Stetler v. Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterso

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
www.flsb.uscourts.gov
In re: 	Case No.: 24-10741-PDR
RV SALES OF BROWARD, INC., 	Chapter 7
Debtor.
______________________________________/
GIGI STETLER,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Adv. Proc. No. 26-01070-PDR
STEARNS WEAVER MILLER WEISSLER
ALHADEFF & SITTERSON, P.A.,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT
Peter D. Russin, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on May 22, 2026.
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Before the Court is a motion to remand a legal malpractice action to state court.
The underlying facts are uncommon. A law firm that represented a business owner
for several years before her company filed for bankruptcy later appeared in that
bankruptcy as counsel to the Chapter 7 Trustee — in a capacity directly adverse to
the very client it had previously represented years before. The former client has now
filed suit in state court for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. The firm removed the case to this Court.
Plaintiff Gigi Stetler then filed a Motion to Remand to State Court (the “Motion to
Remand”)1 and related submissions.2 The Court has reviewed all submissions and the
record in the main bankruptcy case, In re RV Sales of Broward, Inc., Case No. 24-
10741-PDR. The Court heard oral argument on April 23, 2026.
The Court holds as follows. First, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). The claims at issue do not “arise in” the bankruptcy case
because they are rooted in an attorney-client relationship and legal advice that
predate the bankruptcy by more than a decade, and because the duties allegedly
breached — including those arising from the firm's subsequent adverse
1 Adv. Dkt. No. 2. Unless otherwise noted, citations to "Main Dkt. No. ___" refer to the docket in the
main bankruptcy case, Case No. 24-10741-PDR, and citations to "Adv. Dkt. No. ___" refer to the docket
in this adversary proceeding, Adv. No. 26-01070-PDR.
2 The related submissions include the Complaint (Adv. Dkt. No. 1); Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's
Opposition (Adv. Dkt. No. 9), filed March 20, 2026; Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum on
Mandatory Abstention (Adv. Dkt. No. 10), filed April 3, 2026; Defendant's Memorandum of Law in
Opposition (Adv. Dkt. No. 8), filed March 17, 2026; Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law
in Opposition (Adv. Dkt. No. 12), filed April 9, 2026; Plaintiff's Final Reply in Support of Mandatory
Abstention and Remand (Adv. Dkt. No. 14), filed April 13, 2026; and Defendant's Notice of
Supplemental Authority (Adv. Dkt. No. 15), filed April 22, 2026.
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representation — are imposed by the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, which
apply in every forum and do not depend on the bankruptcy proceeding for their
existence or enforcement. A claim whose legal basis exists independently of any
bankruptcy cannot be said to arise in one, regardless of the forum in which the breach
became apparent.
Second, “related to” jurisdiction is likewise absent. Any judgment entered in
the state court action would run entirely in favor of Plaintiff personally; no estate
asset is at risk, no estate liability is implicated, and the outcome of the litigation could
have no conceivable effect on the administration of the bankruptcy estate.
Third, and in the alternative, even if jurisdiction existed, mandatory
abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) would compel the same result, as this
proceeding is based on a state law claim that is neither arising under nor arising in
the bankruptcy case, and the state court is a fully capable forum for its adjudication.
For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Remand is granted, and this
adversary proceeding is remanded to the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida.
Background
Two separate but related proceedings form the backdrop for this dispute, the
bankruptcy case of RV Sales of Broward, Inc., and the state court malpractice action
that Plaintiff filed against her former counsel.
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I. 	The Underlying Bankruptcy Proceeding
On or about January 26, 2024, RV Sales of Broward, Inc. (the “Debtor”) filed a
voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11, Subchapter V of the
Bankruptcy Code. The case was subsequently converted to Chapter 7 by order dated
June 20, 20243 and Kenneth A. Welt was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee. The Trustee
applied to this Court for approval to retain Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff
& Sitterson, P.A. (“Stearns Weaver”) as counsel pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327, and this
Court entered an order approving that retention on June 25, 2024.4 In that capacity,
Stearns Weaver operated subject to this Court's supervisory jurisdiction, including
with respect to compensation, which was subject to court approval under 11 U.S.C. §
330.
During administration, the Trustee determined that postpetition proceeds
from vehicle sales had been directed by Gigi Stetler, the Debtor's principal, to
accounts outside the bankruptcy estate. The Trustee sought and obtained multiple
court orders requiring Ms. Stetler to provide a verified accounting of those proceeds.
Ms. Stetler did not comply. After an evidentiary hearing, this Court entered a Final
Judgment against Ms. Stetler in the amount of $679,710.73, inclusive of $103,108.28
in attorney's fees and costs, as a compensatory contempt sanction.5
3 Main Dkt. No. 159
4 Main Dkt. No. 167
5 Main Dkt. No. 542
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In defending against the contempt proceedings, Ms. Stetler asserted that she
had structured her consignment operations based on legal advice received from
Stearns Weaver during that firm's prior representation of her. This Court, in its
Order Holding Gigi Stetler in Civil Contempt6 squarely rejected that defense, finding
that whatever advice may have been given during the prior representation could not
excuse Ms. Stetler's failure to comply with the Court's unambiguous and repeatedly
issued orders. The Court made no finding that the prior advice was professionally
deficient or that it failed to meet any standard of care. This Court's prior orders speak
for themselves and are not subject to recharacterization through selective quotation
in motion practice.
Ms. Stetler also moved to disqualify Stearns Weaver as counsel to the Trustee
based on its prior representation of her. Following a full-day evidentiary hearing, this
Court denied the motion to disqualify, finding no evidence of a disqualifying conflict
and no evidence that Stearns Weaver used any confidential information obtained
during the prior representation.7
II. 	The State Court Action and Removal
On January 20, 2026, Ms. Stetler filed a Complaint for Legal Malpractice in
the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County,
Florida, Case No. 26-000947. The Complaint asserts three counts under Florida law:
Count I for Legal Malpractice, Count II for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Count III
6 Main Dkt. No. 453
7 Main Dkt. No. 420, as amended, Main Dkt. No. 426
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for Violation of Florida Rules of Professional Conduct constituting Negligence Per Se.
No federal cause of action is pleaded.
The claims arise from two categories of alleged misconduct. First, Counts I and
III as principally pleaded allege that Stearns Weaver provided negligent legal advice
during the prior attorney-client relationship regarding the structure of consignment
operations—advice allegedly given between 2009 and 2013, years before the
bankruptcy was filed. Second, Count II and portions of Count III allege that Stearns
Weaver, having previously represented Ms. Stetler, later accepted representation of
the Trustee in a matter directly adverse to her, without proper disclosure, and used
confidential information obtained during the prior representation against her in the
bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff alleges damages in excess of $782,000, which as
pleaded include the contempt judgment and fee award entered by this Court.
Stearns Weaver was served on January 27, 2026, and filed its Notice of
Removal on February 25, 20268 invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1334(b) on both “arising in” and “related to” grounds. Plaintiff filed the instant Motion
to Remand on March 2, 2026.9 This matter was fully briefed as of April 13, 2026.
8 Adv. Dkt. No. 1; see also Main Dkt. No. 560; Plaintiff argues in her Reply that Defendant waived its
right to remove by filing a motion for extension of time in state court. The argument is without merit.
Stearns Weaver was served on January 27, 2026 and filed its Notice of Removal on February 25, 2026,
within the thirty-day window established by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Filing a motion for extension of time
to respond to a complaint does not constitute the clear and unequivocal conduct inconsistent with the
right to remove that waiver requires. See Yusefzadeh v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP,
365 F.3d 1244, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 2004).
9 Adv. Dkt. No. 2
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Legal Standards
Bankruptcy removals are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), and remand for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c), a case must be remanded if the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction—that is, when federal jurisdiction never existed and removal was
improper at the threshold. Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal,
and all doubts are resolved in favor of remand.10 The removing party bears the burden
of establishing federal jurisdiction.11
Federal district courts, and by referral, bankruptcy courts, have original
jurisdiction over civil proceedings “arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
cases under title 11.”12 Proceedings “arising under” title 11 involve a cause of action
created by the Bankruptcy Code itself. Proceedings “arising in” a bankruptcy case are
those that, by their very nature, could arise only in bankruptcy—administrative-type
matters that have no practical existence outside of the bankruptcy context.13 The
governing test for “related to” jurisdiction in the Eleventh Circuit is whether the
outcome of the proceeding “could conceivably have an effect on the estate being
10 See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).
11 See Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
13 See In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Toledo, 170 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
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administered in bankruptcy.”14 A merely speculative or attenuated connection to the
estate is insufficient.
Analysis
The Court addresses two questions: first, whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), encompassing both “arising in” and “related to”
grounds, and second, in the alternative, whether mandatory abstention under 28
U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) independently requires remand. The Court finds that neither
basis for jurisdiction exists and that, were jurisdiction found to exist, mandatory
abstention would compel the same result.
I. 	“Arising In” Jurisdiction Does Not Apply
“Arising in” jurisdiction is limited to matters that, by their very nature, could
arise only in bankruptcy — proceedings that have no practical existence outside of
the bankruptcy context.15 The Court concludes that neither category of claims in this
proceeding satisfies that standard.
Defendant’s counsel relied principally during oral argument on In re Tronox.16
The Court has reviewed Tronox carefully and finds it inapplicable on its facts. In
Tronox, the law firm was retained after the petition date specifically to represent a
class of tort creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Tronox court emphasized
that the alleged misdeeds—failing to object to competing creditors’ proofs of claim,
14 In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990).
15 See In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 97; In re Toledo, 170 F.3d at 1345.
16 In re Tronox, 603 B.R. 712 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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drafting deficient trust distribution procedures, failing to object to a fraudulent
transfer settlement— related to bankruptcy-specific rights and tasks and could only
have arisen in a bankruptcy context and that all of the allegations regarding the
defendants’ alleged malpractice are limited to things the defendants did (or did not
do) during the course of the bankruptcy cases themselves.17 The Tronox court further
noted that the mere fact that conduct took place during a bankruptcy case is not
enough to establish “arising in” jurisdiction.18
None of those conditions are present here. The core of Ms. Stetler’s claim traces
to an attorney-client relationship with and legal advice given by Stearns Weaver
between 2009 and 2013, years before the bankruptcy was filed. That advice, and the
professional duties governing it, existed entirely under Florida law, independent of
any bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy did not create the malpractice claim; at
most, it may have revealed it. The filing of the bankruptcy petition, the conversion to
Chapter 7, and the subsequent appointment of the Trustee provided the occasion and
the forum in which Stearns Weaver’s prior representation of Ms. Stetler became
relevant and potentially adverse. But the occasion for a claim is not the source of a
claim.
The professional duties allegedly breached, including competent advice,
loyalty, and confidentiality, attached at the moment of the prior representation,
existed independently of any bankruptcy proceeding, and would have been
17 603 B.R. at 722–23.
18 Id.
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enforceable under Florida law regardless of whether a bankruptcy was ever filed. The
bankruptcy context surfaced the claim and provided the occasion for its filing, but
that is insufficient to trigger “arising in” jurisdiction.19 What matters under the
Eleventh Circuit’s standard is not where the alleged breach became apparent, but
whether the claim itself could have existed outside of bankruptcy.20 This one could.
It existed the moment the prior representation ended and the duties it created
remained in force.
Defendant might rejoin that at least some of the claims in the complaint—
specifically, the conflicted employment theory and the misuse of confidential
information theory—require in-bankruptcy acts as their operative elements. Without
Stearns Weaver being retained by the Chapter 7 Trustee, the argument goes, there
is no conflicting adverse representation. Without appearing adversarially in the
bankruptcy, there is no occasion to deploy confidential information against a former
client. Those acts occurred inside the bankruptcy, and so, on this view, those claims
could not exist outside of it. The Court acknowledges the argument and rejects it. The
duties underlying both claims do not arise from the bankruptcy. They arise from
Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.9, which imposes on every lawyer continuing
obligations of loyalty and confidentiality to former clients and prohibits adverse
representation in the same or substantially related matter regardless of forum. Rule
19 See In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Arising in jurisdiction is not a
matter of timing but of the nature of the claim.”).
20 See In re Toledo, 170 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (defining 'arising in' proceedings as 'matters
that could arise only in bankruptcy').
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4-1.9 applies in state court litigation, in federal litigation, in transactional matters,
in arbitration, and in bankruptcy. The rule does not distinguish between forums.
What it looks to is the prior attorney-client relationship and the nature of the
subsequent representation—both of which are defined entirely by events that predate
the bankruptcy by more than a decade.
Defendant’s argument also proves too much. If the forum of the adverse
representation determined where a former client conflict claim “arises,” then a Rule
4-1.9 claim against a lawyer who appeared adversarially in a state court proceeding
would “arise in” that state court proceeding—plainly not a basis for any federal
jurisdiction. The proposition, stated that way, is untenable, and it illustrates that the
forum of the breach is not the source of the duty. The source is the prior
representation and the obligations it created. The bankruptcy was the setting in
which those obligations were allegedly violated but setting and source are not the
same thing. Plaintiff herself drew this distinction, perhaps more clearly than she
realized, when she stated at oral argument that the malpractice occurred when
Stearns Weaver sought employment in the bankruptcy case. She was not conceding
that her cause of action arose in bankruptcy. She was identifying the moment at
which the prior relationship—and the duties it imposed—first came into conflict with
Stearns Weaver’s new role as counsel to the Trustee. That is the moment the breach
became apparent to her. It is not the moment the duty was created. The duty was
created years earlier, under Florida law, in a relationship that had nothing to do with
the bankruptcy.
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Defendant also submitted additional supplemental authority in advance of the
hearing.21 The Court has considered the Murray Energy decision. Plaintiff has not
had a full opportunity to respond, but the Court finds no prejudice in that regard, as
Murray Energy does not change the outcome here.
Defendant relies on two holdings from Murray Energy: that “arising in”
jurisdiction turns on a “but for” test, and that a court may consider defenses—not just
the complaint—in assessing jurisdiction. Neither helps Defendant. On the “but for”
test, the core of Plaintiff’s claim traces to advice given years before the bankruptcy
was filed. That claim existed under Florida law independent of any bankruptcy
proceeding. The bankruptcy was where the consequences of that advice became
apparent; under the Eleventh Circuit's standard that is not enough. In Murray
Energy, by contrast, the alleged malpractice was negotiating a Chapter 11 plan—
conduct that could only have occurred inside a bankruptcy case. The distinction is
dispositive. On the defense point, Murray Energy found jurisdiction because the
defenses required interpretation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, which is an order of
the court. Here, Defendant’s reliance on this Court’s prior orders goes only to
preclusion—a doctrine state courts apply routinely to federal judgments. That is not
the same thing, and it does not establish “arising in” jurisdiction.
As to the consignment structure advice (Counts I and III as principally
pleaded): those claims arise from legal advice provided during the prior attorney-
client relationship, well before the bankruptcy was filed. They had full existence as
21 In re Murray Energy Holdings Co., 662 B.R. 604 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2024).
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potential state law causes of action before any bankruptcy proceeding was
commenced. These claims owe their existence to the Florida attorney-client
relationship, not to the bankruptcy proceeding.
Defendant argued at oral argument that the operative question is not when
the advice was given but what Ms. Stetler is actually complaining about, specifically,
that Stearns Weaver is "attacking" its own prior advice in its role as Trustee's
counsel. The Court is not persuaded. The problem alleged is not that Stearns Weaver
is attacking the advice now, but rather that the advice was deficient when given. The
bankruptcy context may have made the prior advice's alleged deficiencies apparent,
but it did not give rise to the claim.
As to the adverse representation and use of confidential information claims
(Count II and portions of Count III): this category presents a closer question, as the
alleged misconduct occurred during the pendency of the bankruptcy case in
connection with Stearns Weaver’s role as Trustee’s counsel. But the legal standards
governing those claims are entirely creatures of state law, specifically Florida Rules
of Professional Conduct 4-1.9 and 4-1.7, governing duties to former clients and
conflicts of interest respectively. Neither provision derives from nor is informed by
the Bankruptcy Code. An attorney’s duties of loyalty and confidentiality to a former
client do not arise from or depend on the existence of a bankruptcy proceeding. Those
duties attach at the moment of representation, travel with the client when the
representation ends, and remain enforceable under Florida’s professional
responsibility framework regardless of what subsequent proceedings the attorney
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appears in. The claim that Stearns Weaver violated those duties by accepting
representation of the Trustee adverse to Ms. Stetler is therefore a Florida
professional responsibility claim that happens to have become apparent in a
bankruptcy context—not a bankruptcy claim that happens to sound in malpractice.
The Court also addresses the argument that this Court’s disqualification
ruling, which found no conflict and no use of confidential information, creates “arising
in” jurisdiction because adjudicating the malpractice claim will require interpreting
that order. The Court rejects this argument. The existence of a prior ruling that may
have preclusive effect in subsequent litigation does not transform a state law claim
into one that arises in the bankruptcy case. Preclusion is a doctrine that state courts
apply routinely, including to federal and bankruptcy court judgments. The state
court’s obligation to consider the preclusive effect of this Court’s orders does not make
the underlying malpractice claim a matter that “could not exist outside of
bankruptcy.” To hold otherwise would extend “arising in” jurisdiction to any state law
claim in which a bankruptcy court order might serve as evidence or operate as a
defense, a result plainly inconsistent with the jurisdictional limits Congress intended.
The same standard confirms that the authority on which Defendant relied in
its written submissions is distinguishable.22 In Southmark, the professional whose
conduct was at issue was a court-appointed examiner performing duties created by
and existing solely within 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c), a role with no analog outside of
bankruptcy. Here, Stearns Weaver served as counsel to the Chapter 7 Trustee
22 Defendant relied on In re Southmark Corp., 163 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1999), in support of its argument.
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pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327, but court approval of the retention does not transform
the nature of the professional relationship. The duties allegedly breached are imposed
by the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, not the Bankruptcy Code, and would
exist in identical form in any non-bankruptcy fiduciary engagement.
The Court acknowledges that Ms. Stetler’s Complaint, as drafted, creates some
ambiguity in that several of the alleged breaches are pleaded in terms of conduct that
occurred during the bankruptcy case. Jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the
underlying claim, however, not the form in which it is pleaded.23 The root of every
alleged wrong traces back to the prior attorney-client relationship and the duties that
arose from it. A complaint that reveals a pre-existing state law claim through
bankruptcy related facts does not thereby transform that claim into one that arises
in the bankruptcy case.
For these reasons, the Court declines to find “arising in” jurisdiction over this
proceeding.
II. 	“Related To” Jurisdiction Does Not Exist
The Court finds that “related to” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) is
likewise absent. The Eleventh Circuit’s standard asks whether the outcome of a
proceeding could conceivably have an effect on the estate being administered in
bankruptcy and further requires that the outcome be capable of altering the debtor’s
23 See Baker v. Simpson, 613 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2010).
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rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action.24 Applied here, the standard is not
satisfied.
The Debtor is a corporation in Chapter 7 liquidation with no ongoing
operations, no remaining rights to be altered, and no freedom of action to be affected.
The state court malpractice action runs entirely in favor of Plaintiff personally. No
estate asset is at risk, no estate liability is implicated, and any judgment entered in
state court would not create a new obligation running to or from the bankruptcy
estate. The estate is not a party to the state court action and has no exposure to its
outcome.
Defendant argued that a state court adjudication could generate inconsistent
findings with respect to this Court’s prior orders, specifically the Final Judgment, the
Order Holding Gigi Stetler in Civil Contempt, and the disqualification ruling. The
Court is not persuaded. This Court’s prior orders are final and enforceable
independent of any state court proceeding. A state court adjudication of professional
negligence neither disturbs nor diminishes those findings. There is no realistic
scenario in which a state court judgment could render this Court’s contempt judgment
unenforceable. The estate’s rights under this Court’s orders are fully fixed, and the
risk of inconsistent adjudications is properly managed through preclusion principles
that a state court is fully equipped to apply.
The Court has also considered whether Ms. Stetler's potential recovery in the
state court action could indirectly benefit the estate by improving her ability to satisfy
24 In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990).
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the contempt judgment. At oral argument, Ms. Stetler confirmed that she seeks
recovery from Stearns Weaver's professional liability insurer. A judgment debtor's
improved financial condition does not, without more, bring proceedings affecting that
debtor's net worth within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. The connection between
a potential state court recovery and the bankruptcy estate is too speculative and
attenuated to satisfy the Lemco Gypsum standard.
The Court further notes that while Plaintiff's Complaint references the
contempt judgment of $679,710.73 as a measure of her damages, the source of that
figure does not determine jurisdiction. What matters is whether the outcome of the
litigation could affect the estate. A state court malpractice verdict against Stearns
Weaver would create a liability running to Ms. Stetler personally and would not
reduce, modify, or otherwise affect the estate's existing judgment.
Because subject matter jurisdiction is absent, removal was improper. The
Court addresses mandatory abstention in Section III as an independent alternative
ground for remand.
III. Mandatory Abstention is Required Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2)
The Court need not reach mandatory abstention given its finding that subject
matter jurisdiction is absent. Nevertheless, because the issue has been fully briefed
by both parties25 and because an independent alternative basis for remand supports
the same result, the Court addresses mandatory abstention under 28 U.S.C. §
25 Adv. Dkt. Nos. 10, 12, and 14
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1334(c)(2) in the event a reviewing court disagrees on the jurisdictional question.
Were jurisdiction found to exist, the Court would be required to abstain.
A. 	All Six Elements of Mandatory Abstention Are Met.
Even if jurisdiction were found to exist, remand would still be required. Each
of the six statutory prerequisites to mandatory abstention under 28 U.S.C. §
1334(c)(2) is independently satisfied, and the statute's mandatory command leaves
this Court no discretion to proceed.
1. 	Timely Motion
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's invocation of mandatory abstention is
untimely under Local Rule 5011-2, which requires a motion to abstain to be filed
within 21 days of the notice of removal. Plaintiff raised mandatory abstention in her
Reply26 filed March 20, 2026, 23 days after the Notice of Removal was filed on
February 25, 2026. The Court declines to find mandatory abstention unavailable on
this basis.
Plaintiff is a pro se litigant who filed her Motion to Remand27 five days after
removal, well within both the local rule period and the 30-day window provided by 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). That motion placed the jurisdictional question squarely before the
Court. Mandatory abstention is a legal theory in support of that timely filed motion,
not a separate motion subject to an independent deadline. Courts afford pro se
litigants reasonable latitude in the presentation of their legal arguments, particularly
26 Adv. Dkt. No. 9
27 Adv. Dkt. No. 2
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where the substantive motion was timely and the opposing party suffered no
prejudice. Stearns Weaver had a full opportunity to brief the abstention issue28 and
the Court heard argument on the motion.
The cases Defendant cites do not support a different result. One decision
merely held that mandatory abstention must be raised through a timely motion,
without addressing what constitutes untimeliness or the consequences of procedural
default.29 Another simply observed that a motion filed twenty days after removal was
timely.30 Neither decision holds that a local-rule deadline bars a pro se plaintiff from
raising mandatory abstention in connection with an otherwise timely motion to
remand.
2. 	State Law Claim or Cause of Action
Every cause of action in the Complaint arises under Florida law and requires
application of Florida professional responsibility standards and tort principles. Count
I Legal Malpractice is a Florida common law tort. Count II Breach of Fiduciary Duty
arises under Florida fiduciary duty principles. Count III Negligence Per Se is
predicated on alleged violations of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules
4-1.7, 4-1.9, 4-3.3, and 4-8.4, administered by the Florida Supreme Court. No
provision of the Bankruptcy Code governs the standard of care applicable to any
count. This element is satisfied.
28 Adv. Dkt. No. 12
29 Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas. Co., 918 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1990).
30 Dunkirk Ltd. P'ship v. TJX Cos., Inc., 139 B.R. 643 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
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3. 	“Related To” But Not “Arising Under” or “Arising In” Title 11
As found above, this proceeding does not arise under title 11 or arise in the
bankruptcy case. For purposes of this alternative analysis only, the Court assumes
without deciding that "related to" jurisdiction exists, as that assumption is necessary
to reach mandatory abstention.
4. 	No Independent Basis for Federal Jurisdiction
Both parties are Florida citizens — Plaintiff is a Florida resident and
Defendant is a Florida professional association with its principal place of business in
Miami-Dade County. Diversity jurisdiction is therefore unavailable, no federal
question appears on the face of the Complaint, and the sole asserted basis for
jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1334. This element is satisfied.
5. 	Action Commenced in State Court
Plaintiff filed the State Court Action on January 20, 2026. This element is
satisfied.
6. 	Timely Adjudication in State Court
At the time of removal, the action had been pending only 36 days, with a motion
to compel discovery under Florida Statute § 627.4137 already pending. Florida's
circuit courts regularly adjudicate complex legal malpractice cases, and there is no
evidence the Broward County Circuit Court could not try this case in a timely
manner. This element is satisfied.
All six elements of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) are satisfied. Were jurisdiction found
to exist, the statute’s mandatory command would independently require this Court
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to abstain and remand this proceeding to the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit. Defendant’s argument that mandatory abstention is inapplicable
because “arising in” jurisdiction exists fails for the reasons set forth in Section I
above.
B. 	Plaintiff's Request for Costs Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) Is Denied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a court may award “just costs and any actual
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” The Supreme
Court has held that fee awards under § 1447(c) are not automatic; the standard turns
on whether the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
removal.31 Where an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.32
Here, two independent reasons counsel against an award. First, while the
Court has found jurisdiction absent, Defendant's removal was not frivolous. The
jurisdictional arguments advanced, particularly regarding "arising in" jurisdiction in
light of Stearns Weaver's court approved retention and this Court's prior orders,
presented nonfrivolous questions of law. Reasonable counsel could have believed
removal was proper.
Second, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has identified no actual out-of-pocket
expenses incurred as a result of the removal. Section 1447(c) authorizes
31 Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).
32 Id.
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reimbursement of actual expenses, not compensation for time or effort expended by a
self-represented litigant. Absent a showing of actual costs, there is nothing to award.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Neither “arising in” nor “related to”
jurisdiction exists. Plaintiff's malpractice claim traces to legal advice given years
before the bankruptcy was filed; the bankruptcy may have revealed the alleged wrong
but did not create it. No estate asset is at risk, and this Court's prior orders are final
and enforceable regardless of any state court proceeding. In the alternative,
mandatory abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) would independently compel the
same result for the reasons set forth above.
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The Motion to Remand (Adv. Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED.
2. This adversary proceeding is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, Case No. 26-
000947. The Clerk of Court is directed to take all steps necessary to effectuate
this remand.
3. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Adv. Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED AS MOOT,
without prejudice to renewal in the state court forum.
4. Plaintiff's request for costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is DENIED.
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Copies to: all parties in interest
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