MCPHERSON v. T-MOBILE et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
GLORICE MCPHERSON, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-78-CDL-AGH
:
T-MOBILE, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
_________________________________ 	:
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s recast complaint (ECF No. 9). 	For the reasons
stated below, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s recast complaint be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The Court received Plaintiff’s original complaint on March 4, 2025 (ECF No. 1).
The same day, the Court received her motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
(ECF No. 2). 	On March 5, 2025, the Court granted (ECF No. 3) Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed IFP (ECF No. 2). 	However, because Plaintiff was granted IFP status, the
Court conducted a preliminary screening as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Order 1, Apr. 14, 2025, ECF No. 6. 	The Court concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint
failed to meet the requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that a complaint include “a short and plain statement” of her claim and provide
“sufficient factual matter” to state a facially plausible claim. 	Id. at 3. 	In fact, the
Court observed that Plaintiff’s original complaint was “largely incomprehensible,
consisting of pages of conclusory statements, incomplete sentences, random legal
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citations, and irrelevant philosophical musings.” 	Id. at 3. 	It noted that while
Plaintiff apparently had concerns about Defendant T-Mobile’s billing practices, her
grounds for relief were “wholly unclear.” 	Id. 	Citing the civil cover sheet attached
to her complaint, the Court speculated that Plaintiff might be attempting to bring a
civil rights complaint but that in order to do so she “must allege facts” sufficient to
satisfy the elements of such claim. 	Id. at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
Therefore, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a recast complaint. 	Id. at 4. 	The
Court specifically explained to Plaintiff that it would “consider only the factual
allegations and claims contained” in her recast complaint and would not consider
facts alleged in the original complaint “or other documents submitted to the Court.”
Id. 	Finally, the Court warned Plaintiff that “failure to fully and timely comply” with
the order could result in the dismissal of her action. 	Order 5, Apr. 14, 2025. 	On
May 	11, 	2025, 	the 	Court 	received 	Plaintiff’s 	recast 	complaint 	(ECF 	No. 	9).
Accordingly, the Court will conduct a preliminary screening of the recast complaint.
I. 	Preliminary Review Requirement
Once a court grants a plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP, the Court
must conduct a preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	That statute
requires the court to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .
the action or appeal . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	An action is frivolous when the
complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490
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U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	Additionally, “[a] case is frivolous if the factual allegations are
‘clearly baseless,’ or if it is based on an ‘indisputably meritless’ legal theory.”
Johnson v. Wilbur, 375 F. App’x 960, 963 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carroll v. Gross,
984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a
claim. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 	“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and are liberally construed.” 	Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175
(11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). 	Nevertheless, while “[c]ourts do and
should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a
legal education[,]” the Court is not permitted “to serve as de facto counsel for a party”
by “rewrit[ing] an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action[.]” 	GJR
Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled
on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Recast Complaint
Unlike Plaintiff’s original complaint, Plaintiff’s recast complaint is at least
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short. 	Nevertheless, it still suffers from the fatal flaw of providing no factual
allegations sufficient to state a claim. 	Having read the recast complaint, the Court
still does not know exactly what it is that T-Mobile allegedly did or did not do that
Plaintiff feels violated the law. 	The Court notes that Plaintiff’s original complaint
was docketed as a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 	But her recast
complaint does not allege that she was discriminated against based on race as
required to state a claim under that statute. 	See Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys.,
Inc., 596 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff’s recast complaint cites the peonage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1581.
Recast Compl. 2, ECF No. 9. 	However, Plaintiff does not allege that she was forced
to work for Defendants to pay off any debt. 	See United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d
364, 372 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “peonage is compulsory service in payment of
debt” that is “the equivalent of involuntary servitude . . . which the Supreme Court
has defined as ‘a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the
defendant” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988)). 	Simply owing money to someone does not
equate to being held in peonage.
Plaintiff also cites a host of federal consumer protection statutes, but she
provides no factual allegations to allow the Court to conclude that her claims under
any of them are plausible. 	From what little can be gleaned, it appears that Plaintiff
possibly had some sort of account, contract, or agreement with T-Mobile, and she
apparently 	believes 	it 	engaged 	in 	various 	unsavory 	practices, 	including 	using
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deceptive billing, failing to provide adequate disclosures prior to extending her credit,
and violating consumer protection laws in vaguely asserted ways. 	Recast Compl.
2-3. 	But she does not state what sort of account, contract, or agreement she had with
T-Mobile; what was deceptive about its billing practices; or what it told Plaintiff or
failed to tell Plaintiff that she feels was false or should have been disclosed. 	She
alleges she was “treated unfairly based on income,” Recast Compl. 2, but she does not
explain how she was treated unfairly or why she believes it was related to her income
such that it violated federal law.
“Merely listing federal statutes, with no attempt to allege supporting factual
details, fails to state a claim or a basis for federal jurisdiction.” 	Williams v. Tommy
& Shirley Strickland Cancer Ctr. Inc., No. CV 622-049, 2022 WL 3221832, at *1 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 9, 2022). 	Further, “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. 	Nor does a
complaint 	suffice 	if 	it 	tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
In summary, Plaintiff has for the second time failed to state a claim that is
plausible on its face. 	Accordingly, the Court recommends that her recast complaint
be dismissed.1
1 Plaintiff also filed a motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 11) and motion for declaratory judgment
(ECF No. 12), which are just as devoid of factual support as her recast complaint. 	Therefore, the
Court recommends that those motions be denied as moot.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s recast
complaint (ECF No. 9) be dismissed without prejudice. 	Plaintiff’s motions for
injunctive relief (ECF No. 11) and declaratory judgment (ECF No. 12) should be
denied as moot. 	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Plaintiff may serve and file
written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file
objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. 	Any
objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. 	See M.D. Ga.
L.R. 7.4. 	The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the 	Recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made. 	All 	other 	portions 	of 	the
Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
Plaintiff is hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a]
party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained
in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time
period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. 	In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 12th day of February, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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