BERGAU v. DIXON et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
CAMERON BERGAU,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-134-MCR-MJF
RICKY DIXON, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a second
amended civil-rights complaint Doc. 14. The undersigned recommends
that 	this 	case 	be 	dismissed 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1915(e)(2)(B) 	and
1915A(b), based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.
P LAINTIFF’S SECOND A MENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections
(“FDC”) housed at the Graceville Correctional Institution. Doc. 14 at 2.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint names seven Defendants. Id. at 1–
4. 	Six 	Defendants 	are 	employed 	at 	the 	Washington 	Correctional
Institution (Officer Bryant, Sergeant Gordon, Warden Duvall, Officer
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Ketchum, Officer Stein and Captain Jones). The remaining Defendant is
the FDC Secretary Ricky Dixon. Plaintiff sues each Defendant in their
individual and official capacities. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff’s claims arise from the following incidents: (1) Plaintiff
was placed in “confinement” December 5–12, 2024, because he disobeyed
an order to return to his dormitory after the medical department denied
Plaintiff’s “psychological emergency”; (2) Captain Jones placed Plaintiff
on property restriction (confiscation of all clothing, bedding and property
except boxer shorts) for 20 hours on December 20, 2024, after a use of
force 	on 	Plaintiff; 	(3) 	Plaintiff 	was 	placed 	on 	property 	restriction
December 24–28, 2024, after Plaintiff “had a breakdown episode.” Doc.
14 at 6–10.
Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claims” consists of two counts:
● 	Count 1 – Eighth Amendment violation for:
(1) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s mental-health needs;
(2) “depriv[ation] of basic human necessities during the month
of December, normally a very cold period of the year, once for
20 hours and the other for approx. a week.”
● 	Count 	2 	– 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	violation 	for 	placing
Plaintiff 	on 	property 	restriction 	without 	a 	hearing 	or
penological justification.
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Doc. 	14 	at 	11–12. 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	both 	counts 	against 	all 	seven
Defendants because they “are all staff where the incident occurred or of
the Florida prison system and failed to protect [Plaintiff] and his rights
as a United States citizen, even after becoming aware of the violations.”
Id. at 12. Plaintiff is seeking damages. Id. at 11.
S CREENING STANDARD UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding in forma pauperis,
the District Court is required to review Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint, identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (corresponding standard applicable to in
forma pauperis proceedings).
To prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007));
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
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plaintiff 	pleads 	factual 	content 	that 	allows 	the 	court 	to 	draw 	the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint containing only “naked
assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual 	enhancement” 	or 	“[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted).
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is an Impermissible
“Shotgun” Pleading
Plaintiff’s 	second 	amended 	complaint 	asserts 	multiple 	claims
against 	multiple 	Defendants 	without 	specifying 	which 	particular
Defendant is responsible for which act or omission. The only specific act
Plaintiff attributes to a specific Defendant is Captain Jones placing
Plaintiff on property restriction for 20 hours on December 20, 2024. Doc.
14 at 7–8, 10.
The 	undersigned 	previously 	warned 	Plaintiff 	that 	shotgun
pleadings violate federal pleading standards and are subject to dismissal.
Doc. 13. The undersigned ordered Plaintiff to replead for that very
reason. Id. Despite this warning and instructions how to correct the
deficiency, 	Plaintiff’s 	second 	amended 	complaint 	remains 	an
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impermissible shotgun pleading. On this basis, alone, Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint may be dismissed. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878
F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A district court has the inherent
authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of
lawsuits, which includes the ability to dismiss a complaint on shotgun
pleading grounds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
However, because Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends that the
District Court dismiss the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
B. 	Section 1983 Standard
“A section 1983 claim is conditioned on two essential elements: first,
the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting
under color of state law; second, this conduct must have deprived the
plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
or the laws of the United States.” Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416,
1419 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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C. 	No Constitutional Violation
1. 	No Eighth-Amendment Violation
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible Eighth-Amendment claim based
on the property restriction. An Eighth-Amendment claim under § 1983
requires sufficient factual allegations on four elements:
1. the 	plaintiff 	suffered 	a 	deprivation 	that 	was 	“objectively,
‘sufficiently 	serious’”—one 	that 	posed 	a 	substantial 	risk 	of
serious harm to the plaintiff;
2. the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk
of serious harm;
3. the plaintiff suffered an injury; and
4. the defendant’s deliberate 	indifference 	caused the plaintiff’s
injury.
Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); Chandler v. Crosby, 379
F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court has set a high bar for the objective component
of a claim challenging 	a condition of confinement. “The 	challenged
condition must be ‘extreme’”: the prisoner must show, at the very least,
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“that a condition of his confinement poses an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his future health or safety.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289
(quotation omitted). As part of this analysis, courts determine “whether
society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone
unwillingly to such a risk.” Id. (emphasis in original). Courts consider
both the “severity” and the “duration” of the prisoner’s exposure to the
challenged condition. Id. at 1295. Merely showing that prison conditions
are uncomfortable is not enough. Id.; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 	337, 	347 	(1981) 	(“To 	the 	extent 	that 	[prison] 	conditions 	are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.”).
To satisfy the deliberate indifference element, a plaintiff must
allege that the defendant “was actually, subjectively aware that his own
conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade,
106 F.4th at 1262 (quoting 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). “[D]eliberate
indifference 	describes 	a 	state 	of 	mind 	more 	blameworthy 	than
negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
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Plaintiff fails to allege any of the required elements for an Eighth-
Amendment 	violation. 	Regarding 	the 	objective 	component, 	Plaintiff
alleges that December was “a period of cold temperature below 30°”
during the 20-hour and weeklong property restrictions. Doc. 14 at 6.
These facts do not raise a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was exposed
to an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his health or safety. See
Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289; cf. McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172, 175
(5th Cir. 1978) (no constitutional violation when pretrial detainee who
had just attempted suicide was placed in a “strip cell” for 90 days without
clothing, a mattress, sheets, or blankets); O’Connor v. Kelley, 644 F. App’x
928, 930–32 (11th Cir. 2016) (prisoner’s placement in “cold cell” for
“longer than 72 hours (weeks)” without a blanket, mattress, or bed, and
with only a “suicide shroud” to wear, failed to satisfy objective component
for Eighth-Amendment violation); Turner v. Warden, GDCP, 650 F. App’x
695, 701–02 (11th Cir. 2016) (prisoner’s placement in strip cell naked for
ten days in October during which he suffered cold failed to satisfy
objective 	component 	for 	Eighth-Amendment 	violation); 	Woodson 	v.
Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 932 (11th Cir. 2016) (prisoner’s allegations
that he was confined, for disciplinary confinement, without clothing other
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than boxer shorts, bedding, or hygienic materials for 72 hours during
April and August in Florida did not involve the type of extreme prison
conditions that would create a substantial risk of serious harm).
Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the deliberate-indifference element.
Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant “was actually, subjectively
aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to
the plaintiff.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. The mere fact that Defendants
saw the conditions in which Plaintiff was held during the property
restriction is not enough to show that any Defendant believed Plaintiff’s
health or safety to be at substantial risk of serious harm. Woodson, 673
F. 	App’x 	at 	932 	(prisoner’s 	allegation 	that 	prison 	warden 	saw 	the
conditions in which prisoner was held during disciplinary confinement,
i.e., 	without 	clothing other than 	boxer shorts, 	bedding, 	or hygienic
materials for 72 hours, was not a sufficient allegation that warden and
three other prison officials believed that prisoner’s health or safety was
at risk).
Plaintiff’s 	Eighth-Amendment 	claim 	based 	on 	deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s mental-health needs falls even farther from the
mark. Plaintiff does not allege that any individual Defendant actually
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was aware that Plaintiff had an immediate need for mental-health
treatment 	yet 	deliberately 	delayed 	or 	denied 	Plaintiff 	access 	to
treatment. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262; see also Moore v. Hunter, 847 F.
App’x 694, 696–98 (11th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff describes one instance
where he reported a “psychological emergency” on December 5, 2024. In
response to that report, “Echo Dorm Staff” arranged for Plaintiff to speak
with a member of the medical department who, in turn, determined that
Plaintiff did not require immediate mental-health treatment. See Doc. 14
at 	6. 	Plaintiff’s threadbare 	allegations 	fail to 	support 	a reasonable
inference that any named Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a
serious medical need.
Because Plaintiff fails to allege that any individual Defendant
violated the Eighth Amendment, Count 1 of Plaintiff’s complaint should
be dismissed for failure state a claim on which relief may be granted.
2. 	No Fourteenth-Amendment Violation
In Count 2, Plaintiff claims that he was not provided a formal
hearing before being placed on property restriction, which deprived him
of due process. Doc. 14 at 12.
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Courts recognize two situations in which a prisoner is deprived of
his liberty such that due process is required. Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d
1285, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 1999). First, a prisoner is entitled to due process
when a change in his conditions of confinement “is so severe that it
essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court.” Id. at 1291.
Second, a prisoner has a liberty interest where the state consistently has
provided a benefit to a prisoner and deprivation of that benefit imposes
an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–86 (1995).
“The Due Process Clause does not create an enforceable liberty
interest in freedom from restrictive confinement while a prisoner is
incarcerated.” Woodson, 673 F. App’x at 933 (first citing Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); and then Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484–87). “Nor
does it create a liberty interest in the ‘mandatory’ language of prison
rules and regulations.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482–84.
Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that property restriction is the
kind of change in conditions of confinement that exceeds the sentence
already imposed, or that imposes an atypical or significant hardship on
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Plaintiff. See Kirby, 195 F.3d at 1291; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482–86;
Woodson, 673 F. App’x at 933; Turner, 650 F. App’x at 700–02.
Because Plaintiff fails to allege that any individual Defendant
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Count 2
of Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure state a claim.
D. 	No Official-Capacity Claim
In addition to the individual-capacity claims for damages, Plaintiff
also 	asserts 	official-capacity 	claims 	against 	the 	Defendants. 	These
claims, however, are barred as a matter of law by Eleventh-Amendment
sovereign immunity.
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)); Christman
v. Saint Lucie County, Florida, 509 F. App’x 878, 879 (11th Cir. 2013) (in
a section 1983 action, “a claim against a defendant in his official capacity
is the same as a claim against his employer.” (citing McMillian v. Monroe
County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997))). Eleventh-Amendment
sovereign immunity bars suits by an individual against a State, its
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agencies, and its employees in their official capacities, unless Congress
has abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity or the State has consented
to the lawsuit. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890).
Congress has not abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity in
actions for damages under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 67–68 (1989). Furthermore, Florida has not waived its sovereign
immunity in § 1983 actions. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400
(11th Cir. 1986) (“Florida’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity was not
intended to encompass section 1983 suits for damages.” (internal citation
and quotations omitted)).
Because Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims are barred as a matter of
law, 	they 	must 	be 	dismissed. 	Pennhurst 	State 	Sch. 	& 	Hosp. 	v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984) (state official cannot be sued in
his official capacity for damages); Zatler, 802 F.2d at 400 (FDC official
was immune from suit in his official capacity); Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of
Health & Rehab. Serv., 779 F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir.1986) (Eleventh
Amendment bars “damages awards against state officers sued in their
official capacities in suits brought in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.”).
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CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DISMISS this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b), based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.
2. 	DIRECT the clerk of court to enter judgment accordingly and
close this case.
At Panama City, Florida, this 23rd day of October, 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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