WILLIAMS v. AGBAOSI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
ANTHONY WILLIAMS, :
:
Petitioner, :
v. : Case No. 1:25-cv-44 (LAG)
:
Warden MARK AGBOASI, :
:
Respondent. :
________________________________ :
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Anthony Williams, an inmate currently confined at Dooly State Prison in
Unadilla, Georgia, filed a pro se application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1).
Pending before the Court are Respondent’s motion to dismiss the habeas petition as untimely, and
Petitioner’s motions seeking to invoke the equitable tolling doctrine as well as an evidentiary
hearing. (Docs. 15, 19). For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Respondent’s
motion be granted, Petitioner’s motions be denied, and the petition be dismissed as untimely.
BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2003, Petitioner was indicted by a Terrell County, Georgia, grand jury for
a malice murder that “occurred between November 19, 1992 and November 20, 1992.” Williams
v. State, 300 Ga. 218, 218 n.1, 794 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 2016). After a two-day jury trial in March
2004, Petitioner was found guilty of malice murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Id. On
November 21, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Petitioner’s direct appeal.1 Id. at 222.
1 Following his conviction, Petitioner filed a motion for new trial on March 23, 2004, which was not finally decided
until October 23, 2015. Williams, 300 Ga. at 218 n.1. Petitioner’s direct appeal was taken from the denial of his motion
for new trial. Id.
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On November 9, 2020, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Superior Court of
Dooly County, Georgia, and on May 3, 2021, he filed an amendment to his state habeas petition.
(Docs. 16-1, 16-2). On May 15, 2023, the state habeas court denied Petitioner’s state habeas
petition. (Doc. 16-3). On August 13, 2024, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed Petitioner’s
appeal of the denial of his state habeas petition because he did not timely file an application for a
certificate of probable cause to appeal with that court. (Doc. 16-5). The Supreme Court of
Georgia’s remittitur issued on August 28, 2024. (Doc. 16-6).
On March 10, 2025, Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition asserting that the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction. (Doc. 1). On June 12, 2025, Respondent moved to
dismiss the petition as untimely. (Doc. 15). Petitioner timely responded to the motion, and he
moved to invoke equitable tolling and for an evidentiary hearing. (Docs. 18, 19). All briefing has
concluded, and the motions are ripe for a recommendation.
DISCUSSION
I. The Applicable Limitations Period
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a petitioner must
file a federal habeas petition challenging his state conviction within one-year of his conviction
becoming final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This limitations period begins to run on “the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review[.]” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the limitations period is tolled while a
petitioner’s “properly filed application” for state habeas relief is pending. Id. § 2244(d)(2). Thus,
to determine whether a petition was timely filed, the Court “must determine (1) when the collateral
motion was filed and (2) when the judgment of conviction became final.” McCloud v. Hooks, 560
F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009) (alterations adopted) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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II. Analysis
Petitioner’s application for federal habeas relief is untimely. Because the Supreme Court
of Georgia affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on November 21, 2016, Petitioner had ninety (90)
days thereafter in which to file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States
pursuant to Rule 13 of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Thus,
Petitioner had until February 21, 2017,2 to file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States. Petitioner acknowledges that he did not file a petition for certiorari. (Doc. 1, at 4).
As a result, Petitioner’s conviction became “final” for the AEDPA finality purposes on
February 21, 2017. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (“Finality attaches . . .
when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.”). Petitioner had one year, or until February
21, 2018, to file a federal habeas petition or to toll the limitations period. Under § 2244(d)(2), the
time during which a “properly” filed application for state post-conviction review is pending does
not count toward any period of limitation.
While Petitioner challenged his convictions in a state habeas petition in the Superior Court
of Dooly County, his state habeas petition was not filed until November 9, 2020 – over two years
and eight months after the AEDPA limitations period expired. As such, Petitioner’s state habeas
petition could not toll the one-year limitations period. Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th
Cir. 2001) (“[A] state court petition . . . that is filed following the expiration of the federal
limitations period ‘cannot toll that period because there is no period remaining to be tolled.’”)
(citation omitted). Consequently, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely under the AEDPA
limitations period, and his petition should be dismissed unless he can show that he is entitled to
equitable tolling of the limitations period.
2 Technically, the time for Petitioner to seek certiorari expired on February 19, 2017, which was a Sunday, and the
following day, February 20, 2017, was a federal holiday.
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III. Equitable Tolling
Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, and his motion seeking to invoke equitable
tolling (Doc. 19) should be denied. The one-year AEDPA limitations period is subject to equitable
tolling only in certain situations. Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). A petitioner must
show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649 (quotation marks omitted).
“The burden of proving circumstances that justify the application of the equitable tolling doctrine
rests squarely on the petitioner.” San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011).
In asserting that he is entitled to equitable tolling, Petitioner focuses on the period after his
state habeas petition was filed on November 9, 2020. (Doc. 19, at 2). However, the AEDPA clock
began running – as Petitioner acknowledges – on October 4, 2016, the day after the Supreme Court
of Georgia affirmed his conviction on direct appeal because he did not seek certiorari in the
Supreme Court of the United States. Id. Thus, the AEDPA limitations period had already expired
more than two years and eight months before Petitioner even filed his state habeas petition.
Consequently, because Petitioner has not met his burden to show that he was pursuing his rights
diligently and that an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way before the AEDPA limitations
period expired, he is not entitled to equitable tolling, and the Court recommends that his motion
for equitable tolling be denied.
IV. Actual Innocence and Schlup Evidentiary Hearing
Petitioner also seeks to invoke the “actual innocence” gateway under Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298 (1995), to evade the AEDPA limitations period. (Doc. 19, at 3). Petitioner asserts that he
has new evidence which proves no reasonable juror would convict him, which evidence consists
of alibi witness affidavits, a forensic report discussing cocaine metabolites, and police reports
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suggesting an alternate suspect threatened the murder victim. Id. at 3.
Under Schlup, a claim of actual innocence is “‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead
a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional
claim considered on the merits.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court
of the United States subsequently extended the actual innocence gateway to federal habeas
petitions barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386
(2013). In doing so, the Court cautioned “that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare:
‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that,
in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329) (alteration in original).
In considering an actual innocence plea to evade the statute of limitations, the Court may consider
the timing of the federal habeas petition. Id. at 386-87. For the following reasons, the Court finds
that Petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to suggest he is entitled to the actual
innocence gateway or to an evidentiary hearing.
First, simply put, Petitioner has not presented any evidence of his innocence, let alone
credible evidence. On September 18, 2025, the Court directed Petitioner to file his alleged alibi
affidavits and any other supporting documentation that allegedly showed his actual innocence
within fourteen (14) days. (Doc. 21). In doing so, the Court also ordered Petitioner to file an
explanation for why he waited twenty-one (21) years after his conviction for malice murder to
present the alleged alibi affidavits, and it highlighted that the state habeas court noted that, during
the hearing on Petitioner’s state habeas petition, Petitioner presented no alibi witnesses and no
evidence from any such witness who could testify that Petitioner was somewhere else when the
murder was committed. Id. at 2.
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On October 10, 2025, Petitioner sought an extension of time to respond. (Doc. 23).
The Court granted Petitioner’s request, but noted its confusion that Petitioner claimed that he
needed time to “properly complete the proper documents” and to “retrieve and send all documents
the Court inquired about[.]” (Doc. 24, at 1). The Court expressed its confusion as to how any
paperwork needed to be completed and also to be retrieved when the documents were allegedly
already attached to Petitioner’s response to the motion to dismiss. Id. at 1-2.
Petitioner’s response to the Court’s order to produce the alleged alibi affidavits and other
documentation does nothing to resolve the Court’s confusion. Petitioner again claims that he
submitted the documentation, but he also states that he “sent all of his legal paperwork home due
to prison conditions and maintenance.” (Doc. 25, at 1). Petitioner asserts his own confusion, and
he contends that his alleged alibi witnesses are “fully prepared to testify at an evidentiary hearing,
mainly due to conflicts in mail and uncertainty of the Courts [sic] intention.” Id. at 2.
Thus, even after the Court notified Petitioner that the record did not reflect any alleged
alibi witness affidavits and other supporting documentation, Petitioner failed to supplement the
record as ordered. Petitioner claims to have witnesses ready to testify, but he neither produced
those witnesses at his state habeas hearing, nor produced their alleged affidavits to this Court.
He claims to have the alleged alibi affidavits at home, but he failed to have copies sent to the Court.
Petitioner has not even provided the alleged witnesses names to the Court. Consequently, there is
simply no evidence – credible or otherwise – before the Court suggesting that Petitioner is actually
innocent.
Second, timing matters – and it cuts against Petitioner. Petitioner was convicted in 2004.
The state habeas court heard his state habeas petition in 2021, and at that time, he did not call any
alibi witnesses and did not present any evidence from any such witness. In this case, Petitioner
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was given a fourteen (14) day extension to respond to the Court’s order to produce the alleged alibi
witness statements. While Petitioner alleges that he received the Court’s order granting an
extension of time to produce the documents after the time to respond had expired, he nonetheless
waited four more days to send a short two-page document with no factual allegations to the Court.
(Doc. 25, at 1) (stating the Order was received on Nov. 6, 2025); id. at 3 (certificate of service
showing Nov. 10, 2025). It simply is not credible that a person wrongfully convicted would wait
over twenty-one (21) years to submit affidavits showing his alleged actual innocence – and then
refuse to submit those allegedly exculpatory affidavits when directed to do so by a court.
Consequently, the timing of Petitioner’s absolute innocence claim is suspect and the Court does
not find it credible. It is therefore recommended that Petitioner’s motion for a Schlup hearing be
denied, Respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted, and Petitioner’s application for habeas relief
be dismissed as untimely.3
V. Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a
final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant
makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When
a court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the
petitioner’s application for habeas relief, this standard requires a petitioner to demonstrate that
“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
3 To the extent that Petitioner relies on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) in requesting a hearing (Doc. 19, at 3), his request for
a hearing should still be denied. Petitioner has not suggested a new rule of constitutional law, and Petitioner clearly
could have discovered who he was allegedly with at his home at the time of the murder.
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was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Petitioner
cannot meet this standard and a certificate of appealability in this case should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Petitioner’s motion for equitable tolling
and motion for a Schlup hearing (Doc. 19) be DENIED, Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc.
15) be GRANTED, and Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be
DISMISSED as untimely. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file
written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection should be no longer
than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The district judge shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other
portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to
object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and
recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for
failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal
for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 12th day of December, 2025.
s/ ALFREDA L. SHEPPARD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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