cited the 2020 MOU and did not provide the court with evidence as to how many travel
document requests were made in 2025 and ultimately granted and did not even “identif[y] what
concrete steps ICE has taken to process [the petitioner’s] particular travel document.” In Noem and
in this case, by contrast, Respondent provided this information.
As such, Respondent has established a significant likelihood that in the reasonably
foreseeable future Petitioner will be removed to Vietnam. In support of his response, Respondent
provided a declaration of Jeffrey Knowles, a Deportation Officer employed by DHS and ICE/ERO.
(Doc. 27-1). Mr. Knowles declared that “[a]s of September 11, 2025, ICE has removed 569
Vietnam citizens to Vietnam in fiscal year 2025, this includes Vietnam citizens who entered the
United States Prior to July 12, 1995.” (Id., ¶ 5).3 This assertion, along with Mr. Knowles statement
that “[s]ince February 2025, Vietnam has issued a [travel document] in response to every [travel
document] request submitted by ICE,” evidences the changed circumstances. (Id.). Petitioner was
not eligible for removal under the 2008 Agreement, but under the 2020 MOU Vietnamese citizens
who entered the United States before July 12, 1995, like Petitioner, are explicitly covered. In
Unlike the respondents in Hoac, Respondent in this case has provided evidence that that Vietnam has issued
a travel document in every case requested by ICE since February 2025. (Doc. 27-1, ¶ 5). Petitioner has
offered no evidence to make the Court believe that this case would be the first exception. Petitioner’s
assertion that “ICE has not identified any changed circumstances” and that “there is no evidence of new
travel documents [or] agreements with the destination country” are unavailing considering Mr. Knowles’
declaration and the 2020 MOU. (Doc. 32-1, p. 8). As such, the Court finds that removal is significantly
likely.
3 As Petitioner observes, this statistic alone is of limited value, as it fails to specify a denominator. Evidence of 569
successful removals has one significance if ICE has detained 600 Vietnamese citizens and a completely different
significance if ICE has detained 10,000 Vietnamese citizens pending removal. In addition, Respondent fails to
specify how many of those removals were Vietnamese citizens who entered the United States before July 12, 1995.
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accordance with the 2020 MOU, ICE is routinely removing Vietnamese citizens and conducting
approximately two charter flights per month. (Id.). ERO has submitted Petitioner’s travel
documents to Vietnam, received a response that certain documents would need to be translated
into Vietnamese and reissued, and submitted those documents for translation that same day. (Id.,
¶ 16). The 2020 MOU, which explicitly covers Vietnamese nationals such as Petitioner, along with
Mr. Knowles declaration that Vietnam has issued a travel document for every request submitted
and ERO’s submitting a travel document in this case, demonstrate a significant likelihood that
Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
As a final matter, Petitioner provides the Court with ICE/ERO data from 2021–2023
detailing the percentage of travel documents issued in cases where the alien entered the United
States prior to July 12, 1995. (Doc. 32-2). Although it is a small percentage, data from 2–4 years
ago does not overcome the evidence presented by Respondent that travel documents have been
issued in every instance since February 2025. See (Doc. 27-1, ¶ 5).
II. 	Jurisdictional Challenges to Counts Two, Three, Four, and Seven
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Respondent argues next that Counts Two, Three, Four, and Seven should be dismissed
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims seeking review of his OSUP
revocation.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(citations omitted). In other words, this Court may only hear a case over which it has subject matter
jurisdiction. See id. There are generally three ways a party may establish subject matter jurisdiction
in federal court: “(1) jurisdiction pursuant to a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1332.” Hallett v. Ohio, 711 F. App'x 949, 950 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
“[T]he party invoking the court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the existence of federal
jurisdiction,” and if “the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it has no power to render a
judgment on the merits and should dismiss the complaint . . . .” Id. Petitioner argues that the Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to the Suspension Clause of the United Staes Constitution, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All-Writs Act), 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(Declaratory Judgment Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Immigration and Nationality Act), and 5 U.S.C
§ 551 (Administrative Procedure Act). (Doc. 1, pp. 3–4). Respondent asserts that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g) bars the Court from exercising jurisdiction over Counts Two, Three, and Four, and that
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars the Court from exercising jurisdiction over Count Four and
portions of Counts Two and Three. (Doc. 27, pp. 16–21).
Within the INA, Section 1252 governs the judicial review of orders of removal. Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including
section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision . . . no court shall
have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General
or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under
this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this
title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Section 1252(g) similarly provides that
except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
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to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
Section 1252(g) is “narrow[ly] read[]” so that it blocks courts from exercising jurisdiction over
only “three discrete actions[: the] ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482,
487 (1999) (quoting Section 1252(g)).
Respondent is correct that Section 1252(g) deprives the Court of “subject-matter
jurisdiction over Respondent[’s] decision to revoke the OSUP, but not [ICE’s] purported failure to
comply with their own procedures in doing so.” Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL
2280485, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025).4 “The decision to revoke Petitioner's OSUP, for the stated
purpose of executing his removal order, clearly falls under the purview of [Section] 1252(g).” Id.
Nevertheless, the Court does have jurisdiction to review whether ICE adhered to its own policies
and procedures in its revoking Petitioner’s OSUP. Kurapati v. U.S. Bureau of Citizenship &
Immigr. Servs., 775 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014); see Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *5; see
also Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 150–55 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Zhu v. Genalo, No.
1:25-CV-06523 (JLR), 2025 WL 2452352, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025). As such, neither
Sections 1252(g) or 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bar Petitioner’s challenge to the manner in which ICE
effected his OSUP revocation to the extent Petitioner asserts the revocation was done without
adequate process and in violation of ICE’s own regulations.
B. Lawfulness of Petitioner’s Redetention
4 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida was recently presented with facts and
arguments similar to those in this case. Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 8, 2025). Although that court’s jurisdictional analysis, is highly persuasive, this recommendation
reaches a different conclusion as to whether a Deputy Assistant Director or other subordinate official, in
this case a Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer, has the authority to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP.
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Petitioner argues that ICE violated its own regulations and his due process by failing to
provide him with prompt notice and an informal interview and by not having the appropriate
authority revoke his OSUP. Petitioner’s argument that he should be released because ICE did not
provide him with notice and an informal interview is not persuasive, but Petitioner is entitled to
release because the SDDC who signed Petitioner’s notice of revocation did not have the authority
to do so.
1. 	Notice and Interview
First, Petitioner has not shown that ICE violated its own regulations to provide him with
notice and an informal interview. It is uncertain whether 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) requires ICE to
afford a petitioner who did not violate the conditions of release a notification and informal
interview. The plain language of that regulation provides that
[a]ny alien . . . who has been released under an order of supervision or other
conditions of release who violates the conditions of release may be returned to
custody. . . . Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation
of his or her release or parole. The alien will be afforded an initial informal
interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an
opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.
8 C.F.R. 241.4(l)(1).
District courts across the country appear to reach different conclusions as to whether Section
241.4(l)(1) applies to petitioners, like Petitioner in this case, who did not violate the conditions of
his OSUP. See Ceesay, 781 F.Supp.3d at 162–63 (collecting cases); but see Barrios, 2025 WL
2280485, at *6. Although the decision in Ceesay considers whether a petitioner was entitled to
notice and an informal interview under Section 241.4(l), the Court need not engage in such an
analysis in this case because Petitioner is clearly entitled to notification and an interview under
Section 241.13(i). This regulation states that “[u]pon revocation, the alien will be notified of the
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reasons for revocation of his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview
promptly after his or her return to Service custody . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). As such, it is clear
that ICE was required to provide Petitioner with notice of the reasons for revocation and an
informal interview.
The record shows that ICE complied with this requirement, and Petitioner’s arguments to
the contrary are not persuasive. First, Petitioner appears to argue that ICE was required to give
Petitioner notice prior to revoking the OSUP. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 82–83). Such a position is contrary to
the plain language of both Sections 241.4(l) and 241.13(i) which state “[u]pon revocation, the alien
will be notified . . . .” The use of “upon” necessarily meaning “thereafter” or “thereon”—but
certainly not prior. Upon, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upon
[https://perma.cc/9AJM-Y4N9] (defining “upon” as “thereafter” or “thereon”). Accordingly,
Petitioner’s argument that notice was required prior to revocation is unavailing.
Second, Petitioner asserts ICE did not provide him with “individualized, written notice of
the specific reasons for revocation.” (Doc. 32-1, p. 13). Although nowhere in Sections 241.4(l)(1)
or 241.13(i)(3) is it required that “written” notice be given, ICE did so. See (Doc. 27-13). While
ICE certainly could have been more specific in its reasoning for the revocation, the Court cannot
say that ICE did not provide notice at all.5 As such, Petitioner’s argument that ICE failed to abide
by its regulations to provide notice fails.
5 Petitioner directs the Court to Roble v. Bondi, for the proposition that “boilerplate” language “does not
satisfy the Government’s obligation to provide the ‘reasons’ why [a petitioner’s] Order of Supervision was
revoked.” (Doc. 32-1, p. 18 n.15) (citing Roble v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3196 (LMP/LIB), 2025 WL 2443453,
at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025). The United States District Court of the District of Minnesota explained that
“ICE’s notice to [the petitioner] provides zero reasons as to what changed circumstances exist such that [the
petitioner’s] removal is now significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The notice does not
state, for example that ICE had received or was seeking a travel document for [the petitioner].” Roble, 2025
WL 2443453, at *3. In this case, ICE did provide in the Notice of Revocation that Petitioner’s case was
currently under review by Vietnam for the issuance of a travel document. (Doc. 27-13).
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Finally, Petitioner argues that he did not receive an informal interview with a meaningful
opportunity to respond. (Doc. 32-1, pp. 13–14, 17–18). Petitioner’s argument fails because the
record establishes clearly that he was afforded an informal interview on October 27, 2025 (Doc.
27-14), six days after he was transferred to Stewart Detention Center. (Doc. 27-1, ¶ 14). Petitioner
was given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation, but he refused to cooperate with
the interviewing officer. (Id., ¶ 15); (Doc. 27-14). The record shows that Petitioner was afforded
an informal interview, and Petitioner’s argument that he was not provided a meaningful
opportunity to respond fails.6
2. 	Authority to Revoke Release
Lastly, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to release because the revocation notice was not
issued or signed by the appropriate official. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) provides that
[t]he Executive Associate Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of
discretion, to revoke release and return to Service custody an alien previously
approved for release under the procedures in this section. A district director may
also revoke release of an alien when, in the district director's opinion, revocation is
in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the
case to the Executive Associate Commissioner.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2).
By the regulation’s plain language, only the Executive Associate Commissioner or district director
may revoke an alien’s OSUP. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1.2, the authority of the Executive Associate
6 Petitioner directs the Court to two cases for the proposition that the absence of a meaningful interview
renders the revocation unlawful. (Doc. 32-1, p. 19 n.16) (citing Phan v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-01757-DC-
JDP, 2025 WL 1993735 (E.D. Cal. 2025) and Rokhfirooz v. Larose, No. 25-cv-2053-RSHVET, 2025 WL
2646165 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 15, 2025)). Each of these cases are easily distinguishable, however, because in
Phan the respondents provided no evidence that the petitioner received an interview at all, and in
Rokhfirooz, that court seemingly did not even reach the issue of whether an interview was afforded because
it found that the petitioner was entitled to release due to the DHS not making an adequate Section
241.13(i)(2) determination.
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Commissioner was conferred to the Executive Associate Director of ICE. See 8 C.F.R. § 1.2
(“Commissioner means the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service prior to
March 1, 2003. Unless otherwise specified, references after that date mean the Director of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
and the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as appropriate in the context in
which the term appears.”). That regulation provides further that the terms “director” or “district
director”
mean, to the extent that authority has been delegated to such official: asylum office
director; director, field operations; district director for interior enforcement; district
director for services; field office director; service center director; or special agent
in charge. The terms also mean such other official, including an official in an acting
capacity, within U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and
Border 	Protection, 	U.S. 	Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement, 	or 	other
component of the Department of Homeland Security who is delegated the function
or authority above for a particular geographic district, region, or area.
Id.
It is undisputed that Selwyn W. Bunbury was the signatory for Petitioner’s Notice of
Revocation. (Doc. 27-13); (Doc. 32-1, p. 15). It is further undisputed that Mr. Bunbury is a
Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer (“SDDO”)—not the Executive Associate Director
of ICE. Id. The question then is whether Mr. Bunbury, as an SDDO, had the authority to issue a
revocation order. Respondent contends that a July 25, 2019, “ERO Delegation Order” (Doc. 27-15)
authorized Mr. Bunbury to sign the revocation order on behalf of the ICE Executive Associate
Director. (Doc. 27, p. 24).
District courts across the country presented with this argument have reached opposite
conclusions. See Ceesay, 781 F.Supp.3d at 161–62 (no delegation order clearly giving an Assistant
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Field Office Director authority); Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, No. CV 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL
2841886, at *3–5 (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2025) (authority not properly delegated to deportation office);
Zhu, 2025 WL 2452352, at *8; Morales Sanchez v. Bondi, No. 5:25-CV-02530-AB-DTB, 2025
WL 3651899, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025); Funes v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 7429 (PAE), 2025
WL 3263896, at *18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2025) (explaining the Delegation Order “gives
assistant field office directors ‘authority under INA § 241 [8 U.S.C. § 1231] and 8 C.F.R. Part 241,
relating to warrants of removal, reinstatement of removal, self-removal, and release of aliens from
detention. Absent from this list of delegated authority, however, is revocation of OSUPs. The
absence of such a reference is decisive”); but see Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *7–8.
Ultimately, Respondent argues that the final bullet point of the delegation affords SDDOs
enforcement authority under 8 C.F.R § 241 “relating to warrants of removal, reinstatement of
removal, self-removal, and release of aliens from detention.” (Doc. 27, p. 24). And while Section
241.4(l)(2) includes “the exercise of discretion to revoke release and return to Service custody an
alien previously approved for release” that is not one of the delegated powers listed in the final
bullet point of the delegation. “[B]ecause the Delegation Order lists a series of other actions under
8 C.F.R. § 241 as to which authority has been delegated but does not include OSUPs or their
revocation, the expressio unius canon excludes revocation.” Funes, 2025 WL 3263896, at *19.
Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that Mr. Bunbury had the authority to revoke Petitioner’s
OSUP. Therefore, Petitioner’s release was not lawfully revoked, and Petitioner is entitled to
release.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 27) be DENIED and that Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief (Doc. 1)
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be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s
motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 4) be DISMISSED as moot.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this
Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20)
PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the
Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing
to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and
recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for
failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal
for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 22nd day of December, 2025.
s/ Charles H. Weigle_________
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge
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