COATES v. MCCORVEY et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
JOHN LEON COATES, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv1536-MW-HTC
T. MCCORVEY,
Defendant.
_________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff John Leon Coates, Jr., a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, filed a second amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
Defendant McCorvey violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect Coates.
Doc. 13. The Court previously advised Coates of the legal standards applicable to
his claims and gave him an opportunity to amend his complaint1 to state a claim.
Nevertheless, the undersigned concludes the second amended complaint still fails to
state a claim. Thus, this case should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A(b)(1).
1 Coates filed an amended complaint without any instruction from the Court. See Doc. 5. Thus,
Coates’s first amended complaint was the first complaint the Court reviewed.
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Case No. 3:25cv1536-MW-HTC
I. 	BACKGROUND
In the first amended complaint, Coates named six (6) defendants. Although
Coates names only one defendant, Corrections Officer Lt. T. McCorvey, in the
second amended complaint, the complaint remains a disjointed and unintelligible
stream of consciousness offered in run-on sentences. The following is a summary
of the facts taken from the second amended complaint as best the Court can discern.
On June 6, 2024, Coates “put a metallic screw in his urethra as self-inflating
behavioral.” He was not in the right state of mind. The Secretary and mental health
were notified. Lt. McCorvey is responsible for inmates in F-dorm. Lt. McCorvey
observed Coates “over consuming” melatonin for “self-harm on video camera and
on secretary tape.” Lt. McCorvey did a cell extraction “knowing” that Coates was
calling for mental health. Coates stated he was going to kill himself with “inmate
cellmate in cell F3101 name of inmate is Shamel Smith DC#148870.” 	“Putting
inmate back in the same cell is a serious security risk and unprofessional.”
On November 24, 2024, at 7:19, McCorvey “once again not protecting”
Coates by “encompasses infirmary isolation management medical SHOS cell in
medical.”2 “She in violation for not doing so.” “Florida Department of Corrections
charging disciplinary report log 119-243822.”
2 “SHOS” stands for “Suicide and/or Self-Harm Observation Status.”
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“Forced to live with inmate that [he] called PREA on, in housing emergency
room in B-Dorm,” Coates “told them [he] would like to go on SHOS and [he is]
going to kill [himself].” Coates was raped in the “same cell and Plaintiff, call PREA3
elimination act that violated the inmate PREA forced to live with Williams
Corinthian.” Lt. McCorvey “observable Plaintiff Coates eat feces and smear feces
and cut him self in shower cell front shower B3126 on 11-24-24.” 	“Organized
unlawful physical force violating [Coates] with restraints on and feet restraints on
not housing [Coates] on SHOS medical for SIB behavioral not protecting [Coates]
with a self-harm injury in the body, the urethra making more damage.”
Based on these allegations, Coates contends McCorvey violated the Eighth
Amendment by intentionally denying or delaying access to mental health care.
Coates seeks declaratory relief stating the “acts and omissions described herein
violate his rights,” and an injunction ordering McCorvey to “cease … physical
violence” towards Coates. He also seeks punitive damages of $250,000.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Because Coates is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and seeking relief
from government employees, the Court must dismiss his complaint, or any portion
thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
3 “PREA” is the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 34 U.S.C. § 30301 et seq.
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from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). 	To state a claim,
Coates must plead factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable
inference the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must liberally construe pro se allegations, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but conclusory allegations and legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Like his first amended complaint, Coates’s second amended complaint is an
improper and incoherent shotgun pleading, which wholly fails to meet the Rule 8
standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a complaint to contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief”). Reading the
second amended complaint liberally, Coates appears to be taking issue with two
incidents in which he attempted to engage in self-harm and an inmate rape occurred.4
None of those claims, however, pass muster. The factual allegations underpinning
them are scant and scattered. While Coates contends that McCorvey is liable for not
4 The second amended complaint also references a “cell extraction” and “an organized unlawful”
use of force. It is not clear whether these are the same or two unrelated incidents. Regardless, to
the extent Coates believes his Eighth Amendment rights were violated in either instance because
excessive force was used, those vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim.
See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2015)
(complaints “replete with conclusory, vague and immaterial facts” are a type of improper
“shotgun” pleading).
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protecting him during these incidents, he has failed to allege any facts sufficient to
provide notice to McCorvey about what Coates contends McCorvey did wrong. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, Coates must allege
facts showing: “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate
indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” 	Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227,
1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted). “The first element of a failure-to-
protect claim—whether a substantial risk of serious harm existed—is an objective
determination.” 	Rhiner v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 817 F. App’x 769, 775 (11th
Cir. 2020). “[A] prisoner must provide evidence that there was a ‘strong likelihood’
of his injury occurring, because the mere possibility of injury is not enough.” 	Id.
The 	second 	element, 	deliberate 	indifference, 	has 	three 	parts, 	including 	the
defendant’s (1) subjective awareness the inmate was at risk of serious harm; (2)
disregard of that risk; and (3) actions rising to subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law. Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024).
Coates claims he was “forced to live with Williams Corinthian,” who raped
him, and that such occurrence was a PREA violation. To the extent Coates seeks to
hold McCorvey liable for failing to protect him from the rape, Coates has failed to
allege facts sufficient to support such a claim. As an initial matter, it is not clear
when the rape occurred or how it relates to the other events in the complaint.
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Regardless, Coates has not alleged any facts showing that Corinthian posed a threat
to him prior to the rape occurring, that McCorvey knew Corinthian was a danger to
Coates, or that McCorvey acted with criminal recklessness or failed to respond
reasonably given that actual knowledge. Indeed, there is no indication McCorvey
was even responsible for putting Coates in the cell with Corinthian, that Coates asked
to be removed from the cell, or that any such request was made to McCovery.
Coates’s contention that staying in the same cell with Corinthian was a “violation”
does not make it so. See Farrukh v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs., 2021 WL 734586,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2021) (agreeing with magistrate judge that “‘conclusory
allegations of wrongdoing’ absent any specific factual support” violate Rule 8).
Similarly, to the extent Coates contends McCovery failed to protect him from
self-harm, Coates has not alleged any facts to show that he was at serious risk of
self-harm, that McCorvey was actually aware of that risk, or that McCorvey acted
with criminal recklessness or responded unreasonably when faced with that actual
knowledge. 	See Gish v. Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in
original) (A plaintiff must show the defendant was “subjectively aware that the
combination of the prisoner’s suicidal tendencies and the feasibility of suicide in the
context of the prisoner’s surroundings creates a strong likelihood that the prisoner
will commit suicide.”).
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Coates’s allegation that McCovery observed him eating and smearing feces or
“overconsuming” melatonin are not sufficient.5 Bennett v. Ford, 2025 WL 718712,
at *7 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2025) (finding defendant was not deliberately indifferent
to prisoner plaintiff’s risk of self-harm where defendant was aware of plaintiff’s
mental health issues, including an incident where he had smeared feces on his cell
door’s window); see also Mulvaney v. Meeks, 2021 WL 130970, at *6 (M.D. Ala.
Jan. 13, 2021) (finding deliberate indifference where, beyond merely observing the
plaintiff smearing feces, defendants were also aware she had failed to “eat or drink
for 	days” 	and 	was 	“hallucinating, 	screaming, 	urinating 	and 	defecating” 	and
defendants did “almost nothing” in response).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
In its November 10 Order, the Court advised Coates of the legal standard for
pleading a claim under Federal Rule 8 and the elements for an Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim. 	The Court also gave Coates an opportunity to more
carefully craft his allegations to support such a claim. Coates, however, was not able
to do so; the second amended complaint is a shotgun pleading “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular
cause of action.” 	Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-22. 	“The problem with shotgun
5 Moreover, even accepting those allegations as true, it is not clear when McCorvey observed that
conduct.
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pleadings is that they ‘waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope
of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s
respect for the courts.’” Adorjan v. Duval Cnty., Fla., 2022 WL 833664, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 21, 2022) (citing Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2018) (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although the Court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s allegations, the
Court “cannot act as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise deficient [pro se]
pleading to sustain an action.” Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir.
2020). 	Indeed, 	“district 	courts 	are 	flatly 	forbidden 	from 	scouring 	shotgun
complaints to craft a potentially viable claim for a plaintiff.” Barmapov v. Amuial,
986 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1355 n.6 (11th Cir. 2018)). 	That, however, is
what the Court would have to do to make sense of Coates’s allegations.
Because Coates has already had one opportunity to amend his complaint, this
case should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). 	See Brennan v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t
of Corr., 626 F. App’x 939, 945-46 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A pro se litigant must be
given at least one opportunity to amend his complaint before the court dismisses the
action with prejudice if it appears that a more carefully drafted pleading would state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.”).
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Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	This case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for Coates’s
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
2. 	The clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 12 th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all
other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
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