Teixeira Jardim v. Perez Paez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-24087-BLOOM/Elfenbein
JOHNNY TEIXEIRA JARDIM,
Petitioner,
v.
BARBARA YAILYN PEREZ PAEZ,
Respondent.
__________________________________/
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
THIS 	CAUSE 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	upon 	Respondent’s 	Emergency 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration and Stay of Court Order (“Motion”), ECF No. [52], filed on December 30,
2025. On December 30, 2025, the Court ordered an expedited response. ECF No. [53]. On
January 1, 2026, Respondent filed a Psychological Report in support of her Motion. ECF No.
[54]. On January 2, 2026, Petitioner filed a Response. [56]. The Court has considered the
Motion, the record, the supporting and opposing submissions, the applicable law, and is
otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2025, following an evidentiary hearing, the Court entered an Order
granting Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Return of Children to Venezuela (“Order”). ECF No.
[50]. In the Order, the Court found—and Respondent conceded—that Petitioner established a
prima facie case, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent wrongfully retained the
minor children in the United States. Id. at 6. The Court also found that Respondent failed to
satisfy her burden for the consent/acquiescence, settled child, and mature child affirmative
defenses. Id. at 7-14. Although, in her Answer to the Petition, Respondent pled that the children
Case 1:25-cv-24087-BB Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/03/2026 Page 1 of 7

Case No. 25-cv-24087-BLOOM/Elfenbein
2
would be at grave risk of harm if returned to Venezuela, ECF No. [15] at 8, Respondent
conceded after the evidentiary hearing that she had not met her burden of proof on this
affirmative defense. ECF No. [50] at 6 n.2 (“Respondent concedes in her Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law that her “third Affirmative Defense has not been established under
law.” ECF No. [49] ¶ 63. She acknowledges in her recommended findings of fact that “there is
not clear and convincing evidence that the parties’ children would themselves be at ‘grave risk of
harm’ if forced to return to Venezuela.” Id. ¶ 57”). Therefore, the Court ordered that the minor
children be returned to Venezuela no later than January 5, 2026. Id. at 13.
On December 30, 2025, Respondent filed the instant Motion, requesting that the Court
“reopen the final hearing in this case and stay its Order until the evidence underpinning the Third
Affirmative defense can be elicited on the record.” ECF No. [52] at 2. Respondent also states
that since the evidence to be presented on the grave risk of harm affirmative defense “is impacted
by the Fourth Affirmative defense (the mature child exception), additional testimony on this
issue should be permitted as well. Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Reconsideration
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a motion for
reconsideration, such a motion can be treated as either a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
under Rule 59(e) or a Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(b).” Dingman v. Cart
Shield USA, LLC, No. 12-cv-20088, 2013 WL 2034984, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 2013) (citing
Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 n. 5 (11th Cir.
1993)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or amend a
Case 1:25-cv-24087-BB Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/03/2026 Page 2 of 7

Case No. 25-cv-24087-BLOOM/Elfenbein
3
judgment “no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “Relief is
proper under Rule 59(e) only if the party presents newly discovered evidence or demonstrates a
manifest error of law or fact.” Marques v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 805 F. App’x 668, 670 (11th
Cir. 2020) (citing Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007)). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion
[cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have
been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343 (quoting Michael Linet,
Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), “courts may relieve a party from a
judgment or order on several grounds, including (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment is
no longer in effect; and (6) ‘any other reason that justifies relief.’” Marques, 805 F. App’x at 671
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). For a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment to be
successful under the catchall provision—Rule 60(b)(6)—the movant “must demonstrate ‘that the
circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief. Even then, whether to grant the
requested relief is . . . a matter for the district court’s sound discretion.’” Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d
1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1317
(11th Cir. 2000)).
B. Motion to Stay
The Supreme Court has instructed courts to “apply the four traditional stay factors in
considering whether to stay a return order” under the Hague Convention and ICARA: 	“‘(1)
whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the
stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the
Case 1:25-cv-24087-BB Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/03/2026 Page 3 of 7

Case No. 25-cv-24087-BLOOM/Elfenbein
4
public interest lies.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 179 (2013) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In support of Respondent’s request to stay the Order, reopen the hearing, and permit her
to enter additional evidence in support of her third and fourth affirmative defenses, Respondent
attaches her affidavit. In it, she states that “[f]rom the beginning of our relationship, [Petitioner]
engaged in violent, aggressive, and abusive behavior, characterized by verbal, psychological, and
physical abuse, directed toward both me and our children.” ECF No. [52] at 6. Respondent
describes “[t]hese behaviors” as “recurrent and intensified” when Petitioner “was under the
influence of alcohol and drugs, substances he consumed in a habitual and uncontrolled manner,
even in the presence of the children[.]” Id. Respondent argues that “she should have a fair
opportunity to offer this testimony at a renewed hearing before the children are returned to
Venezuela.” Id. at 3. Respondent also files a “Descriptive Psychological Report” of interviews
conducted online of Respondent and her child. In Response, Petitioner argues that the narrative
presented in Respondent’s affidavit is not supported by the evidence that was presented during
the evidentiary hearing. ECF No. [56] at 1-4 (citing ECF No. [48-7] (Petitioner’s “hair follicle
drug tests [taken] in Venezuela and Florida that were negative”)). Petitioner also disputes the
credentials 	of 	Yuoarary 	Carrizales, 	who 	authored 	the 	psychological 	report 	submitted 	by
Respondent. Id. at 5-6; see ECF No. [54]. Petitioner points out that Carrizales’s LinkedIn profile
“does not show that she is a licensed psychologist or employed in that capacity.” ECF No. [56] at
6. Because “there is a significant difference in licensing, education, methods of evaluation and
the higher level of experience in Hague cases,” Petitioner argues that the Court should not
consider Carrizales’s report. Id.
Case 1:25-cv-24087-BB Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/03/2026 Page 4 of 7

Case No. 25-cv-24087-BLOOM/Elfenbein
5
Although Respondent argues that “[i]n the event the Court were to grant this Motion
undersigned counsel believes that the evidence to be presented would permit the Respondent to
prevail on the merits in this action[,]” Respondent has presented no argument as to why,
procedurally, following a full evidentiary hearing, the Court should reconsider its prior Order
and give Respondent a second opportunity to present evidence. ECF No. [52] at 3. Respondent
cites Bassat v. Dana, a case in which the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s finding
that the grave-risk defense did not apply in a Hague Convention case. ECF No. [52] at 2 (citing
Bassat v. Dana, No. 25-10915, 2025 WL 2304896 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2025)). In Bassat, the
Eleventh Circuit found that, based on the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing,
“where the district court found the testimony of Dana and the children to be ‘persuasive’ and
didn’t find their testimony to lack credibility, as a matter of law, Dana has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that returning the girls to Israel would subject them to a grave risk of
harm.” 2025 WL 2304896, at *8. However, Respondent does not point to any evidence presented
during the hearing which would establish that the children would be at grave risk of harm if
forced to return to Venezuela. Instead, Respondent “requests that this Court reopen the final
hearing in this case and stay its Order until the evidence underpinning the Third Affirmative
Defense 	can 	be 	elicited 	on 	the 	record.” 	ECF 	No. 	[52] 	at 	2. 	Significantly, 	Respondent
acknowledged that, in the briefings following the evidentiary hearing, Respondent’s counsel
stipulated that “there is not clear and convincing evidence that the parties’ children would
themselves be at ‘grave risk of harm’ if forced to return to Venezuela.” ECF No. [50] at 6 n.2
(quoting ECF No. [49] ¶ 57); ECF No. [52] at 1.
In the Court’s Order following the evidentiary hearing, it noted Respondent’s concession
that her “third Affirmative Defense has not been established under law.” ECF No. [50] at 6 n.2.
Case 1:25-cv-24087-BB Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/03/2026 Page 5 of 7

Case No. 25-cv-24087-BLOOM/Elfenbein
6
In the instant Motion, Respondent fails to 	explain her change in position nor does she contend
that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing established the grave risk of harm
affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence. Gomez v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005,
1012 (11th Cir. 2016) (party opposing child’s return bears burden of proving grave risk of harm
affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence).
As Petitioner correctly points out, Respondent “states no evidence that she presented to
[her prior attorney], which he did not disclose to this Court either before, during or after the
evidentiary hearing.” ECF No. [56] at 2. Respondent “was free to make [these] argument[s]
before the Court ruled on [the] petition, but [she] did not.
A motion for reconsideration is not a second bite at the apple.” Figueredo v. Rojas, No.
22-cv-1268, 2023 	WL 	4419722, 	at 	*2 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	July 	10, 	2023) 	(denying motion 	for
reconsideration 	of 	order 	denying 	petition 	to 	return 	minor 	child 	to 	Venezuela). 	Because
Respondent has presented no legal basis upon which the Court may reconsider its prior Order
and hold a new evidentiary hearing, she has not “made a strong showing that [s]he is likely to
succeed on the merits[.]” Chafin, 586 U.S. at 179 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). Therefore, her
request for reconsideration and a stay of the Court’s Order returning the children to Venezuela
must be denied.
While the Court’s Order required that the mior children be returned to Venezuela no later
than January 5, 2026, circumstances have changed. On the morning of January 3, 2026, the
Federal Aviation Administration banned United States commercial flights over Venezuela due to
“ongoing military activity.” Jennifer Jacobs, et al., U.S. Launches Military Strikes on Venezuela,
Trump Says Maduro Captured and Flown Out of The Country, CBS News (Jan. 3, 2026 at 3:34
a.m.), 	https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/venezuela-us-military-strikes-maduro-trump/#.
Case 1:25-cv-24087-BB Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/03/2026 Page 6 of 7

Case No. 25-cv-24087-BLOOM/Elfenbein
7
Former counsel for Respondent also seeks clarification regarding return of the children’s
passports. See ECF No. [57]. Therefore, it does not appear feasible for the children to return to
Venezuela while the FAA ban is in place. Accordingly, the portion of the Court’s Order to return
the children to Venezuela is stayed pending the rescission of the FAA’s ban on United States
commercial aircrafts operating in the airspace above Venezuela.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	Respondent’s Emergency Motion for Reconsideration and Stay of Court Order, ECF
No. [52], is DENIED.
Former Counsel for Respondent’s Unopposed Urgent Motion for Clarification, ECF
No. [57], is GRANTED. Respondent’s former attorney, Andrew Kassier, shall
forthwith return the passports to Respondent’s new counsel forthwith.
2. 	The Order Granting Petition, ECF No. [50], regarding the return of the children to
Venezuela by January 5, 2026, is STAYED pending the rescission of the FAA’s ban
on United States commercial aircrafts operating in Venezuelan airspace. The parties
shall confer regarding the feasibility of returning the children to Venezuela and notify
the Court of the results of the conferral 72 hours after the FAA has lifted the ban.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida on January 3, 2026.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to: 	Counsel of Record
Case 1:25-cv-24087-BB Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/03/2026 Page 7 of 7