SALAH EL DEAN v. DOE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HESHAM MAGDI AHMED SALAH EL
DEAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LANGE, KIM & DOWELL, LLP, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-2634 (JMC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Hesham Magdi Ahmed Salah El Dean filed a complaint alleging legal malpractice
based on an attorney-client relationship in a prior case. ECF 1. Defendants Nancy Kim and Lange,
Kim & Dowell LLP filed a motion to dismiss on November 5, 2025. ECF 5. Because Plaintiff is
appearing pro se, the Court entered a Fox order directing Plaintiff to respond to that motion by
December 12, 2025. ECF 6; Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(requiring district court to inform a pro se plaintiff that “failure to respond . . . may result in the
district court granting the motion and dismissing the case”). The Court warned Plaintiff that failure
to respond could result in the Court deeming the matter conceded. ECF 6 at 2. Because the deadline
for responding to Defendants’ motion to dismiss passed 41 days ago, and because the Court also
agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state any viable claim, the Court will treat the motion as conceded
and GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at
the top of each page.
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I. ANALYSIS
A. Local Civil Rule 7(b)
Under Local Civil Rule 7(b), an opposing party must “serve and file a memorandum of
points and authorities in opposition” to any motion within 14 days of the date of service. LCvR
7(b). If no memorandum is filed within that time, the Court “may treat the motion as conceded.”
Id. The D.C. Circuit has affirmed the application of Rule 7(b) to motions to dismiss when plaintiffs
fail to respond. See Cohen v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 819 F.3d
476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Court thus grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as conceded
because Plaintiff “has failed to make any response.” Woodhouse v. Ayfi Grp., No. 22-cv-1834,
2022 WL 22625187 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2022).
B. Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Because the D.C. Circuit has expressed some concern about the interaction between Local
Civil Rule 7(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), alternatively, the Court also agrees
with Defendants that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on the merits and should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).2
For a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, the Court must determine whether
the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Plaintiff is pro se,
the Court will “liberally construe[ ]” his filing. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But
“even a pro se plaintiff must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's
2 The Circuit has noted that “[t]o the extent that [Local Rule 7(b)] allows a district court to treat an unopposed
motion to dismiss as conceded, Local Rule 7(b) effectively places the burden of persuasion on the non-moving
party: when he fails to respond, he loses. But Federal Rule 12(b)(6) places this burden on the moving party.” Cohen,
819 F.3d at 481. While the D.C. Circuit has “yet to wrestle with th[is] tension,” “most circuits that have considered
the application of similar local rules in this context prohibit district courts from granting a motion to dismiss solely
because the plaintiff failed to respond.” Id.
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local rules.” Hedrick v. FBI, 216 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93 (D.D.C. 2016). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges
that Defendants engaged in “legal malpractice” by “not including important facts” in a 2022
lawsuit for “breach of contract.” ECF 1 at 1. Plaintiff argues that “[b]ut for defendants, Plaintiff
would have won his case,” and asks the Court for “additional time to improve this complaint to be
tried by Jury.” Id.
In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff seeking to assert a legal malpractice claim must
allege facts supporting three elements: “(1) that there is an attorney-client relationship; (2) that the
attorney neglected a reasonable duty; and (3) that the attorney’s negligence resulted in and was the
proximate cause of a loss to the client.” Chase v. Gilbert, 499 A.2d 1203, 1211 (D.C. 1985). As
Defendants note in their motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s complaint contains barely more than the two
sentences the Court has quoted above and “provide[s] no facts to support the essential elements of
a legal malpractice claim.” ECF 5-1 at 3. For example, the complaint does not specify what
“important facts” were missing from the prior lawsuit, or even what filings are at issue. ECF 1.
The complaint also does not explain how the failure to include those facts led Plaintiff to lose that
prior case. Id. Because Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain “sufficient factual matter” to state a
plausible claim for legal malpractice, Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, the Court also finds that the
complaint can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ECF 5, is GRANTED, and as a result Plaintiff’s complaint,
ECF 1, is DISMISSED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
Date: January 22, 2026
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