Toho Co., Ltd. v. The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified in Schedule A Hereto

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-23049-BLOOM/Elfenbein
TOHO CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS,
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES,
PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED IN
SCHEDULE “A” HERETO,
Defendants.
_________________________/
ORDER ON FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
(“Motion”), ECF No. [39], filed on October 16, 2025. The Court has considered the Motion, the
record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons discussed below, the
Court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is in the business of developing, marketing, selling, and distributing GODZILLA
products. ECF No. [1] ¶ 7. Plaintiff is a Japanese film, theater production, and distribution
company. Id. Plaintiff’s most famous creation is Godzilla, a prehistoric reptilian monster awakened
and powered by nuclear radiation. Id. The GODZILLA brand has become one of the most
recognizable symbols of Japanese pop culture worldwide. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff develops, markets, sells,
and distributes GODZILLA brand products. Id. Plaintiff is the official source of GODZILLA
products. Id. Plaintiff is the registered owner of the wordmark “GODZILLA”, among others.
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Plaintiff’s registered trademarks include those with U.S. Registration Nos. 2,360,489; 4,183,291;
and 7,245,324 (the “GODZILLA Trademarks”). Id. ¶ 9.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 8, 2025, alleging Trademark Infringement (Count
I), False Designation of Origin (Count II), Common Law Trademark Infringement (Count III),
Common Law Unfair Competition (Count IV), and Copyright Infringement (Count V) as to
Plaintiff’s 	federally 	registered 	trademarks 	and 	copyrights 	(respectively, 	the 	“Godzilla
Trademarks” and “Godzilla Copyrights”). ECF No. [1]. On July 30, 2025, the Court authorized
electronic service via email on Defendants, ECF No. [13], and issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (“TRO”) ECF No. [12]. On August 13, 2025, the Court issued an Amended TRO. ECF No.
[23]. On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff effected service on all named Defendants and filed a Response
to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, generating a deadline to respond of September 12, 2025. ECF
No. [29]. No Defendant responded to the Complaint or sought additional time by which to do so.
On September 15, 2025, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
which was granted in part and denied in part. ECF Nos. [32]; [38]. Plaintiff now moves for default
judgment.
On September 17, 2025, the Clerk entered default against Defendant No. 1, GFsafasfvafv
and Defendant No. 2, ADASJDFVDSGG for failure to respond to the Complaint or otherwise
appear in this action. ECF No. [35]. On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. ECF
No. [39]Defendants failed to move to set aside the Clerk’s Entry of Defaults or otherwise respond
to the Default Judgment Motion.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), the Court is authorized to enter a
final judgment of default against a party who has failed to respond to a complaint. “A ‘defendant,
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by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts
by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.’” Eagle Hosp.
Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F. 3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F. 2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975));
Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987). “Because the defendant is not held to
admit facts that are not well pleaded or to admit conclusions of law, the court must first determine
whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleading for the judgment to be entered.” Luxottica Group
S.p.A. v. Individual, P’ship or Unincorporated Ass’n, No. 17-cv-61471, 2017 WL 6949260, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2017); see also Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987)
(“[L]iability is well-pled in the complaint, and is therefore established by the entry of default . .
.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting (15 U.S.C. § 1114)
Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides liability for trademark
infringement if, without the consent of the registrant, a defendant uses “in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark: which is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114. In order to prevail on its
trademark infringement claim under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, Plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) it had prior rights to the mark at issue; and (2) Defendants adopted a mark or name that was
the same or confusingly similar to the Plaintiff’s trademark, such that consumers were likely to
confuse the two. Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 360
(11th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the GODZILLA Trademarks. Id. ¶ 41. The
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United States Registrations for the GODZILLA Trademark are in full force and effect. Id. Each
Defendant sold, offered to sell, marketed, distributed, and advertised products in connection with
the GODZILLA Trademarks without Plaintiff’s authorization or permission. Id. ¶ 44.
Defendants have knowledge of Plaintiff’s rights in the GODZILLA Trademarks and are
willfully infringing and intentionally using counterfeits of the GODZILLA Trademarks despite
such knowledge. Id. ¶ 45. Each Defendant’s activities constitute willful trademark infringement
under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114. Id. ¶ 46. Each Defendant’s willful,
intentional, and unauthorized use of the GODZILLA Trademarks for goods identical, nearly
identical, directly competing, and/or overlapping to Plaintiff's GODZILLA Products is likely to
cause and is causing confusion, mistake, confusion, and deception as to the quality, origin,
sponsorship, or approval of Defendants’ Products among the general public. Id. ¶ 47. The factual
allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint have been substantiated by sworn declarations and other
evidence and establish Defendants’ liability under each of the claims asserted in the Complaint.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts for judgment to be entered against Defendants as
to Count I.
B. False Designation of Origin (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
False designation of origin claims “proscribe[] the behavior of ‘passing off’ or ‘palming
off,’ which ‘occurs when a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s.’”
Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 (2003)). The test for
liability for false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) is the same as for a trademark
counterfeiting and infringement claim – i.e., whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused
by the similarity of the marks at issue. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
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780 (1992). Accordingly, Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts for judgment to be entered against
Defendants as to Count II.
C. Common Law Unfair Competition and Trademark Infringement
Whether a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s trademarks created a likelihood of confusion
between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s products is also the determining factor in the analysis
of unfair competition under Florida common law. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Forrester, No.
83-cv-8381, 1986 WL 15668, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 1986) (“The appropriate test for determining
whether there is a likelihood of confusion, and thus trademark infringement, false designation
of 	origin, 	and unfair competition under the common law of Florida, is set forth in John H.
Harland, Inc. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 972 (11th Cir. 1983).”); see also Boston
Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975)
(“As a general rule . . . the same facts which would support an action for trademark infringement
would also support an action for unfair competition.”).
The analysis of liability for Florida common law trademark infringement is the same as the
analysis of liability for trademark infringement under § 32(a) of the Lanham Act. See PetMed
Express, Inc. v. MedPets.com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1217-18 (S.D. Fla. 2004). Accordingly,
Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts for judgment to be entered against Defendants as to Counts III
and IV.
D. Copyright Infringement (17 U.S.C. § 501)
The Copyright Act provides in relevant part that “[a]nyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 [17 U.S.C. §§
106-122] or of the author as provided in section 106A(a) [17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)] . . . is an infringer
of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). “Liability for
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copyright infringement arises when a plaintiff can prove (1) ownership of a copyright, and (2) a
defendant’s 	copying 	of 	the 	copyrighted 	work.” 	XYZ 	Corp. 	v. 	Individuals, 	P’ships, 	&
Unincorporated Ass’ns. Identified on Schedule “A”, 668 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2023)
(citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
At all relevant times, Plaintiff is, and has been, the owner of all valid and enforceable rights
to the GODZILLA Works, which contain copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101
and 501, et seq. ECF No. [1] ¶ 72. The GODZILLA Works are the subject of valid certificates of
copyright registrations for the GODZILLA Works. Id. ¶ 74. Plaintiff has complied with the
registration requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) for the GODZILLA Works. Id. Each Defendant’s
images, artwork, and derivative works are virtually identical to and/or substantially similar to the
GODZILLA Works. Id. ¶ 78. Each Defendant’s infringement has been willful, intentional, and
purposeful, and in disregard of and with indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. Id. ¶ 81. The factual
allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint have been substantiated by sworn declarations and other
evidence and establish Defendants’ liability under each of the claims asserted in the Complaint.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts for judgment to be entered against Defendants as
to Count V. As a result of each Defendant’s infringement of Plaintiff’s exclusive rights under
copyrights, Plaintiff is entitled to relief pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504 and to its attorneys’ fees and
costs pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. Id. ¶ 83.
E. Injunctive Relief
Pursuant to the Lanham Act, a district court is authorized to issue an injunction “according
to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable,” to prevent
violations of trademark law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Indeed, “[i]njunctive relief is the remedy of
choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for the
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injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.” Burger King Corp. v. Agad, 911 F. Supp.
1499, 1509-10 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180
(9th Cir. 1988)). Moreover, even in a default judgment setting, injunctive relief is available. See, e.g.,
PetMed Express, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23. Defendants’ failure to respond or otherwise appear in
this action makes it difficult for Plaintiff to prevent further infringement absent an injunction. See
Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“[D]efendant’s lack of participation
in this litigation has given the court no assurance that defendant’s infringing activity will cease.
Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunctive relief.”)
Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate where a plaintiff demonstrates that (1) it has
suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardship
favors an equitable remedy; and (4) an issuance of an injunction is in the public’s interest. eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006).
Plaintiff has suffered irreparable injury and has no adequate remedy at law. ECF No. [1]
¶¶ 29, 36. Each Defendant is causing harm to Plaintiff and the consuming public by (i) depriving
Plaintiff of its right to fairly compete for space online and within search engine results and reducing
the visibility of Plaintiff’s genuine goods on the Internet, (ii) causing an overall degradation of the
value of the goodwill associated with the GODZILLA Trademarks, and (iii) increasing Plaintiff’s
overall cost to market its goods and educate consumers about its brand via the Internet. Id. ¶ 31.
Permanent injunctive relief is in the public interest because each Defendant is engaged in illegal
activities and are directly defrauding the consuming public by palming off Defendant’s competing
infringing products as genuine GODZILLA Products through the publication of the infringing
works. The public interest favors maintaining the integrity of the copyright laws. See C.B. Fleet
Co. v. Unico Holdings, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“The public interest can
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only be served by upholding copyright protection and preventing the misappropriation of protected
works); see also CBS Broad., Inc. v. EchoStar Comm’ns. Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 1198 (11th Cir.
2001) (the public interest lies with protecting the rights of copyright owners).
Plaintiff 	has 	carried 	its 	burden 	on each of the four factors. Therefore, permanent
injunctive relief is appropriate.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of
Default Judgment, ECF No. [39], is GRANTED. In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58, judgment for Plaintiff will be entered separately.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida on November 21, 2025.
_____________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: counsel of record
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