Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 26-20187-CV-DIMITROULEAS
EDWIN AGUSTO HERNANDEZ LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MIAMI FEDERAL DETENTION CENTER
FDC ICE, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, USCIS,
Respondents.
/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Edwin Agusto Hernandez Lopez
(“Petitioner”)’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”)
[DE 1], filed herein on January 12, 2026. The Court required an expedited response, [DE 3] and
Respondents filed their response on January 16, 2026. See [DE 5]; Petitioner filed a Reply [DE-
12]. The Court held a hearing on the Petition on January 27, 2026, [DE 13] and heard argument
from both parties, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the following reasons, the
Petition is GRANTED IN PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The petitioner, Edwin Agusto Hernandez Lopez, (“Petitioner”), is a native and citizen of
Guatemala. He has been present in the United States for over two years and has six U.S. Citizen
children.
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On September 5, 2024, Petitioner was arrested for domestic battery and for no valid
driver’s license. [DE 5-1]. Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) encountered Petitioner
following his arrest in Martin County, Florida. Id. On September 6, 2024, ERO lodged a detainer
with the Martin County jail and issued a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest. [DE 5-7] [DE 5-8]. On
September 30, 2024, ERO issued and served Petitioner a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner
with inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration Nationality Act (“INA”), as
an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,” and not as an
“arriving alien.” [DE 5-2]. On the same day, Petitioner was released on his own recognizance and
required Petitioner to report for ICE check-ins. See [DE 5-3].
A year later, on October 3, 2025, Petitioner reported to the Miramar office for a routine
check-in, as directed. [DE 5-9]. Petitioner was taken into custody the same day and transferred to
the Florida Soft-Sided Facility South (FSSFS) located in Ochopee, Collier County, Florida. [DE
5-5]. On October 7, 2025, Petitioner was transferred to the Miami Federal Detention Center
(Miami FDC). Id. Upon his detention, Petitioner requested a review of the custody determination
by an Immigration Judge. [DE 5-11].
On October 17, 2025, Petitioner, through his attorney, filed Respondent’s First Motion for
Bond. See [DE 5-4]. On October 30, 2025, Petitioner appeared with his attorney at the bond
hearing. See [DE 5-4]. The Immigration Judge entered an order denying the motion, finding that
the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
See [DE 5-4]. To date, Petitioner remains in custody at Miami FDC.
Petitioner accordingly brings one count for improper detention under the INA. He seeks an
order granting immediate release or in the alternative an order directing the Immigration Judge to
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conduct a bond hearing. The Government contends that Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to
8 U. S. C. § 1225(b)(2) and therefore is not entitled to a bond hearing, and that the Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) governs the Immigration Judge’s actions.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may be issued to a petitioner who demonstrates
that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). 	The Court’s jurisdiction extends to challenges involving immigration-related
detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. 	DISCUSION
a. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Would Be Futile
Respondents argue Petitioner has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. As
an initial matter, “Section 2241 itself does not impose an exhaustion requirement,” Santiago-Lugo
v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 471 (11th Cir. 2015), nor do the relevant sections of the INA require
Petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies before filing petitions for habeas corpus. See Paz
Nativi v. Shanahan, No. 16-CV-8496 (JPO), 2017 WL 281751, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017)
(“There is no statutory requirement of administrative exhaustion before immigration detention may
be challenged in federal court by a writ of habeas corpus; however, such exhaustion is generally
required as a prudential matter.”) (collecting cases). Nor is “a § 2241 petitioner’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies a jurisdictional defect.” Santiago-Lugo, 785 F.3d at 471. Instead, the
exhaustion requirement as applied to a habeas action like this one is judicially imposed and serves
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as a prudential consideration. Id. at 474-75. In this case, the Court will not require exhaustion, as
exhaustion would be inadequate, futile, or would cause irreparable harm and Petitioner has already
been in detention unlawfully for several months. See e.g., Blandon v. Barr, 434 F. Supp. 3d 30, 37
(W.D.N.Y. 2020) (declining to require exhaustion in light of Petitioner’s already prolonged
detention).
b. 	Detention authority under §§ 1225 and 1226
Accordingly, the Court proceeds to the merits of the Petition, beginning with Count II.
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s entry into the United States without inspection or admission
renders him an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), making him subject to
mandatory detention and ineligible for a bond hearing. 	Petitioner asserts that his detention is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for the release of noncitizens on bond. This Court
has already rejected similar arguments to those the Government makes here in granting habeas
petitions. See e.g., Acosta v. Ripa, et. al., Case No. 25-cv-62360-WPD (S.D. Fla. Dec. 26, 2025);
Taffur v. Noem, et. al. Case No. 25-cv-62308-WPD (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2025). The Seventh Circuit
has likewise rejected the Government’s argument. See Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., No. 25-3050, 2025 WL 3552514, at *8 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025).
The Court begins with the statutory framework. Under the INA, § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens before a final order of removal. Section 1225 covers “applicants for
admission” who are noncitizens “present in the United States who have not been admitted.” Puga,
2025 WL 2938369, at *3 (cleaned up). Section 1225(a)(3) requires all applicants for admission to
be inspected by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). Certain applicants for admission
may be subject to removal proceedings under § 1225(b). See id. § 1225(b); see also Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108–09 (2020) (citations omitted). 	“Because
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section 1225 is mandatory, a ‘noncitizen detained under section 1225(b)(2) may be released only
if he is paroled for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’” Puga, 2025 WL
2938369, at *3 (quoting Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565, at *2 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 19, 2025). Section 1225(b)(2) applies where an alien is “seeking admission” into the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Unlike § 1225, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the
country pending the outcome of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018). Section 1226(a) sets out a discretionary detention framework for noncitizens arrested
and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” and authorizes the Attorney General
to “continue to detain the arrested alien[,]” release him on a “bond of at least $1,500[,]” or release
him on “conditional parole[,]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). While the arresting immigration officer
makes an initial custody determination, noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) may appeal that
determination in a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).
“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the
outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)); see
also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025) (“To be sure, a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) is undoubtedly entitled to a bond hearing
before an immigration judge.”).
Respondents contend that Petitioner qualifies as “an alien seeking admission under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)”—despite having been physically present in the United States for years
before his arrest and detention—because § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies broadly to all applicants for
admission. In contrast, Petitioner asserts that § 1225 applies only to noncitizens actively “seeking
admission” at the border or its immediate functional equivalent.
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Whether Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) is an issue of statutory
interpretation that hinges on the meaning of “seeking admission.” The Court thus applies
traditional tools of statutory construction, beginning with the plain meaning of the statutes, to
decipher the meaning of that phrase. See Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th
Cir. 2003); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Reform Party of U.S., 479 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2007).
To begin, the phrase “seeking admission” is ambiguous in the context of the INA. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1225. Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in
the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States[.]” Id.
§ 1225(a)(1). And “admission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13).
But the INA does not define “seeking admission.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see generally id.
§ 1101. 	Some courts have noted that the phrase “implies action—something that is currently
occurring, and . . . would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.” Lopez-Campos v.
Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); see also
Rosado v. Figueroa, No. 25-cv-02157, 2025 WL 2337099, at *11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025). And in the context
of the title of § 1225, which references “arriving” aliens, § 1225; and its function—establishing an
inspection scheme for when to allow aliens into the country—the language appears susceptible to
multiple interpretations. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined not only by reference to the language itself, but as
well by the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute
as a whole.” (cleaned up)).
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Next, the Court turns to the structure of § 1225 and § 1226, and their legislative history—
which each support Petitioner’s interpretation. “Whereas § 1225 governs removal proceedings for
‘arriving aliens,’ § 1226(a) serves as a catchall.” 	Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546,
2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025). As the Supreme Court noted in Jennings,
§ 1226 “creates a default rule” that “applies to aliens already present in the United States.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. The inclusion of a “catchall” provision in § 1226, particularly following
the more specific provision in § 1225, is “likely no coincidence, but rather a way for Congress to
capture noncitizens who fall outside of the specified categories.” 	Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL
2609425, at *5; see also Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (citation omitted). The circumstances
surrounding Petitioner’s arrest by warrant align with § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Additionally, a recent amendment to § 1226 would be rendered meaningless under
Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225. 	See Puga, 2025 WL 2938369, at *5; Rosado, 2025 WL
2337099, at *9. In January 2025, the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”), Pub. L. No. 119-1, section 2, 139
statute 3, 3 (2025), added § 1226(c)(1)(E), which “mandates detention for noncitizens who (i) “are
inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A) (noncitizens present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled, like Petitioner), § 1182(a)(6)(C) (obtaining a visa, documents, or admission
through misrepresentation or fraud), or § 1182(a)(7) (lacking valid documentation)” and (ii) “have
been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes.” Puga, 2025 WL 2938369, at *5
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii)).
If Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225 is correct—that the mandatory detention provision
in § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to all noncitizens present in the United States who have not been
admitted—then Congress would have had no reason to enact § 1226(c)(1)(E). See Lepe v.
Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (citations
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omitted). “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant[.]” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.
303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up). “This principle . . . applies to interpreting any two provisions in the
U.S. Code, even when Congress enacted the provisions at different times.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 608 (2010) (citation omitted). “The Court will not find that Congress passed the LRA
to perform the same work that was already covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Puga, 2025 WL 2938369,
at *5; Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 2374411, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025);
see also Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *6; Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4; Rosado, 2025 WL
2337099, at *9; Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *6–7.
Respondents’ reliance on the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado—rejecting the
argument that a noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection and has resided here
for years is not “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A)—is misplaced. Under Loper Bright,
the Court need not defer to the BIA’s interpretation of law simply because the statute is ambiguous.
See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (“[C]ourts need not and under
the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is
ambiguous.”).
As explained, the statutory text, context, and scheme of § 1225 do not support a finding
that a noncitizen is “seeking admission” when he never sought to do so. Additionally, dozens of
courts that have examined the interpretation of § 1225 articulated by Respondents—particularly
following the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado—have rejected their construction and
adopted Petitioner’s. See, e.g., Jhon Peter Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4303, 2025 WL 2829511,
at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (collecting cases); Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (same);
Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (same); Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at *5 (same). But see Chavez
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v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (citations
omitted).
For these reasons, contrary to the Immigration Judge’s finding that he lacks jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s bond request, the Court finds that § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations
govern Petitioner’s detention, not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and as such, Petitioner is entitled to an
individualized bond hearing as a detainee under § 1226(a) and the Immigration Judge has
jurisdiction to conduct the bond hearing.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	The Petition [DE 1] is GRANTED in part. Respondents shall afford Petitioner an
individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days
and file a notice in the record upon the completion of the bond hearing indicating
that a bond hearing has been held. Failure to file a notice in the record within seven
days may result in the Court ordering the immediate release of Petitioner.
2. 	The Court affirmatively finds that the Immigration Judge has jurisdiction to conduct
the bond hearing.
3. 	All pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.
4. 	The Court RETAINS JURISDICTION to enforce this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this
27th day of January, 2026.
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