GRAHAM v. BONDI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KEVINO GRAHAM, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03319 (UNA)
)
PAMELA J. BONDI, 	)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a “Notice” (“Not.”) ECF No. 1,
and an Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2.1 Upon review,
for the reasons explained below, this matter is dismissed without prejudice.
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff has attempted to open a civil matter without
filing an actual complaint, which he may not do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; In re Sealed Case No. 98-
3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Adair v. England, 193 F. Supp. 2d 196,
200 (D.D.C. 2002). 	In any event, and generously construing Plaintiff’s “Notice” as Complaint,
this matter still cannot survive.
Plaintiff attempts to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which he was
convicted, namely, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which governs sex trafficking crimes. See Not. at 1–5. He
seeks to do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1, see id. at 1, but neither Federal
Rule 5, nor D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1, bear any relevance to Plaintiff’s intended claim. 	In any
1 Plaintiff’s IFP Application is not captioned for this Court, nor for any other court, in contravention of Federal Rule
10(a) and D.C. Local Rule 5.1(g), and it asks for leave to proceed IFP on appeal, even though Plaintiff has only just
initiated this matter, and there is no appealable order yet entered. Insofar as Plaintiff intended to request for leave to
proceed IFP in this matter, such request is granted.
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event, Plaintiff contends that § 1591(a) is unconstitutionally vague because of the alleged
uncertainty as to whether the statute includes one offense or multiple offenses, and is thus
ambiguous as to whether an operative statutory crime (or crimes) must involve a minor victim.
See id. at 2–5. 	He asks the Court to assess the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute’s
language “As Applied (emphasis on As Applied) to him.” See id. at 2, 5.
First, Plaintiff’s challenge is a very thinly veiled attempt to contest his conviction in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which is an improper collateral attack.
A lawsuit is considered a collateral attack “if, in some fashion, it would overrule a previous
judgment[,]” 	Stone v. HUD, 859 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) and “questions the validity of a judgment or order in a separate proceeding that is not
intended to obtain relief from the judgment[,]” 37 Associates v. REO Constr. Consults., Inc., 409
F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, Plaintiff has already presented this same exact challenge in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 	See U.S. v. Graham, No. 14-623-1, 2020 WL 9596330, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21,
2020) (“Graham I”), cert. of appealability denied, No. 20-1631, 2020 WL 9596841 (3rd Cir. Oct.
23, 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2655, (2021). As explained by the court in Graham I:
Petitioner first asserts that Section 1591(a) is unconstitutionally vague
because of the alleged ‘uncertainty as to whether the statute defines one
offense or multiple offenses.’ . . . A plain reading of Section 1591(a)
reveals 	no 	such 	ambiguity. 	Petitioner 	has 	been 	challenging 	the
constitutionality of Section 1591(a) since first being charged with same
because he refuses to acknowledge the “either/or” language provided
therein. There was never any assertion that this matter involved minors,
yet Petitioner’s constitutional challenge necessarily rests on that particular
section of the statute. The portion of the statute that applies to Petitioner
clearly delineates the circumstances under which he could be held
accountable. For the reasons set forth in this Court’s prior ruling on the
matter, said issue is without merit.
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Plaintiff attempts now to circumvent the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s ruling by
recasting it as a broad national policy or constitutional issue, but he also explicitly asks this Court
to interpret § 1591(a) as it relates to his own conviction. But this Court is without jurisdiction to
review or otherwise interfere with the existing decisions of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
or for that matter, any other federal court. See In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Panko
v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States
v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172
(D.D.C. 1994) (applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482
(1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)), aff’d, No. 94-5079, 1994
WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995).
In other words, Plaintiff must seek the relief sought by filing, in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, either a direct appeal or a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255. See Taylor v. United States Board of Parole, 194 F.2d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (holding
that an attack on the constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant was convicted and
sentenced his suit could not “be used as a substitute for appeal, nor to compel” the federal
goverment “to exercise powers” outside of its purview, and noting that plaintiff’s claims must be
raised through 28 U.S.C. § 2255). And if Plaintiff is then dissatisfied with the outcome of his §
2255 petition in Graham I, he “may not complain that the remedies provided him by [§ 2255]
[were] inadequate merely because he was unsuccessful when he invoked them.” Wilson v. Office
of the Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995); see also Boyer v. Conaboy, 983 F. Supp.
4, 7 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding same and noting that “federal courts have been virtually unanimous
that when a prisoner claims his § 2255 proceeding is inefficacious, ‘[l]ack of success in the
sentencing court does not render his remedy inadequate or ineffective.’”) (collecting cases)
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(quoting Boyden v. United States, 463 F.2d 229, 230 (9th Cir. 1972)). Nor would this District be
the appropriate place to raise such concerns; such is the province of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit, and thereafter, the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
For all these reasons, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. An Order consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.
Date: December 29, 2025
/s/_________________________
ANA C. REYES
United States District Judge
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