ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS et al v. BONDI et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	Civil Action No.: 	26-865 (RC)
:
v. 	: 	Re Document Nos.: 	6, 12, 13
:
TODD BLANCHE, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY I NJUNCTION AND S TAY
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the purportedly unlawful closure of immigration hearings at the Fort
Snelling Immigration Center in Minnesota. Plaintiff The Advocates for Human Rights (“AHR”)
reports that its volunteer observers have been repeatedly denied access to immigration hearings
in Fort Snelling, which AHR argues contravenes 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 and the First Amendment.
Based on these purported past closures, AHR asks this Court to enter a universal, preliminary
injunction or stay under the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 705–06.
Specifically, AHR asks the Court to enjoin a host of federal officers from closing
immigration court proceedings unless the presiding immigration judge (1) “state[s] orally in open
court and on the record . . . any asserted basis for closing such proceeding[s]” and (2) gives the
public and press an opportunity to object to the closure. Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at
8–9, ECF No. 6. AHR seeks this injunction against Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche,
Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) Daren K. Margolin, Chief
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Immigration Judge Hon. Teresa L. Riley, and Assistant Chief Immigration Judge Hon. Eric. L.
Dillow (collectively, the “Government”).1
The Court denies AHR’s motion for a preliminary injunction and stay because the Court
concludes that AHR lacks standing. AHR asks the Court to enjoin a series of federal officials
before reaching a final determination of whether those officials have done anything unlawful and
based on an incomplete record. That is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2948 (2d ed. 1995)). The standard for attaining this extraordinary
relief—including establishing standing—is correspondingly high. AHR must carry the burden of
persuasion by “a clear showing.” Id. (quoting same). The Court finds that AHR has not met that
high standard at this preliminary juncture.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background provided below is based on the evidence provided by the parties,
the allegations in AHR’s Complaint, the parties’ representations in their briefs and at argument,
and publicly accessible government documents. It does not reflect findings of fact made by the
Court.
A. EOIR and Immigration Proceedings
The Fort Snelling Immigration Court is an immigration court located in the Bishop Henry
Whipple Federal Building in Minnesota. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1. According to the
Government, it “is supervised by an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge and staffed by six
additional Immigration Judges.” Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 4, ECF No. 10.
1 AHR initially sued then Attorney General Pamela Bondi but has since substituted her
for Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche.
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These immigration judges, and the Chief Immigration Judge, are part of EOIR. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.0, 1003.9. EOIR, which sits within the Department of Justice, “conducts immigration
court proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings.” Defs.’ Ex. A, Decl. of Daren
K. Margolin (“Margolin Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 10-1. As spelled out in an EOIR Policy Manual,
these immigration proceedings include “removal, deportation, exclusion,” and other hearings,
with deportation proceedings comprising “the vast majority of proceedings conducted by
Immigration Judges.” EOIR Policy Manual Part II, Chs. 3.1, 6.1.2
The Government represents that “[t]he most common types of hearings in Immigration
Court are master calendar hearings, individual calendar or merits hearings, and custody
redetermination or bond hearings.” Defs.’ Opp’n. at 2. “Master Calendar hearings are held for
pleadings, scheduling, and other similar matters.” EOIR Policy Manual Part II, Ch. 3.14(a).3
This includes, among other things, advising the respondent of their right to counsel and the
availability of pro bono legal services as well as informing the respondent of the charges against
them. Id. Part II, Ch. 3.14(e). If a case requires an evidentiary hearing, such as for “challenges
to removability and applications for relief,” the matter is set for an “individual calendar
hearing[ ] or merits hearing[ ].” Id. Part II, Ch. 3.15(a).4 Finally, although the Department of
2 Chapter 3.1 of Part II of the EOIR Policy Manual is available at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-3-1
[https://perma.cc/X9CX-VETZ]. Chapter 6.1 of Part II of the Manual is available at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-6-1
[https://perma.cc/X74X-S8AB]. Part II of the Manualwas last updated on February 10, 2026.
3 Chapter 3.14 of Part II of the EOIR Policy Manual is available at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-3-14
[https://perma.cc/GB9Y-4D3Z].
4 Chapter 3.15 of Part II of the EOIR Policy Manual is available at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-3-15
[https://perma.cc/W5LQ-5QLF].
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Homeland Security initially sets the bond for all respondents, a respondent may request a “bond
hearing” at which an immigration judge may “redetermine the amount of bond set by” the
Department. Id. Part II, Ch. 8.3(a).5
According to EOIR Executive Director Daren K. Margolin, an EOIR analysis found that
between March 1, 2025 and February 28, 2026—the period at issue in AHR’s Complaint—the
Fort Snelling Immigration Court held 47,248 immigration hearings. Margolin Decl. ¶ 8. During
this period, the number of hearings ranged from roughly 2,800 to 4,600 a month. Id.6
B. AHR and Its Declarations
AHR is a 501(c)(3) international human rights organization headquartered in Minnesota
that has run an Immigration Court Observation Project since 2017. Pl.’s Ex. 2, Jan. 9 Letter at 1,
ECF No. 6-1. The project involves volunteers observing immigration proceedings, primarily at
the Fort Snelling Immigration Court. Id. at 2. AHR trains its observers to “follow best practices
of court observation,” including “non-intervention, neutrality, respect, and professionalism.” Id.
According to AHR, over the last eight years it has “generally been a strong partner with the
court” and has “enjoyed access to hearings” consistent with applicable regulatory requirements.
Id. Observers were able to “freely observe all master calendar hearings without prior approval”
5 Chapter 8.3 of Part II of the EOIR Policy Manual is available at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-8-3
[https://perma.cc/NP8D-TBHG].
6 Although immigration judges and EOIR conduct immigration proceedings, according to
Director Margolin, they do not control the federal buildings in which the immigration courts
sit—in this case the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building. Margolin Decl. ¶¶ 5–6. Control
over the federal building lies with the Federal Protective Service, an arm of the Department of
Homeland Security. Thus, “[a]lthough an immigration judge generally controls who may remain
inside a courtroom during a hearing pursuant to regulation and by issuing orders, the
immigration judge cannot execute the orders.” Id. ¶ 6
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and “also were able to observe a significant percentage of detained and non-detained individual
calendar hearings.” Id. at 3.
As AHR tells it, that began to change in March 2025. See id. AHR’s volunteer observers
began experiencing limitations on their ability to observe immigration proceedings at Fort
Snelling. See id. To attest to these limitations, AHR provides a series of declarations from its
volunteers and one employee outlining their experiences. The declarations describe five broad
categories of limitations on access to immigration hearings.
First, many of the limitations described in these declarations reflect practices by
immigration judges or other staff that, while perhaps new, fall short of a complete closure of the
immigration hearing. For example, Amy Lange, the Program Manager for the Immigration
Court Observation Project, tells that one immigration judge was instructing guards to lock the
courtroom doors during master calendar hearings, preventing observers from entering or exiting
except during formal recesses. Pl.’s Ex. 7, Decl. of Amy S. Lange (“Lange Decl.”) ¶¶ III–IV,
XVII, ECF No. 6-1; see also Pl.’s Ex. 9, Decl. of Kathleen Burke Scheffler (“Scheffler Decl.”)
¶ III, ECF No. 6-1; Pl.’s Ex. 11, Decl. of Megan R. Barker (“Barker Decl.”) ¶ III, ECF No. 6-1 .7
Other observers report being warned that they could not wait for hearings to start in the lobby
outside the courtroom but rather must wait in the hallway or that they could not wait in the
building at all. See Pl.’s Ex. 8, Decl. of Craig Hollenbeck (“Hollenbeck Decl.”) ¶ IV, ECF
No. 6-1; Pl.’s Ex. 6, Decl. of Lyndsey Marcelino Schalkwyk (“Schalkwyk Decl.”), ECF No. 6-1.
Second, the declarations describe apparent confusion and disorganization among court
staff regarding existing practices. For example, when a clerk was asked about the process for
7 Megan Barker’s declaration restarts its paragraph numbering after paragraph IV. To
avoid confusion, the Court refers to the paragraph numbers using a sequential renumbering
starting with I and ending with VII so that no two paragraphs have the same number.
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attending remote hearings, the clerk answered that they were “out of the loop and know
nothing.” Lange Decl. ¶ XIX. Another declaration describes uncertainty between a security
officer and the clerk’s office about the process for admitting observers. See Barker Decl. ¶ VI.
Similarly, in June 2025, EOIR’s communications division informed Ms. Lange that observers
did not need to check in before observing hearings, Lange Decl. ¶ VI, but other observers were
informed they would not be admitted without permission, Pl.’s Ex. 13, Decl. of Patricia A.
Bethke (“Bethke Decl.”) ¶ III, ECF No. 6-1; Lange Decl. ¶ VIII. And in October 2025, when an
observer asked a court staff member why all merits hearings were closed that day, the staff
member did not know and stated only that “each day is different.” Pl.’s Ex. 10, Decl. of Marily
K. Knieriemen (“Knieriemen Decl.”) ¶ VII, ECF No. 6-1.
Third, the declarations emphasize the difficulty AHR’s observers experienced in
attending hearings remotely. Many observers report that they were not allowed to attend
hearings remotely. See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 12, Decl. of Mark G. Rabogliatti (“Rabogliatti Decl.”)
¶ III, ECF No. 6-1; Hollenbeck Decl. ¶ III; Lange Decl. ¶ VII. Ms. Lange elaborates that since
February 25, 2026, only a single immigration judge at Fort Snelling has allowed observers to
remotely observe master calendar hearings, and on one day in March, no immigration judges
allowed observers to watch the hearings remotely. Lange Decl. ¶¶ XXII–XXIII.
But although the declarations describe some hearings that could only be attended
remotely, see, e.g., id. ¶ XIX, Ms. Lange and the volunteer observers largely do not specify
whether the hearings to which they were denied remote access could only have been observed
remotely. According to an EOIR factsheet quoted in a letter AHR sent to EOIR, the agency
specifies that “[v]isitors should observe in person,” and remote-access “links posted on EOIR’s
website are for parties appearing remotely,” not observers. Jan. 9 Letter at 11.
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Fourth, declarations submitted by members of NorCal Resist, the Immigrant Advocates
Response Collaborative, and Immigration Services and Legal Advocacy describe restrictions on
observing immigration hearings in California, New York, and Louisiana. See generally Pl.’s
Exs. 14–16, ECF No. 6-1. According to these declarations, observers have been excluded from
hearings and barred from accessing immigration courts without prior appointments, among other
limitations. See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 14, Decl. of Heidi D. Phipps at 1–2; Pl.’s Ex. 15, Decl. of Gillian
Rowland-Kain (“Rowland-Kain Decl.”) ¶¶ 17–33. Some of these declarations suggest that
courts have limited remote access to hearings to the parties and attorneys because of bandwidth
constraints or because they cannot ensure that remote observers are not recording the hearings.
See Rowland-Kain Decl. ¶¶ 9–16; Pl.’s Ex. 16, Decl. of Emma Wilson.8
Finally, the declarations from AHR’s volunteers describe a number of instances where
hearings at Fort Snelling were entirely closed to observers. One observer reports that on October
27, 2025, all merits hearings were closed to observers. See Knieriemen Decl. ¶ VII. Another
observer recounts an immigration judge experiencing technical difficulties in her courtroom and
deciding to join the hearing from a different location without allowing observers to do so as well.
Hollenbeck Decl. ¶ III. On one occasion, an observer encountered a sign indicating that a
hearing was confidential. Bethke Decl. ¶ IV.9 Other observers were simply excluded from
specific hearings without explanation. See, e.g., Rabogliatti Decl. ¶ IV; Knieriemen Decl. ¶ VI.
For most of these closed hearings, AHR does not provide evidence from lawyers or
parties that attended the hearing, but on three occasions lawyers present at the hearings could not
8 AHR also attaches letters sent by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
Northern California and Public Justice describing concerns about public access to immigration
proceedings in California. See generally Pl.’s Exs. 4–5, ECF No. 6-1.
9 On another occasion, observers were met with a similar sign, but when an observer tried
to enter, they were let in anyway. See Lange Decl. XVIII.
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identify any basis for the closure. For two of those hearings, the attorney for the respondent had
been asked by the immigration judge about observers and had expressly consented to observers
attending. See Knieriemen Decl. ¶ VI; Lange Decl. ¶ XIII. For the third hearing, an attorney
exiting the courtroom was “unsure why” the hearing would have been closed. Bethke Decl.
¶ VIII.
Although the declarations recount various closed hearings, AHR does not provide any
figure or estimate for the number of hearings from which its volunteers and staff were excluded.
Nor does AHR indicate what percentage of hearings its observers were excluded from relative to
the total number of hearings they tried to observe.
C. AHR’s Communications with EOIR
In response to these limitations and restrictions, AHR reached out to government officials
at Fort Snelling. On April 2, 2025, Ms. Lange sent an email to the then Asisstant Chief
Immigration Judge expressing concern about an immigration judge locking courtroom doors
during hearings. Lange Decl. ¶ III. This practice had resulted in a respondent’s family being
excluded from a hearing. Id. According to Ms. Lange, the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge
responded that he shared her “concern regarding a closed courtroom during master calendar
sessions.” Id. He reiterated that AHR observers “along with others should be able to enter and
exit the courtroom throughout the session,” and he stated that he would “address this issue” with
the relevant immigration judge. Id. Ms. Lange reports that, after this email, the courtroom doors
were left unlocked, but the immigration judge began “to chastise observers for entering her
courtroom” during hearings. Id. ¶ IV.
Around June 15, 2025, Ms. Lange emailed EOIR regarding observers’ inability to access
hearings remotely. Lange Decl. ¶ VI. A member of EOIR’s Communication and Legislative
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Affairs division responded via email that “[i]mmigration court hearings are open to the public,
with some exceptions, as outlined in the EOIR Policy Manual.” Id. The email also gave
instructions for where to find Webex links to join hearings remotely. Id.
On January 9, 2026, AHR Executive Director Michele Garnett McKenzie sent a letter to
Defendants Daren K. Margolin and the Hon. Eric L. Dillow detailing the limitations and burdens
the organization’s volunteers had faced. See Jan. 9 Letter at 3–6. Executive Director McKenzie
requested that “immigration court proceedings at the Fort Snelling Immigration Court, whether
held in person or via Webex, remain open to the public and to the press.” Id. at 1. She also
asked for copies of any relevant policy changes. Id. at 11–12.
EOIR Press Secretary Kathryn Mattingly responded to Executive Director McKenzie on
January 20, 2026. See Pl.’s Ex. 3, Jan. 20 Letter, ECF No. 6-1. Press Secretary Mattingly noted
that “there may be instances where hearings need to be closed or held with limited attendance for
a variety of reasons, as described in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Code of Federal
Regulations, and EOIR Policy.” Id. at 1. She also explained that the Federal Protective Service,
a part of the Department of Homeland Security, “is responsible for access to, and securing, the
buildings.” Id. “Immigration Judges or [the Federal Protective Service] may determine that
doors need to be locked for security reasons or to prevent disruptions of court proceedings.” Id.
Finally, regarding remote access, Press Secretary Mattingly wrote that “[o]bservers should plan
to observe immigration hearings in person at the courtroom” and clarified that “Webex links
posted on EOIR’s website are posted for parties appearing remotely.” Id. at 1–2. She further
stated that “[w]hen in-person access is not available, the Immigration Judge has the discretion to
admit non-parties via Webex to observe a hearing that is open to the public.” Id. at 2. AHR
represents that, after its January 9 Letter, the access restrictions “temporarily abated somewhat”
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but have since “largely resumed and have continued in other parts of the nation.” Pl.’s Mot. at
13. After AHR filed suit, EOIR Director Daren K Margolin sent an email to all EOIR staff
reiterating that “immigration courts are open daily to the public,” that “[v]isitors do not need
permission to visit or to observe an open hearing,” and that only “[l]imited exceptions apply.”
Margolin Decl. Ex. 2 at 1, ECF No. 10-1 (emphasis removed).
D. Legal Proceedings
AHR brough this action on March 12, 2026. See Compl. One week later, AHR moved
for a preliminary injunction and stay. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. After the parties fully briefed the motion,
two amici curiae sought leave to file briefs in support of AHR’s motion—Reporters Without
Borders and Dow Jones et al.—leave which the Court now grants. ECF Nos. 12–13. The Court
held a motions hearing on April 16, 2026, after which it took AHR’s motion under advisement.10
III. LEGAL STANDARD
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The “familiar standard” for a preliminary
injunction “requires a plaintiff to make a clear showing that ‘he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’”
Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345 (2024) (emphasis added) (quoting Winter, 555
U.S. at 22).
10 After the motions hearing, AHR submitted a Notice of Supplemental Evidence with
two additional declarations, ECF No. 14, which the Government asks the Court to strike as
untimely, ECF No. 15. Because the Court’s standing analysis, which is dispositive for AHR’s
motion, does not implicate the information raised in the supplemental declarations, the Court
need not decide whether to strike the additional declarations.
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The D.C. Circuit has traditionally applied a sliding-scale approach to these factors,
meaning that a strong showing on one factor, such as irreparable harm, may compensate for a
meager showing on another factor, such as likely success on the merits. See Davis v. Pension
Ben. Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Courts in this Circuit have
questioned that approach for the last eighteen years without resolving whether it remains good
law. See Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 134 F.4th 1230, 1235–36 (D.C. Cir. 2025). But cf.
Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 639 F.3d 1078,
1088 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“When a plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits,
there is no need to consider the remaining factors.”). Today is once again not the day to resolve
that question because neither party mentions the sliding-scale approach, and the D.C. Circuit has
held that its application may be waived. See Clevinger, 134 F.4th at 1236.
AHR also moves for a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. Both parties agree that
the preliminary-injunction factors also govern the analysis for a stay under Section 705. Pl.’s
Mot. at 13; Def.s’ Opp’n. at 8; see also Sierra Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30 (D.D.C.
2012). The parties do not address, however, whether the same “clear showing” requirement
from the preliminary-injunction context carries over to a Section 705 stay as well, although AHR
quotes language from a case suggesting that they are the same. See Pl.’s Mot. at 13; Gomez v.
Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 145, 168 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Requests for preliminary relief under the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705, are also governed by the same standards.”). But cf. Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear
Regul. Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (saying nothing about a clear-
showing requirement and applying the sliding-scale approach). Because the parties do not argue
for a different standard, and both parties analyze the preliminary injunction and stay together, the
Court deems any argument for a different burden of persuasion waived. See Carducci v. Regan,
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714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Court therefore collapses the analysis of the
preliminary injunction and stay into one.
IV. ANALYSIS
AHR presses two claims in its motion. First, it argues that the Government’s closure of
immigration hearings violates 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27. See Pl.’s Mot. at 21. The regulation provides
that “[a]ll hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open to the public . . . .” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.27. It also enumerates, however, a series of exceptions. Immigration judges “may place
reasonable limitations upon the number [of people] in attendance,” with priority given “to the
press,” “[d]epending upon physical facilities.” Id. § 1003.27(a). Immigration judges may also
“limit attendance or hold a closed hearing” to “protect[ ] witnesses, parties, or the public
interest.” Id. § 1003.27(b). And immigration judges “shall” close proceedings in certain cases
concerning “abused alien spouse[s],” “abused alien child[ren],” and “information subject to a
protective order under § 1003.46.” Id. §§ 1003.27(c)–(d). Second, AHR contends that,
independent of Section 1003.27, the First Amendment precludes the closure of immigration
hearings unless the closures serve a compelling governmental interest and reflect the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest. Pl.’s Mot. at 24–25. For the reasons explained
below, the Court concludes that AHR lacks standing for both claims.11
11 AHR initially pressed two other claims, arguing in the alternative that if the
Government had changed its policy regarding opening immigration hearings to the public, any
such change violated applicable procedural requirements. See Pl.’s Mot. at 33–34. After the
Government disavowed any change in policy, AHR relinquished those claims for purposes of
this motion, so the Court need not address them. See Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n (“Pl.’s
Reply”) at 5, ECF No. 11.
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A. Preliminary Discussion
The parties’ briefs raise many important and difficult questions regarding both procedural
barriers and the merits, some of which the Court raised with the parties at the April 16 motions
hearing. To start, the Government questions whether AHR challenges a discrete, final agency
action, suggesting that the suit mounts a “broad programmatic attack” against the immigration
court of the kind not countenanced by the APA. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55,
64 (2004); see Defs.’ Opp’n. at 15–19. AHR answers that it challenges, in aggregate, a series of
individually discrete, final agency actions because each order closing a hearing constitutes a final
agency action. Pl.’s Reply at 4–5. A similar question is at issue in a pending case before the en
banc D.C. Circuit. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Vought, 149 F.4th 762, 784 (D.C. Cir.
2025) (“Rather than seeking to challenge any of these discrete decisions that may have caused
them harm, the plaintiffs seek to dress up these ‘many individual actions’ as a single decision in
order to challenge all of them at once, which is exactly what National Wildlife prevents.”), reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 25-5091, 2025 WL 3659406 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) (en
banc) (per curiam); see also New York v. Trump, 133 F.4th 51, 68 (1st Cir. 2025) (“[W]e are not
aware of any supporting authority for the proposition that the APA bars a plaintiff from
challenging a number of discrete final agency actions all at once.”). Relatedly, the parties do not
address whether the analysis would change if the Court entertained a narrower injunction—one
targeting a more specific practice at Fort Snelling, such as purportedly excluding observers from
remote-only hearings.
Turning to the merits, AHR appears to argue that, to comply with Section 1003.27 and
the APA, immigration judges must make on-the-record findings and provide an opportunity for
observers to be heard before closing any non-expulsion immigration hearings. See Pl.’s Reply
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at 3–4; see also Compl. ¶ 48. As the Government notes, the text of Section 1003.27 does not
expressly require such on-the-record findings or an opportunity to be heard. Defs.’ Opp’n at 24.
In response, AHR points to cases involving arbitrary-and-capricious challenges to agency
adjudications and rulemakings. See City of Holyoke Gas & Elec. Dep’t v. F.E.R.C., 954 F.2d
740, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Action for Children’s Television v. F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741, 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). Neither party has developed arguments about whether these requirements apply to an
immigration judge’s decision to close a hearing.
Finally, the parties dispute whether the First Amendment guarantees nonparties a right to
access immigration proceedings. That question has divided at least two Circuits. Compare N.
Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding the First
Amendment does not guarantee access to all immigration proceedings), and Ashcroft v. N. Jersey
Media Grp., Inc., 536 U.S. 954 (2002) (granting stay pending appeal from preliminary injunction
that found the First Amendment protected access to immigration proceeding), with Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding the First Amendment “confers a
public right of access to deportation hearings”). On this question, the parties and amici curiae
thoughtfully dispute whether the so-called “experience and logic” test from Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), controls the analysis and, if so, whether
immigration proceedings satisfy that test.
Still, other questions linger. For example, neither the parties nor amici answer whether
AHR must show immigration proceedings satisfy both the experience and logic prongs of the
Richmond Newspaper test, and, if so, whether one prong weighs heavier in the analysis than the
other. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (“If
the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience and logic, a qualified First
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Amendment right of public access attaches.”). Compare Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701
(“Therefore, although historical context is important, a brief historical tradition might be
sufficient to establish a First Amendment right of access where the beneficial effects of access to
that process are overwhelming and uncontradicted.”), with N. Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at
216 (“Even if we could find a right of access under the Richmond Newspapers logic prong,
absent a strong showing of openness under the experience prong, a proposition we do not
embrace, we would find no such right here.”). Nor do the parties or amici advise the Court on
what to make of the history of closed exclusion hearings contrasted with the history of open
deportation proceedings or how to understand evidence that at least some deportation hearings
have historically been held in places where it may have been difficult for the public to access,
such as prisons and private homes. Compare Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701–03, with N.
Jersey Media Grp., 308 F.3d at 211–12. And neither the parties nor amici analyze whether the
result might be different for master calendar hearings, merits hearings, or bond hearings.
Perhaps most importantly, the parties do not address whether it matters that the openness
of deportation hearings has long been qualified by a series of exceptions. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.27(a)–(d). Does the “experience and logic” test require a history of unqualified access?
If the “experience and logic” test is met, does the First Amendment ossify only this qualified
level of access—such that an immigration judge may close a hearing subject to the enumerated
exceptions in Section 1003.27 without meeting strict scrutiny? Or, once the First Amendment
attaches, does it raise the level of protection such that even for these historical exceptions an
immigration judge must make sufficient findings to survive strict scrutiny? Neither the parties
nor amici suggest any answers.
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B. Standing
The Court need not address these questions today, however, because it concludes that
AHR has not established standing for its motion for a preliminary injunction. Without standing,
AHR cannot obtain a preliminary injunction. See Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024).12
1. AHR must make a clear showing of imminent future harm
To establish standing, AHR must show that it suffers an injury that is “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable
by a favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). Because AHR seeks
“forward-looking relief,” it must “face ‘a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.’” Murthy,
603 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)). There
12 There is some uncertainty about whether, in the context of a preliminary injunction, the
Court must decide standing first. Generally, if a party lacks standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction
and thus cannot reach the merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94
(1998). But, in the context of preliminary injunctions, the D.C. Circuit has evaluated standing
and other jurisdictional questions as part of the likelihood of success on the merits prong. See
Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In keeping with this
approach, some courts in this District have decided other prongs of the preliminary-injunction
analysis (or temporary-restraining-order analysis), such as irreparable harm, without first
considering standing. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Musk, 770 F. Supp. 3d 192, 203 n.2 (D.D.C.
2025); Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Trump, 768 F. Supp. 3d 6, 20 n.3 (D.D.C. 2025). But see,
e.g., Jacinto-Castanon de Nolasco v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 319 F. Supp. 3d 491, 497–
98 (D.D.C. 2018). The Supreme Court, however, has suggested recently that even in the context
of a preliminary injunction, if the plaintiff cannot establish jurisdiction, the Court cannot “reach
the merits of the dispute” and has “no business deciding [the case], or expounding the law in the
course of doing so.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 56–57 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 341 (2006)). The Supreme Court did not frame its standing analysis as part of
evaluating the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits. See id. at 50 (concluding no
plaintiff had “standing to seek a preliminary injunction”). It did not even mention the four
preliminary-injunction factors. This could be interpreted to require courts to analyze standing as
an issue antecedent to the four preliminary-injunction factors. This would presumably also mean
that the D.C. Circuit’s sliding-scale approach, to the extent it remains good law, would not apply
to jurisdictional determinations like standing. Rather than wade into this uncertainty, the Court
addresses standing first, without deciding whether it is bound to do so.
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must be “a ‘substantial risk that the harm will occur,’” if not evidence that “the threatened injury
is ‘certainly impending.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409). “‘[A]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
The standard of proof for this imminent injury varies “with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561 (1992). “At the preliminary injunction stage, . . . the plaintiff must make a ‘clear
showing’ that [it] is ‘likely’ to establish each element of standing,” including the substantial risk
of imminent harm. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (quoting Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). “[T]he plaintiff cannot ‘rest on . . . mere allegations, but must’” establish
standing through “affidavit[s] or other evidence.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential
Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity (“PACEI”), 878 F.3d 371, 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(omission in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).13
2. AHR’s evidence regarding past closures of immigration hearings does not clearly
establish that further unlawful closures are imminent.
At this stage, AHR’s evidence of imminent future harm falls short. AHR argues that it
has suffered a concrete injury in the past due to the previous closures of immigration hearings.
See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 17 (“AHR has suffered an injury in fact . . . .” (emphasis added)).
13 The D.C. Circuit has described this standard as requiring the plaintiff to be “likely to be
able to demonstrate standing at the summary judgment stage.” Centro de Trabajadores Unidos
v. Bessent, 167 F.4th 1218, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Com., 928 F.3d 95, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2019)). Although potentially diverging from the standard
articulated in Murthy, the D.C. Circuit appears to apply this standard with an understanding that
it requires not just a possibility that a reasonable juror could find standing (or, alternatively that
no reasonable juror could not find standing) but rather a “substantial likelihood of standing,”
with references to the summary-judgment standard referring to the requirement that a plaintiff
put forth evidence and affidavits rather than relying on mere allegations. See Elec. Privacy Info.
Ctr., 928 F.3d at 104 (quoting PACEI, 878 F.3d at 377, 380).
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Evidence of prior unlawful conduct, however, does not necessarily establish standing for a
preliminary injunction, which requires an imminent future injury. For a preliminary injunction,
“past injuries are relevant only for their predictive value” about whether harm is likely to reoccur
in the immediate future. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 59.
In terms of past injuries, AHR identifies roughly a dozen days with purportedly closed
hearings since June 2025:14
• 	On two days in June 2025, observers were denied access to remote-only hearings—in one
case due to a technical difficulty, Lange Decl. ¶ V; Hollenbeck Decl. ¶ III, and with no
explanation for the other, Rabogliatti Decl. ¶ III.
• 	On July 2, 2025, observers were denied entrance to a master calendar hearing because the
immigration judge had not granted them permission. Lange Decl. ¶ VIII.
• 	On August 15, 2025, an observer was told a hearing he sought to attend was closed.
Hollenbeck Decl. ¶ IV.
14 It is difficult for the Court to discern the exact number of purportedly closed hearings
during this period based on the record before it. AHR does not specify the number of hearings or
even the number of days its observers faced closed hearings. Moreover, some of the declarations
are unclear regarding whether the hearings were truly closed. For example, Ms. Barker reports
that on January 27, 2026, she was asked to leave the courtroom after certain master calendar
hearings ended. Barker Decl. ¶ VII. She asked the clerk whether she could stay to observe the
no-show hearings, to which the clerk replied, “I cannot comment on that.” Id. Ms. Barker does
not reveal whether she subsequently tried to re-enter once the no-show hearings began. See id.
In other instances, it is unclear whether the observers could have attended via alternative means.
See, e.g., Rabogliatti Decl. ¶ IV. And in yet others, it is unclear whether an observer showing up
at exactly the time a hearing was scheduled to start, or after the hearing started, was excluded
because that courtroom followed a practice of locking the doors when hearings were supposed to
start and unlocking them only after all hearings completed. See, e.g., Scheffler Decl. ¶ IV.
Considering this uncertainty, the Court has done its best to aggregate the days on which
observers reasonably describe a denial of access but excluding those with potentially apparent
other explanations—mindful that AHR bears the burden of persuasion.
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• 	On September 29, 2025, an observer was prevented from attending “no show” hearings
and non-detained master calendar hearings. Knieriemen Decl. ¶¶ III–IV.
• 	On four days in October 2025, observers were prevented from attending hearings.
Knieriemen Decl. ¶ V–VII; Lange Decl. ¶ XIII. This includes situations where
respondent’s counsel did not object to the observers’ presence, Lange Decl. ¶ XIII, and
where the immigration judge initially welcomed the observers in before a clerk spoke
with the immigration judge and all observers were excluded, Knieriemen Decl. ¶ VI.
• 	Observers were excluded from hearings on three days in November 2025, including on
November 6, when an observer was excluded from a courtroom “due to confidentiality
issues,” but an attorney exiting the proceeding stated that nothing confidential was
discussed. Bethke Decl. ¶¶ III–IV, VIII; Rabogliatti Decl. ¶ IV; Barker Decl. ¶¶ IV, VI;
Knieriemen Decl. ¶ VIII.
For three reasons, the Court finds that these twelve incidents, spread across almost as
many months, with no violations identified in the three months preceding the motion, do not
amount to a “clear showing” that AHR is “likely” to face additional unlawful closures in the
“immediate” future. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (first quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; and then
quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496). First, as the Government points out, these closures—even if
each closure encompassed multiple hearings—represent a tiny fraction of the more than 47,000
immigration hearings held at the Fort Snelling Immigration Court between March 2025 and
February 2026—the time period covered by AHR’s complaint. Margolin Decl. ¶ 8. By
comparison, AHR provides no indication of the proportion of closed hearings to the total
hearings it sought to observe.
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Second, these past incidents do not evince a “pattern” of conduct, which courts often
expect when a party seeks “anticipatory relief.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Closures appear to range from ad hoc
technical difficulties, see Lange Decl. ¶ V, to potential confidentiality concerns, see Bethke Decl.
¶¶ III–IV, to a misstatement by a security guard, see Barker Decl. ¶ IV. Although a clear pattern
may not be necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction, the one-off nature of some of AHR’s
evidence undermines its claim to imminent harm.
Third, by AHR’s own admission, the closures subsided in the months leading up to its
lawsuit. As AHR explains, “the restrictions complained of in AHR’s January 9, 2026, letter
temporarily abated somewhat following [the Government’s] receipt of the letter.” Pl.’s Mot. at
13. Although AHR claims that the “restrictions have largely resumed” since then, id., as
explained below, AHR does not provide evidence of unlawful conduct since its letter. Indeed,
AHR does not identify any purportedly unlawful closures in 2026 despite filing its motion on
March 19, 2026.15 The lack of recent unlawful closures further undermines AHR’s claim of
imminent future injury. Cf. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 71–72 (explaining that because the purportedly
unlawful conduct had “considerably subsided” leading up to the lawsuit, it would be “very
difficult” for the plaintiff “to show that she faces future harm”).
AHR’s counterarguments do not surmount the high standard AHR faces in establishing
standing for a preliminary injunction. AHR starts by suggesting that even one improper closure
constitutes irreparable harm. Pl.’s Reply at 1. That may be so—although, as the Government
15 As discussed in note 14 supra, although Ms. Barker’s declaration suggests she may
have been excluded from a hearing in January 2026, Barker Decl. ¶ VII, the Court finds there is
insufficient information in the declaration to determine whether she was actually excluded as
opposed to being temporarily excused from the courtroom between hearings.
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21
argues, even the hearings AHR identifies may have been closed for lawful reasons, and AHR
provides little evidence from attorneys or parties inside the courtroom that could shed light as to
whether these purported closures were unlawful. But even assuming, without deciding, that
these past hearings were closed improperly, AHR must persuade the Court that it is likely to
experience additional improper closures in the immediate future. It has not.
AHR also contends that evidence of closures and limitations at other immigration centers
across the country bolsters its claim of impending future harm in Minnesota. Pl.’s Mot. at 15.
For example, at the April 16 hearing, counsel for AHR represented that an immigration court in
Virginia conducts all its hearings remotely and is denying all public access. Although AHR
acknowledges that it suffers no harm from these practices in other states, AHR suggests that the
experiences elsewhere indicate that immigration judges in Fort Snelling are likely to continue
unlawfully closing hearings. The difficulty with AHR’s argument is that AHR provides no
reason to believe that Fort Snelling will follow the lead of other immigration facilities in the
imminent future—assuming, without deciding, that the procedures at other facilities are
unlawful. AHR provides no evidence that Fort Snelling is likely to end in-person hearings
anytime soon. AHR’s declarations even concede that at least some immigration judges at Fort
Snelling continue to allow remote observation, Lange Decl. ¶ XXII, indicating that Fort
Snelling’s practice is different. Nor does AHR press, as part of its motion, that the Government
maintains a national policy that would connect events at other immigration courts to Fort
Snelling.
3. AHR’s evidence regarding other purported limitations on public observation of
immigration hearings does not clearly establish that future harm is imminent.
Besides evidence of unlawful closures, AHR identifies other evidence of limitations on
public access to immigration hearings as well. This evidence of limitations, particularly
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22
regarding remote hearings, seems to represent the bulk of AHR’s access concerns in 2026. But
this evidence does not aid AHR’s quest for standing because AHR does not meaningfully argue
in its present motion that these limitations are unlawful.
First, AHR provides evidence of limitations on in-person attendance. According to the
declarations, some immigration judges at Fort Snelling have closed their courtrooms during
hearings. See Lange Decl. ¶¶ III–IV, XVII; Barker Decl. ¶ III. Apparently, some immigration
judges locked courtroom doors at the start of hearings and required observers to remain for the
duration of the hearing or calendar, rather than entering and exiting during the proceedings. See,
e.g., Lange Decl. ¶¶ XII, XVII; Scheffler Decl. ¶ III. Similarly, the declarations reference
limitations on waiting in the courtroom lobby and being accused of “loitering,” Schalkwyk Decl.
at 1, and inaccurate signage, see, e.g., Lange Decl. ¶ XVIII, among other impediments.
Although the Court does not diminish the burden these limitations place on volunteer
observers dedicating their time to attend immigration hearings, AHR develops no argument that
these limitations are unlawful. AHR vaguely suggests in its brief that “unreasonable restrictions
on attendance are contrary to law,” Pl.’s Mot. at 39, but it never explains how these purported
limitations violate either 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 or the First Amendment, and it provides no
supporting authority for either proposition. “[P]erfunctory and underdeveloped arguments, and
arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are deemed waived.” McNeil v. District
of Columbia, 233 F. Supp. 3d 150, 157 n.11 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Johnson v. Panetta, 953 F.
Supp. 2d 244, 250 (D.D.C. 2013)); see also Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir.
2019). Absent a developed argument as to why these limitations were unlawful, they cannot
support AHR’s claim of future unlawful conduct. To the extent AHR seeks to use these
purported limitations as evidence of a general atmosphere of restrictions on attendance, making
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23
future unlawful closures more likely, the Court is reluctant to infer future unlawful conduct from
past potentially lawful conduct.
Second, AHR points to evidence of limitations on remote attendance; but here too, AHR
advances no argument that denying observers remote access violates any applicable regulations
or the First Amendment. According to evidence provided by AHR, the Fort Snelling
Immigration Court prefers for observers to watch hearings in the courtroom, even when the
parties and counsel appear remotely. See Jan. 20 Letter at 2 (“[T]he Webex links posted on
EOIR’s website are for parties appearing remotely.”); see also Compl. ¶ 43. If observers may
attend in person, their ability to observe is little different than if the parties appeared in person
too.
Although, at the April 16 hearing, counsel for AHR began to argue that barring remote
access was unlawful regardless of in-person access because remote access was more convenient
for observers, counsel later acknowledged that allowing in-person observation of the remote
proceeding in the courtroom was a reasonable accommodation. Thus, AHR does not appear to
argue in the present motion that denying remote access where an in-person option is available
constitutes an unlawful closure.16
The result might be different if immigration judges were routinely blocking both in-
person and remote access to remote-only hearings, but AHR has not presented sufficient
16 AHR states, without citing any support, that immigration courts “cannot inhibit
members of the press or the public from attending immigration proceedings . . . whether
conducted in-person or via Webex.” Pl.’s Mot. at 28; see also Compl. ¶ 33. To the extent this is
an argument that requiring observers to watch remote hearings from the courtroom is unlawful,
AHR has not developed this argument under the applicable legal authority, so the argument is
waived for purposes of this motion. See McNeil, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 157 n.11. And the Court is
mindful that in the post-COVID era it conducted many criminal hearings in which the parties and
counsel appeared remotely but members of the public and press had to come to the courtroom to
observe the hearing.
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evidence of such complete closures. For their part, amici curiae Dow Jones et al. indicate these
remote-only hearings focus on Somali refugees, whose hearings have been “moved online and
expedited.” Amicus Curiae Br. of Dow Jones et al. at 7, ECF No. 13-1. Amici further cite to
news reports describing how, on at least a couple of occasions, reporters have been completely
shut out of these online hearings. Id. AHR makes similar representations in its brief and cites a
single news article. See Pl.’s Mot. at 30 & n.14. Such a blanket closure practice targeting a
specific class of refugees might demonstrate a substantial likelihood of future injury. But,
although these reports may be insightful, they do not substitute for sworn affidavits or
declarations and thus do not provide this Court with a sufficient evidentiary basis from which to
find a likely future injury at this stage. See Eisenstadt v. Cent. Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that newspaper articles are hearsay and observing that, unlike sworn affidavits,
“[t]here is no similar dispensation for newspaper or magazine articles, which not being attested
are considered less reliable than affidavits or depositions”). Assuming, without deciding, that
these news reports may be considered as some evidence, at a minimum, they carry less
evidentiary value than sworn statements. Moreover, because both sets of amici filed their briefs
after the Government’s opposition brief—indeed, after AHR’s reply brief—and the Court did not
hold an evidentiary hearing, the Government has had no opportunity to provide counterevidence.
Turning, then, to AHR’s sworn declarations, the Court finds that they do not clearly
demonstrate that immigration judges at Fort Snelling will close access to remote hearings in the
imminent future. To start, Ms. Lange states that, on February 18, 2026, two immigration judges
at Fort Snelling held “Webex Only” hearings and that no dockets were posted. Lange Decl.
¶ XX. She does not specify, however, if she tried to attend remotely and was denied. See id.
Similarly, Ms. Lange explains that since February 25, 2026, only one judge has “allow[ed] any
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remote observation of master calendar hearings docketed in Minesota.” Id. ¶ XXII. Further, on
March 3, 2026, no observers were “admitted via Webex for any of the 70 morning or afternoon
hearings.” Id. ¶ XXIII. Ms. Lange does not address whether these hearings could have been
viewed in-person in a courtroom and, if any could not, how many. This nuance matters because,
as discussed above, even if all the parties and attorneys attend remotely, AHR does not argue it is
unlawful to require observers to attend in person.17 The declarations do indicate that on June 26,
2025, observers were denied access to a remote-only hearing—which the Court also discussed
above. See Rabogliatti Decl. ¶ III; Lange Decl. ¶ VII. The Court finds that this single instance
of closing a remote-only hearing eight months before AHR filed its motion—assuming the
closure was unlawful—does not amount to a clear showing that immigration judges at Fort
Snelling are likely to close hearings again in the imminent future.
Finally, AHR points to a statement by a press secretary to AHR regarding attendance at
remote hearings as evidence of an unlawful policy regarding remote attendance. In response to a
letter from AHR, EOIR Press Secretary Kathryn Mattingly wrote that “[w]hen in-person access
is not available, the Immigration Judge has the discretion to admit non-parties via Webex to
observe a hearing that is open to the public.” Jan. 20 Letter at 2. Another email from EOIR
states that “immigration judges are not obligated to admit non-parties into an internet-based
17 To the extent Ms. Lange’s declaration, read holistically, could be understood to imply
that these hearings could only be accessed remotely, the Court notes that AHR has not
characterized them that way. The Government’s brief pointed out that AHR “largely fails to
identify whether the remote hearings at issue were accessible by in person attendance.” Defs.’
Opp’n at 10. Yet AHR offered no clarification, or any response whatsoever, in its reply brief.
See Pl.’s Reply 8. In addition, when the Court inquired about this lack of clarity at the April 16
hearing, counsel for AHR did not clarify the statements in the sworn declarations or provide any
concrete figures regarding how frequent these closures were. He merely represented that in the
case of Somali refugees there has been no in-person access. Such a representation by counsel is
not evidence. See Wood ex rel. U.S. v. Am. Inst. in Taiwan, 286 F.3d 526, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(“Statements by counsel, of course, are not evidence.”).
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hearing” but that the judges “will exercise discretion to keep the hearing open, close it, or limit
attendance.” Barker Decl. ¶ V. As AHR sees it, this “discretion” is inconsistent with 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.27 and therefore indicates that immigration judges will continue to unlawfully close
remote hearings.
Such discretionary decisions, to be made in the future, will rarely establish the imminent
harm necessary for a plaintiff to maintain standing. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, 998 F.3d 926, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2021). In Union of Concerned Scientists, the
plaintiff challenged an agency rule defining critical electric infrastructure information—a
category of information exempt from disclosure requirements. Id. at 927–28. The plaintiff
claimed it would be injured because, among other things, the agency would, in the future, use the
rule to deny it access to information designated as critical electric infrastructure information. Id.
at 929. The D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert this claim because it
could not establish a future injury. Id. at 931. The court explained that the agency “exercises
discretion” when deciding to designate and provide access under the regulation. Id. at 930.
“And this court has been reluctant to find standing based on predictions of how agencies will
exercise discretion in future proceedings.” Id. The court concluded that the plaintiff lacked
standing because “the discretion [the agency] has in making designation and access decisions
takes the denial of access to [critical electric infrastructure information] from the decidedly likely
to the speculative.” Id.
For similar reasons to those articulated in Union of Concerned Scientists, Press Secretary
Mattingly’s statement, and similar statements from EOIR, cannot confer standing here. For
AHR to suffer a concrete injury in the future based on this purported policy, two things must
happen: (1) an immigration judge must exercise its discretion to close a hearing, and (2) that
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decision must be unlawful. AHR therefore asks this Court to predict how the immigration judges
“will exercise discretion in future proceedings,” which the D.C. Circuit has counseled this Court
not to do. Id. at 931. Further complicating matters, these decisions will be made by a variety of
individual immigration judges on a case-by-case basis. Absent compelling evidence that
immigration judges are in fact exercising their discretion to deny remote access to hearings
where in-person access is not available, and when layered atop the possibility that any exercise
of that discretion may be lawful in a particular case, AHR’s anticipated future injury is too
speculative to confer standing.
V. CONCLUSION
All told, although AHR has provided some evidence of past closures of immigration
hearings that may have been unlawful and that may presage future unlawful closures, the Court
is not convinced that they have made a clear showing of such impending harm. A preliminary
injunction is a dramatic remedy, so it requires a robust showing by the moving party of an
imminent injury. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam). Because
AHR has not demonstrated an imminent injury, it has not established standing, and the Court
must deny its motion for preliminary injunction and for a stay. An order consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: April 29, 2026 	RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
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