BOZEMAN v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
JESSICA BOZEMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE,
Defendant.
_________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this case by filing an emergency
complaint, ECF No. 1, seeking “prospective non-dispositive relief”
concerning three animals 1 who are being held in the Tallahassee-Leon
County Animal Services Center. Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3.
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and service
was directed, requiring an expedited response. ECF No. 6. In response,
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, ECF No. 12, and a response,
1 The animals at issue are dogs. ECF No. 1 at 2.
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ECF No. 13, in opposition to the emergency motion for a temporary
restraining order. Plaintiff has filed a notice of supplemental facts, 2 ECF
No. 10, and a memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss,
ECF No. 18. Those motions are ready for a ruling.
Underlying Facts
The City of Tallahassee brought an action in state court against
Plaintiff Jessica Bozeman, seeking custody of four dogs and prohibiting
Ms. Bozeman “from possessing or having custody of domestic animals.”
See City of Tallahassee v Jessica Bozeman, 2026 CC 000429. ECF No. 4
at 4; see also ECF No. 12 at 2. Judgment was entered in favor of the City
and against Ms. Bozeman on February 27, 2026. ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No.
4 at 4-8.
The “Final Judgment” transferred custody of four dogs to the City of
Tallahassee. ECF No. 4 at 7. The Order stated that “Respondent, Jessica
Bozeman, shall have no further custody of the three (3) remaining dogs.” 3
2 Plaintiff’s notice concerns the status of the three animals at issue and the
remains of the fourth animal. ECF No. 10. The notice has been reviewed.
3 One dog, Shianne, has already been euthanized. ECF No. 1 at 1. The other
three dogs have been “temporarily placed . . . in administrative hold status.” Id. at 4.
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Id. 	Ms. Bozeman filed an appeal to the First District Court of Appeal which
is still pending. 	Id.
Ms. Bozeman’s emergency motion seeks to prevent the City from
placing the dogs up for adoption and from “transferring, fostering, rescuing,
euthanizing, relocating, sterilizing, surrendering, or subjecting” the dogs to
“irreversible disposition or permanent transfer of custody while state
appellate review remains pending . . . .” ECF No. 3 at 2. Her complaint
asserts a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ECF No. 1 at 5, and
the request for relief within the complaint mirrors the request from the
emergency motion. 	Id. at 6.
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12
The City points out that it lawfully seized the dogs from Ms. Bozeman
“following a finding of probable cause” that her minor son “had engaged in
sexual abuse of” one of the dogs. ECF No. 12 at 2. The Final Judgment
was entered after notice was given to Ms. Bozeman and she was provided
an opportunity to be heard during an evidentiary hearing. 	Id. at 3. That
Judgment ordered that permanent custody of the dogs “be turned over to
the City of Tallahassee Animal Services.” 	Id.
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The City further explains that Ms. Bozeman filed multiples motions to
stay and motions to review in the county court and the court of appeal. 	Id.
at 4. Both “the county court and the appellate court have denied the
motions,” 4 id, and Ms. Bozeman acknowledges that fact in her initial
complaint. 	See ECF No. 1 at 3 (“Prior state preservation and stay requests
have been denied or failed to result in enforceable preservation of the
animals”). Her “emergency motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction” contends that her instant request “for temporary
non-disposition preservation” does not duplicate the request she filed in the
Florida First District Court of Appeal “seeking conditional structured
placement or limited remand,” and she advises that motion was “pending,”
at least as of May 4, 2026. ECF No. 3 at 4.
The City asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this action
and strips this Court of jurisdiction. ECF No. 12 at 5. Further, the City’s
motion to dismiss argues that this Court must abstain under Younger v
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 	Id. at 13. Additional arguments are that
4 The District Court of Appeal denied her motion to stay. ECF No. 12 at 4. The
City advises that Ms. Bozeman filed five motions in the appellate court and three
motions in county court. Id. (citing to ECF No. 11-1). Ms. Bozeman acknowledges that
her stay requests were denied. ECF No. 1 at 3; see also ECF No. 4 at 9.
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Plaintiff lacks Article III standing and her complaint fails to state a claim. 	Id.
at 19-29.
In response, Ms. Bozeman argues that her injury is not the final
judgment, this case is not barred by Rooker-Feldman, and Younger
abstention does not apply. ECF No. 18 at 1-2. She contends those
“arguments are internally contradictory” because state proceedings cannot
be both final and ongoing. 	Id. at 3. Finally, she asserts that the complaint
should not be dismissed because she has standing and has stated a due
process claim. 	Id. at 3-4.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A well established body of law known as the “Rooker-Feldman
doctrine” bars federal district courts from reviewing state court decisions.
Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). “The
Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies when ‘state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments’ bring later claims in federal
district court that invite the district court to review5 and reject the earlier
state-court judgments.” 	Alvarez v. Att’y Gen., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th
5 To be clear, the Court has reviewed only the “Final Judgment” as referenced in
Plaintiff’s complaint and not other attachments provided. See ECF No. 17.
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Cir. 2012). In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), the Supreme Court
clarified that the Rooker–Feldman “doctrine is ‘confined to cases of the kind
from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.’” Target Media Partners v.
Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2018).
The doctrine applies where an issue presented to the district court is
“inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.” Alvarez, 679 F.3d
at 1262. A claim is “inextricably intertwined” if it asks a federal court to
“effectively nullify the state court judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent
that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Target Media Partners,
881 F.3d at 1286. 	Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional doctrine because “[i]t
is well-settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review,
reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision.” Harper v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 138 F. App’x 130, 132 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Dale v.
Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997)).
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Here, Ms. Bozeman argues that this action is not barred because her
“alleged injury is not the entry of the Final Judgment” but, instead, it is the
threatened loss of the dogs “before appellate review concludes.” ECF No.
18 at 1. She contends that granting relief in her favor “would not require
finding the state judgment erroneous.” 	Id. at 2. Her emergency motion
states that she “does not ask this Court to reverse, modify, vacate, review,
or stay the state Final Judgment.” ECF No. 3 at 2. Rather, her complaint
seeks to prevent the City from transferring custody of the dogs through
adoption, fostering, or rescue and seeks to prevent them from being
euthanized during her appeal. ECF No. 1 at 6.
Importantly, a final judgment was entered against Ms. Bozeman and
in favor of the City in county court. The judgment was based on the court’s
conclusion that Ms. Bozeman did not meet her burden “to prove she is able
and fit to have custody of and adequately provide for” the dogs at issue.
ECF No. 4 at 5. Her custody of the dogs was terminated and the dogs
were placed in the custody of the City. 	Id. at 7. Ms. Bozeman’s “injury” is
directly caused by the Final Judgment - her loss of possession of the dogs
which renders her unable to control what the City does with the dogs.
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It would appear that her claim in this case is inextricably intertwined
with the Final Judgment as entered by County Court Judge Nina Ashenafi-
Richardson on February 27, 2026, because she is asking this Court to
nullify the Judgment by forbidding the City to assert its authority over
property which was placed in its custody - four dogs. Although she argues
that she is not seeking to vacate the state court order in this case, see ECF
No. 3 at 2, and she contends she is merely requesting the dogs be
preserved in this action, Ms. Bozeman’s ultimate purpose is to “obtain
restoration” of the animals. 	Id. at 8. She contends that if the “animals are
disposed of,” her “appeal risks becoming a paper exercise.” 	Id. 	Yet the
ongoing appeal presents an additional issue - has the state proceeding
ended for purposes of Rooker–Feldman? 	That question was addressed
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal in Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d
1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009).
There, the Court pointed to its earlier decision in Powell v. Powell, 80
F.3d 464 (11th Cir.1996), which “implie[d] that the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine does not apply where a state court loser has appealed to the state
appellate court.” Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1276. However, there is no longer
a need to rely on an implication as the Eleventh Circuit has now clearly
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held “that state proceedings have not ended for purposes of
Rooker–Feldman when an appeal from the state court judgment remains
pending at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action that
complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment and invites review
and rejection of that judgment.” 558 F.3d at 1279.
The City argues that “[t]he pendency of the state appeal is irrelevant”
because this action “does not challenge the issues raised on appeal.” ECF
No. 12 at 10-11. First, regardless of what issues are currently on appeal,
this Court must recognize the undisputed fact between the parties that an
appeal is currently pending. If the state court proceedings have not ended,
then Rooker-Feldman does not bar this action. Second, if plaintiffs filed an
action in federal court, requesting the court “to consider whether their
constitutional rights were violated during the proceedings and whether they
are entitled to damages for those violations,” such a claim “falls outside
Rooker-Feldman’s boundaries.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1213
(11th Cir. 2021) (finding that due process claim was not barred).
Ms. Bozeman’s claim in this Court is a due process claim. ECF No. 1 at 5.
The argument that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be denied.
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Younger Abstention
The City next argues that the Younger abstention doctrine compels
this Court to “decline the exercise of jurisdiction . . . out of respect for the
independence of state court proceedings.” ECF No. 12 at 13. The City
argues that this case fits within two categories of cases which require
abstention. 	Id. at 14. First, the underlying state court case was brought
pursuant to F LA. STAT . § 828.073, 6 a “civil enforcement statute through
which” the City initiated a proceeding against Ms. Bozeman for violating
Florida's animal welfare laws. ECF No. 12 at 14. According to the City,
that is “a civil enforcement proceeding akin to a criminal prosecution within”
the second category of Younger abstention cases. Additionally, it is argued
that this is also a civil proceeding “that implicate[s] a state court’s interest
in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” 	Id. at 15. Of course,
Ms. Bozeman disagrees. ECF No. 18 at 2. She argues this case does not
fall within one of the three exceptional categories. 	Id.
6 The Final Judgment said that the trial court “considered evidence properly
presented pursuant to Section 828.073(5)(a), (d), (e), and (h), Florida Statutes.” ECF
No. 4 at 5. Section 828.073 provides for the removal and care of animals which have
been “neglected or mistreated.”
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At the outset, this Court highlights for the parties that “federal courts
are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction.” Sprint
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588, 187 L. Ed.
2d 505 (2013). The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]bstention is not in
order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same
subject matter.” Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 72, 134 S. Ct. at 588.
While the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging” obligation
to hear the cases before them, the Younger doctrine presents a
narrow exception. [31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255,
1274 (11th Cir. 2003)] (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47
L.Ed.2d 483 (1976)). 	Younger “requires a federal court to
abstain where a plaintiff's federal claims could be adjudicated in
a pending state judicial proceeding.” 	Deakins v. Monaghan,
484 U.S. 193, 202, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988).
Leonard v. Alabama State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F.4th 902, 907 (11th Cir.
2023). “The Supreme Court has recognized only three types of state
proceedings where abstention is warranted: (1) ‘criminal prosecutions’; (2)
‘civil enforcement proceedings’; and (3) ‘civil proceedings involving certain
orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ... judicial
functions.’” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 105 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1989)
(NOPSI) (quoted in Leonard, 61 F.4th at 907-08).
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The first consideration is whether the underlying state court
proceeding was a “civil enforcement proceeding.” Court “decisions
applying Younger to instances of civil enforcement have generally
concerned state proceedings ‘akin to a criminal prosecution’ in ‘important
respects.’” Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 79, 134 S. Ct. at 592 (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court explained the characteristics of such actions
as sanctioning the federal plaintiff “for some wrongful act,” involving “a
state actor who “often initiates the action,” and which involves the
enforcement of state law, commonly begun by an investigation which
culminates “in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.” 571 U.S. at 79-
80 (citations omitted); see also Watson v. Fla. Jud. Qualifications Comm’n,
618 F. App’x 487, 490 (11th Cir. 2015). The Court agrees with the City that
the underlying proceeding based on the enforcement of Florida’s animal
welfare law is a civil enforcement proceeding.
The next consideration is “whether the case warrants Younger
abstention” by analyzing the three factors from Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) - “(1) do the
proceedings constitute ‘an ongoing state judicial proceeding,’ (2) ‘do the
proceedings implicate important state interests,’ and (3) ‘is there an
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adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges.’” Morancy v. Salomon, No. 24-12505, 2025 WL 1341957, at *2
(11th Cir. May 8, 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 888, 223 L. Ed. 2d 276
(2025) (quoting Middlesex). The first factor is simple - both parties agree
that Ms. Bozeman’s appeal is still pending and, thus, “ongoing.”
The second factor is also simple. “Proceedings implicate important
state interests when they are necessary for the vindication of vital state
policies.” Morancy, 2025 WL 1341957, at *2 (citing to 31 Foster Children,
329 F.3d at 1274). The State of Florida has an important interest in
preventing animal cruelty and has made animal cruelty a criminal offense.
FLA. STAT . § 828.12.
The third Middlesex factor puts the burden on the plaintiff to
demonstrate “that the state proceedings do not provide an adequate
remedy for their federal claims.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279
(quoted in Morancy, 2025 WL 1341957, at *3). This Court must “assume
that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of
unambiguous authority to the contrary.” 	Id. 	Ms. Bozeman has not shown
that she is unable to obtain an “adequate remedy” in the Florida First
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District Court of Appeal. Therefore, because all three Middlesex factors
have been met, abstention under Younger is appropriate. 7
“Younger abstention applies to claims for injunctive relief, as well as
claims for declaratory judgment that would effectively enjoin state
proceedings.” Watson, 618 F. App’x at 491 (citing to Old Republic Union
Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997)). Ms.
Bozeman’s only requests for relief in this case were for injunctive and
declaratory relief. ECF No. 1 at 6. Because the Younger abstention bars
this case, it is recommended that Ms. Bozeman’s motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3, be denied. 	See
Watson, 618 F. App’x at 491 (holding the district court “did not abuse its
discretion by dismissing Watson’s claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief” which were barred by Younger abstention). The Defendant City’s
motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12, should be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, ECF No. 12, based on Younger abstention be GRANTED, that
7 Briefly, this Court notes that “[e]xceptions to Younger abstention include bad
faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute.” 618 F. App’x at 490. None of
those exceptions apply in this case and Ms. Bozeman did not argue that they do.
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Plaintiff’s emergency motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to preserve specific animals from irreversible
municipal disposition, ECF No. 3, be DENIED; and this case be
DISMISSED.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on May 28, 2026.
S/ 	Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other
parties. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). 	Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	If a
party 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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