Smith v. Kreeger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-23572-CIV-SANCHEZ
SHOLA A. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDITH KREEGER, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________________/
O MNIBUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (ECF No. 5) and Amendment to Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order for
Ex-Parte Consideration (ECF No. 7) (collectively, the “Motions”), as well as on the Court’s
screening of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	Following a careful review of the
complaint, the Motions, the record, and the applicable law, and the undersigned being otherwise
fully advised in the premises, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS that the
Motions (ECF Nos. 5, 7) be DENIED and that this case be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 8, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint asserting claims against
retired Judge Judith Kreeger of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in her official capacity;
Judge Ivonne Cuesta of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida in her official capacity;
guardian ad litem Diane Trainor in her individual and official capacity; and Miami-Dade County
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(collectively, “Defendants”).1 See ECF No. 1 at 2.
In essence, the complaint alleges that in divorce and custody proceedings in state court,
(i) the guardian ad litem, Defendant Trainor, was biased, solicited a fee to offer a favorable child
custody recommendation, filed a misleading report with the state court, and misrepresented to the
state court that Florida was the “home state” for Plaintiff’s minor child; (ii) Judge Cuesta “falsely”
held Plaintiff in contempt, “willfully disregarded” Plaintiff’s objections to the guardian ad litem,
and “engaged in a pattern of judicial misconduct” by “chastising,” “retaliating,” and “issuing
verbal threats” against Plaintiff; (iii) Judge Kreeger improperly presided over the case despite
exceeding Florida’s judicial retirement age;2 and (iv) both judges relied on the guardian ad litem’s
misrepresentation as to the child’s “home state” to “illegally retain[] jurisdiction.”3 	Id. at 2-5
1 Plaintiff purports to assert the following causes of action in her complaint: “Violation of
Procedural and Substantive Due Process”; “Violation of Equal Protection”; “Civil Conspiracy to
Interfere with Civil Rights”; “Americans with Disabilities Act”; “Rehabilitation Act”; “Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act”; “Violence Against Women Act”; “Municipal Liability (Monell)”;
“Declaratory and Injunctive Relief”; “Racial Discrimination”; and “Void Judgments for Lack of
Jurisdiction and Judicial Ineligibility.” ECF No. 1 at 7-9. Plaintiff has also sought to “add[] the
State of Florida as a defendant . . . for official-capacity claims regarding Defendant Judge Ivonne
Cuesta” in a recent filing, see ECF No. 10 at 1, but Plaintiff has offered no additional factual
allegations in her filing beyond those already alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1.
2 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s contentions, Florida law allows retired judges who are past the
constitutional age of retirement to serve as judges on temporary assignment by the state’s chief
justice. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. V, § 2(b) (“The chief justice of the supreme court . . . shall have
the power to assign justices or judges, including consenting retired justices or judges, to temporary
duty in any court for which the judge is qualified . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 8 (“No justice or
judge shall serve after attaining the age of seventy-five years except upon temporary assignment.”)
(emphasis added).
3 Along with these allegations, Plaintiff’s complaint is replete with legal conclusions, see, e.g.,
ECF No. 1 at 3 (claiming Judge Kreeger’s ruling are “void ab initio”), which the Court need not
accept as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 555 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Notably, to support her claims,
Plaintiff has relied on non-existent case citations that appear to have been generated by artificial
intelligence. 	See ECF No. 1 at 6-7. 	Plaintiff should be aware that her “pro se status does not
absolve [her] of the responsibility to abide by a duty of candor to the Court,” and that “[t]he
imposition of sanctions against parties who submit fake citations,” including dismissal, is “not
uncommon.” See O’Brien v. Flick, No. 24-61529-CIV, 2025 WL 242924, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10,
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(referencing Kirnon v. Kirnon, Case No. 2018-008711-FC-04 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.)).
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment voiding all custody-related state court orders; a
temporary restraining order directing the return of Plaintiff’s minor child to her custody;
authorization for the U.S. Marshals Service to “recover and safely return” her minor child; a “no-
contact and gag order” prohibiting the petitioner in the state court proceeding (a non-party in this
case) from contacting Plaintiff and her minor child; the suspension of the guardian ad litem “from
any involvement in this matter”; a stay of all state family court proceedings regarding custody or
visitation of Plaintiff’s minor child; an expedited hearing date for Plaintiff’s “request for a
preliminary injunction”; and an award of $50,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
at 9-10.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As a threshold matter, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must
screen the complaint to ensure it states a plausible claim on which relief may be granted. Mehmood
v. Guerra, 783 F. App’x 938, 939 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 	A
complaint must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction
. . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of
relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 	Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require
“detailed factual allegations,” a complaint shall be “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,
2025) (dismissal warranted where plaintiff relied on non-existent case citations and fake legal
authority), aff’d, 2025 WL 2731627 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025).
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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and must be sufficient “to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 555, 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	However,
“[a]lthough courts liberally construe pro se pleadings, they are not required to rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Anderson v. Ward, 373 F. App’x 968, 969 (11th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
i. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.
Despite purporting to set forth eleven different causes of action, Plaintiff does not state any
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count VII. Most egregiously, Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Violence Against Women
Act “if applicable.” See ECF No. 1 at 1, 8. But the law is clear that the Violence Against Women
Act does not provide for a civil remedy. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(holding provision of Violence Against Women Act creating civil remedy unconstitutional);
Samedi v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (granting motion for
judgment on the pleadings relating to a civil claim brought under the Violence Against Women
Act).
Counts IV and V. Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under Title II of the Americans with
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Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As an initial matter, it appears
Plaintiff is asserting these claims on behalf of her minor child, who Plaintiff describes as disabled.
See ECF No. 1 at 7. But “[a] parent may not represent their child pro se in claims brought under
the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.” L.R. v. Leon Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 4:18CV72-MW/CAS, 2019
WL 1177996, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1172012 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2019). 	And in any event,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either law because she does not allege “(1) how she [or her
child] qualif[y] under the ADA or Section 504; (2) how [they] were discriminated against; (3) who
discriminated against [them]; (4) what accommodation [they] requested; or (5) who denied [them]
any accommodation.”4 Hokama v. Williams, No. 3:25CV460-MCR-HTC, 2025 WL 2078300, at
*5 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2062282 (N.D. Fla.
July 23, 2025).
Count III. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. The allegation that Defendants “conspired and acted in concert to deprive Plaintiff of her
parental rights and protections guaranteed under federal law” by “manipulating jurisdictional facts
and court processes,” see ECF No. 1 at 7, is entirely conclusory, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570,
and Plaintiff does not otherwise allege the existence of any agreement among Defendants, which
is the linchpin of a conspiracy claim. See Wilbourne v. Forsyth Cnty. Sch. Dist., 306 F. App’x 473,
478 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In order to establish a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, [a plaintiff] must show
an agreement between two or more persons to deprive [her] of [her] civil rights.”) (quoting
Dickerson v. Alachua Cnty. Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also United States
4 Indeed, the only relevant allegations—that Defendants “discriminated against Plaintiff and her
disabled daughter” by “failing to provide reasonable accommodations in custody proceedings and
related services,” ECF No. 1 at 7—are wholly conclusory. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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v. Mercer, 165 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[t]he essence” of a conspiracy is
an agreement); Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th
Cir. 1992) (explaining that “the linchpin for conspiracy is agreement”).
Count X. Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To state a claim of
race discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff “must allege facts establishing that: (1) he is a member
of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race;
and (3) the discrimination concerned an activity enumerated in the statute.” Johnson v. Wilbur,
375 F. App’x 960, 963-64 (11th Cir. 2010). 	However, aside from the conclusory claim that
Defendants “intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on her race,” see ECF No. 1 at 9,
there are no factual allegations in the complaint that establish any of the elements of a § 1981
claim.
Count VI. 	Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 	Plaintiff’s sole allegation that Defendants
“failed to provide [Plaintiff’s daughter] with special education services and related supports to
which she is legally entitled,” ECF No. 1 at 8, is entirely conclusory and devoid of facts. 	See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Moreover, the IDEA “is simply not the proper vehicle for [P]laintiff to
challenge [a] [state] [c]ourt’s custody determinations.” Skillings v. City of New York, No. 21 CV
3034 (DG)(LB), 2023 WL 8531493, at *9 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023) (explaining that the IDEA
“guarantees that children with disabilities have access to a ‘free appropriate public education’ that
meets their needs, namely by ensuring school districts offer disabled students requisite services,”
and that the IDEA “‘only authorizes a private right of action with respect to a local educational
authority’s alleged failure to provide’ a free appropriate public education” (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(d)(1)(a) and then Y.D. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 14-CV-1137, 2016 WL 698139,
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at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2016))). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IDEA claim should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
Count IX. 	Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. 	See
ECF No. 1 at 8. As an initial matter, a “count for injunctive relief is not an independent cause of
action,” and thus, Plaintiff’s freestanding claim seeking injunctive relief should be dismissed. See
Curtis Int’l, Ltd. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., No. 06-81079, 2007 WL 9701816, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
June 4, 2007); Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 2004) (“There is
no such thing as a suit for a traditional injunction in the abstract.”). And while Plaintiff also seeks
declaratory relief in Count IX pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, as explained infra at section
II(A)(iii)(1), Plaintiff is seeking retrospective relief for allegedly unlawful actions occurring in the
past by requesting that this Court nullify prior state court orders. Accordingly, “Plaintiff has failed
to allege a case or controversy sufficient to establish standing for seeking the requested declaratory
. . . relief.” Point Conversions, LLC v. Lopane, No. 20-CV-61549, 2021 WL 328533, at *8 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 8, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 327536 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2021);
see also Haim v. Monroe Cnty., 479 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1280-81 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (dismissing claim
for declaratory and injunctive relief because “past alleged violations do not establish a continuing
violation”), aff’d, 858 F. App’x 340 (11th Cir. 2021).
Counts I, II, VIII, and XI. As for Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, through
which she seeks to redress violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal
protection clauses, see ECF No. 1 at 7-9, Plaintiff similarly fails to state a claim against any
Defendant.
First, to the extent Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against Defendant Trainor in her
individual capacity, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if true, establish deprivation of a
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federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Amnesty, Intern., USA v. Battle,
559 F.3d 1170, 1179 (11th Cir. 2009). However, absent specific allegations that transform them
into state actors, guardian ad litems are considered private parties. 	See Higdon v. Smith, 565 F.
App’x 791, 793 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim against a guardian ad litem
where plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing that the guardian was a state actor). As discussed
above, Plaintiff failed to allege the existence of any conspiracy between Defendant Trainor and
any state actor that would render Trainor a state actor for purposes of § 1983. 	See Harvey v.
Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1992) (“For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff
must plead in detail, through reference to material facts, the relationship or nature of the conspiracy
between the state actor(s) and the private persons.”). With no factual allegations that can plausibly
establish that Defendant Trainor was a state actor, the complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against
her.
Second, while Plaintiff appears to bring § 1983 claims against Judges Kreeger and Cuesta,
“neither a [s]tate nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”
Molette v. Georgia, No. 11-10581, 2012 WL 1002342, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2012) (quoting
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)); see also Will, 491 U.S. at 70
(concluding that “governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the [s]tate’ for Eleventh
Amendment purposes” are not considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983). Here, Plaintiff
is suing two judges from the state court custody proceedings, who are considered “arms of the
state,” see infra section (II)(A)(iii)(1); Coker v. Warren, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1327 (M.D. Fla.
2023) (“In Florida, the state court system, and therefore a state court judge acting in his official
capacity, are considered arms of the State of Florida.”), aff’d, No. 23-11160, 2025 WL 1575578
(11th Cir. June 4, 2025), in their official capacities. See ECF No. 1 at 1, 2. As such, the judges are
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not “persons” under § 1983 and “cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983.” Coker, 660 F.
Supp. 3d at 1327 (dismissing § 1983 claim against Florida circuit court judge sued in official
capacity).
Lastly, to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Miami Dade County or Defendant Trainor
in her official capacity, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that [her] constitutional rights were violated; (2)
that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that
constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown,
392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Although Plaintiff does not specify precisely whom she intended to sue by bringing a
§ 1983 against Defendant Trainor in her official capacity, “[t]he claim against [Trainor] in her
official capacity is a claim against the [g]uardian ad [l]item [p]rogram.” Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d
1540, 1545 n.3 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). “To
recover against the [guardian ad litem program], [plaintiff] must show that [the guardian ad litem’s]
conduct was the result of a custom or policy of the [p]rogram.” Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1545 n.3. Here,
however, Plaintiff does not allege that Trainor’s conduct resulted from any policy or custom of the
guardian ad litem program. 	See ECF No. 1. As a result, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against
Defendant Trainor in her official capacity.5
As for Defendant Miami Dade County, while Plaintiff alleges “supervisory authorities”
engaged in a “cover-up” to allow “fraud, corruption, and misconduct” to continue in the custody
5 To the extent that the guardian ad litem program may be an arm of the state of Florida, see, e.g.,
Fla. Stat. § 39.8296; Dolin ex rel. N.D. v. West, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1350 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(treating appointed guardian ad litem as a state officer), aff’d, 207 F.3d 661 (11th Cir. 2000), this
claim would be barred because neither the state of Florida, the guardian ad litem program, nor
Defendant Trainor in her official capacity would be a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See,
e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 70.
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proceeding, and that “[t]his systemic failure and retaliation . . . exemplify a custom or policy of
deliberate indifference,” ECF No. 1 at 8, liability under § 1983 applies “only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” See City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“[V]icarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”). Indeed, a municipality
“cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 	Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 	“Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflict the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under
§ 1983.” 	Id. at 694. 	As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, “a county rarely will have an
officially-adopted policy of permitting a particular constitutional violation.”6 See Knight through
Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 819 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335
F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). “Thus, most plaintiffs ‘must show that the county
has a custom or practice of permitting [the violation] and that the county’s custom or practice is
the moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330). To
prove that a custom or practice exists, a plaintiff “must establish a widespread practice that . . . is
so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Watkins v.
Willson, No. 18-61055-CIV-WPD, 2019 WL 11343404, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2019) (quoting
Grider v. Cook, 590 F. App’x 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2014)), aff’d, 824 F. App’x 938 (11th Cir. 2020).
The plaintiff must further establish that “there was knowledge, actual or constructive, of the custom
or practice by the governing body of the municipality.” Watkins, 2019 WL 11343404, at *2 (citing
6 Plaintiff does not allege that her claims are based on any official policy adopted by Miami-Dade
County.
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Depew v. City of St. Marys, Georgia, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Here, Plaintiff never alleges the existence of any widespread practice by Miami-Dade
County—indeed, never alleges any facts beyond those of her own case—and never alleges that the
final policymakers for Miami-Dade County had any notice of the circumstances about which she
complains.7 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has also failed to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant
Miami-Dade County.
ii. 	Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by the Rooker-Feldman and Younger Doctrines.
In her complaint, Plaintiff also asks the Court to declare as void “all custody-related orders,
rulings, and judgments” issued by Florida’s state courts, to stay all state court proceedings
regarding custody and visitation, and to provide other forms of relief that would effectively nullify
the state court’s prior rulings and grant Plaintiff custody of her minor child. See ECF No. 1 at 9-
10 (seeking suspension of Defendant Trainor, the appointed guardian ad litem, “from any
involvement in this matter”; the return of Plaintiff’s minor child by the U.S. Marshals Service; a
“no-contact and gag order” prohibiting the child’s father, a non-party to these federal proceedings,
from contacting Plaintiff and her minor child; $50,000,000 in damages from Defendants; and a
restraining order restoring granting Plaintiff legal and physical custody of her minor child).
However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine8 precludes federal district courts “from reviewing
7 The final policymakers for Miami-Dade County are the Board of County Commissioners and the
Mayor. See, e.g., Balbin v. Concepcion, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1360 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 26, 2019) (“As
for [Miami-Dade] County, its final policymakers are the Board of County Commissioners and the
Mayor.”); Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 09-23462-CIV-TORRES, 2012 WL
12845657, at *9 n.9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2012) (“[N]umerous courts have all concluded that the
Board of County Commissioners or the Mayor is the final policymaking authority of [Miami-Dade
County] . . . .”) (collecting cases). The judges and court personnel identified by Plaintiff in Count
VIII are not final policymakers for Miami-Dade County. Indeed, they are not even a part of Miami-
Dade County government under Florida law. See Fla. Const. art V.
8 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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final state court decisions.” Green v. Jefferson County Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir.
2009). 	This doctrine involves “a simple inquiry—whether the plaintiff’s claim directly
challenge[s] a state court loss.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021). In other
words, “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments” are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 1212
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
Here, Plaintiff brings a case that consists primarily of “complain[ts] of injuries caused by
state-court judgments,” which falls squarely within the realm of cases barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. See Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211, 1212 (explaining that the doctrine “bars all appeals
of state court judgments—whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal of the judgment or
tries to call the appeal something else”). And a review of the docket in the state court proceeding
reveals that no appeal of the final judgment—or any of the “custody-related orders” that Plaintiff
asks this Court to overturn and declare void—was timely filed or is pending, thereby making the
state court’s rulings final for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.9 	See Fla. R. App. P.
9.110(b) (setting deadline for the filing of a notice of appeal). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Fox v. Fla.
Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 828 F. App’x 639, 640 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We’ve applied Rooker-Feldman
principles to child custody proceedings on multiple occasions and have concluded that, under
Rooker-Feldman, we may not interfere with final judgments rendered by state courts.”); Goodman
9 The undersigned takes judicial notice of the docket in the state case, Kirnon v. Kirnon, Case No.
2018-008711-FC-04 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.), a copy of which is attached to this report. See, e.g., Paez
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652 (11th Cir. 2020); Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199
(11th Cir. 1984).
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ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming application of Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to claims for monetary damages that “str[uck] at the heart of” state court custody
proceedings and rulings).
Moreover, pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine,10 “federal district courts may not
interfere with ongoing child custody proceedings” in state court. Liedel v. Juv. Court of Madison
Cty., 891 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir.
1988) (“[F]ederal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody,
visitation rights, . . . child support, and enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject
to state court modification.”). Thus, to the extent that the state court custody proceedings may be
ongoing, see ECF No. 1 at 10 (seeking a stay of “all pending and future state family court
proceedings regarding custody or visitation”), Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because
the relief requested would “nullify rulings in [a] state proceeding[] that w[as] ongoing at the time
Plaintiff filed her federal [c]omplaint.” 	Sorhegui v. Park E. Home Owners Ass’n, Inc., No. 24-
23162-CIV, 2025 WL 1047150, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 926399 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2025); see also Rabold v. Hayes, No. 6:24-CV-
1580-PGB-RMN, 2025 WL 1332910, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2025) (“Plaintiff’s Complaint is
challenging an ongoing state court domestic relations proceeding which implicates important state
interests—such as divorce and child custody—and he can raise any constitutional claims he may
have there. 	Thus, the Younger abstention doctrine applies to Plaintiff’s claims . . . .”) (citation
omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1085238 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2025).
10 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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iii. 	Plaintiff Brings Claims Against Parties Who Are Immune from Suit.
1. 	Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to claims against Judge Kreeger and
Judge Cuevas in their official capacities.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI. In practice, the Eleventh Amendment “largely shields states from suit in federal
courts without their consent,” Monroe v. Fort Valley State Univ., 93 F.4th 1269, 1275-76 (11th Cir.
2024) (quoting United States ex rel. Lesinski v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 739 F.3d 598, 601 (11th
Cir. 2014)), and also “prohibits suits against state officials where the state is, in fact, the real party
in interest,” Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). In other
words, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment applies not only to the state, but to a defendant who acts as an
‘arm of the state.’” Kicklighter v. McIntosh Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 694 F. App’x 711, 714 (11th
Cir. 2017) (citing Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, state sovereign
immunity does not apply where the state has waived, or where Congress has abrogated by
legislation, state sovereign immunity. 	See Stroud v. McIntosh, 722 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir.
2013).
Here, Plaintiff brings claims against Judges Kreeger and Cuevas in their official capacities
as state court judges. See ECF No. 1 at 1. Because they, as Florida circuit court judges, are state
officials, they are considered “arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” See Badillo
v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 212-13 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Sorhegui, 2025 WL 1047150, at
*10 (“In Florida, the state court system, and therefore a state court judge acting in his official
capacity, are considered arms of the State of Florida.”) (quoting Coker, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 1327).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that the state waived its immunity. See ECF No.
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1. And neither Congress nor the state of Florida have abrogated state sovereign immunity with
respect to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985.11 See Henry v. Fla. Bar, 701 F. App’x 878, 881
(11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “neither Congress nor the state of Florida have abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity” for claims arising “under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985”).
Moreover, while a suit against state officials seeking prospective injunctive or declaratory
relief may still proceed under the Ex parte Young doctrine,12 see Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2000), the doctrine
is “focused on cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed
to cases in which federal law has been violated at one time or over a period of time in the past.”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1986). 	Thus, despite Plaintiff’s request for what she
describes as prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against Judges Kreeger and Cuesta, see
ECF No. 1 at 2, when “look[ing] to the substance rather than to the form of the relief sought,”
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279, it is clear that “even though Plaintiff states that the violations of federal
law are ongoing, Plaintiff is actually seeking retrospective relief for allegedly unlawful action by
requesting that this Court halt or undo prior state court orders. As such, Plaintiff fails to adequately
demonstrate that the narrow exception under the Ex parte Young doctrine applies.” Sorhegui, 2025
11 Because the abrogation of state sovereign immunity with respect to claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (Count IV), the Rehabilitation Act (Count V), and/or the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (Count VI) is a less settled and more context-specific question, because
the question of immunity is inapplicable in the context of the Violence Against Women Act (Count
VII), which does not provide a civil remedy, see supra at 4, and because Plaintiff’s complaint in
any event fails to state claims under the foregoing federal acts, see supra at 4-6, this Court need
not reach, and the undersigned does not reach, the question of whether Eleventh Amendment
immunity additionally bars claims asserted under these federal acts.
12 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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WL 1047150, at *10 (emphasis added).13 Accordingly, as to the claims against Judge Kreeger and
Judge Cuevas, all but Counts IV, V, VI, and VII are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.14
2. 	Defendant Trainor is entitled to absolute immunity from suit.
While judicial immunity extends to judges “for those acts taken while they are acting in
their judicial capacity,” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit
has held that such immunity similarly extends to other persons whose “official duties have an
integral relationship with the judicial process” and who are acting within the scope of those duties.
Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). That includes guardian
ad litems, who are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. See Dolin ex rel. N.D. v. West, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 1343, 1349-50 (M.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 207 F.3d 661 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Hill v.
Manning, No. 1:21-CV-04549-SDG, 2022 WL 4361822, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2022)
(concluding that guardian ad litem was entitled to absolute immunity because the guardian ad litem
role “ha[s] an integral relationship to the judicial process”).
Here, the allegations in the complaint concerning Defendant Trainor’s conduct—that while
13 With respect to Judge Kreeger, a retired judge, see ECF No. 1 at 2, 3, the only relief that could
ever potentially be sought against her in her official judicial capacity would have to be
retrospective because she no longer serves as a judge.
14 As to Counts IV, V, VI, and VII, see supra note 11. Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff
brings claims against Judges Kreeger and Cuesta in their individual capacities, they are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity. 	The acts they 	allegedly committed—including “dismiss[ing]
Plaintiff’s petition,” “rel[ying] on [Defendant Trainor’s] misrepresentation,” “h[olding] Plaintiff
in contempt of court,” and “disregard[ing] [Plaintiff’s] motion,” see ECF No. 1 at 3-4—are
unequivocally acts made in their judicial capacities, and thus, judicial immunity applies. See Bolin
v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity
. . . for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the
‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978));
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit . . . .”);
Tarver v. Reynolds, 808 F. App’x 752, 754 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[J]udges also receive protection from
declaratory and injunctive relief.”); see also Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1234 (“[Judicial] immunity applies
even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.”)
(citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356).
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acting as guardian ad litem, she was biased, solicited and accepted a fee to offer a favorable child
custody recommendation, filed a misleading report with the state court, and misrepresented to the
court that Florida was the “home state” for Plaintiff’s minor child, see ECF No. 1 at 2-5—directly
relate to her role as a guardian ad litem and representative of the minor child’s interests in court,
which had “an integral relationship to the judicial process.” 	Hill, 2022 WL 4361822, at *5.
Accordingly, the claims brought against Defendant Trainor are barred by absolute immunity.
B. Plaintiff’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order Should Be Denied.
In her Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and subsequent amendment to
the motion, ECF Nos. 5, 7, Plaintiff seeks the same injunctive relief described in the complaint.
See ECF No. 1 at 9-10; ECF No. 5 at 2.
To obtain a temporary restraining order, a party must demonstrate “(1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not
granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-
movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. rel Schindler
v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163,
1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 	“Additionally, the requirements for granting an ex parte
temporary restraining order, such as is at issue here, go beyond the usual requirements for
injunctive relief, allowing a district court to grant such a request ‘only if (A) specific facts in an
affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the
movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should
not be required.’” Starmark Fin. LLC v. Luther Appliance & Furniture Sales Acquisition LLC, No.
24-62357-CIV, 2024 WL 5181749, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
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65(b)(1)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5187945 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2024).
As discussed above, however, Plaintiff fails to state any claims upon which relief can be
granted, brings claims against immune defendants, and brings claims that are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman and/or Younger doctrines. For those reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. Additionally, aside from conclusory statements, see, e.g., ECF
No. 7 at 2 (claiming “[t]he ongoing harm is irreparable”), Plaintiff’s motion does not otherwise
address or explain how any of the requirements for injunctive relief are met in this case. See ECF
Nos. 5, 7. For example, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any harm or injury that will result if
injunctive relief is not granted.15 Thus, “[g]iven the absence of a sufficient basis for the Court to
conclude that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits or make determinations on
the other factors” that must be satisfied for the entry of temporary injunctive relief, the Court
should deny Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order. 	Gardi v. United Healthcare
Servs., Inc., No. 19-80369-CIV, 2019 WL 13185453, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2019).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS
that Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 5) and Amendment
to Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order for Ex-Parte Consideration (ECF No. 7)
15 The undersigned further finds that Plaintiff has also failed to show that “immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard
in opposition.” 	See Starmark, 2024 WL 5181749, at *2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)).
Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants would “use advance notice to further conceal or relocate the
child,” ECF No. 7 at 3, is wholly speculative and unsupported by any specific allegations. And
while the undersigned recognizes Plaintiff’s concern with providing “specialized medical care and
emotional stability,” Plaintiff has failed to show that her child is not receiving appropriate care or
why or how her child would suffer “physical and psychological injury” before Defendants can be
heard in opposition. See id. at 2-3.
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be DENIED, and that Plaintiff’s case be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommendation, that is, by no
later than February 17, 2026, Plaintiff shall serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report
and Recommendation with the assigned United States District Judge. 	Failure to file timely
objections will bar a de novo determination by the District Judge of any issue addressed in the
Report and Recommendation, will constitute a waiver of a party’s “right to challenge on appeal
the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions,” and will only allow
appellate review of the district court order “for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Henley v. Johnson,
885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Harrigan v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977
F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2020).
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 2nd day of
February 2026.
___________________________________
EDUARDO I. SANCHEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	Shola A. Smith, pro se
1301 Roundhill Ave. NW
Palm Bay, FL 32907
Email: smithshola@gmail.com
(Via U.S. Mail and email)
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