Lewis v. Chief Judge of the 17th Judicial Circuit in Broward County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-62642-STRAUSS
JONATHAN K. LEWIS,
Petitioner,
v.
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE
17 TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
BROWARD COUNTY,
Respondent.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER was assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant
to Administrative Order 2025-11. However, because I find that dismissal of this case is warranted,
and because I do not presently have authority to issue a dispositive order, I am issuing a Report
and Recommendation. I have separately entered an order directing the Clerk to randomly reassign
this 	case 	to 	a 	District 	Judge of 	this 	Court. 	For 	the following 	reasons, 	I 	respectfully
RECOMMEND that this action be DISMISSED and that all pending motions be denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jonathan K. Lewis (“Petitioner”) filed his “Petition for Writ of Prohibition” on
December 19, 2025, [DE 1], along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE 3]. 	The
Petition seeks a “Petition for Writ of Prohibition on the respondent Chief Judge of 17 th Judicial
Circuit in Broward County Ms. Carol-Lisa Phillips to compel the judge to fix the order authorizing
my settlement . . . .” [DE 1] at 1.
Because Plaintiff has moved to proceed in forma pauperis, the screening provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, if a court determines that the case is frivolous
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or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, then the court “shall dismiss the case at
any time.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require
“detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and conclusions”; a “formulaic
recitation of the cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must
be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings
and hold them to “less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care,
LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency
does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-
69 (11th Cir. 2014).
Construing the rambling, and often difficult to comprehend, statements in the Petition
liberally, Petitioner takes issue with the settlement of a lawsuit initiated by his grandmother in
1988 in Broward County Circuit Court to redress damages Petitioner (who was a minor at the time)
suffered from a car accident. [DE 1] at 3. Petitioner alleges that, as a result of a lawsuit, he won
money that was paid through an annuity contract. Id. Petitioner appears to allege that $10,000 of
what he was supposed to be paid is “still missing unaccounted for in the annuity contract that did
not go to [Petitioner] or the attorney or the medical bills and the contract was for me.” Id. at 3-4.
Petitioner apparently blames the state court judge overseeing the case for the fact that he has not
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received this $10,000. He appears to assert that the state court judge was obligated to “inspect the
contract and make sure it is legal,” including by inquiring “why the $10,000 was not going to be
part of the money [Petitioner] was waiting for and how much was going towards my bills.” Id. at
4. Yet he appears to assert that the state court judge erred in approving the settlement and did not
adequately protect his rights as a minor, making any order approving the settlement “an illegal
order because [Petitioner] didn’t get everything [he] was supposed to get[.]” Id. Consequently,
Petitioner asks this Court to
issue an order on the chief judge1 in Broward County to show cause why this
petition should not be granted for the requested relief of this court ordering the 17 th
judicial circuit in Broward County chief judge to alter the order authorizing my
settlement contract by doing whatever needs to be done so the plaintiff can get the
rest of his funds based on the information above.
Id. at 6.
ANALYSIS
The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief Plaintiff seeks. Moreover, the Petition fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, the “writ of prohibition” that Petitioner
explicitly seeks is not a writ this Court can issue – and certainly not to a state court. The writs of
prohibition and mandamus “afford an expeditious and effective means of confining the inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction, or of compelling a court to exercise its
authority.” Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 (1943) (emphasis added); In re State of
Mo., 664 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1981). In other words “a writ of prohibition is not a means for
invalidating the judgment of a non-subordinate court, such as a state court, but rather is a means
of confining or compelling the exercise of jurisdiction of an ‘inferior court’ such as a lower federal
1 Petitioner states that the judge on his underlying state court case “is deceased or does not practice
law any more[.]” [DE 1] at 2. Therefore, he asserts that “the proper party is the chief judge[.]”
Id.
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court.” Hyman-Bozeman v. Fulton Cnty. Superior Ct., Case No. 22-cv-4609, 2023 WL 11960550
*2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2023). 	While Petitioner appears to labor under the misimpression that
federal courts have “jurisdiction over the state court system and its employees,” [DE 1] at 1, state
courts are not subordinate to federal courts, and “this Court has no authority to issue a writ of
prohibition against the [state] court or [state court judge].” Behr v. Ticktin, No. 9:19-CV-80722-
ROSENBERG, 2019 WL 11639535, *2 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2019); McGowan v. Bondi, No. 25-
24779-CIV-ALTONAGA, 2025 WL 3113211, *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2025) (finding Court lacked
jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition to a state court); Thomas v. Rowe, No. 25-81180-CV-
WILLIAMS, 2025 WL 3039835, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2025) (same); cf. Moye v. Clerk,
DeKalb Cnty. Superior Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A] federal court lacks the
general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the
performance of their duties where mandamus is the only relief sought.”).2
Second, while the Petition explicitly seeks a writ of prohibition, and does not style itself as
a complaint for violations of federal law, Petitioner’s claims would fail even if the Court were to
liberally construe it as such a complaint. The Petition does not cite any particular federal law that
Petitioner believes the state court judge violated. However, the Petition does make a conclusory
assertion that the judge’s failure to protect the rights of Petitioner (who was, at the time, a minor)
against adults attempting to take advantage of him “is a direct violation of US Constitution 14th
amendment [sic].” [DE 1] at 3. Yet, even construing the Petition as a complaint for a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint would still fail.
2 While Petitioner makes vague reference to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, that statute does
not confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Rather, this Court may only issue writs under the All Writs
Act when there is an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 	Henson v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 261 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir. 2001); Hyman-Bozeman, 2023 WL 11960550 at *2.
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The Petition sues Defendant in her official capacity.3 	As such, Petitioner’s claims are
barred by sovereign immunity and the fact that Defendant is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Eleventh Amendment bars “suits against a state initiated by that state’s own citizens.”
Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). This immunity extends
to state agencies and other arms of the state. 	Cassady v. Hall, 892 F.3d 1150, 1153 (11th Cir.
2018). 	Although “a state can consent to suit in federal court . . . .[,] Florida has not waived its
sovereign immunity with regard to § 1983 actions.” Cichowski v. Totten, No. 24-10195, 2024 WL
2182487, at *2 (11th Cir. May 15, 2024) (citation omitted). 	Nor has Congress abrogated “the
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 suits.” Id.
A Florida state-court judge in her official capacity is an arm of the State of Florida. See
Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 213 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding Florida state-court judge is an
arm “of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore enjoy immunity from liability
on [Plaintiff’s] § 1983 claims, both legal and equitable”); Kaimowitz v. The Fla. Bar, 996 F.2d
1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits actions against state courts and
state bars.”); Coker v. Warren, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2023) (“In Florida, the state
court system, and therefore a state court judge acting in his official capacity, are considered arms
of the State of Florida.”).
There is an exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity when a plaintiff brings
a suit seeking “prospective equitable relief to end ongoing and continuing violations of federal
3 As described above, the Petition admits that Chief Judge Phillips is not the judge who presided
over the underlying state case, and Petitioner names her because the original state judge is no
longer available to be sued. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (explaining that
“[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions
he takes under color of state law[,]” whereas “[o]fficial-capacity suits, in contrast, generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”).
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law.” Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1336. This is known as the Ex parte Young doctrine. But
the doctrine does not include or permit judgments against state officers that declare that the state
officers violated federal law in the past or permit a plaintiff to adjudicate the legality of past
conduct. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
That is what Plaintiff seeks to do here by asking this Court to find that the state judge’s approval
of a settlement several decades ago violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Additionally, a plaintiff cannot use a § 1983 claim as a device to review a state court
judgment. Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We reject, from the outset, the
use of § 1983 as a device for collateral review of state court judgments.”). And “neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Clark v. Clark, 984 F.2d 272, 273 (8th Cir.
1993) (“Courts are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”); Ippolito v. State of
Fla., 824 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (“[I]t is important to note that a state court is not
a ‘person’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Consequently, Petitioner could not bring a
viable § 1983 suit against Defendant in her official capacity as a Broward County Circuit Judge
and dismissal is warranted. See Shean, 2021 WL 2403936, at *5.
Finally, 	the 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine 	potentially 	bars 	Petitioner’s 	claim 	against
Defendant. Under this doctrine, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity
of a state court order.” Thurman v. Jud. Correction Servs., Inc., 760 F. App’x 733, 736 (11th Cir.
2019). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to cases “brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 	Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In such cases, the district court lacks
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subject matter jurisdiction because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests authority to review a state court’s
judgment solely with the Supreme Court. Id. at 291-92.
It is true that Rooker-Feldman does not strip a district court of subject matter jurisdiction
over a claim “simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously
litigated in state court.” Id. at 293. But, Rooker-Feldman does not prioritize form over substance;
rather, it bars all appeals of state court judgments, brought in federal district court, regardless of
how a plaintiff labels his complaint. Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021); see
also May v. Morgan Cnty. Ga., 878 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A] state court loser cannot
avoid Rooker-Feldman’s bar by cleverly cloaking her pleadings in the cloth of a different claim.”).
When reviewing if Rooker-Feldman applies, “[t]he question isn’t whether the whole
complaint seems to challenge a previous state court judgment, but whether resolution of each
individual claim requires review and rejection of a state court judgment.” Behr, 8 F.4th at 1213.
It is unclear from the Petition what specific action by the state court Petitioner is seeking to undo
or redo. Indeed, it is unclear whether any “judgment” was entered in the underlying state court
case. And, by the Petition’s description, it seems Petitioner “won” the underlying case in obtaining
his settlement; at the very least, it does not seem like the state court ruled against Petitioner in
some way. Nevertheless, in this case, Plaintiff explicitly seeks an order to compel Defendant to
“fix the order authorizing [Petitioner’s] settlement.” 	[DE 1] at 1. 	Thus, to resolve Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim, this Court would have to review and reject the state court’s prior decision regarding
the validity of that settlement (to the extent a decision was ever made). Rooker-Feldman arguably
prohibits such a review.
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Therefore, I respectfully RECOMMEND that this action be DISMISSED without
prejudice and that all pending motions be denied as moot.4
The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with this Court.5
Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by a District
Judge of this Court of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on
appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds
of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 29th day of December 2025.
4 “Our cases make clear that ‘a [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice’—at least, that is, where ‘a
more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.’” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927
F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)). 	However, given the issues described above, I
conclude that amendment here would be futile.
5 As set forth in Rule 4(b) of the of the Magistrate Judge Rules of this Court’s Local Rules:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, recommendations
or report under subsections 1(d), (e), and (f) of these rules, supra, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof, or within such other time as may
be allowed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. Such party shall file with the
Clerk of the Court, and serve on all parties, written objections which shall
specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or
report to which objection is made, the specific basis for such objections, and
supporting legal authority. . . . A District Judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.
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