WHITED v. ROSS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KEVIN L. WHITED, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03313 (UNA)
)
CARL E. ROSS, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff Kevin Whited’s pro se
Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF
No. 3. The Court grants the in forma pauperis Application, and for the reasons explained below,
it dismisses this case without prejudice.
Whited, a resident of the District of Columbia, sues a D.C. Superior Court judge who
presided over a landlord-tenant proceeding filed against him by PNC Bank. See Compl. at 2 (citing
PNC Bank, National Association v. All Occupants, et al., No. 2025-LTB-001910 (D.C. Super. Ct.
filed Feb. 20, 2025) (“PNC Bank”));1 see also Compl. Exhibit A, ECF No. 1-3 (PNC Bank Dkt.
Sheet I); Compl. Exhibit B, ECF No. 1-4 (PNC Bank Dkt. Sheet II). 	On July 2, 2025, a non-
redeemable judgment for possession was entered in favor of PNC Bank, National Association and
against Whited, an action which, according to Whited, closed the case. 	See Compl. at 2 (citing
PNC Bank Dkt. Entry, “Case Status: 07/02/2025 Closed”); see also PNC Bank Dkt. at (“a non-
redeemable judgment for possession is entered in favor of PNC Bank, National Association and
against All Occupants and Kevin Whited.”) (dated July 2, 2025). Later, on September 5, 2025, to
1 	A court may take judicial notice of the docket and facts on the public record in other court proceedings. See
Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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prevent eviction, Whited filed a Motion for Stay of Execution of Writ of Restitution, and the
Superior Court held a hearing on September 8, 2025, denying Whited’s Motion. See Compl. at 2;
see also PNC Bank Dkt. at (“App of Stay of Execution of Writ of Restitution Filed”) (dated Sept.
5 2025); id. at (“CourtSmart: 200/Webex hybrid Plaintiff’s atty Ed Farnsworth present, remotely.
Defendant Kevin Whited present pro se, in person. Defendant’s written Motion for App to Stay
DENIED.”) (dated Sept. 9, 2025). Despite having filed the Motion for Stay of Execution in PNC
Bank, thus availing himself of the Court’s jurisdiction, Whited nonetheless now contends that,
because in PNC Bank was already “closed,” the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear his
Motion––an act that Whited alleges violated his civil and constitutional rights. See Compl. at 2–
4. He asks this Court to overturn the denial of his Motion for Stay of Execution and to award him
damages. See id. at 4–5.
Whited has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 	His claims are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman 	abstention 	doctrine, 	which 	prohibits 	federal 	courts 	from 	reviewing
determinations made by state or local courts, see Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing District of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 476 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). 	The Rooker-Feldman
abstention doctrine “bars lower federal courts from considering not only issues raised and decided
in the state courts, but also issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the issues that were before
the state court.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; see also Laverpool v. Taylor, 229 F. Supp. 3d 5, 16
(D.D.C. 2017) (“Although Plaintiff styles his claims as arising under various federal statutes and
constitutional protections, even a liberal reading of his Complaint makes clear that he seeks the
invalidation of the judicial foreclosure on his property [by alleging that the defendants] . . .
conspired to abuse the judicial process in order to unlawfully deprive him of his property.”)
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(cleaned up); Ananiev v. Freitas, 37 F. Supp. 3d 297, 312 (D.D.C.) (dismissing the plaintiff’s
constitutional claims stemming from an eviction as barred by the Rooker–Feldman abstention
doctrine), aff’d, 587 Fed. Appx. 661 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Insofar as Whited seeks review
of the propriety of the decisions in PNC Bank, such is the province of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. See D.C. Ct. App. R. 4(a).
Furthermore, the named Defendant is immune to suit for damages. Judges are absolutely
immune for “all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see
also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that a long line of Supreme Court
precedents have found that a “judge is immune from a suit for money damages”); Caldwell v.
Kagan, 865 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have absolute immunity for any actions
taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”). 	“The scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be
construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356 (1978). Relevant here, “a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he
took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Id.; see Mireles, 502
U.S. at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.”); see also
Caldwell v. Kagan, 777 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D.D.C. 2011) (Although “Plaintiff asserts that he is
challenging each defendant’s ‘non-judicial acts,’ it is clear from the allegations in the complaint
that the only actions he is complaining about are judicial decisions and the judicial decision-
making process.”).
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For these reasons, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3); 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
Date: November 21, 2025 	United States District Judge
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