LEE v. DIXON

Page 1 of 12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
RUFUS LEE,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-43-MCR-MJF
RICKY DIXON,
Respondent.
____________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Rufus Lee has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Respondent (“the State”) moves to dismiss the
petition as untimely. Doc. 13. Lee opposes the motion. Doc. 16. The
undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required, and that
the District Court should dismiss Lee’s petition because it is time-barred.
B ACKGROUND
In Taylor County Circuit Court Case No. 2009-CF-218, Lee pleaded
no contest to second-degree murder with a firearm (Count One), armed
robbery with a firearm (Count Two), attempted first-degree murder with
a firearm (Count Three), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 1 of 12

Page 2 of 12
(Count Four). Doc. 13-2, Ex. 4.1 On November 29, 2010, the trial court
accepted Lee’s plea, orally adjudicated Lee guilty of the four counts, and
sentenced Lee to 40 years of imprisonment with a 25-year mandatory
minimum followed by 10 years on probation for Counts One, Two and
Three; and 15 years of imprisonment for Count Four. Ex. 2. All counts
were imposed concurrently. Id. On November 29, 2010, the court entered
a 	written 	judgment 	that 	adjudicated 	Lee 	guilty 	and 	contained 	the
sentencing forms. Ex. 5–6. The written sentence misstated the Count
Four sentence by including a 10-year term of probation. Ex. 6. Lee moved
to withdraw his plea, but the trial court denied the motion on June 22,
2012. Ex. 8. Lee did not file a direct appeal. Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 13-2, Ex. 1.
On November 20, 2013, Lee filed a pro se motion for postconviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Ex. 9. The state
circuit court denied the motion. Ex. 1. The Florida First District Court of
Appeal (“First DCA”) affirmed without opinion. Lee v. State, 1D14-2888,
150 So. 3d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 2, 2014) (Table) (copy at Ex. 10). The
mandate issued October 29, 2014.
1 Citations to the state-court record are to the exhibits attached to the
State’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 13-2.
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 2 of 12

Page 3 of 12
On March 10, 2016, Lee filed a pro se motion to correct sentence
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Ex. 11. On April 20,
2016, the state circuit court denied the motion. Ex. 1. Lee’s appeal was
dismissed as untimely. Lee v. State, 1D16-2541, 194 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 1st
DCA July 8, 2016) (per curiam) (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.420(a)(2); Rivera
v. Dep’t of Health, 177 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)) (copy at Ex. 12).
On October 12, 2020, Lee filed a second pro se motion under Rule
3.800(a), followed by an identical copy of same on May 18, 2021. Exs. 13,
14. The state circuit court denied the motion. Ex. 15. The First DCA
affirmed without opinion. Lee v. State, 1D22-157, 344 So. 3d 404 (Fla. 1st
DCA Aug. 11, 2022) (Table) (copy at Ex. 16).
On March 10, 2022, Lee filed a fourth pro se motion under Rule
3.800(a), followed by a fifth. Exs. 17, 18. The state circuit court denied
the motions. Ex. 19. On appeal, the First DCA ruled:
We affirm without comment as to all of Appellant’s
claims except for the Count Four claim that his sentence for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon exceeds the
statutory maximum.
As to Count Four, in response to this Court’s Toler order,
the 	State 	concedes 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	did 	not 	address
Appellant’s illegal sentence 	claim and that 	the 	appellate
record does not conclusively refute it. See Toler v. State, 493
So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D);
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 3 of 12

Page 4 of 12
Johnson v. State, 252 So. 3d 1289, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
(remanding for further proceedings under rule 3.800(a)). The
State’s response also noted a scrivener’s error in the written
sentencing document with the inclusion of Count Four in the
Order of Probation. Under these circumstances, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings as to Count Four.
AFFIRMED 	in 	part, 	REVERSED 	in 	part, 	and
REMANDED.
Lee v. State, 373 So. 3d 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (copy at Ex. 20).
On remand, the state circuit court acknowledged the “scrivener’s
error” 	in 	the 	written 	sentencing 	document, 	and 	ordered 	that 	the
sentencing document be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement
of sentence by removing the paragraph about the probationary term on
Count Four. Ex. 21. On January 3, 2024, the court entered an “Amended
Judgement [sic] *as to Ct-4 only*” that removed the probationary term
on Count Four. Ex. 22. The amended judgment was designated: “Nunc
pro tunc Nov. 29, 2010.” Id.
Lee filed his federal habeas petition on January 27, 2025. Doc. 1.
The State asserts that Lee’s petition must be dismissed because it is
barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Doc. 13.
DISCUSSION
A. 	The Federal Habeas Limitations Period
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 4 of 12

Page 5 of 12
The 	Antiterrorism 	and 	Effective 	Death 	Penalty 	Act 	of 	1996
(“AEDPA”) governs Lee’s § 2254 petition, because the petition was filed
after AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320 (1997). AEDPA establishes a 1-year period of limitation for a
state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The limitations period runs from the latest of:
(A) 	the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws
of 	the 	United 	States 	is 	removed, 	if 	the 	applicant 	was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) 	the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the 	Supreme 	Court 	and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) 	the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
§ 2244(d)(1). The limitations period is tolled for “[t]he time during which
a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review” is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
B. 	The Statute of Limitations Is Measured From the Date Lee’s
2010 Judgment Became Final
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 5 of 12

Page 6 of 12
Lee 	does 	not 	assert 	that 	an 	unconstitutional 	State-created
impediment to filing his federal habeas petition existed, that he bases his
claims on a right newly recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
or that the facts supporting his claims could not have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence before his judgment became final.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations is measured from the remaining
trigger, which is the date Lee’s judgment became final. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1).
In Florida, defendants are required to commence direct appeals
within thirty days of rendition of the judgment and sentence. Fla. R. App.
P. 9.140(b)(3). A timely motion to withdraw plea “delays rendition of the
judgment and sentence until the court files a signed, written order
disposing of the motion.” Haber v. State, 961 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007).
The trial court filed its signed, written order denying Lee’s motion
to withdraw plea on June 22, 2012. Lee, therefore, had thirty days from
that date—i.e., until July 23, 2012—to file a direct appeal.2
2 The thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, so Lee’s thirty-day window closed on
Monday, July 23, 2012. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.420(e); Fla. R. Gen. Prac. &
Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(C).
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 6 of 12

Page 7 of 12
Lee did not file a direct appeal. Thus, Lee’s judgment became final
for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) on July 23, 2012—the date his time for
seeking direct review expired. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150
(2012).
C. 	The State Court’s Correction of Lee’s Sentence on January
3, 2024, Did Not Restart the One-Year Clock
The state court amended Lee’s sentence on January 3, 2024. That
raises the question of whether the amended sentence created a new
judgment for purposes of § 2244. As previously discussed, the amended
sentence corrected a scrivener’s error by removing the probationary term
from Count Four to conform to the oral pronouncement of that sentence.
The state court issued its change nunc pro tunc to the date of the original
judgment and sentence, which was November 29, 2010. The state court’s
nunc pro tunc designation relates back to Lee’s original judgment and,
therefore, the federal clock for the one-year limitations period did not
reset. Cassidy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 119 F.4th 1336, 1341–42 (11th
Cir. 2024) (state court’s designation of amended sentence as nunc pro
tunc related back to date of the original judgment and was not a new
judgment for purposes of § 2244(d)); Osbourne v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
968 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2020) (same).
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 7 of 12

Page 8 of 12
D. 	Lee’s Petition Is Untimely
The federal habeas limitations period began to run on July 24, 2012,
and expired one year later on July 24, 2013. San Martin v. McNeil, 633
F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011); Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1318
(11th Cir. 2008). Lee did not file any application that qualified for tolling
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), during that critical one-year period.
None of Lee’s later state postconviction filings triggered the tolling
benefit 	of 	§ 	2244(d)(2), 	because 	the 	limitations 	period 	already 	had
expired. See Alexander v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 523 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2008) (a state-court motion for postconviction relief cannot toll the
limitations period if that period already expired); Webster v. Moore, 199
F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). Nor did the later filings reinitiate the
limitations period. Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001).
Lee’s federal habeas petition, filed on January 27, 2025, is untimely
by more than eleven years.
E. 	Lee’s Untimely Petition Should Be Dismissed
Lee argues that his untimely petition should be considered because
he qualifies for the Martinez exception for excusing a procedural default.
Doc. 16 at 1 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)). Lee’s reliance
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 8 of 12

Page 9 of 12
on 	Martinez 	is misplaced. “[T]he 	Martinez 	rule explicitly relates to
excusing a procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims and does
not apply to AEDPA’s statute of limitations or the tolling of that period.”
Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 630 (11th Cir. 2014).
Lee’s allegations that he did not have the assistance of counsel in
his state-court postconviction proceedings does not demonstrate that Lee
is entitled to equitable tolling or any other exception to the limitations
bar. Perez v. Florida, 519 F. App’x 995, 997 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have
not accepted a lack of a legal education and related confusion or ignorance
about the law as excuses for a failure to file in a timely fashion. As with
any litigant, pro se litigants ‘are deemed to know of the one-year statute
of limitations.’” (first citing Rivers v. United States, 416 F.3d 1319, 1323
(11th Cir. 2005); and then quoting Outler v. United States, 485 F.3d 1273,
1282 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2007))).
Lee’s untimely petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
A CERTIFICATE OF A PPEALABILITY IS N OT WARRANTED
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts provides: “[t]he district court must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 9 of 12

Page 10 of 12
applicant.” If a certificate is issued, “the court must state the specific
issue 	or 	issues 	that 	satisfy 	the 	showing 	required 	by 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2253(c)(2).” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must
still be filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(b).
“[Section] 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a
petitioner 	has 	made 	a 	‘substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional right.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)). “At the COA stage, the only question is
whether the applicant has shown that jurists of reason could disagree
with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115
(2017). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,
a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 10 of 12

Page 11 of 12
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner has not made the requisite demonstration. Accordingly,
the court should deny a certificate of appealability in its final order.
“Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to
submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254 Rule 11(a). If there is an objection to this recommendation, the
relevant party shall file such an objection with the District Court.
C ONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	GRANT Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 13.
2. 	DISMISS 	with 	prejudice 	Petitioner’s 	habeas 	corpus
petition, Doc. 1, because it is time-barred.
3. 	DENY a certificate of appealability.
4. 	DIRECT the clerk of court to close this case file.
At Panama City, Florida, this 6th day of November, 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 11 of 12

Page 12 of 12
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Case 4:25-cv-00043-MCR-MJF Document 17 Filed 11/06/25 Page 12 of 12