Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
N.D., 	:
:
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-62-CDL-AGH
: 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
Warden, STEWART DETENTION 	:
CENTER, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
____________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s second recast petition for 	a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 6) and Respondents’ motion to
dismiss the petition (ECF No. 7). For the reasons explained below, it is recommended
that Respondents’ motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was initially admitted into the
United States on October 8, 1991, as a lawful permanent resident.1 	Hayes Decl.
¶¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 7-1; Hayes Ex. A, at 2, ECF No. 7-2; Hayes Ex. B, ECF No. 7-3. On
October 5, 1999, Petitioner was served with a notice to appear (“NTA”) before an
Immigration 	Judge 	(“IJ”), 	charging 	him 	with 	removability 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(C) based on a 1997 Maryland conviction involving possession of a
1 Because all documents have been electronically filed, this Order and Recommendation cites to the
record by using the document number and electronic screen page number shown at the top of each
page by the Court’s CM/ECF software.
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handgun. 	Hayes Ex. E, at 1-2, ECF No. 7-6. 	An IJ entered an order on April 11,
2000, granting Petitioner voluntary departure in lieu of removal. Hayes Ex. F, at 1-
2, ECF No. 7-7. 	However, on July 21, 2000, Petitioner’s motion to reopen removal
proceedings 	was 	granted, 	and 	proceedings 	terminated 	without 	prejudice 	on
September 19, 2000. Hayes Ex. G, ECF No. 7-8; Hayes Ex. H, ECF No. 7-9.
Petitioner was convicted of forgery in Virginia in March 2004, and then
convicted in the District of Columbia of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
in June 2005. 	Hayes Ex. J, ECF No. 7-11; Hayes Ex. K, ECF No. 7-12. He entered
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody for the first
time on July 2, 2007. Hayes Decl. ¶ 14. The same day, Petitioner was served with a
new NTA, charging him with removability under 	8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and
(B)(i) based on convictions for an aggravated felony and a controlled substance
offense. 	Hayes Ex. L, at 1-3, ECF No. 7-13. 	However, on July 25, 2007, Petitioner
was extradited to North Carolina on a pending murder charge. 	Hayes Decl. ¶ 15;
Hayes Ex. M, ECF No. 14. 	On July 31, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter in the Nash County, North Carolina, Superior Court Division and was
sentenced to 103 to 133 months of imprisonment. Hayes Ex. N, ECF No. 7-15.
On December 17, 2024, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”)
arrested Petitioner at his residence in Maryland. Hayes Decl. ¶ 18; Hayes Ex. A, at
3. The same day, he was served with a NTA, charging him with removability under
various provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 	Hayes Ex. O, ECF No. 7-16. Following his
arrest in Maryland, Petitioner remained in custody and was eventually transferred
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to Stewart Detention Center, in Lumpkin, Georgia, where he is still detained. Hayes
Decl. 	¶ 18. 	On February 14, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
served 	Petitioner 	with 	a 	Form 	I-261, 	Additional 	Charges 	of
Inadmissibility/Deportability, 	charging 	Petitioner as 	removable 	under 8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) based on his convictions for aggravated felonies and two
crimes involving moral turpitude. Hayes Ex. P, at 3, 5, ECF No. 7-17. According to
Respondents’ most recent status update, an IJ sustained the charges of removability
on October 3, 2025, and designated Jamaica as the country for removal. Chambliss
Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 10-1. However, as of December 12, 2025, immigration proceedings
were still pending for consideration of Petitioner’s application for relief from removal.
Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.
The Court received Petitioner’s original application for habeas relief on
February 19, 2025 (ECF No. 1). The Court received his first recast petition on March
18, 2025, and his second recast petition on March 21, 2025 (ECF No. 6). In his second
recast petition, Petitioner contends that his continuing “indefinite detention” violates
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and his Fifth Amendment due process rights.2 2d Recast Pet.
5, ECF No. 6. 	On April 10, 2025, Respondents moved to dismiss the petition,
contending and that Petitioner’s detention complies with due process. 	Resp’ts’ Mot.
to Dismiss 5-6, ECF No. 7. 	The same day, the Court notified Petitioner of his right
to respond to the motion to dismiss within thirty days and advised him that failure
2 Because the amended petition supersedes his previous petitions, Petitioner’s second recast petition
is now the operative pleading in this case. See Calhoun v. Bergh, 769 F.3d 409, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2014).
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to respond could result in the statements set forth in Respondents’ motion “being
accepted as uncontested and correct.” Order 1-2, ECF No. 8. However, Petitioner did
not file a response to Respondents’ motion to dismiss. The case is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) Mandatory Detention and Due Process
Because Petitioner is being held pre-final order of removal and is charged as
being deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), his detention is governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which applies to criminal aliens.3 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). As
a criminal alien, Petitioner’s detention is statutorily mandated. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
(stating that the Attorney General “shall take into custody” an alien falling under its
provisions and allowing release only under narrow circumstances related to witness
protection). 	Section 1226(c) does not set out a limit as to how long a criminal alien
can be detained as expressed in days, months, and years. This previously led many
courts construing the statute to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance to read
an implicit temporal limitation into the permissible length of detention. 	However,
the Supreme Court rejected this approach, concluding that because § 1226(c) “is not
silent as to the length of detention,” but instead “mandates detention pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” the canon
was inapplicable. 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 304 (2018) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	The Court held that Ҥ 1226(c) has a
3 Petitioner alleges that his detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), presumably attempting to make
a claim under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 2d Recast Pet. 5. However, because § 1231(a)(6)
applies only to those detained post-final removal order, that section is inapplicable to Petitioner.
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definite termination point: the conclusion of removal proceedings.” 	Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Significantly, however, Jennings explicitly left undecided the issue of whether
prolonged detention under § 1226(c) could be subject to an as-applied constitutional
due process challenge, noting that because the lower court had not considered the
issue, it would remand the case for further consideration. Id. at 312. 	Since Jennings,
district courts have grappled with how to analyze a petitioner’s as-applied due process
to prolonged detention under § 1226(c). This Court has applied the multi-factor test
set forth in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Sopo v. United States Attorney General
(“Sopo I”), 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016), vacated as moot, 890 F.3d 952 (11th Cir.
2018) (“Sopo II”), to address such challenges. See, e.g., J.N.C.G. v. Warden, Stewart
Det. Ctr., No. 4:20-CV-62-MSH, 2020 WL 5046870, at *6-7 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2020).
Sopo I was one of the lower court decisions whose constitutional avoidance rationale
was rejected by Jennings. 	Nevertheless, many other district courts have continued
to cite Sopo I as persuasive authority for as-applied due process challenges to
§ 1226(c) because the Eleventh Circuit’s explanation of why the statute could pose
constitutional concerns absent an implicit temporal limitation is suggestive of how
the Court would ultimately rule on such challenge. 	See, e.g., 	Msezane v. Garland,
No. 5:19-cv-51, 2020 WL 1042293, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2020) (collecting cases),
recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 1046796 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2020).
Respondents, however, reject the notion that Sopo I is relevant and instead—
as they have in previous cases—contend that the Court need look no further than
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Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), to find Petitioner’s continuing detention
constitutional. Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss 10-13. The Court has continuously rejected
that argument, noting that the only thing decided by the Supreme Court in Demore
was whether any period of mandatory detention under § 1226(c) was constitutional,
not whether prolonged detention could at some point violate due process. 	See, e.g.,
S.C. v. Warden, Stewart Det. Ctr., No. 4:23-CV-64-CDL-MSH, 2024 WL 796541, at
*2-4 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2024). 	Nevertheless, the Court need not wade into that
discussion at this time because even if the Court applies the multi-factorial analysis
of Sopo I, Petitioner is still not entitled to habeas relief.
II. 	Sopo Factors
As noted, the Eleventh Circuit in Sopo I applied the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance to conclude there is an implicit temporal limitation against unreasonably
prolonged detention without a bond hearing of § 1226(c) detainees. 	However, in
determining whether a criminal alien’s due process rights have been violated, the
Court 	rejected 	a 	bright-line 	rule 	like 	the 	six-month 	presumptively 	reasonable
removal period the Supreme Court adopted in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)
for petitioners detained post-final order of removal under § 1231(a)(6). 	Sopo I, 825
F.3d at 1214-17. 	Instead the Eleventh Circuit adopted a case-by-case approach for
district courts to follow, noting that “reasonableness, by its very nature, is a fact-
dependent inquiry requiring an assessment of all circumstances of any given case.”
Id. at 1215 (quotation marks omitted).
Sopo identified five factors for district courts to consider. Id. at 1217-18. The
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first was the length of detention, with the Court suggesting that “a criminal alien’s
detention without a bond hearing may often become unreasonable by the one-year
mark, depending on the facts of the case.” 	Id. at 1217. 	The second factor was a
consideration of “why the removal proceedings have become protracted.” Id. at 1218.
The Court noted that while criminal aliens should not be “punished for pursuing
avenues of relief and appeals,” district courts should consider whether the alien has
“sought repeated or unnecessary continuances” or acted in bad faith to delay
proceedings. 	Id. 	The Court also identified three other factors: whether removal of
the criminal alien would be possible once a removal order became final, whether the
civil detention period exceeded the time the alien spent in prison for the crime
rendering him removable, and whether the facility where he was detained was
“meaningfully different from a penal institution for criminal detention.” Sopo I, 825
F.3d at 1218. 	Finally, the Court stated its list was “not exhaustive” and that the
factors to be considered would vary depending on the facts of each case. Id. at 1218.
Among other factors, the Court noted that the First Circuit looked at whether there
was a “foreseeability of proceedings concluding in the near future” and “the likelihood
that proceedings will culminate in a final removal order.” Id. at 1218 (quoting Reid
v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 500 (1st Cir. 2016)).
III. 	Petitioner’s Detention Complies with Due Process
Applying the Sopo factors here, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s ongoing
detention does not violate due process. At present, Petitioner has been detained for
just short of fourteen months, which slightly exceeds the one-year “outer limit of
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reasonableness” identified by Sopo as the point at which detention without a bond
hearing “may often become unreasonable . . . depending on the facts of the case.” Sopo
I, 825 F.3d at 1217. However, the Court notes that at the time Petitioner originally
filed his petition, he had been detained for two months. Pet. 1, ECF No. 1. Thus, this
factor only weighs slightly in Petitioner’s favor.
The second factor looks at why removal proceedings have been protracted.
Sopo I, 825 F.3d at 1218. 	Here, the evidence shows that Petitioner has requested
continuances of the immigration proceedings on at least five occasions. Hayes Decl.
¶¶ 20-21; Chambliss Decl. ¶¶ 4, 9-10. While there is no evidence that these requests
were in bad faith, they were also not a result of the Government failing to facilitate
removal proceedings. 	In fact, despite the continuances, immigration proceedings
have steadily progressed such that the IJ has sustained the charges of removability
and proceeded to consideration of Petitioner’s request for relief from removal.
Chambliss Decl. ¶¶ 	5, 8, 11. 	Moreover, while no estimate has been provided as to
when removal proceedings may conclude, it is clear that they are proceeding in
reasonably timely fashion. Petitioner has not responded to the motion to dismiss to
contend otherwise. Therefore, the Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of
Respondents.
The third factor considers “whether it will be possible to remove the criminal
alien after there is a final order of removal.” 	Sopo I, 825 F.3d at 1218. 	Assuming
Petitioner is not granted relief from removal to Jamaica, the evidence before the
Court is that immigration detainees are regularly issued travel documents and
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successfully removed to Jamaica. 	Hayes Decl. ¶ 23.
The fourth factor is “whether the alien’s civil immigration detention exceeds
the time the alien spent in prison for the crime that rendered him removable.” Sopo
I, 825 F.3d at 1218. Here, Petitioner has spent considerably longer in prison than his
period 	in 	immigration 	detention, 	and 	this 	factor 	weighs 	heavily 	in 	favor 	of
Respondents.4
Among other possible factors Sopo I mentioned as being relevant was the
likelihood of removal proceedings resulting in a removal order. Id. Here, an IJ has
already sustained the charges of removability, and Petitioner has provided the Court
with no reason to believe that his request for relief from removal will be granted.
Therefore, this is an additional factor weighing in Respondents’ favor.
In summary, the record shows that while Petitioner has been held for a little
less than fourteen months, his removal proceedings have proceeded steadily and
there is no reason to believe that a final removal order will not be obtained in a
reasonably 	expeditious 	manner. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	recommends 	that
Respondents’ motion to dismiss be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Respondents’ motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 7) be GRANTED. 	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties
may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension
4 The Eleventh Circuit has held that Stewart Detention Center is not meaningfully different than a
prison, Sopo I, 825 F.3d at 1221, so Respondents do not contest the fifth Sopo factor. Resp’ts’ Mot. to
Dismiss 13.
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of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
hereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
Recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made. 	All 	other 	portions 	of 	the
Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 6th day of February, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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