Ofer v. Mukamal et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-22691-RKA
RAZIEL OFER,
Appellant,
v.
BARRY MUKAMAL, et al.,
Appellees.
/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN APPEAL
The pro se Appellant moves us to reopen his appeal from an order entered in In re 942 Penn
RR, LLC, No. 22-bk-14038 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (Mark, Bankr. J.). See Motion to Reinstate Appeal [ECF
No. 9]. Local Rule 87.4(c) “authorize[s] and direct[s]” bankruptcy courts to dismiss appeals when the
appellant fails to comply with certain duties imposed by the federal or local rules. S.D. Fla. L.R. 87.4(c).
The Appellant failed to comply with those duties, so the Bankruptcy Court did as the Local Rule
directs and dismissed his appeal. He now wants us to “reinstate” his appeal, see Mot. ¶ 10, claiming
that he didn’t comply because he never received “any deficiency notices” and suggesting that his
“medical history” kept him from “timely” obeying the rules, id. ¶¶ 5–7. But to this day, the Appellant
still hasn’t fully complied with the relevant requirements—and, even if he had, it wouldn’t entitle him
to relief. The Motion is DENIED.
STANDARD
The Appellant seeks review of the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal order under Local
Rule 87.4(c).1 As we previewed, that rule “authorize[s] and direct[s]” the Bankruptcy Court “to dismiss
1 Local Rule 87.4(c) was previously numbered Local Rule 87.2. See, e.g., In re Frottier, 185 B.R. 928, 929
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). Before that, it was numbered Local Rule 27. See, e.g., In re Suncoast Airlines, Inc.,
121 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Moreno, J.).
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a[ ] [bankruptcy] appeal for appellant’s: (1) failure to pay the prescribed filing fees; . . . or (3) failure to
file a designation of the items for the record or copies thereof or a statement of the issues as required
by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009[.]” S.D. Fla. L.R. 87.4(c). Rule 8009, for its part,
requires an appellant to designate a record and file a statement of the issues within fourteen days of
the effective date of the notice of appeal. See F ED . R. BANKR . P. 8009(a)(1)(B). Our Local Bankruptcy
Rules link everything together: “If the appellant fails to timely file a designation of record or statement
of the issues as required by Bankruptcy Rule 8009, th[e] [Bankruptcy Court] shall dismiss the appeal
as authorized by District Court Local Rule 87.4(c).” S.D. F LA . LOCAL BANKR . R. 8009-1(A) (emphasis
added). “Bankruptcy Court orders entered under [Local Rule 87.4(c)] may be reviewed by the District
Court on motion filed in the District Court within fourteen (14) days after entry of the order on the
District Court docket.” S.D. F LA . L.R. 87.4(c) (emphasis added).2
“The district court in a bankruptcy appeal functions as an appellate court in reviewing the
bankruptcy court’s decision,” In re Williams, 216 F.3d 1295, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000), so “[w]e review
conclusions of law by the bankruptcy court . . . de novo, and any factual findings for clear error,” In
re Fox, 2025 WL 1924219, at *2 (11th Cir. July 14, 2025) (quoting In re Stanford, 17 F.4th 116, 121 (11th
Cir. 2021)). Of course, that standard would seem to leave us little to do when we review a dismissal
under Local Rule 87.4(c). Whether an appellant has paid its filing fee, stated its issues, or designated
its record is plainly a question of fact. We answer that question by looking at the docket: If the docket
reflects that the appellant complied with its obligations, the dismissal was clearly erroneous; if not, it
wasn’t.
2 See also In re Amendments to Federal Bankruptcy Rules and Local Rule 87.4 re Processing of Bankruptcy Appeals,
Admin. Order 2015-9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2019) (“Review of Bankruptcy Court orders under this
section shall be by motion filed in the District Court case within fourteen (14) days after entry of the order
sought to be reviewed[.]”).
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In Fox, the Eleventh Circuit applied this straightforward reasoning to dispose of a nearly
identical case. There, a pro se appellant complained that the district court had wrongly affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s Local Rule 87.4(c) dismissal for failure to state the issues or designate a record. But
since the “applicable procedural rules required [the appellant] to file these documents and he did not
do so,” “[t]he bankruptcy court did not err” in dismissing the case—and neither did the district court
in affirming. In re Fox, 2025 WL 1924219, at *3. Simple problem, simple answer.
“[A]s Einstein is reputed to have said,” however, “[e]verything should be made as simple as
possible, but not simpler,” Menasha Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 707 F.3d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner,
J.)—and the approach affirmed in Fox might be an oversimplification. The Eleventh Circuit “review[s]
for abuse of discretion a district court’s order dismissing a bankruptcy appeal on procedural grounds.”
In re Uribe, 2023 WL 5950131, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2023) (citing Pyramid Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Speake,
531 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1976)).3 Through Local Rule 87.4(c), we vested bankruptcy courts with
“limited 	authority 	to 	dismiss 	bankruptcy 	appeals,” 	Admin. Order 2015-9—but 	that 	authority
necessarily can’t exceed our own, see Brown v. Crawford Cnty., Ga., 960 F.2d 1002, 1008 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that local rules may not contravene federal statutes or rules of procedure). And our discretion
to dismiss bankruptcy appeals depends on the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
documents: “An appellant’s failure to take any step other than timely filing a notice of appeal does not
affect the appeal’s validity, but is ground only for the district court or BAP to act as it considers
appropriate, including dismissing the appeal.” F ED . R. B ANKR . P. 8003(a)(2); accord Pyramid Mobile
Homes, Inc., 531 F.2d at 746 (construing an older version of this rule). Put another way, of all the
documents that are due at the beginning of a bankruptcy appeal, only the notice of appeal “is a
3 “All decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit.” Roman v. United States, 789 F. App’x 211, 212 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Bonner
v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
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prerequisite to jurisdiction [that] must be strictly construed” and for which “strict enforcement is
crucial.” In re Beverly Mfg. Corp., 778 F.2d 666, 667 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Fase v. Seafarers Welfare &
Pension Plan, 574 F.2d 72, 75–76 (2d Cir. 1978)). Otherwise, enforcement is up to us.
When, then, may we exercise our discretion to dismiss appeals because of late-filed non-
jurisdictional documents? Our circuit has never spelled out a general rule, but for opening briefs
(obviously “not a jurisdictional pre-requisite [sic]”), “routine dismissal” isn’t appropriate. Ibid. (citing
Marcaida v. Rascoe, 569 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1978)). Instead, we must consider the appellant’s “bona
fides”—his “proffered reasons for his or her lack of diligent prosecution.” In re Mohorne, 718 F. App’x
934, 936 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Pyramid Mobile Homes, Inc., 531 F.2d at 746). We may dismiss when we
conclude that the appellant didn’t timely file its brief because of “bad faith, negligence[,] or
indifference[.]” Beverly Mfg. Corp., 778 F.2d at 667 (adopting In re Winner Corp., 632 F.2d 658 (6th Cir.
1980)). “Bad faith” and “negligence” seem to mean what they usually do in the equitable-excuse
context: deliberate noncompliance or inexcusable neglect, respectively. Compare, e.g., In re Suncoast
Airlines, 121 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Moreno, J.) (distinguishing “inadvertence due to
something beyond the control of the person sought to be excused” from “bad faith, negligence, or
indifference” when considering whether to excuse the appellant’s failure to timely designate a record
and state the issues), with Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)
(holding that whether a party’s neglect is excusable under Rule 60(b)(1) depends partly on “the reason
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant” and “whether the
movant acted in good faith”). “Indifference” doesn’t seem to have any standalone meaning. What
matters most under Pyramid Mobile Homes and Beverly Manufacturing is the quantum of “bad faith” or
“negligence.” “[A] slight lack of diligence on the part of the appellant,” such as “fail[ing] to file a single
brief,” “may not be sufficient to warrant dismissal.” In re Tucker, 665 F. App’x 841, 844 (11th Cir.
2016).
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Both Pyramid Mobile Homes and the analogous case on which Beverly Manufacturing relied,
Marcaida, also suggest that we should balance an appellant’s bad faith or negligence against the
prejudice to the appellee from permitting the late filing. See Pyramid Mobile Homes, Inc., 531 F.2d at 746
(explaining, with respect to an untimely designation of the record, that “dismissal . . . should be
considered in light of the prejudicial effect of delay on the appellee and the bona fides of the
appellant”); Marcaida, 569 F.2d at 830 (excusing an appellant’s late-filed brief where “appellee [could]
point to no prejudice flowing to him”). But this prejudice seems entitled to little weight. Post-Beverly
Manufacturing, the Eleventh Circuit seems never to have used the lack of prejudice to an appellee to
excuse an appellant’s bad-faith or negligent late filing. See In re Smart Baking Co., LLC, 2025 WL
1157151, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025) (affirming dismissal for negligence with no discussion of
prejudice); In re Myers, 2024 WL 5252472, at *5 (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2024) (same); In re Uribe, 2023 WL
5950131, at *3–4 (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2023) (same); In re Zadeh, 772 F. App’x 837, 838 (11th Cir. 2019)
(same); In re Worrell, 763 F. App’x 905, 906 (11th Cir. 2019) (same); Thakkar v. Noble, 760 F. App’x
724, 725 (11th Cir. 2019) (same even where the appellant expressly argued that there was “no
indication of prejudice to the [appellee]”); Lawrence v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 522 F. App’x 836, 840
(11th Cir. 2013) (same); In re Brewer, 442 F. App’x 430, 435 (11th Cir. 2011) (same). Prejudice only
seems to come up when the district court fails to apply the Beverly Manufacturing test at all. See In re
Mohorne, 718 F. App’x 934, 935 (11th Cir. 2018) (vacating dismissal because there was “nothing in the
record that indicates bad faith, negligence, or indifference on [the appellant’s] part”); In re Tucker, 665
F. App’x 841, 845 (11th Cir. 2016) (vacating dismissal where “[t]he court did not expressly find that
any of the[ ] [Beverly Manufacturing] grounds had been shown,” but noting that the court did not
“otherwise evaluate . . . the prejudice to [the appellee]”).
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With all this in mind, we’ll analyze the Motion under both the Fox “test” 4 and the
Pyramid/Beverly Manufacturing test. We don’t take it as a given that the latter test applies when the
bankruptcy court dismisses a case under Local Rule 87.4(c)—especially since the Eleventh Circuit
didn’t apply that test in Fox, which seems to have been the only occasion on which it reviewed such a
dismissal. Even so, we hesitate to conclude that our local rules effectively give us more discretion to
dismiss bankruptcy appeals than the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. So, first, we’ll check the
docket to confirm that the appeal was indeed deficient when the bankruptcy court dismissed it; second,
we’ll evaluate whether the appellant’s failure to prosecute the appeal was the consequence of bad faith,
negligence, or indifference, looking to his explanation for his lack of diligence.5
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed the appeal.
a. 	Background
On June 13, 2025, the pro se Appellant appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s June 4, 2025, Order
Denying Motions for Reconsideration [Bankr. D.E. 1672]. See Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 1]. He
didn’t pay the filing fee, designate items for the record, or file a statement of the issues. See generally
Docket; see generally Bankr. Docket. As a courtesy, the Bankruptcy Court notified the Appellant of the
filing-fee deficiency on June 13, 2025, reminding him that he was required to pay the filing fee by June
27, 2025. See Notice of Deficiency [Bankr. D.E. 1676]. That date was fourteen days from the effective
date of the Appellant’s appeal. But June 27, 2025, came and went with no response from the Appellant;
4 We realize that Fox isn’t binding on us and didn’t announce a test, but we think it’s persuasive because
it involved very similar facts.
5 Some other courts in our district have treated motions to reopen an appeal after a Local Rule 87.4(c)
dismissal as Rule 60(b) motions for reconsideration. See, e.g., First Consultant Servs., Inc. v. Tabas, 2021
WL 327473, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2021) (Scola, J.); Sporea v. Regions Bank N.A., 2020 WL 820269, at
*1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2020) (Bloom, J.). We’re not sure that’s the best approach. A motion for
reconsideration asks the deciding court to revisit its own judgment—and insofar as we delegated the
dismissal to the bankruptcy court, we didn’t decide anything ourselves.
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he neither paid the filing fee nor designated a record nor filed a statement of the issues. See generally
Docket. So, as “authorized and directed” by Local Rule 87.4(c) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 8009-1,
the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the appeal. See Order Dismissing Appeal [ECF No. 7].
Seven days later, the Appellant moved us to reinstate the appeal. Here’s what he says in
support:
2. 	The Court issued its notice that the Appellant could participate in
electronic notifications based on the delivery of the electronic
consent to service which was delivered to the Court but never
seemingly filed on the docket.
[ . . . ]
4. 	The Appellant did not receive the required notices to put him on
notice that the cases had been issued in three different matters
before three different district court judges. The NEF does not
appear on any of the dockets of the three cases.
5. 	Further, the Court did not issue any deficiency notices which
placed the Appellant on the requirements that were necessary.
6. 	The lack of the notice of non-compliance, which the Appellant has
complied with as of this filing, was due to a lack of notice to the
Appellant who did not receive the electronic notifications required
to comport with due process. Further, the Appellant is located
outside the United States and the local rules of this Court do not
allow for electronic filings by pro se parties which places the
Appellant at a disadvantage of timeliness.
7. 	Equity also arises here as there is a well-documented history of the
Appellant’s medical history [sic] which he was not able to review
the dockets of the matters timely to address deficiencies in the
cases.
Mot. ¶¶ 4–7. Charitably construed, we think the Appellant is making three arguments for his request
that we excuse his failure to timely correct the deficiencies that caused the dismissal of his appeal.
First, he’s saying that he didn’t know about the deficiencies because we didn’t tell him about them
before the Bankruptcy Court dismissed his appeal. See id. ¶ 5. Second, (we think) he’s saying that, even
if he’d known about the deficiencies, he didn’t know that he could have filed the necessary documents
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because he never received electronic notice that the case had been opened. See id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6. Third, he
seems to be claiming that, even if he’d known about the deficiencies and had received electronic notice
of the case, his “medical history” would have (or perhaps in fact) disabled him from timely filing the
necessary documents. Also, he now seems to have paid the filing fee in the Bankruptcy Court and has
filed a statement of the issues. See Statement of Issues [ECF No. 8]. But he’s still never designated a
record. See generally Docket.
b. 	Analysis
The Motion should be denied. As a preliminary matter, even if we accepted any of the
Appellant’s arguments—and we accept none of them, as we’ll explain shortly—he still hasn’t designated
a record or asked for permission to do so, so there remains no basis for us to reinstate this appeal.
Setting that aside, the Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed the appeal under both the Fox test and the
Pyramid/Beverly Manufacturing test. First, the docket clearly shows that the Appellant didn’t timely pay
the filing fee, submit a statement of the issues, or designate a record—all violations of Local Rule
87.4(c). Second, none of the Appellant’s stated reasons for failing to prosecute his appeal establish the
absence of bad faith, negligence, or indifference. His excuses aren’t credible and wouldn’t entitle him
to relief even if they were.
i. 	Dismissal Was Appropriate Under Local Rule 87.4(c).
The docket makes plain that the Bankruptcy Court properly applied Local Rule 87.4(c). The
Appellant had fourteen days from the date on which he filed his notice of appeal to file a statement
of the issues and designate a record. See F ED . R. BANKR . P. 8009(a)(1)(B). He filed his notice of appeal
on June 13, 2025; fourteen days later was June 27, 2025. But, after filing his notice of appeal, the
Appellant took no further action. He neither paid the filing fee, nor designated the record, nor filed a
statement of the issues, and June 27, 2025, came and went. These deficiencies all existed at the time
of the dismissal, so the Bankruptcy Court was “authorized and directed” by Local Rule 87.4(c) and
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Local Bankruptcy Rule 8009-1 to dismiss the appeal. See In re Fox, 2025 WL 1924219, at *3 (finding
that the bankruptcy court “did not err” in dismissing the appeal under Local Rule 87.4(c) where “more
than fourteen days passed” and the appellant “did not file a designation of the record items” or “a
statement of the issues,” as required).
ii. 	The Appellant has not shown a lack of bad faith, negligence, or indifference.
Recall the Appellant’s three excuses for failing to perfect his appeal: (1) he wasn’t told about
any deficiencies before the Bankruptcy Court dismissed his appeal; (2) he never got notice that the
case was active because he lives abroad, so he didn’t know he could file anything; and (3) some
unspecified medical issues prevented him from filing the required documents on time. See Mot. ¶¶ 4–7.
Liberally construing the Motion, we take the Appellant to be arguing that he never acted negligently,
indifferently, or in bad faith. See Oliver v. Ameris Bank, 2023 WL 6159997, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 21,
2023) (“We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants.” (citing Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008))); Raghubir v. Parrish, 2022 WL 17826349, at *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022)
(“We liberally construe pro se filings.” (citation omitted)). Even so, we find each of the Appellant’s
explanations completely unavailing and conclude that the record indeed demonstrates at least
negligence and indifference.
The Deficiency Notices. As for his first argument, the efficacy of the Federal and Local Rules
doesn’t depend on advance notice, even for pro se litigants. “Despite [the] construction leniency
afforded pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Loren v.
Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)
(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so
as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”). In particular, “pro se litigants are held
to filing deadlines.” Fitzpatrick v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 580 F. App’x 690, 694 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing
Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2001)). The Appellant was required both to
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timely pay the filing fee, see F ED . R. BANKR . P. 8003(a)(3)(C), and to timely file a designation of record
and a statement of the issues, see F ED . R. BANKR . P. 8009(a)(1)(B). Moreover, inasmuch as dismissal
generally isn’t an abuse of discretion “where the litigant has been forewarned,” Moon v. Newsome, 863
F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989), each corresponding local rule clearly states that the penalty for untimely
compliance is dismissal, see S.D. F LA . L OCAL BANKR . R. 8003-1 (“If the prescribed fee does not
accompany the notice of appeal, . . . the appeal shall be dismissed by this court as authorized by District
Court Local Rule 87.4(c).” (emphasis added)); S.D. Fla. Local Bankr. R. 8009-1(A) (“If the appellant
fails to timely file a designation of record or statement of the issues as required by Bankruptcy Rule
8009, this court shall dismiss the appeal as authorized by District Court Local Rule 87.4(c).” (emphasis
added)).6
On this record, in fact, it’s rather difficult for us to conclude that the Appellant’s failure to
timely comply doesn’t evince at least negligence or indifference. We have absolutely no reason to think
that deficiency notices would have made any difference at all. The text of the Rules, with their spelled-
out penalties for noncompliance, doesn’t seem to have mattered to the Appellant. Nor, indeed, did
the clear text of the dismissal order itself. That order indicates that the bankruptcy court dismissed the
appeal because the Appellant had, in part, “failed to timely file the designation of the items for the
6 For several reasons, this case is distinguishable from Tucker, in which the Eleventh Circuit vacated
and remanded the district court’s dismissal of a bankruptcy appeal partly because the district court
“did not provide clear notice that the court would dismiss [the appellant’s] appeal if she failed to file
her brief by the original deadline.” In re Tucker, 665 F. App’x at 845. First, there aren’t any Local Rules
or Local Bankruptcy Rules prescribing dismissal as a penalty for failing to timely file a brief. Although
(as we’ve said) we don’t think the Rules necessarily affect how we assess whether dismissal was
appropriate, we think it’s significant that the Rules do forewarn litigants that their failure to timely state
the issues or designate the record will result in dismissal. Moreover, in Tucker, the pro se appellant timely
moved to extend her time to file her brief (albeit on the day her brief was due); a few days later, the
district court denied the motion without explanation and sua sponte dismissed her appeal for failure to
prosecute. Id. at 843. The Eleventh Circuit seems to have concluded that the pro se appellant might not
have understood how to comply with a deadline that had already passed by the time the district court
ruled on her extension motion—let alone that dismissal was among the penalties she faced.
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record.” Order Dismissing Appeal at 2. Even though the Appellant claims he “acted with extreme
diligence in rectifying [his errors] and complying with the local rules to . . . correct the deficiencies
here,” Mot. ¶ 9, he still never designated a record—and he hasn’t to this day, see generally Docket. He
even exacerbated his noncompliance by filing five motions without observing the Local Rule 7.1(a)(2)
conference requirement. See Mot.; Motion for Direct Certification [ECF No. 10]; Motion to Consider
Preliminary Issue [ECF No. 11]; Motion to Expand Page Limit [ECF No. 12]; Motion to Consolidate
Appeals [ECF No. 14]; see also S.D. F LA. L.R. 87.4(d) (“Local Rules 5.1 and 7.1 shall apply to motions
for stay and other motions seeking intermediate appellate relief from the District Court.”). And we’re
allowed to take his behavior as further proof of negligence and indifference. In re Smart Baking Co.,
LLC, 2025 WL 1157151, at *2 (holding that the appellant’s rules violations on top of the late filing of
his brief “justified the district court’s conclusion that [the appellant] had shown negligence, and even
indifference, to compliance with its obligations related to this appeal” (cleaned up)).7
Notice of the Appeal. The Appellant’s second argument also cuts against him. Even if he had
designated a record, his excuse that he “did not receive the required notices,” Mot. ¶ 7, strikes us as
frivolous. As a threshold matter, we don’t see (and the Appellant doesn’t explain) why he needed notices
of his appeal to comply with his other obligations under the Rules. Remember, the Appellant initiated
this appeal; he can’t possibly have been taken by surprise. In any event, our Local Rules again reveal
the flaws in his arguments. “[A]ny party appearing pro se shall maintain current contact information
7 Local Bankruptcy Rule 8003-1 contemplates that the bankruptcy court “shall” dismiss a bankruptcy
appeal “if the prescribed fee does not accompany the notice of appeal”—but “after service . . . of a
fee due notice[.]” S.D. FLA. L OCAL B ANKR . R. 8003-1. Here, as we mentioned, the Bankruptcy Court
issued a fee-due notice, see Notice of Deficiency [Bankr. D.E. 1676] at 1, but the mailing certificate for
that notice suggests that it was sent to one of the Appellant’s alternative addresses rather than his
Coconut Grove address, see Certificate of Notice [Bankr. D.E. 1681] at 1 (indicating that “[n]otice by
first class mail was sent” to the Appellant at “851 NW 1 Ave, Miami, FL 33131,” with no mention of
the Coconut Grove address). Of course, even if the Appellant didn’t receive the fee-due notice, that
wouldn’t affect the validity of his dismissal for failure to state the issues or designate a record because
the corresponding Local and Bankruptcy Rules don’t require notice of any kind.”
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with the Clerk of Court,” and “[a] party appearing pro se shall conventionally file a Notice of Current
Address with updated contact information within seven (7) days of a change.” S.D. F LA . L.R. 11.1(g).
Importantly, “[t]he failure to comply shall not constitute grounds for relief from deadlines imposed
by Rule or by the Court,” and “all Court Orders and Notices will be deemed to be appropriately served
if directed either electronically or by conventional mail consistent with the information on file with
the Clerk of Court.” Ibid.
We’re quite certain the Appellant received conventional notice of this appeal. All his papers in
this appeal state his address as 3701 DeGarmo Lane, Coconut Grove, FL 33133. That’s the same
address the Clerk of Court had on file for him. And the filing receipts, which state the docket number
for the appeal, confirm that the filings in this appeal went to that address. See Filing Receipt for [ECF
No. 3] Clerk’s Notice of Judge Assignment [ECF No. 18-1] (showing that the document was mailed
to “Raziel Ofer, 3701 DeGarmo Lane, Coconut Grove, FL 33133”); Filing Receipt for [ECF No. 4]
Clerk’s Notice re Local Rule 87.4 [ECF No. 18-2] (same); Filing Receipt for [ECF No. 5] First
Amended Transmittal of Bankruptcy Appeal [ECF No. 18-3] (same); Filing Receipt for [ECF No. 6]
Second Amended Transmittal of Bankruptcy Appeal [ECF No. 18-4] (same); see also Certificate of
Mailing of Notice of Appeal [Bankr. D.E. 1680] at 1, 4 (same).
We can discern two more unavailing address-based excuses from the Motion. The Appellant
says he didn’t receive the “electronic notifications required to comport with due process” and also
offers that he’s “located outside the United States” and is therefore “at a disadvantage of timeliness”
because pro se parties can’t file electronically. Mot. ¶ 6. But the docket doesn’t reflect that he ever filed
a notice of consent to receive notices of electronic filing—either at the time he filed his appeal, at the
time he filed the Motion, or as of this writing. And to the extent he’s outside the United States, he’s
never given us an international address or proposed an alternative domestic address to avoid further
issues. That doesn’t suggest diligence. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Kelley, 2020 WL 4960592, at *2 (M.D. Ga.
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Aug. 24, 2020) (dismissing bankruptcy appeal where “[the appellant] claimed that he did not receive
any of the bankruptcy court’s notices,” but “[n]evertheless . . . never communicated with the Court
regarding [his] extenuating circumstances, [ ]or . . . request that the Court extend the deadlines for
filing”).
Much as we had no doubt that deficiency notices wouldn’t have altered the Appellant’s
indifference, we have no doubt that he in fact received notice of his appeal. And, much as before, his
excuses cast even greater doubt on his motives. If there is a problem with the Appellant’s current
mailing address—the same address he listed on all his papers—he’s violated Local Rule 11.1(g) by
failing to update it. And if, as he seems to suggest, he delivered a consent to receive notices of
electronic filings that was “seemingly never filed on the docket,” Mot. ¶ 2, he’s evinced his negligence
and indifference by failing to correct that problem. Taking him at his word, he’s displayed (and
continues to display) far worse than “a slight lack of diligence.” In re Tucker, 665 F. App’x at 844.
Rather, he’s “made no effort to comply with” our Rules. Pyramid Mobile Homes, 531 F.2d at 746.
Dismissal for negligence or indifference may be appropriate when “[the] appellant’s . . . failure to
receive notice in [itself] demonstrate[s] a failure to prosecute.” See In re Beverly, 778 F.2d at 667
(emphasis added & cleaned up)). And, of course, if he’s not being truthful, that’d tend to show bad
faith.
The “Medical” Issues. As for his third argument, the Appellant isn’t entitled to relief based
on 	his 	supposed 	“well-documented” 	medical 	history. 	The 	Appellant 	himself 	says 	that 	his
noncompliance “was due to a lack of notice.” Mot. ¶ 6. What he seems to be saying about his medical
history, then, is that even if he’d known that he had to pay the filing fee, state the issues, and designate a
record, he wouldn’t have been healthy enough to do all that on time. But the Motion is conspicuously
silent about how and why his medical issues would have prevented him (or maybe did prevent him)
from timely complying with procedural rules. See LaFavors v. Thayer, 706 F. App’x 489, 492 (11th Cir.
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2017) (“If a pro se party believes he cannot fulfill a court order, . . . he must timely, directly, and
particularly explain his inability to comply.” (citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 838 n.5 (11th Cir.
1989) (emphasis added))). The Appellant gives us no supporting declaration, no medical records, no
doctor’s note—nothing. Nor does the Motion explain why the Appellant supposedly was (or would
have been) too unhealthy to comply with the largely ministerial duties of paying his filing fee, stating
the issues, and designating a record when at the same time he was evidently drafting a seventy-four-page
brief, see Appellant’s Brief [ECF No. 13] and five motions.8 See, e.g., Johnsen v. Kirtz, 2019 WL 7899729,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2019) (Bloom, J.) (“[W]hile the Court is sympathetic to Kirtz’s medical
condition, he has not indicated how this condition prevented him from complying with Court orders.
Indeed, despite his medical condition, Kirtz filed numerous documents in this case, including two
motions to dismiss, a motion to strike, [ ] and two appeals.”).
This argument just isn’t enough. Our cases make plain that a pro se litigant must do more than
gesture at medical issues without supporting evidence to explain why he couldn’t comply with a rule
or court order. See Williams v. Bank of Am. Corp., 824 F. App’x 790, 795 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming
sanctions against a pro se litigant for disregarding court orders where the district court “found
‘particularly troubling’” the fact that the pro se litigant claimed “for the first time” in his objections to
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation “that the reason he [failed to comply] was because
he was ‘disabled’ and ‘too sick to appear’” and yet “failed to attach any corroborating evidence”);
United States v. Theochem Lab’ys, Inc., 2007 WL 9747238, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2007) (Mickle, J.)
8 The Appellant (it’s true) explained his apparent medical issues a bit more in his Motion to
Consolidate Appeals [ECF No. 14]. See id. ¶ 11 (“The Appellant is currently undergoing almost daily
hospital visits with regard to a very serious infection which does inhibit him sometimes for days at a
time. This is not helped by the medicine regiment which he takes which does leave him incoherent at
times.”). Not only did he fail to mention any of this in his Motion to Reinstate, but, as we’ve said, he
hasn’t supplied anything—not even an affidavit—to substantiate these claims. Moreover, if it’s true
that the Appellant is as ill as he claims, we’re hard-pressed to understand why he waited until after his
case was dismissed to say anything about it.
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(“Illness of a litigant or counsel can be a valid reason for failing to meet court deadlines. However, in
many cases, a defendant must do more than merely allege the illness; some courts have required
medical documentation or affidavits detailing the extent of the illness and its effect on the individual’s
ability to comply with court orders.” (listing cases)); Santry v. Hicks, 2022 WL 21713996, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 30, 2022) (“[The plaintiff] contends his health issues make ‘it near impossible to answer let
alone research as a [pro se] litigant.’ [ ] Plaintiff has not presented any evidence, such as medical records
or a physician’s statement, to corroborate his assertion that his health issues have rendered him
incapable of filing a response.”).
In short, the Appellant hasn’t shown that his medical issues excuse, or even mitigate, his
negligence in pursuing this bankruptcy appeal. Cf. In re Fox, 2025 WL 1924219, at *3 (finding no clear
error where the district court, in denying a motion to reconsider its affirmance of a bankruptcy court’s
dismissal order, “did not credit [the appellant]’s allegation as factual” where he had claimed “that he
did file the required documents, but that the bankruptcy court clerk ripped them up” and “offered no
evidence of its occurrence” (emphasis added)).
* 	* 	*
Between the record before us and the Appellant’s shoddy excuses, we easily conclude that he
was negligent and indifferent towards his obligations under the Rules. To the extent there’s a scrap of
truth to any of what he says in the Motion, it makes his negligence and indifference more egregious,
not less. He failed to pay the filing fee, state the issues, or designate a record. Even after he was told
exactly what he did wrong, he failed to correct his errors. In fact, he compounded them by violating
even more of the Rules. He claims not to have received notice of the appeal, but he did. He claims
that he consented to receive notices of electronic filing, but he didn’t and still hasn’t. He claims to
have been ill (perhaps in the alternative), with no proof. And, although we think the appellees would
not be unduly prejudiced if we permitted this appeal to proceed—which the Appellant doesn’t even
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mention—he’s given us absolutely no reason to excuse his extensive negligence and indifference. This
appeal was correctly dismissed.9
* 	* 	*
We therefore ORDER AND ADJUDGE as follows:
1. 	The Motion to Reinstate Appeal [ECF No. 9] is DENIED.
2. 	All other motions on this docket are DENIED as moot.
3. 	This appeal shall remain CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on November 10, 2025.
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
9 Although we needn’t look beyond the record before us to find (at least) negligence and indifference,
the Appellant has extensively violated rules and court orders elsewhere in our District. See, e.g.,
Paperless Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal, DRO 15R, LLC, v. Ajar Holdings, LLC, No. 22-
CV-23964-DPG (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2023), ECF No. 16 (dismissing appeal where the Appellant failed
to timely file his initial brief in violation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8018 and failed to
hire new counsel “nearly two [ ] months past” the deadline set by the bankruptcy court); Paperless
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Ofer v. Ajar Holdings, LLC, No. 22-CV-24104-DPG (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 4, 2023), ECF No. 18 (dismissing appeal where the Appellant failed to timely file his initial
brief in violation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8018 and “did not timely seek leave of the
Court for an extension of time”). His violations in those other cases suggest that his conduct here is
not merely negligence, but in bad faith. See Thakkar v. Noble, 760 F. App’x 724, 728 (11th Cir. 2019)
(affirming the district court’s finding of the appellant’s “dilatory and uncooperative conduct” where
the district court noted in part that he “had failed to comply with Rule 8018(a)(1) in three prior
bankruptcies”).
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