Cubanos Pa'lante et al v. Florida House of Representatives et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 24-cv-21983-JB
CUBANOS PA’LANTE, ez al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. THREE-JUDGE COURT

FLORIDA HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.,

Defendants.

Before GRANT, Circuit Judge, and RUIZ and BECERRA, District Judges.
BECERRA, District Judge:

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Florida House of
Representatives’ Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. [122]. Plaintiffs filed a
Response in Opposition to the Motion, and the House filed a Reply. ECF Nos. [127],
[131]. The parties also filed Statements of Material Facts in support of their
respective memoranda. ECF Nos. [123], [126], [130]. On October 29, 2025, the Court
heard oral argument on the Motion. ECF No. [148].

Upon due consideration of the parties’ written submissions, argument of
counsel, pertinent portions of the record, and the relevant authorities, for the reasons

explained below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to State House

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Districts 112, 113, 114 and 116, and DENIED as to State House Districts 115, 118
and 119, and Congressional District 26.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This action challenges seven State House Districts—112, 113, 114, 115, 116,
118 and 119—and Congressional District 26 (collectively, the “Challenged Districts”),
as 	racially 	gerrymandered in 	violation of 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment’s 	Equal
Protection Clause.1 	See generally ECF No. [58]. 	Plaintiffs allege that the Florida
Legislature subordinated traditional redistricting criteria to race when drawing the
Challenged Districts and did not narrowly tailor district lines to advance a compelling
governmental interest. 	Id. 	As relevant here, Plaintiffs set forth the statements of
key legislators and their staff to demonstrate that race was the predominant factor
in the design of the Challenged Districts, and claim that the Challenged Districts
deviate from race-neutral criteria in that district lines created noncompact shapes,
cross major geographic boundaries, and unnecessarily split municipalities. Id. at ¶¶
50–190.
The House now argues that Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because
there is no evidence that racial considerations predominated in the drawing of district
lines in any of the Challenged Districts. See generally ECF No. [122]. In particular,
the House contends that each of the Challenged Districts adheres to traditional race-
neutral districting principles, such as following existing political and geographic
1 Initially, this action also challenged Congressional Districts 27 and 28. 	ECF No.
[58]. However, in its Order on Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. [88], the Court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ claims based on those districts.
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boundaries, keeping municipalities whole, and avoiding bizarre shapes. Id. at 10–15,
18. 	The House further asserts that even where the Legislature adjusted district
boundaries or chose between alternative configurations, the decision was “made in
unison” with traditional race-neutral districting principles or was rooted in race-
neutral considerations. Id. at 13, 15, 16–19. The House also contends that testimony
of the chief map drawer shows that “race was either a non-factor or a secondary
consideration in shaping the challenged districts.” Id. at 7.
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion, arguing that they have offered sufficient direct
and circumstantial evidence for a rational factfinder to conclude that race was the
Legislature’s predominant motive in drawing the Challenged Districts. See generally
ECF No. [127]. 	Specifically, Plaintiffs point to various statements made by key
legislators and the chief map drawer regarding the role that race played in the
decisionmaking process. 	Id. at 6–16. 	Plaintiffs also rely on the “low compactness”
scores of the Challenged Districts in support of their position that the district lines
do not comport with race-neutral principles. 	Id. at 16. 	Finally, Plaintiffs set forth
expert evidence, in the form of both alternative maps for the Challenged Districts as
well as statistical analyses, that support their contention that race predominated
over race-neutral criteria. Id. at 17–19.
In short, the House’s Motion for Summary Judgment presents the Court with
a single issue: is there sufficient record evidence to create a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether race predominated in the design of each of the Challenged
Districts? As explained below, the answer is yes as to House Districts 115, 118 and
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119, and Congressional District 26, and no as to House Districts 112, 113, 114 and
116.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one with “a real basis in the record,”
such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Mann
v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hairston v.
Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether a genuine issue exists for
trial, the court must “view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party.” In re Delco Oil, Inc., 599 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010).
When making this determination, “the district court may not weigh the evidence or
find facts . . . [n]or may the court make credibility determinations of its own.” 	Ga.
State Conf. of the NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
As to issues on which the nonmoving party would bear the burden of proof at
trial, it is sufficient for the movant to highlight a failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmovant’s case. 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986). Once the movant carries its burden, the nonmovant must offer specific
evidence showing a genuine issue for trial. 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 	“If reasonable minds could differ on the
inferences 	arising 	from 	undisputed 	facts, 	then 	a 	court 	should 	deny 	summary
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judgment.” 	Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 	But if the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue for trial, and
summary judgment is proper. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
III. 	ANALYSIS
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits racial
gerrymanders in legislative districting plans.” 	Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 291
(2017). A racial gerrymandering claim like the one here entails a two-step analysis.
Id. 	First, the challenger must establish that “race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district.” 	Id. (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1995)); see also Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 7 (2024)
(same); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 187 (2017) (same);
Nord Hodges v. Albritton, 774 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2025) (same). If the
challenger meets his burden, “then the burden shifts to the State to prove that the
map can overcome the daunting requirements of strict scrutiny.” Alexander, 602 U.S.
at 11.
As to the first step of the analysis, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that “[r]acial considerations predominate when ‘race was the criterion
that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised’ in the drawing of district lines.”
Id. at 7 (alteration adopted) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996)); see
also Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 189 (same). 	A plaintiff satisfies its burden to show
racial predominance by proving “that the legislature subordinated traditional race-
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neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity,
and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations.” 	Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; see also Alexander, 602
U.S. at 7 (explaining that to successfully establish racial predominance, “a plaintiff
must prove that the State subordinated race-neutral districting criteria such as
compactness, contiguity, and core preservation to racial considerations” (quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
The plaintiff can meet its burden at this first step through “some combination
of direct and circumstantial evidence.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 8; see also Miller, 515
U.S. at 916 (“The plaintiff's burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence
of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.”);
Cooper, 581 U.S. at 291 (“The plaintiff may make the required showing through direct
evidence of legislative intent, circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and
demographics, or a mix of both.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 	“Direct
evidence often comes in the form of a relevant state actor’s express acknowledgment
that race played a role in the drawing of district lines.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 8. In
those 	cases, 	the 	court 	assesses 	“relevant, 	contemporaneous 	statements 	of 	key
legislators” 	to 	“determin[e] 	whether 	racial 	considerations 	predominated 	in 	the
redistricting process[].” 	Jacksonville Branch of the NAACP v. City of Jacksonville,
No. 22-13544, 2022 WL 16754389, at *4 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2022) (citation omitted).
In 	evaluating 	such 	evidence, 	the 	court 	must 	be 	mindful 	that 	“[r]edistricting
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legislatures will . . . almost always be aware of racial demographics[,] but it does not
follow that race predominates in the redistricting process.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
Circumstantial 	evidence 	of 	race-based 	redistricting 	typically 	includes 	a
district’s lack of “conformity to traditional districting principles, such as compactness
and respect for county lines.” 	Cooper, 581 U.S. at 308. 	It also includes a district’s
unusual or “bizarre” shape, which “may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that
race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature’s
dominant and controlling rationale.” 	Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 188 (quoting Miller,
515 U.S. at 913). 	In addition, a plaintiff can submit alternative redistricting maps
that reflect “greater racial balance.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 34–35 (citations omitted).
These maps, “driven only by [the State’s] professed mapmaking criteria,” can
“undermine[] the legislature’s defense that the districting lines were based on a
permissible, rather than a prohibited, ground.” 	Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). 	Importantly, “a conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and
traditional redistricting criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory
precondition in order for a challenger to establish a claim of racial gerrymandering.”
Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 190. Even where a map respects traditional, race-neutral
districting criteria, “if race for its own sake is the overriding reason for choosing one
map over others” or if “race-neutral considerations came into play only after the race-
based decision had been made,” then “race still may predominate.” 	Id. at 189–190
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shaw, 517 U.S. at 907).
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In Florida, the drawing of district lines must also comport with the Fair
Districts Amendments as set forth in Article III of the Florida Constitution.2 	The
Fair Districts 	Amendments 	“consist[] 	of 	two 	tiers, 	each with 	its 	own distinct
standards.” 	In re Senate Joint Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 100 (In re SJR 100),
334 So. 3d 1282, 1286 (Fla. 2022) (citation omitted). 	Tier one “protects racial and
language minority voters,” and states that “districts shall not be drawn with the
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language
minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect
representatives of their choice.” 	Id. at 1286; Fla. Const. art. III, §§ 20(a), 21(a).
“Practically, that non-diminishment provision instructs the State to consider racial
minorities’ ability to elect their candidate of choice—even in districts where the racial
minority group does not comprise a majority of the population.” Nord Hodges, 774 F.
Supp. 3d at 1344–45; see also In re SJR 100, 334 So. 3d at 1289 (“The non-
diminishment 	protection 	afforded 	by 	article 	III, 	section 	21(a) 	means 	that 	the
Legislature cannot eliminate majority-minority districts or weaken other historically
performing minority districts where doing so would actually diminish a minority
group’s ability to elect its preferred candidates.” (quotation marks and citation
omitted)). 	To ensure that a district is likely to perform for minority candidates of
choice, the Legislature must conduct a “functional analysis of voting behavior within
the districts at issue.” In re SJR 100, 334 So. 3d at 1289 (quotation marks omitted).
2 	Article 	III, 	section 	20 	sets 	forth 	the 	standards 	applicable 	to 	establishing
congressional district boundaries, and section 21 sets forth the standards applicable
to establishing legislative district boundaries. Fla. Const. art. III, §§ 20, 21.
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The functional analysis “requir[es] consideration . . . of the minority population in the
districts, . . . the minority voting-age population in those districts, . . . political data
and how a minority population group has voted in the past.” In re Senate Joint Resol.
of Legis. Apportionment 1176 (In re SJR 1176), 83 So. 3d 597, 625 (Fla. 2012).
Tier two sets forth race-neutral criteria that “address legislative districts’
population, shape, and boundaries.” 	In re SJR 100, 334 So. 3d at 1286. It requires
that districts shall “be as nearly equal in population as is practicable; districts shall
be 	compact; 	and 	districts 	shall, 	where 	feasible, 	utilize 	existing 	political 	and
geographical boundaries.” Fla. Const. art. III, §§ 20(b), 21(b). Compactness refers to
the “shape of a district,” which courts assess by conducting a “visual examination”
and using “quantitative geometric measures of compactness.” In re SJR 1176, 83 So.
3d at 634–35. “Compact districts should not have an unusual shape, a bizarre design,
or an unnecessary appendage unless it is necessary to comply with some other
requirement.” Id. at 634. Political boundaries “primarily encompass[] municipal or
county 	boundaries,” 	and 	geographic 	boundaries 	are 	those 	that 	are 	“easily
ascertainable and commonly understood, such as ‘rivers, railways, interstates, and
state roads.’” Id. at 637–638. 	In the event of a conflict between the requirements of
tier one and tier two, “[t]he tier-one standards take precedence over those in tier two.”
In re SJR 100, 334 So. 3d at 1286; Fla. Const. art. III, §§ 20(b), 21(b).
Several principles should be considered in deciding a racial gerrymandering
claim. To start, racial gerrymandering claims are evaluated on a “district-by-district”
basis, rather than against “a State considered as an undifferentiated ‘whole.’” 	Ala.
Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 262 (2015); see also Bethune-Hill, 580
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U.S. at 191 (“[T]he basic unit of analysis for racial gerrymandering claims in general,
and for the racial predominance inquiry in particular, is the district.”). 	And in
evaluating such a claim, a court “should not divorce any portion of the lines—
whatever their relationship to traditional principles—from the rest of the district”
and “may consider evidence regarding certain portions of a district’s lines, including
portions that conflict with traditional redistricting principles.” 	Bethune-Hill, 580
U.S. at 191–2. 	This is because “a legislature’s race-based decisionmaking may be
evident in a notable way in a particular part of a district.” 	Id. at 192. 	Further, a
challenger “can present statewide evidence in order to prove racial gerrymandering
in a particular district” given that “a legislature may pursue a common redistricting
policy toward multiple districts.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the
end, courts undertake a “holistic analysis” to determine whether race was “the
legislature’s predominant motive for the design of the district as a whole.” Id.
We also note that in considering racial gerrymandering claims, courts “start
with a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith” because courts must
“exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district
lines on the basis of race” given the “intrusive potential of judicial intervention into
the legislative realm.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 6; Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
A. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Exist as to Whether Race
Predominated in the Drawing of House Districts 115, 118 and
119, and Congressional District 26.
The House argues that Plaintiffs lack sufficient evidence that “race was
privileged above other neutral redistricting factors” when designing House Districts
115, 118 and 119, and Congressional District 26. 	ECF No. [122] at 15 (citation
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omitted). 	The 	Court 	does 	not 	agree. 	Plaintiffs 	offer 	sufficient 	direct 	and
circumstantial evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that race played a
predominant role in the drawing of these Districts. The Court begins with the direct
evidence that Plaintiffs rely upon for each of these Challenged Districts, and then
turns to the circumstantial evidence offered.
District 115: 	With respect to House District 115, Plaintiffs point to several
statements from key individuals to support their claims. For example, the chief map
drawer, Jason Poreda, agreed that “ensuring Tier 1 compliance is the reason why
[House District] 115 extended as far north as it does” and is also “the reason why the
border between [House Districts] 115 and 116 is where it is.” 	ECF No. [123-3] at
169:22–170:3.3 Further, when asked by a state legislator “[w]hy wouldn’t . . . [House]
District 115 lose its northern appendage . . . and be more compact,” then-Chair of the
State Legislative Redistricting Subcommittee, Representative Cord Byrd, explained
that it was “[b]ecause that’s a Tier One standard that we applied.” ECF No. [126-8]
at 53:5–13.
Plaintiffs 	supplement 	this 	direct 	evidence 	with 	circumstantial 	evidence,
arguing that House District 115 is not visually or mathematically compact. 	In
particular, Plaintiffs rely upon the northern extension of House District 115, which
they contend is “an irregular appendage.” ECF No. [127] at 14. Plaintiffs also point
to evidence that House District 115 forms an unusual “long and skinny” shape
because it “runs over 15.5 miles north-south but is only 1.8 miles at its narrowest
3 Deposition page numbers used herein refer to the page number reflected in the
CM/ECF heading.
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point.” Id. at 16 n.9, 17; see also ECF No. [123-1] at 5 (Map 3). Plaintiffs further rely
upon the low compactness scores of House District 115, which Plaintiffs assert is an
“outlier[] compared to the rest of the map.” 	ECF No. [127] at 16; see also ECF No.
[130-3] at 3 (compactness scores).
At this stage, Plaintiffs have presented enough evidence to raise a genuine
dispute as to whether race predominated over other considerations in the drawing of
House District 115. 	Indeed, the House readily admits that it altered the northern
boundary of House District 115 after the Legislature performed a functional analysis
because “the district did not sufficiently protect the ability of Hispanic voters to elect
their preferred candidates.” ECF No. [122] at 12. Although the House contends that
this extension was “slight” and thus, race did not have “a direct and significant impact
on District 115’s configuration,” ECF No. [131] at 11 (quotation marks omitted),
Plaintiffs disagree that House District 115 extends only “slightly” to the north, ECF
No. [126] at ¶ 62. 	Moreover, although the House discounts Plaintiffs’ evidence
because it does not explain the design of House District 115 as a whole, ECF No. [131]
at 10–11, “a legislature’s race-based decisionmaking may be evident in a notable way
in a particular part of a district.” Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 192.
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether race
predominated in the drawing of House District 115. 	In addition, the parties’
disagreement as to why the district line was modified is clearly a genuine issue of
material fact that must be decided at trial because the Court cannot resolve factual
disputes at summary judgment. 	See Fernandez v. Bankers Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 906
F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A trial court must not decide any factual issues it
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finds in the records; if factual issues are present, the court must deny the motion and
proceed to trial.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Districts 118 and 119:4 	With respect to House Districts 118 and 119, Plaintiffs
contend that statements of the chief map drawer give rise to an inference of racial
predominance. ECF No. [127] at 14. Plaintiffs note that Mr. Poreda agreed that staff
had different “equally Tier 2 compliant options of [House Districts] 118 and 119” and
chose the option that was “more Tier 1 compliant . . . based on the fact that Hispanic
voters’ ability to elect would not be diminished.” 	ECF No. [123-3] at 176:10–177:8.
Mr. Poreda also stated that “ensuring that a[] Hispanic [candidate] would be elected
in either district . . . was the primary focus.” 	ECF No. [123–3] at 174:5–6. 	Such
evidence is material because “race still may predominate” where “race for its own
sake is the overriding reason for choosing one map over others.” 	Bethune-Hill, 580
U.S at 190.
Plaintiffs also offer circumstantial evidence to show that House Districts 118
and 119, in their view, deviate from race-neutral districting criteria. As with House
District 115, Plaintiffs contend that these are “noncompact districts drawn to form
long, skinny shapes running north-south.” 	ECF No. [127] at 16. 	In addition,
Plaintiffs rely on mathematical measures to show that these districts have low
compactness scores. Id. at 16 n.9; see ECF No. 130-3 at 3 (compactness scores).
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether race
predominated in the drawing of House Districts 118 and 119. 	As the Supreme Court
4 In their briefing, the parties discuss House Districts 118 and 119 together, and thus
the Court does the same.
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recognized, “[t]he legislature’s motivation is itself a factual question.” Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999) (citation omitted). 	As such, it is particularly ill-
suited to resolution at summary judgment because the Court cannot “resolve the
disputed fact of [the legislature’s] motivation at the summary judgment stage.” 	Id.
at 552.
Congressional District 26: 	As for Congressional District 26, Plaintiffs again
direct the Court to various statements made by key legislators and the chief map
drawer, 	which 	they 	contend 	demonstrate 	that 	racial 	considerations 	drove 	the
configuration of this district. 	For example, Senator Ray Rodrigues, Chair of the
Senate’s Committee on Reapportionment, confirmed that “[a] big consideration in
drafting CD 26 . . . is that [Congressional District] 26 is a Tier One protected district.”
ECF No. [126-13] at 66:15–19. 	Representative Tyler Sirois, Chair of the House
Congressional Redistricting Subcommittee, agreed that Congressional District 26
was “impacted by the fact that it’s a Tier 1–protected district for Latino voters or
Hispanic voters.” 	ECF No. [126-10] at 38:10–16. 	Mr. Poreda explained that “[t]he
shape of [Congressional] District 26 was largely because . . . it was a Tier 1–protected
district” as were certain of its neighboring districts. Id. at 39:6–15.
Plaintiffs also rely upon statements from Alex Kelly, Governor DeSantis’s
Deputy Chief of Staff, who made final adjustments to the boundaries of Congressional
District 26. 	Mr. Kelly stated that in making those adjustments, “knowing that this
is a historically performing majority-minority Hispanic seat, I was watching those
numbers carefully to make sure that in terms of the overall Hispanic voting age
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population, I was staying very close to the benchmark seat, which I think is maybe a
little bit more than 74 percent.” ECF No. [126-11] at 73:19–25.
Plaintiffs buttress the foregoing evidence with circumstantial evidence. 	As
with the Challenged House Districts, Plaintiffs point to the poor compactness scores
of Congressional District 26. ECF No. [127] at 16; see also ECF No. [123-3] at 213:4–
23 (testimony of chief map drawer that “the three mathematical compactness scores”
for 	Congressional 	District 	26 	“are 	certainly 	lower 	than 	other 	districts 	in 	the
map . . .”). 	The Court recognizes that Mr. Poreda takes a different view, explaining
that “a seemingly low compactness score does not necessarily mean low compactness.”
ECF No. [123-3] at 214:15–17. 	However, “the credibility of the map drawer’s
testimony is an issue for trial.” 	Nord Hodges, 774 F. Supp. 3d at 1345. 	Plaintiffs
further point to statistical analysis conducted by their expert which found that
Congressional District 26 “was drawn to divide the region along racial lines.” 	ECF
No. [127] at 19; cf. ECF No. [126-18] at ¶¶ 16–29. 	Finally, Plaintiffs rely upon
alternative maps in which Congressional District 26 remains wholly within Miami-
Dade County, rather than “stretch[ing] across the peninsula” into Collier County as
in the enacted map. ECF No. [127] at 17–18; cf. ECF No. [126-16] at ¶¶ 23–29, figs.
4, 7–8.
* * *
To be sure, the House disputes the inferences that Plaintiffs argue should be
made from the evidence offered. The Court also recognizes that the House has cited
evidence which, in its view, confirms that the Legislature designed these Challenged
Districts in accordance with race-neutral criteria and attempted to balance tier one
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and tier two considerations such that racial considerations did not predominate. See
ECF No. [122] at 7–9, 12–19; ECF No. [131] at 3–6, 11–16. 	However, the Court is
unable to determine the extent to which race-neutral principles were subordinated,
if at all, to racial considerations without weighing the evidence—an action the Court
cannot perform at this stage of the proceedings. 	See Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP,
775 F.3d at 1343 (at summary judgment, a district court may not “make credibility
determinations of its own” (citation omitted)).
In sum, Plaintiffs have offered district-specific statements of key actors and
district-specific circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to create a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether race predominated in the drawing of House Districts
115, 118 and 119, and Congressional District 26. 	See, e.g., Nord Hodges, 774 F. Supp.
3d at 1345–46. 	Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to
these districts.
B. There is Insufficient Record Evidence to Establish That Race
Predominated in the Drawing of House Districts 112, 113, 114
and 116.
The House argues that Plaintiffs fail to provide either direct or circumstantial
evidence that the Legislature was motivated predominantly by racial considerations
when drawing House Districts 112, 113, 114 and 116. ECF No. [122] at 10–13. As to
these Districts, the Court agrees.
District 112: 	With respect to House District 112, Plaintiffs assert that the
district “split[s] Miami into more parts than necessary.” ECF No. [127] at 16. Even
assuming that Plaintiffs are correct, they do not cite any evidence that shows the
Legislature decided to split the city of Miami for racial reasons. The same infirmity
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exists with respect to Plaintiffs’ other complaint, that the Legislature could have
added the southeast corner of House District 112 to a neighboring district. ECF No.
[126] at ¶ 55. Again, Plaintiffs do not offer any evidence that inclusion of the disputed
corner in House District 112 was racially motivated. The absence of such evidence is
significant, as the gravamen of a racial gerrymandering claim is that the State
“intentionally assign[ed] citizens to a district on the basis of race without sufficient
justification.” 	Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 585–86 (2018) (emphasis supplied)
(citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993)). Notably, Plaintiffs do not rely upon
alternative maps to argue that House District 112 was racially gerrymandered.
“Without an alternative map, it is difficult for plaintiffs to defeat [the Court’s]
starting presumption that the legislature acted in good faith.” 	Alexander, 602 U.S.
at 10.
Districts 113 and 114:5 	With respect to House Districts 113 and 114, Plaintiffs
do not offer sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to support their claim. As for
direct evidence, Plaintiffs only point to generalized statements of Mr. Poreda which,
at best, indicate that the Legislature was aware of race when drawing these districts.
ECF No. [126] at ¶¶ 33, 46. Such evidence is not enough to create a triable issue of
fact because “the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines . . .
[t]hat sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race
discrimination.” 	Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646 (emphasis in original); see also Allen v.
Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 30 (2023) (“[T]here is a difference between being aware of racial
5 Plaintiffs offer much of the same evidence as to House Districts 113 and 114 and,
therefore, the Court analyzes these Districts together.
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considerations and being motivated by them. The former is permissible; the latter is
usually not.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 	No other statements are
provided which could support Plaintiffs’ claim that race predominated in the design
of these Districts.
As for circumstantial evidence, Plaintiffs again complain that these districts
“split Miami into more parts than necessary.” ECF No. [127] at 16. 	However, as
explained above, Plaintiffs do not cite any evidence indicating that this decision was
made for racial reasons. 	Plaintiffs also fail to direct the Court to any favorable
findings of their statistical expert with respect to these Districts. 	While Plaintiffs
contend that race-based adjustments to House District 115 affected the borders of
House District 114, ECF No. [127] at 14, this cannot support Plaintiffs’ claim. 	The
Supreme Court has long held that racial gerrymandering in one district “does not
prove anything about the legislature’s intentions with respect to [a neighboring
district].” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 746 (1995); see also Sinkfield v. Kelley,
531 U.S. 28, 30–31 (2000) (“[A]n unconstitutional use of race in drawing the
boundaries 	of 	majority-minority 	districts 	[does 	not] 	necessarily 	involve[] 	an
unconstitutional use of race in drawing the boundaries of neighboring majority-white
districts.”).
District 116: 	As for House District 116, Plaintiffs assert that the Legislature
extended this district “to the north for racial reasons, at least in part.” ECF No. [126]
at ¶ 69. 	Plaintiffs offer only meager support for this assertion, which itself fails to
advance their position. In particular, Plaintiffs cite to an extended colloquy between
Representatives 	Fentrice 	Driskell 	and 	Thomas 	J. 	Leek, 	Chair 	of 	the 	House
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Redistricting Committee, that largely focuses on other districts, rather than House
District 116, and when House District 116 is specifically mentioned, Chair Leek
merely repeats his view that the district is compact. ECF No. [126–8] at 46:18–50:22.
None of the cited statements support the position that the House subordinated
traditional districting criteria to racial considerations when drawing House District
116. Plaintiffs also rely on Mr. Poreda’s testimony that “ensuring Tier 1 compliance
in at least [House District] 115 is the reason why the border between [House Districts]
115 and 116 is where it is.” ECF No. [123-3] at 169:25–170:3. However, as explained
above, adjustments made to House District 116 because of allegedly race-based
decisions as to House District 115 are insufficient to support Plaintiffs’ racial
gerrymandering claim regarding House District 116. 	See Hays, 515 U.S. at 746;
Sinkfield, 531 U.S. at 30–31.
In short, Plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence for a rational trier of
fact to conclude that race was the Legislature’s predominant motive when drawing
district lines as to House Districts 112, 113, 114 and 116. 	Accordingly, the House is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to these Districts.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Defendant Florida House of Representatives’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. [122], is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. 	Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Florida House of
Representatives with respect to State House Districts 112, 113, 114 and
116.
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2. Summary judgment is DENIED as to State House Districts 115, 118 and
119, and Congressional District 26.

DONE AND ORDERED this 21st day of November, 2025.

Brant C. Mat

BRITT C. GRANT
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

POD

RADOLFO A. RUIZ II
TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED SFATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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