CLINE v. THE PEP BOYS MANNY MOE & JACK LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
BUCCIE CLINE, III,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No.: 3:26cv565/MCR/ZCB
THE PEP BOYS MANNY
MOE & JACK LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP) in this
civil rights action. 	On January 29, 2026, the Court ordered Plaintiff to
show cause as to why his claims should not be dismissed as time-barred.1
(Doc. 7). Plaintiff has responded to the show cause order. (Doc. 8).
I. 	Discussion
Constitutional 	claims 	brought 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	are
“governed 	by 	the 	forum 	state’s 	residual 	personal 	injury 	statute 	of
limitations.” Doe as Next Friend of Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295,
1302-03 (11th Cir. 2022). This means in “Florida . . . such an action must
1 See Lindley v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 452 F. App’x 878, 880-81 (11th
Cir. 2011) (noting a district court must give “adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard” before dismissing a complaint as time-barred).
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be commenced within four years.” 	Id. at 1303. Claims under § 1981 are
subject to the same four-year statute of limitations. 	Smith v. Lakeview
Ctr., No. 3:23cv24676, 2024 WL 2117753, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 10, 2024).
Under Florida law, negligence claims accruing after March 24,
2023, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations; claims accruing
before are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. 	Fla. Stat. §
95.11(5)(a); Flynn v. Berkley Vacation Resorts, 2025 WL 3091000, at *2
n.2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2025); McConley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2025 WL
3190880, at *6 n.7 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025), adopted, 2025 WL 3033907
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2025). 	A four-year statute of limitations also applies
to civil battery claims under Florida law.2 	Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(n);
Scullock v. Gee, 161 So. 3d 421, 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
2 Plaintiff’s first-party spoliation claim is not a recognized cause of action
under Florida law. 	See Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So. 2d 342,
345 n.2 (Fla. 2005) (“First-party spoliation claims are claims in which the
defendant who allegedly lost, misplaced, or destroyed the evidence was
also a tortfeasor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries or damages. These
actions are contrasted with third-party spoliation claims, which occur
when a person or an entity, though not a party to the underlying action
causing the plaintiff’s injuries or damages, lost, misplaced, or destroyed
evidence critical to that action.”); Kubisiak v. Gualtieri, 723 F. Supp. 3d
1154, 1173 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (“There is no independent cause of action for
first-party spoliation of evidence in Florida . . . . 	[U]nder Florida law,
presumptions and sanctions are the appropriate remedy for first-party
spoliation.”). Thus, this claim is subject to dismissal on that basis alone.
Even if Plaintiff alleged third-party spoliation against non-parties, such
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The “statute of limitations begins to run” when “the facts which
would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a
person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” 	Bridges v. Poe,
155 F.4th 1302, 1319 (11th Cir. 2025); see also Porter v. Ogden, Newell &
Welch, 241 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2001) (Florida law) (“[A] cause of
action for negligence does not accrue until the existence of a redressable
harm or injury has been established and the injured party knows or
should know of either the injury or the negligent act”); Scullock, 161 So.
3d at 422 (“An excessive-use-of-force claim is properly considered a
battery. 	As such, it is subject to a four-year statute of limitations.
Scullock’s cause of action accrued at the time of his alleged injury . . . .”
(cleaned up)).
claims are unripe and subject to dismissal given Plaintiff’s underlying
claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See Amerisure Ins. Co. v.
Rodriguez, 255 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“[T]hird-party
spoliation claims should generally be abated or dismissed until the
underlying tort claim is resolved.”); Ramon v. Corp. City of New York, No.
17cv2307, 2019 WL 2271896, at *7 and n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019)
(dismissing spoliation claim because “there is no independent cause of
action for spoliation available under . . . Florida law” and stating that
while discovery sanctions are available under procedural rules or a
court’s inherent power, “such relief would be inappropriate here, where
the plaintiff has failed to state any claims that are not time-barred”),
adopted, 2019 WL 1306061 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2019).
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Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a car service entity, Pep
Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, LLC, and Escambia County Sheriff Chip
Simmons. 	(Doc. 1 at 3-5). 	On “September 5, 2019,” Plaintiff took his
vehicle to Pep Boys for service. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff allegedly got into an
altercation with Pep Boys employees. Law enforcement arrived and gave
Plaintiff a trespass warning. (Id.). Plaintiff brings state law negligence
and battery claims against Pep Boys. 	(Id. at 4). 	Against Pep Boys and
Sheriff Simmons, Plaintiff brings a state law spoliation claim and claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. (Id. at 4-5).
Plaintiff’s injury occurred and he was aware of the facts supporting
his claims on the day of the altercation at Pep Boys—September 5, 2019.3
(Doc. 1 at 3). 	But Plaintiff did not file his complaint until January 28,
2026, more than four years later. 	(Doc. 1 at 1). Because he filed his
complaint more than four years after his claim accrued, his claims appear
barred by the relevant statutes of limitations.
3 Plaintiff even admits that “Defendants knew or reasonably should have
known that litigation was foreseeable on September 5, 2019.” (Doc. 1 at
4). 	If Defendants knew or should have known of Plaintiff’s potential
claims on September 5, 2019, then Plaintiff either knew or should have
known of his potential causes of action at the same time—especially given
the allegedly obvious altercation that occurred here.
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The Court previously notified Plaintiff of the statute of limitations
issue. (Doc. 7 at 1-5). The Court also advised Plaintiff on the availability
of equitable tolling and provided him an opportunity to assert qualifying
circumstances in his response to the show cause order. (Id. at 5-6).
In response, Plaintiff argues that statute of limitations issues
should not be resolved at the screening stage and should be resolved later
after factual development. (Doc. 8 at 1-2). Plaintiff argues his claims did
not accrue on September 5, 2019, and equitable tolling should apply
because of Defendants’ failure to preserve evidence, obstruction, and
continuing harm from the trespass designation. 	(Id. at 1-3). 	Plaintiff
also argues he is not asserting a standalone spoliation claim but is
alleging spoliation as “evidence of misconduct . . . .” (Id. at 2).
A. Courts routinely dismiss untimely claims at screening.
As to Plaintiff’s argument that statute of limitations issues should
not be resolved at screening, the Supreme Court has explicitly said if
allegations “show that 	relief is barred by the 	applicable 	statute 	of
limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim[.]” 	Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). 	Because Plaintiff is
proceeding IFP, the Court must dismiss his complaint if it fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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Courts routinely dismiss untimely complaints in IFP cases at the
screening stage; thus, Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. 	See Zamudio v.
Haskins, 775 F. App’x 614, 616-17 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal
of complaint at the screening stage because the claims were barred by
the statute of limitations and tolling did not apply); see also Dinkle v.
Alabama, No. 2:23cv218, 2023 WL 4675958, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 1,
2023) (finding that dismissal was warranted at the screening stage
because it was clear from the complaint that the claims were barred by
the statute of limitations); Jackson v. Scott, 2021 WL 1931110, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. May 10, 2021) (dismissing a complaint at the screening stage
because it was barred by the statute of limitations and tolling did not
apply).
B. Plaintiff was aware or should have been aware of his claims
on September 5, 2019.
Plaintiff next argues his claims did not accrue on September 5,
2019, 	because 	Defendants’ 	alleged 	misuse 	of 	law 	enforcement,
suppression of evidence, and coordinated failure to preserve video was
not known or reasonably discoverable at that time. 	(Doc. 8 at 2). 	The
Court disagrees. The scope of Plaintiff’s knowledge is irrelevant because
the accrual rules for § 1983 actions say “nothing about a plaintiff knowing
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the ‘viability’ of the claim[.]” 	McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302,
1309 (11th Cir. 2020). 	“[S]imply knowing they were injured and who
inflicted the injury is enough.” 	Id. (cleaned up).
Simply put, Plaintiff knew of his alleged injuries when his vehicle
was damaged, his movement was blocked, and he was removed from the
Pep Boys store and trespassed—all of which occurred on September 5,
2019. 	(Doc. 1 at 3). 	And Plaintiff knew who was responsible for these
alleged acts as they occurred—Pep Boys and its employees and Escambia
County sheriff deputies. 	(Id.). 	Claim accrual in § 1983 actions “focuses
on 	the 	‘facts’ 	apparent 	or 	reasonably 	apparent 	to 	the 	plaintiff[.]”
McGroarty, 977 F.3d at 1309. 	Plaintiff cannot plausibly suggest that a
reasonable person would not have known such facts when Plaintiff was
present and aware for all of the events that occurred on September 5,
2019. 	Plaintiff not having every relevant record available to him on
September 5, 2019, does not alter this conclusion. Plaintiff did not need
such information to realize his alleged injuries.4 	See McCullough v.
4 See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1979) (“We are
unconvinced 	that 	for 	statute 	of 	limitations 	purposes 	a 	plaintiff’s
ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or
its cause should receive identical treatment. That he has been injured in
fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and
the facts about causation may be in the control of the putative defendant,
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United States, 607 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We are not
persuaded by Mr. McCullough’s argument that he could not have known
about the doctor-related cause until he had a reasonable opportunity to
obtain his medical records. He did not need his medical records to learn
the ‘critical facts’ indicating that he had been hurt and who had inflicted
the injury.”); McGinley v. Mauriello, 682 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir.
2017) (“While it is doubtless true, as the plaintiffs point out, that they
lacked the direct evidence of malfeasance that the Florida Highway
Patrol’s internal investigation ultimately revealed, such evidence is not
required for a claim to accrue. The limitations clock begins running when
a reasonable person would know they had a claim, not only when the
facts crystallize into a slam-dunk case.”).
C. The continuing violation doctrine does not apply.
Plaintiff next argues that he “continues to suffer consequences”
“from the September 5, 2019 incident including the effects of an allegedly
unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The
prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts
that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury. He is no longer at
the mercy of the latter. There are others who can tell him if he has been
wronged, and he need only ask.” (cleaned up)).
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false trespass designation and related records.” (Doc. 8 at 3). The Court
disagrees that the continuing violation doctrine is applicable here.
“The continuing violation doctrine allows the plaintiff to sue on
otherwise 	time-barred 	claims 	if 	the 	defendant’s 	actions 	violate 	a
plaintiff’s rights on a repeated or ongoing basis.” 	Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 146 F.4th 972, 992 (11th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). A plaintiff “must
identify 	more 	than 	a 	present 	harm 	from 	a 	past 	act 	to 	satisfy the
continuing violation doctrine.” 	Id. 	“A prior violation of a plaintiff’s
constitutional rights is not a continuing violation simply because its
effects 	linger 	into 	the 	present. 	Instead, 	[a 	court] 	must 	distinguish
between the present consequence of a one time violation, which does not
extend the limitations period, and the continuation of the violation into
the present, which does.” 	Doe, 51 F.4th at 1305 (cleaned up). 	“Only
ongoing violations satisfy the continuing violation doctrine and remain
timely despite accruing outside the statutory limitation period.” 	Id.
As explained above, Plaintiff was aware of the facts and injuries
supporting his claims on September 5, 2019. The alleged violations that
occurred on this date are discrete events with their own limitations
period. 	See Doe, 51 F.4th at 1306 (“When a discrete violation gives rise
to a new cause of action, then each new violation begins a new statute of
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limitations period as to that particular event.” (cleaned up)). Defendants’
alleged obstruction and failure to preserve evidence are separate events
with different limitations periods for any claims arising from them. 	See
id. (“Repeated similar violations are not the same as a single violation of
an ongoing nature.”); see also Jimenez, 146 F.4th at 992 (“A continuing
violation is also a single violation of an ongoing nature, not a series of
repeated violations that result in related harms.” (cleaned up)).
Because the interference Plaintiff allegedly experienced at some
unspecified5 period of time involved discrete and separate events from
those that occurred at the Pep Boys store on September 5, 2019, the
continuing violation doctrine does not apply here. See Ctr. For Biological
Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have
limited the application of the continuing violation doctrine to situations
in which a reasonably prudent plaintiff would have been unable to
5 See Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487 F.3d 641, 644 and n.5 (8th Cir. 2007)
(affirming district court’s decision not to apply the continuing violations
doctrine 	where 	the 	plaintiff 	“never 	designated 	the 	specific 	facts
supporting the application of the continuing violations doctrine” and
instead provided “general, conclusory, and cursory statements” such as
“there were many acts, thereafter, and inactions . . . that were part of the
continuing 	pattern 	of 	a 	hostile 	work 	environment” 	which 	“are 	not
sufficient” to apply the continuing violations doctrine).
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determine that a violation had occurred. If an event or series of events
should have alerted a reasonable person to act to assert his or her rights
at the time of the violation, the victim cannot later rely on the continuing
violation doctrine. Because a reasonably prudent plaintiff would have
been aware of the failure of the Secretary to act on the day following the
deadline, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply.” (cleaned up));
Steele v. City of Port Wentworth, Georgia, 2008 WL 717813, at *16 (S.D.
Ga. Mar. 17, 2008) (holding “that the closure of the road and the City’s
failure to reopen it constitute discrete acts that should have triggered
Plaintiffs’ awareness of their rights when the road was first blocked”).
Plaintiff still being bound by the trespass designation (which was
imposed on September 5, 2019) is also insufficient to apply the continuing
violation doctrine. 	See Betts v. Hall, 679 F. App’x 810, 813 (11th Cir.
2017) (“[T]he pre-January 2010 claims stemmed from discrete, one-time
violations, and the fact that Betts may continue to feel their effects does
not extend the statute of limitations.”). And this is not a situation where
Plaintiff was later arrested or fined for violating the trespass designation
or it was otherwise enforced against him. Instead, Plaintiff merely takes
issue with the initial designation itself, and passive effects related to it.
See McGroarty, 977 F.3d at 1308 and n.6 (“The initial publication of
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McGroarty’s 	information 	online 	was 	a 	‘one 	time’ 	act, 	even 	though
McGroarty is experiencing ‘present consequences’ of that action . . . .
McGroarty has not challenged an ongoing obligation to do anything.
Rather, he alleges only passive effects from a one-time act that occurred
in 2004.” (cleaned up)).
D. Tolling does not apply to save Plaintiff’s claims.
Lastly, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument that the
statute of limitations should be tolled given Defendants’ alleged failure
to preserve evidence and obstruction. (Doc. 8 at 1-2).
“Statutes of limitations are not mere technicalities; they serve an
important purpose in our legal system by requiring plaintiffs to pursue
diligent prosecution of known claims.” Zamudio v. Haskins, 775 F. App’x
614, 615 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). 	In § 1983 cases, “federal courts
refer 	typically 	to 	state 	law 	to 	determine 	the 	applicable 	statute 	of
limitations and tolling rules.” 	Id. 	at 615-16. 	Therefore, the Court
examines Florida statutory tolling before turning to equitable tolling
under federal law and Florida law.
Florida statutory law allows for tolling when: (1) the person being
sued is not in Florida; (2) the person being sued cannot be located because
of use of concealment or false name; (3) there is adjudicated incapacity of
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the person entitled to sue; (4) child payments are being made during
paternity 	actions; 	(5) 	there 	is 	pendency 	of 	any 	arbitral 	proceeding
pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of the action; (6) there is
intervening bankruptcy; or (7) the minority or adjudicated incapacity of
the person entitled to sue occurs during time in which a parent, guardian,
or guardian ad litem does not exist. 	Rager v. Augustine, 760 F. App’x
947, 950 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.051(1)-(2)). Plaintiff does
not argue that any of these circumstances apply to him, nor do any
appear present from the record. 	Thus, the Court turns to equitable
tolling under federal law and Florida law.
Generally, “equitable tolling [under federal law] requires the party
seeking 	tolling 	to 	prove 	(1) 	that 	he 	has 	been 	pursuing 	his 	rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way
and prevented timely filing.” Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839
F.3d 958, 971 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (cleaned up). 	“[B]oth [diligence
and extraordinary circumstances] are required[.]” Rager, 760 F. App’x at
950.
“Florida courts have recognized the application of equitable tolling
during the exhaustion of administrative proceedings when the plaintiff
was misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way been
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prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights in
the wrong forum. Id. (cleaned up). But state-law equitable tolling “is not
available in civil actions in Florida.”6 Pierson v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare
Sys., Inc., No. 6:08CV466-ORL-28GJK, 2010 WL 1408391, at *15 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 6, 2010), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 862 (11th Cir. 2012). 	This is
because, 	“by 	its 	own 	terms, 	Florida’s 	tolling 	statute 	provides 	an
exhaustive list of circumstances that can toll an action, and ‘equitable
tolling’ is not on that list.” 	Philippeaux v. City of Coral Springs, No. 19-
60617-CIV, 	2020 	WL 	2846531, 	at 	*7 	n.9 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	June 	2, 	2020)
(collecting cases and citing Fla. Stat. § 95.051(2)). 	Thus, state-law
equitable tolling should not apply in this civil action.
Even if equitable tolling under Florida law was available,7 Plaintiff
fails to show it should apply here. Plaintiff “does not meet the standard
because he was not misled into inaction, he was not extraordinarily
prevented from asserting his rights, and he did not assert his rights in
the 	wrong 	forum.” 	Rager, 	760 F. 	App’x at 	951. 	Indeed, 	Plaintiff
6 Rather, in Florida, “the application of equitable tolling is limited to
administrative proceedings.” 	Baez v. Root, No. 13-81158-CIV, 2014 WL
1414433, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2014).
7 See In re Engle Cases, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
(concluding equitable tolling under Florida law can apply in civil actions).
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essentially admits he was not misled or lulled into inaction because he
states that he subsequently notified Defendants to preserve evidence
related to the September 5, 2019, incident and reported the alleged
battery to police. 	(Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 8 at 2). 	Moreover, Plaintiff has not
shown that he attempted to assert his rights in the wrong forum.
Plaintiff also “was not extraordinarily prevented from asserting his
rights[.]” Rager, 760 F. App’x at 951. Assuming as true that Defendants
failed to provide Plaintiff with evidence related to the September 5, 2019,
incident, 	this 	fails 	to 	explain 	why 	Plaintiff 	was 	“extraordinarily
prevented” from bringing a lawsuit until January of 2026—over six years
later. Rather than doing nothing for years, Plaintiff should have filed his
claims far sooner despite not having every piece of evidence available to
him.
As to federal equitable tolling, Plaintiff’s arguments fail for the
same reasons. 	Plaintiff has not shown diligence in pursuing his claims
nor extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing. 	Again,
assuming as true that Plaintiff did not have available every piece of
evidence related to the September 5, 2019, incident, this does not change
the fact that Plaintiff was aware of what occurred that day on account of
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being 	present 	for 	the 	alleged 	events.8 	See 	Fowler 	v. 	Coad, 	No.
3:14cv309/RS/EMT, 2015 WL 1843243, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2015)
(finding no extraordinary circumstances or diligence where, despite not
having “the identities of the men who allegedly assaulted him,” a plaintiff
“sat on his rights for over three years between the time he knew that the
public records requests were insufficient and the time he actually filed
his lawsuit” instead of just filing a lawsuit and using discovery to obtain
relevant information).
Equitable 	tolling 	“is 	a 	rare 	remedy 	to 	be 	applied 	in 	unusual
circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs.”
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 396 (2007). Applying equitable tolling here
ignores the causation element of the doctrine. San Martin v. McNeil, 633
F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting plaintiffs must “show a causal
connection between the alleged extraordinary circumstances and the late
filing”). Despite the alleged obstruction and failure to preserve evidence,
Plaintiff knew the facts underlying the alleged battery and damage to his
vehicle when it occurred—September 5, 2019. 	Plaintiff admits as such
8 See also Baez, 2014 WL 1414433, at *3 (refusing to apply equitable
tolling 	where 	plaintiff 	was 	forced 	to 	flee 	the 	country 	because 	the
allegations did “not rise to the level of denial of access to the courts or
lulling Plaintiff into inaction” to justify equitable tolling).
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when he imputes an evidence preservation requirement on Defendants.
(Doc. 1 at 4) (“Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that
litigation was foreseeable on September 5, 2019.”). 	Yet Plaintiff waited
over six years to file a lawsuit on his claims.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	show 	the 	causation 	required 	for
extraordinary 	circumstances 	given 	such 	a 	lengthy 	and 	unexplained
delay.9 	See Hummer v. Adams Homes of Nw. Fla., Inc., No. 8:13cv1981,
2014 WL 897083, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014) (“Plaintiffs could have
filed suit within four years from the date Plaintiffs purchased the home,
July 19, 2007. Equitable tolling is not appropriate where the causal
connection 	between 	nonconforming 	conduct 	and 	Plaintiffs’
injuries/damages was made known to Plaintiffs well within the statute
of limitations.”).
Because Plaintiff has not shown his untimely claims were “due to
extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond his control and
9 See also Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 2010)
(holding that equitable tolling was not warranted where prisoner failed
to 	file 	suit 	within 	the 	ample 	time 	left 	after 	exhausting 	their
administrative remedies); Wilson v. U.S. Penitentiary Leavenworth, 450
F. App’x 397, 399 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that equitable tolling was not
warranted where a plaintiff had “an adequate opportunity” to file a
lawsuit within the limitations period).
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unavoidable even with diligence[,]” Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable
tolling.10 	Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir. 2000);
Fowler, 2015 WL 1843243, at *4 (“When he failed to discover the names
of the men through his public records requests, he had several methods
which 	could 	have 	pursued 	to 	obtain 	their 	identities—for 	example,
promptly filing suit and engaging in discovery. However, waiting for
years and filing suit just two days before the statute expired was not an
acceptable option.”).
II. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	The 	claims 	asserted 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	(Doc. 	1) 	be
10 It bears mentioning that even if the alleged obstruction by Defendants
could support equitable tolling, Plaintiff provides nothing more than
vague and conclusory allegations of obstruction. Rather than specific and
detailed facts, Plaintiff merely states things like “Defendants’ failure to
preserve 	that 	evidence 	after 	law-enforcement 	involvement,” 	and
“Corporate 	delay, 	misrepresentation, 	and 	obstruction 	following 	the
incident.” 	(Doc. 8 at 2). 	Such vague and conclusory assertions are not
sufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden on equitable tolling. 	See Arce v.
Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The plaintiff bears the
burden 	of 	showing 	that 	such 	extraordinary 	circumstances 	exist.”);
Carlsen v. One W. Bank FSB, No. 1080986-DIMITROULEAS, 2010 WL
4123573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2010) (“Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion
of equitable tolling is insufficient; the 	Complaint must 	allege 	facts
sufficient to support the contention that equitable tolling should apply.”).
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DISMISSED because they are barred by the statute of limitations.
2. 	The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment accordingly
and close the case.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 18th day of February 2026.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to the Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.
Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the
Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	An objecting party must
serve a copy of the objections on all other parties. 	A party who fails to
object to the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained
in a report and recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal
the 	district 	court’s 	order 	based 	on 	unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal
conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Case 3:26-cv-00565-MCR-ZCB Document 9 Filed 02/18/26 Page 19 of 19