LUNA GUTIERREZ et al v. NOEM et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YAMIL LUNA GUTIERREZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25 - 1766 (SLS)
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This 	case challenges 	the legality 	of 	the government’s 	recent 	practice of 	holding
immigration detainees at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Named
Plaintiffs are two Nicaraguan nationals who were held at Guantanamo before they were ultimately
removed 	to 	Nicaragua. 	They 	contend 	that 	their 	detention 	at 	Guantanamo 	violated 	the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Named
Plaintiffs moved to certify this case as a class action, seeking to represent a class of immigration
detainees originally apprehended in the United States who are or will be held at Guantanamo. The
Court denies that motion with respect to the Named Plaintiffs’ habeas claim, but otherwise grants
it with a modified class definition. The Court certifies a class of all immigration detainees
originally apprehended and detained in the United States who have been ordered removed, except
those ordered removed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and who are, or will be, held at Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
The United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay “is a U.S. military base in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba. It is the site of a U.S. military prison at which the U.S. government has asserted
law- of- war detention authority since 2001.” Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 1. On one side of the base “is
a maximum-security prison that houses the government’s military detainees and includes what is
known as ‘Camp 6’”; on the other side of the base “is the Migrant Operations Center . . . , where
migrants interdicted on the high seas have traditionally been held.” Compl. ¶ 45.1
In January 2025, President Donald J. Trump directed the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security to expand operations at Guantanamo to “provide additional detention space
for high- priority criminal aliens unlawfully present in the United States,” up to 30,000 people.
Compl. ¶ 24. Since then, over 500 immigration detainees have been held at Guantanamo. The
Named Plaintiffs allege that detention at Guantanamo involves conditions and restrictions unlike
immigration detention in the United States, including the presence of military guards, inadequate
food, and insufficient sanitation. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47–51.
At Camp 6, the facility previously used to detain law-of-war detainees, immigration
detainees are allegedly “permitted only one hour per day of recreation in an indoor cage.” Compl.
¶ 7. Guards have also allegedly physically harmed detainees and withheld water from them as a
form of punishment. Compl. ¶ 46. Those who “complain[] about conditions or mistreatment to
officers have been tied to restraint chairs for hours.” Id.
1 The Court provides a more fulsome factual background in the contemporaneously filed
Memorandum Opinion resolving the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 53.
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At 	the 	Migrant 	Operations 	Center, 	immigration 	detainees 	are 	housed 	“in 	small,
barracks- style units, with several people held in each room.” Compl. ¶ 47. The Named Plaintiffs
allege that they are always confined to their units, except for one hour a day “when they are
released into a small recreation pen, surrounded by armed military personnel and guard dogs.” Id.
When they return from recreation, they are “invasively searched,” “including a pat down of their
genitals.” Id. Guards have allegedly insulted and taunted the detainees and have threatened to shoot
them. Id.
The Named Plaintiffs are Yamil Luna Gutierrez and Rafael Angel Lopez Ocon, two
Nicaraguan nationals. Compl. ¶¶ 12–13. Both were initially held at facilities in the United States.
Id. And both were transferred to Guantanamo in late May 2025 and were detained there when they
filed their Complaint and Motion for Class Certification. See Decl. Yamil Luna Gutierrez (Suppl.
Gutierrez Decl.) ¶ 3, ECF No. 30-1; Decl. Rafael Angel Lopez Ocon (Suppl. Ocon Decl.) ¶ 3,
ECF No. 30-2. But before the Defendants filed their Opposition to the Motion for Class
Certification, Mr. Luna Gutierrez and Mr. Lopez Ocon were moved from Guantanamo. See Suppl.
Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 3; Suppl. Ocon Decl. ¶ 3. They seek to represent a class of other immigration
detainees who are held or will be held at Guantanamo. Suppl. Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 11; Suppl. Ocon
Decl. ¶ 11.
B. 	Procedural Background
In June 2025, the Named Plaintiffs sued several officials and agencies tasked with
overseeing the United States’ immigration system. See generally Compl. Their Complaint alleges
that their detention at Guantanamo violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and their “right to habeas corpus.” Compl. ¶¶ 62–75. That
same day, they filed a Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel.
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ECF No. 4. On August 4, 2025, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 29. On September 9, 2025, the Court
ordered supplemental briefing related to both motions. See Min. Order (Sept. 9, 2025); Defs.’
Suppl. Br., ECF No. 40; Pls.’ Suppl. Br., ECF No. 41. The Court held a hearing related to both
motions on October 23, 2025. The Motion for Class Certification is fully briefed and ripe for
review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 28; Reply, ECF No. 30.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions, and class certification may only
be granted if a plaintiff shows that all its requirements are met. N.S. v. Hughes, 335 F.R.D. 337,
343– 44 (D.D.C. 2020), modified on other grounds sub nom. N.S. v. Dixon, 2020 WL 6701076
(D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2020). Rule 23(a) “contains four threshold requirements” for certification. Id.
They are:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “If the action satisfies these prerequisites, plaintiffs must then demonstrate
that their proposed class falls into one of the categories of class actions listed in Rule 23(b).”
DL v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The relevant category in this case
is Rule 23(b)(2), which addresses a situation where “the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 23(b)(2). A plaintiff must satisfy Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence. Molock v. Whole
Foods Market, Inc., No. 16- cv- 2483, 2025 WL 1913231, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2025).
DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses whether this case is moot. Then it turns to the Named Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification of their APA, constitutional, and habeas claims.
A. 	Mootness
The Defendants argue that the Named Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because they were
transferred out of Guantanamo after they filed their Motion for Class Certification. Opp’n at 8.
The Court disagrees.2
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding ‘actual, ongoing
controversies,’ meaning that courts have no jurisdiction over claims that are moot.” N.S., 335
F.R.D. at 344 (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988)). “A case is moot if ‘events have
so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a
more- than- speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 276 F.3d 627, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 700–01
(D.C. Cir. 1990)). For class actions, the mootness rule is that “[f]or every claim, at least one named
plaintiff must keep her individual dispute live until certification, or else the class action based on
that claim generally becomes moot.” J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
2 In their Opposition, the Defendants present this argument as a reason for the Court to deny class
certification, rather than as a jurisdictional defect. See Opp’n at 8, 12. But the Defendants have
also moved to dismiss this case due to mootness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Mot. Dismiss at 7, ECF No. 29. Because “[c]ourts have an independent obligation to determine
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it,” the Court considers
mootness at the earliest possible point in this case. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).
And the Court’s conclusion here that this case is not moot resolves the Defendants’ mootness
argument raised in their Motion to Dismiss. See Mem. Op. at 9 n.2, ECF No. 53.
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But the Supreme Court has also recognized a mootness exception unique to the class action
context. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 387–88 (2018). The exception is based
on a recognition that “[s]ome claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have
even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s
individual interest expires.” Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (quoting
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980)). “[T]he class certification decision
in inherently transitory settings is simply ‘related back’ to the time of the filing of the complaint
with class allegations, at which point the named plaintiff’s claims were live.” 1 William B.
Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 2:13 (6th ed. Dec. 2025 Update);
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52 (“In such cases, the ‘relation back’ doctrine is properly invoked to
preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution.” (citations omitted)). This exception
commonly arises “in the immigration detention context.” 1 Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein
on Class Actions § 2:13.
For the “inherently transitory” exception to apply, the party opposing mootness must prove
that “(1) it is uncertain that a claim will remain live for any individual who could be named as a
plaintiff long enough for a court to certify the class, and (2) there will be a constant class of persons
suffering the deprivation complained of in the complaint.” Ramirez v. ICE, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1, 35
(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2010)); accord J.D., 925 F.3d
at 1311; see id. at 1307 (“The party seeking jurisdictional dismissal bears the initial heavy burden
of establishing mootness, but the opposing party bears the burden of proving an exception
applies.”).
This case is in the heartland of the inherently transitory exception. The average length of
detention for immigration detainees at Guantanamo is twelve days. Decl. Fransisco Madrigal ¶ 6,
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ECF No. 28- 3. One of the Named Plaintiffs was held at Guantanamo for thirty-seven days, and the
other for thirteen days. See Suppl. Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 3; Suppl. Ocon Decl. ¶ 3. Both Named
Plaintiffs were moved from Guantanamo before the Defendants could even respond to the Motion
for Class Certification. See Suppl. Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 3; Suppl. Ocon Decl. ¶ 3. Periods of this
duration are too short for courts to “‘reasonably be expected to rule’ on certification.” J.D., 925
F.3d at 1309 (quoting Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978)); see, e.g., id. at 1311
(average custody term of forty-one to ninety days); R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 183
(D.D.C. 2015) (period of detention is “weeks or months”); Ramirez, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (same).
Disputing this prong, the Defendants identify two other cases “filed by the same team of
attorneys” in this District and assert that “the overall litigation history” of these cases “shows that
there has been time to adjudicate a request for class relief with plaintiffs whose claims are not
moot.” Opp’n at 9 (first citing Las Americas v. Noem, No. 25-cv-418 (D.D.C.); and then citing
Espinoza Escalona v. Noem, No. 25-cv-604 (D.D.C.)). This argument is fundamentally flawed in
at least two respects. First, the relation-back concept underlying the inherently transitory exception
contemplates that a certification decision might “‘relate back’ to the filing of the complaint,” not
relate back to the filing of a complaint in a different case brought by different plaintiffs. See Basel
v. Knebel, 551 F.2d 395, 397 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Thus, the relevance of other cases to the
mootness analysis is questionable, even if those cases present similar claims. Second, the
“litigation history” of these cases in fact supports that “it is uncertain that a claim will remain live
for any individual who could be named as a plaintiff long enough for a court to certify the class.”
Ramirez, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (quoting Olson, 594 F.3d at 582). One of the cases was voluntarily
dismissed because the named plaintiffs were moved from Guantanamo and “no longer wish[ed] to
continue litigating the case.” Notice Voluntary Dismissal at 1, Espinoza Escalona v. Noem,
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No. 25- cv-604, ECF No. 34 (D.D.C. May 22, 2025). And in the other, the government is seeking
dismissal on mootness grounds because the named plaintiffs were moved from Guantanamo before
the court resolved the pending class certification motion. See Mot. Dismiss at 8, Las Americas v.
Noem, No. 25-cv-418, ECF No. 43 (D.D.C. June 16, 2025). So even considering the other cases,
they support the Named Plaintiffs’ claim that the challenged detention is too short to permit the
Court to make a certification decision while a potential class representative retains a live claim.
On the second prong, the Court is convinced that “there will be a constant class of persons
suffering the deprivation complained of in the complaint.” Ramirez, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (quoting
Olson, 594 F.3d at 582). As discussed further below, news reports referenced by the Named
Plaintiffs indicate that hundreds of immigration detainees have been held at Guantanamo since the
beginning of 2025.3 Mot. at 6–7; see also Madrigal Decl. ¶ 5 (thirty-seven immigration detainees
held at Guantanamo in late July 2025). Another news report referenced by the Named Plaintiffs
states that in July 2025, the government planned to “double the capacity at Guantánamo to 400
people.”4 Reply at 4. And importantly, the Defendants do not dispute that they are currently
holding immigration detainees at Guantanamo and that they intend to continue doing so. Mots.
Hr’g Tr. 45:2–4, ECF No. 50 (“[THE COURT:] You are not saying that you don’t intend to house
3 Carol Rosenburg, Guantánamo Migrant Operation Has Held Fewer Than 500 Detainees, and
None 	in 	Tents, 	N.Y. 	Times 	(May 	5, 	2025),
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/05/us/politics/guantanamo-migrants-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/4SF3-SRCY]; Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Memo Shows U.S. Can Send Migrants
Without Criminal Records to Guantanamo, Despite Trump’s Promise to Hold “the Worst” There,
CBS 	News 	(Apr. 	17, 	2025), 	https://www.cbsnews.com/news/guantanamo-trump-migrants-
without-criminal-records/ [https://perma.cc/3ZCG-CFDA]; Ted Hesson, Migrant Detentions at
Guantanamo Bay Cost $100,000 per Person Daily, Senator Says, Reuters (May 20, 2025),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-migrant-detentions-guantanamo-bay-cost-100000-per-
person-daily-senator-2025-05-20/ [https://perma.cc/ZKX9-ZZHS].
4 Ximena Bustillo & Tom Bowman, Military Bases in New Jersey and Indiana Will Be Expanded
to 	Detain 	Immigrants, 	NPR 	(July 	11, 	2025), 	https://www.npr.org/2025/07/21/nx-s1-
5475109/immigrant-detention-military-bases [https://perma.cc/2YXS-T4MZ].
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immigration detainees at Guantanamo, correct? [DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL:] Absolutely not.”).
This 	record 	assures 	the 	Court 	that 	“the 	alleged 	violations 	are 	pervasive 	and 	ongoing,”
“demonstrat[ing] that the alleged violations will recur often enough for members of the proposed
class to retain live claims throughout the litigation.” Givens v. Bowser, 111 F.4th 117, 121 (D.C.
Cir. 2024).
The Defendants insist that this is insufficient because “[t]here have been times since
January 2025 when there were no aliens detained at [Guantanamo].” Madrigal Decl. ¶ 4; Opp’n at
11. And at the motions hearing, counsel for the Defendants added that there was “nobody currently
at Guantanamo” because there was an incoming hurricane. Mots. Hr’g Tr. 43:11–13. According
to the Defendants, this shows that no live controversy will exist throughout this case. Opp’n at 11.
But a challenge to an ongoing policy does not fall outside the inherently transitory
exception simply because there has been one instant when the challenged policy was not being
applied. See N.S., 335 F.R.D. at 345. A rule that harsh would run counter to a basic tenant of the
exception—that it is meant to accommodate situations where “otherwise the issue would evade
review.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11 (1975); see also Genesis Healthcare Corp. v.
Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 76 (2013) (“The ‘inherently transitory’ rationale was developed to address
circumstances in which the challenged conduct was effectively unreviewable, because no plaintiff
possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for litigation to run its course.”); N.S., 335
F.R.D. at 345 (“To hold that this claim is moot would thus be to hold that the actions of the USMS
with respect to civil immigration arrests are entirely unreviewable. Such an outcome is
unacceptable.”). It would also invite strategic forbearance from defendants.
And in this case, the inherently transitory exception is buttressed by another mootness
doctrine: voluntary cessation. Under that doctrine, “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a
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challenged practice will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot
reasonably be expected to recur.” FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024) (cleaned up). Here, where
periods of no immigration detainees being present at Guantanamo are entirely the result of the
Defendants’ choices, the voluntary cessation doctrine would require them to “prove no reasonable
expectation remains that [they] will return to [their] old ways.” Id. (cleaned up). But of course, the
Defendants have asserted the opposite—that they will “[a]bsolutely not” stop holding immigration
detainees at Guantanamo. Mots. Hr’g Tr. 45:4. Thus, the Court concludes that the Defendants’
proffered instances of forbearance from immigration detention at Guantanamo are not enough to
stop the inherently transitory exception from relating this Court’s decision back to the filing of the
Complaint. J.D., 925 F.3d at 1308. If the Defendants want to argue that its occasional forbearance
otherwise moots the case, it is welcome to shoulder its “formidable burden” under the voluntary
cessation doctrine. Fikre, 601 U.S. at 241 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).5
In sum, the inherently transitory exception “means that as long as [the Named Plaintiffs
are] able to achieve class certification, [their] claim[s] will not be dismissed as moot.” N.S., 335
F.R.D. at 345. And for the reasons below, the Court finds that class certification is warranted.
B. 	Class Certification on APA and Constitutional Claims
Turning to class certification, the Named Plaintiffs move to certify a class under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Mot. at 2. They propose the following class definition:
5 The Defendants also argue that there will not be a constant class of persons suffering alleged
injuries relating to conditions at Guantanamo because conditions are improving over time there,
meaning that the Plaintiffs’ concerns about conditions may be resolved during this litigation.
Opp’n at 10–11. Even assuming this goes to mootness rather than the merits, it would also be
properly assessed under the voluntary cessation doctrine, not the inherently transitory exception.
See FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024). And the Defendants have not made any attempt to
satisfy their significant burden under that doctrine.
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All immigration detainees originally apprehended and detained in the United
States, and who are, or will be held at Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Id. Because the Rule 23 analysis is similar for the Named Plaintiffs’ APA and constitutional
claims, the Court discusses them together. See Simpson v. Dart, 23 F.4th 706, 713 (7th Cir. 2022)
(“Certification may be appropriate as to some of the class’s claims but not others.”). The Court
first addresses the requirements in Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2), then it discusses the class
definition that it certifies.
1. 	Rule 23(a)
A plaintiff seeking to certify a class must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Molock, 2025 WL 1913231,
at *7. “[C]ertification is proper only if ‘the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.’” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33–34
(2013) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011)).
a. 	Numerosity
“A proposed class must be ‘so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.’”
Morgan v. District of Columbia, No. 10-cv-1511, 2025 WL 2255228, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2025)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)). “Impracticability of joinder means only that it is difficult or
inconvenient to join all class members, not that it is impossible to do so.” Id. (quoting Coleman ex
rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 76 (D.D.C. 2015)). “[C]ourts in this jurisdiction
have observed that a class of at least forty members is sufficiently large to meet this requirement.”
Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 241 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2007).
The Named Plaintiffs point to news reports in support of the numerosity requirement. Mot.
at 6–7. These reports reflect that as of May 5, 2025, 497 immigration detainees had been held at
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Guantanamo;6 on April 17, 2025, forty-two immigration detainees were being held there;7 and on
May 20, 2025, that number was approximately seventy.8 A declaration filed by the Defendants
states that thirty-seven immigration detainees were held at Guantanamo in late July 2025. Madrigal
Decl. ¶ 5. This provides a sufficient basis for the Court to infer that the class contains more than
forty individuals, which is presumptively too numerous to make joinder practicable. See Hinton v.
District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 3d 30, 52 (D.D.C. 2021) (“[T]he Court may . . . ‘draw
reasonable inferences from the facts presented to find the requisite numerosity.’” (quoting
Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 76 (D.D.C. 2015))); id. at 53 (“[A]
class with forty identifiable members is presumed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)[.]”).
That presumption is confirmed in light of the “financial resources of class members, the
ability of claimants to institute individual suits, and requests for prospective injunctive relief which
would involve future class members.” Id. (quoting N.S., 335 F.R.D. at 352). The Named Plaintiffs’
proposed class includes individuals who “will be held” at Guantanamo, and the D.C. Circuit has
explained that “classes including future claimants generally meet the numerosity requirement due
to the ‘impracticality of counting such class members, much less joining them.’” J.D., 925 F.3d
at 1322 (quoting 1 Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 3:15). Further, as
mentioned, the average length of stay for immigration detainees at Guantanamo is twelve days,
Madrigal Decl. ¶ 6, meaning that the class members’ detention is “essentially unreviewable
without a class action, as no detainee could litigate his or her claim” that quickly, N.S., 335 F.R.D.
at 353. “This makes joinder not just impracticable, but impossible—without a class action, there
6 Rosenburg, Guantánamo Migrant Operation Has Held Fewer Than 500 Detainees, supra note 2.
7 Montoya-Galvez, Memo Shows U.S. Can Send Migrants Without Criminal Records to
Guantanamo, supra note 2.
8 Hesson, Migrant Detentions at Guantanamo Bay Cost $100,000 per Person Daily, supra note 2.
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is no lawsuit at all, and the [Defendants] could continue [their allegedly] unlawful practice
indefinitely without ever facing judicial review.” Id. The Court thus concludes that the Named
Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)(1).
b. 	Commonality
“Commonality requires that the plaintiff raise claims which rest on ‘questions of law or
fact common to the class.’” Taylor, 241 F.R.D. at 37 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). The
plaintiff must “demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury’ and that their
claims turn on a ‘common contention’ that ‘is capable of classwide resolution—which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of the
claims in a single stroke.’” Morgan, 2025 WL 2255228, at *4 (quoting Wal- Mart, 564 U.S. at
349–50). “Even a single common question will do, but the question must be more specific than
simply asking whether the plaintiffs ‘have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law’
because the same provision of law ‘can be violated in many different ways.’” Thorpe v. District of
Columbia, 303 F.R.D. 120, 145 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350). So “plaintiffs
must bridge the ‘gap’ between individual claims of harm and the ‘existence of a class of persons
who have suffered the same injury as that individual.’” Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S.
at 352– 53). “Where plaintiffs allege widespread wrongdoing by a defendant[,] a uniform policy or
practice that affects all class members bridges the gap.” Id. (cleaned up).
The Court is convinced that this requirement is also satisfied. To begin, the allegedly
unlawful policy of holding immigration detainees at Guantanamo is “a uniform policy or practice
that affects all class members.” Id. And testing that policy’s legality will require answering
“‘common contention[s]’ that ‘[are] capable of classwide resolution.’” Morgan, 2025 WL
2255228, at *4 (quoting Wal- Mart, 564 U.S. at 349–50). To resolve the Plaintiffs’ APA claims,
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the Court would have to answer whether the Defendants lack statutory authority to detain the class
at Guantanamo and whether the Defendants’ decision to do so was arbitrary and capricious.
Answering those questions yes or no “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each
one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
As the Named Plaintiffs observe, the Defendants do not articulate a reason why the
Plaintiffs’ APA claims fail to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). See Reply at 11; Opp’n at 26–27; see also
Simpson, 23 F.4th at 713 (“Certification may be appropriate as to some of the class’s claims but
not others.”). Instead, the Defendants focus entirely on the Plaintiffs’ due process claims. Opp’n
at 26–30. But for that claim, too, a classwide proceeding has the capacity “to generate common
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Richard
A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 131–32
(2009)). That claim is predicated on the Named Plaintiffs’ allegation that the class’s detention at
Guantanamo impermissibly “constitutes punishment.” Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 583
(1984); see, e.g., Compl. ¶ 71. Resolving that claim will require this Court to evaluate whether the
Defendants’ decision to detain the class at Guantanamo was “taken with an ‘expressed intent to
punish,’” or in the absence of an intent to punish, whether it was “rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive government purpose” or “appear[ed] excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538, 561 (1979));
see also Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] court may take a peek at the
merits before certifying a class, . . . limited to those aspects of the merits that affect the decisions
essential under Rule 23.”). The Court’s answers to those questions will be common to the class.
The Defendants raise two arguments to the contrary. First, the Defendants observe that the
immigration detainees held at Guantanamo are housed at two facilities, Camp 6 and the Migrant
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Operations Center. Opp’n at 28. In the Defendants’ view, these facilities differ “in ways that are
significant to Plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. The Court disagrees that the Named Plaintiffs’ due process
claim cannot proceed on a classwide basis simply because the class includes individuals detained
at both Camp 6 and the Migrant Operations Center. The Complaint’s lead due process theory is
that the Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by deciding to hold immigration detainees at
Guantanamo with an expressed intent to punish. See Compl. ¶ 71; Mots. Hr’g Tr. 60:8–11;
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398. Pursuant to that theory, the Named Plaintiffs aver that the use of any
facility at Guantanamo for immigration detention constitutes unconstitutional punishment—which
does not require parsing the conditions at Camp 6 versus the Migrant Operations Center. And
resolving that contention is enough for commonality. Thorpe, 303 F.R.D. at 145 (“Even a single
common question will do[.]”).
It is true that the Named Plaintiffs offer an alternative theory to support their due process
claim: that the conditions at Guantanamo themselves constitute unconstitutional punishment. See
Compl. ¶ 72; Mots. Hr’g Tr. 60:8–11. Yet the Defendants’ argument fails with respect to this
theory too. “[F]actual variations among the class members will not defeat the commonality
requirement, so long as a single aspect or feature of the claim is common to all proposed class
members.” Nio v. DHS, 323 F.R.D. 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up). On this theory, the Court
will have to evaluate whether the conditions for immigration detainees at Guantanamo are
“rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive government purpose.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398.
Nothing in the record indicates that such a purpose differs between Camp 6 and the Migrant
Operations Center. And when the Court goes on to consider whether the conditions at Guantanamo
“appear excessive in relation to that purpose,” id., it seems that many of the conditions of detention
are the same across Camp 6 and the Migrant Operations Center, see, e.g., Madrigal Decl. ¶¶ 32
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(access to medical treatment and entertainment materials), 34 (air conditioning), 42 (absence of
restraints within housing units), 44 (access to food), 48 (contact with counsel); Compl. ¶¶ 45
(presence of military personnel), 48 (access to food), 49 (possessions and cleanliness), 51 (lack of
information). At this point, the Court sees no basis to conclude that differences between those
facilities are the kind that “have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.” See
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,
84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 131– 32). Thus, even if the Named Plaintiffs’ first theory is insufficient to
itself establish commonality for the due process claim, there are also common answers to be
generated on this second theory.9
Second, the Defendants suggest that due process claims are always inappropriate for
classwide resolution. Opp’n at 29. But although procedural protections required by the Due
Process Clause depend on what “the particular situation demands,” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 314 (2018) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)), the Defendants
cite nothing indicating that the Clause’s substantive protection against punishment differs among
the class members here. Similarly unpersuasive is the Defendants’ suggestion that immigration
detainees may not be able to claim a due process violation as might another litigant. Opp’n at 29.
Even assuming that is true, but see Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“‘It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of
removal proceedings.” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993))), the Defendants
identify nothing indicating that due process protections vary among the members of this class. The
Court fails to see how due process accounting for the immigration context says anything about
9 If, as this litigation progresses, it turns out that differentiating between Camp 6 and the Migrant
Operations Center will facilitate efficient resolution of the Plaintiffs’ due process claims, this Court
can certify subclasses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5).
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whether the Court will be able to “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of” the Plaintiffs’
due process claims “in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. The Court therefore concludes that
the Named Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)(2).
c. 	Typicality
“Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement is met when ‘the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.’” Morgan, 2025 WL
2255228, at *6. “While commonality requires a showing that the members of the class suffered an
injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct, the typicality requirement focuses on whether the
representatives of the class suffered a similar injury from the same course of conduct.” Id. (quoting
Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2003)). It “ensures that the named
plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate.” Thorpe,
303 F.R.D. at 147 (quoting Wal- Mart, 564 U.S. at 349). “‘The facts and claims of each class
member do not have to be identical to support a finding of typicality,’ . . . but the class
representatives ‘must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury
as the class members.’” Id. (first quoting Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 246 F.R.D. 326, 338
(D.D.C. 2007); and then quoting General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)). The
requirement is satisfied “when the plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same course of conduct, series
o[f] events, or legal theories of other class members.” Morgan, 2025 WL 2255228, at *6 (quoting
Hoyte v. District of Columbia, 325 F.R.D. 485, 490 (D.D.C. 2017)).
Here, the Named Plaintiffs were detained at Guantanamo pursuant to the same policy as
the rest of the class. See Decl. Yamil Luna Gutierrez (Gutierrez Decl.) ¶¶ 3–11, ECF No. 4-1
(describing detention at Guantanamo); Decl. Rafael Angel Lopez Ocon (Ocon Decl.) ¶¶ 3–10, ECF
No. 4-2 (same). The Defendants do not dispute that this is sufficient to establish that the class
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representatives’ claims “arise from the same course of conduct, series o[f] events, or legal theories
of other class members.” Morgan, 2025 WL 2255228, at *6 (quoting Hoyte, 325 F.R.D. at 490).
Rule 23(a)(3) is thus satisfied.
d. 	Adequacy
“The fourth Rule 23(a) requirement . . . is that the ‘representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.’” Thorpe, 303 F.R.D. at 150 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(4)). It “imposes two criteria on plaintiffs seeking to represent the class: ‘(1) the named
representative must not have antagonistic or competing interests with the unnamed members of
the class, and (2) the representative must appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the
class through qualified counsel.’” Hoyte, 325 F.R.D. at 490 (quoting Twelve John Does v. District
of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). The purpose of the adequacy requirement is “to
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Id.
(quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)). Still, “[t]his is not a stringent
requirement, as a conflict ‘must be fundamental’ and ‘go to the heart of the litigation’ in order to
preclude certification.” Id. at 491 (quoting Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417,
430– 31 (4th Cir. 2003)). Other than one caveat discussed below, the Court concludes that both the
proposed class counsel and the Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the class.
i. 	Class Counsel
“The adequacy heading . . . factors in competency and conflicts of class counsel.” Amchem
Prods., 521 U.S. at 626 n.20. In determining the adequacy of class counsel, the Court considers:
“(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;
(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims
asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that
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counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The ultimate question
is whether counsel can “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(g)(4).
Here, 	the 	Named 	Plaintiffs 	are 	represented 	by 	“well-respected 	public 	interest
organizations”—the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the
International Refugee Assistance Project. See Black Lives Matter D.C. v. United States, 775
F. Supp. 3d 241, 269 (D.D.C. 2025). “Class counsel have decades of civil litigation experience,
including in class actions” involving civil rights and immigration issues. See id.; Decl. Noor Zafar
¶¶ 3–5, 6–9, 11–16, ECF No. 4-3; Decl. Scott Michelman ¶¶ 5–11, ECF No. 4-4. Counsel have led
efforts to challenge immigration detention at Guantanamo, and the Court has no concerns about
the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class. Given their extensive experience
and knowledge of the applicable law, the Court concludes that counsel for the Named Plaintiffs
will fairly and adequately represent the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), (g).
ii. 	The Named Plaintiffs
Turning to the Named Plaintiffs themselves, the Named Plaintiffs have submitted
declarations showing that they will prosecute this action in the class’s interest. They state that they
are participating in this lawsuit because they wish to protect other noncitizens who are detained at
Guantanamo. Suppl. Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 5; Suppl. Ocon Decl. ¶ 10. And they say that they believe
it is important to prevent that detention. Suppl. Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 11; Suppl. Ocon Decl. ¶ 16.
The Defendants raise two objections to the adequacy of the Named Plaintiffs as class
representatives. First, the Defendants contend that the record insufficiently shows that the Named
Plaintiffs comprehend their representational responsibilities. Opp’n at 30. Perhaps to address that
concern, the Named Plaintiffs’ supplemental declarations include attestations that they understand
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the nature of their role and duties. See Suppl. Gutierrez Decl. ¶¶ 6–11; Suppl. Ocon Decl. ¶¶ 11– 16.
The Court is satisfied that the Named Plaintiffs have expressed a sufficient understanding of and
commitment to their role as class representatives. See 1 Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on
Class Actions § 3:67 (“Adequacy is satisfied . . . if the plaintiff has some rudimentary knowledge
of her role as a class representative and is committed to serving in that role in litigation.”); Garnett
v. Zeilinger, 301 F. Supp. 3d 199, 211 (D.D.C. 2018) (sufficient that “the named plaintiffs have
all attested that their lawyers informed them of the responsibilities of a class representative and
that they are willing to protect the class’s interests, and their declarations demonstrate an awareness
of the facts of this case”).
Second, the Defendants raise adequacy concerns because the government has executed the
Named Plaintiffs’ removal orders. Opp’n at 30–31. Specifically, the Defendants question whether
the Named Plaintiffs maintain the capability to communicate with their counsel and participate in
this litigation, and indeed whether they remain interested in this litigation at all. But these concerns,
too, have been dispelled by the Named Plaintiffs’ supplemental declarations. See, e.g., Suppl.
Gutierrez Decl. ¶¶ 10–11; Suppl. Ocon Decl. ¶¶ 15–16; see also J.D., 925 F.3d at 1313
(“[P]laintiffs with moot claims may adequately represent a class.” (quoting DL, 860 F.3d at 726)).
The Court is satisfied that, in general, the Named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives.
iii. 	Expedited Removal Orders
The caveat, however, is with respect to individuals with expedited removal orders. Under
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), there are two ways that a noncitizen can be removed
from the United States. The first is through “[t]he usual removal process,” which “involves an
evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge.” DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108
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(2020); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The second is so-called “expedited removal,” which involves (as the
name suggests) a more summary process. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 108–09; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
This is relevant because judicial review of some claims implicating the expedited removal
process is subject to limitations beyond those otherwise imposed by the INA. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(i), (e). And here, the Named Plaintiffs were not removed pursuant to expedited
removal orders. Mots. Hr’g Tr. 21:13–16. So to prevail on their claims, they need not address the
expedited-removal-specific limitations on judicial review. This raises a question whether the
Named Plaintiffs will vigorously prosecute the claims of class members who are subject to
expedited removal orders.
The Court has some concerns. In their Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification, the
Defendants raise 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), a limitation on judicial review of some challenges related to
expedited removal. Opp’n at 23. And in their Reply, the Named Plaintiffs spend a few paragraphs
arguing that Section 1252(e) does not apply to their claims. Reply at 16– 18. But another provision,
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i), strips courts of jurisdiction to review any “cause or claim arising from
or relating to the implementation or operation of an” expedited removal order except as provided
in Section 1252(e). The Parties’ briefing—both on the Motion for Class Certification and the
Motion to Dismiss—does not address this provision. The Named Plaintiffs addressed it only after
the Court asked about it during the motions hearing. Mots. Hr’g Tr. 28:16–22. And it seems that
neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has definitively interpreted this provision.
The Court suspects that the underdeveloped nature of these arguments is because the
Named Plaintiffs were not themselves subject to expedited removal orders. To address this
concern, the Court explored two options with counsel for the Named Plaintiffs at the motions
hearing: (1) creating subclasses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5), and (2) redefining
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the class to exclude individuals with expedited removal orders. Mots. Hr’g Tr. 24:5–9. Counsel
expressed a preference for redefining the class. Id. 26:15–17. The Court agrees that this is the best
way to proceed. Because individuals with expedited removal orders face their own limitations on
judicial review that the Court is not satisfied has been sufficiently addressed by the Parties, the
Court will redefine the class to exclude them as discussed below.10
* 	* 	*
The Named Plaintiffs have established that they and proposed class counsel are adequate
representatives for the class, with the exception of individuals with expedited removal orders.
Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.
2. 	Rule 23(b)(2)
Having satisfied all the requirements of Rule 23(a), the Named Plaintiffs now must satisfy
Rule 23(b)(2). Under that rule, “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and
if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature
of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can
be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”
Wal- Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. “Rule 23(b)(2) imposes two requirements: (1) that defendant’s actions
or refusal to act are generally applicable to the class and (2) that plaintiffs seek final injunctive
10 At the motions hearing, counsel for the Plaintiffs stated that she was aware of only one individual
subject to an expedited removal order who has been detained at Guantanamo. Mots. Hr’g Tr.
21:21– 22. So at this point, it seems that excluding such individuals from the class definition will
not have significant practical effect. And of course, the Plaintiffs may later seek to certify a broader
class, adding as a class representative a person with an expedited removal order detained at
Guantanamo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
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relief or corresponding declaratory relief on behalf of the class.” O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d
109, 157 (D.D.C. 2019) (cleaned up).
These requirements are both met. There is no doubt that the Defendants’ recent policy of
holding immigration detainees at Guantanamo is generally applicable to the class. And the
Plaintiffs’ claims challenging that policy are such that the policy “can be enjoined or declared
unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Wal- Mart, 564 U.S. at 360.
That is why the Complaint requests a “single injunction or declaratory judgment,” Wal- Mart, 564
U.S. at 360, on behalf of the entire class, Compl. ¶¶ 77, 79. The Plaintiffs’ APA claims also seek
vacatur of the policy. Compl. ¶ 78. Courts in this District have certified claims seeking indivisible
APA relief such as vacatur under Rule 23(b)(2). See, e.g., Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. &
Legal Servs. v. Noem, 793 F. Supp. 3d 19, 102 (D.D.C. 2025); Crowe v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
No. 24-cv-3582, 2025 WL 1635392, at *21 & n.7 (D.D.C. June 9, 2025) (provisional certification);
O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 157; Huashan Zhang v. USCIS, 344 F. Supp. 3d 32, 60, 65 (D.D.C. 2018).
Thus, the relief sought with respect to both the Plaintiffs’ APA and constitutional claims meet the
“key” requirement that the remedy warranted is “indivisible.” See Wal- Mart, 564 U.S. at 360.
The Defendants contend that certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate
because of an INA provision limiting certain relief related to the removal process. Opp’n at 33.
The provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), states:
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or
parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part
IV of this subchapter . . . other than with respect to the application of such
provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have
been initiated.
This “prohibits federal courts” other than the Supreme Court “from granting classwide injunctive
relief” that “order[s] federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce,
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implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions.” Garland v. Aleman
Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 550 (2022).
Section 1252(f)(1), however, is a remedial bar, not a limitation on class certification. See,
e.g., N.S. v. Dixon, 141 F.4th 279, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“remedial bar”); L.G.M.L. v. Noem,
No. 25-2942, 2025 WL 2671690, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2025) (same); Al Otro Lado, Inc. v.
Mayorkas, 619 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1047 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (same). Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez interpreting Section 1252(f)(1) consistently
described that provision as imposing a limitation on courts’ remedial authority, not on the kinds
of claims that can be certified for classwide resolution. See, e.g., Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S.
at 550–51 (“Therefore, § 1252(f)(1) does not preclude a court from entering injunctive relief on
behalf of a particular alien . . . , but injunctive relief on behalf of an entire class of aliens is not
allowed[.]”). 	And 	that 	understanding 	of 	Section 1252(f)(1) 	is 	confirmed 	by 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(1)(B), which expressly provides that “no court may . . . certify a class under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in certain challenges related to expedited removal orders.
The fact that Congress wrote Section 1252(e)(1)(B) to explicitly prohibit class certification while
simultaneously enacting Section 1252(f)(1) is a strong indication that the latter provision is meant
to do something different.11 See Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86, 120 (D.D.C. 2017)
(“[I]t is a well-established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms
11 Both provisions were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–610–11
(1996).
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within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those
words.” (quoting SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003))).12
In their briefing, the Defendants do little to explain why a statutory bar on the remedies
that can be granted at the end of a case has anything to say about the requirements for class
certification under Rule 23. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482
(1999) (Section 1252(f) “is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.”); cf. Almaqrami
v. Pompeo, 933 F.3d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that the legal availability of a certain kind
of relief “goes to the merits”). When the Court pressed at the motions hearing, counsel for the
Defendants said that “there are some real problems with [a] class action moving forward given the
core relief that the individual petitioner class members would want is not within the power of the
Court.” Mots. Hr’g Tr. 31:21–24. But counsel did not articulate a doctrinal basis why this is so.
Few courts have addressed the effect of a statutory limitation on remedies on certifiability
under Rule 23(b)(2). Yates v. Collier is helpful. 868 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2017). The statute at issue
there, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), limited the relief that could be granted in
challenges to prison conditions. Id. at 368. The relevant provision stated:
12 It is true that Section 1252(f)(1) says that “no court . . . shall have jurisdiction to” enter the
prohibited injunction, which—at first glance—could suggest that the provision speaks to more
than just courts’ remedial authority. But as the Supreme Court has observed, “jurisdiction” is “a
word of many, too many, meanings.” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 547 (2019) (quoting
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)). And in the context of equitable relief such as
injunctions, “jurisdiction” typically refers more broadly to the power of a court to grant a remedy.
See, e.g., Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 804 (1869) (“The jurisdiction
of equity is adequate to give the proper remedy, whatever phase the case may assume[.]”); Kristin
A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the
Federal Courts, 60 Duke L.J. 249, 278 (2010) (discussing Mayer v. Foulkrod, 16 F. Cas. 1231
(C.C.E.D. Penn. 1823) (No. 9,341), a case in which Justice Washington used “jurisdiction” “in a
general sense to mean the power of the federal court to apply traditional equitable remedies”); see
also Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 567 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (differentiating between “the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction” and “the remedial authority at issue” in Section 1252(f)(1)).
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Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend
no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular
plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief
unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
Id. at 368–69 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)).
The opponents of class certification argued that the district court was required to “take
account of injunctive relief that the PLRA would authorize it to award as a remedy” before
certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. Id. at 369. But the circuit disagreed. Id. It observed that the
text of the remedial-limitation provision “plainly says nothing at all about class actions or the
requirements for class certification.” Id. Absent an indication in the statutory text, the circuit
explained that it could not “conclude that Congress intended that provision to alter the
well- established requirements of class certification sub silentio.” Id. at 370. Therefore, the Court
held that the PLRA’s remedial-limitation provision “does not alter the requirements for certifying
a class action under Rule 23(b)(2).” Id. at 371. The Tenth Circuit has held the same. Shook v. El
Paso Cnty., 386 F.3d 963, 970 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The text of the PLRA says nothing about the
certification of class actions. Based on the statute’s absence of direction in that area, we presume
that Congress intended to leave Rule 23 intact.”).
The Court is persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Yates. Applied here, it would
suggest that the availability of the Named Plaintiffs’ requested relief is entirely irrelevant to
certifiability under Rule 23(b)(2). The Court, however, need not go that far. After all, the inquiry
under Rule 23(b)(2) is whether final injunctive or declaratory relief would be “appropriate” given
the Named Plaintiffs’ claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Even if such relief must ultimately be legally
available to be “appropriate,” the Court concludes that, at a minimum, declaratory relief is
available in this case despite Section 1252(f)(1). Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518
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(1969) (“[A] request for declaratory relief may be considered independently of whether other
forms of relief are appropriate.”).13
Start with the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provides that “[i]n a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). So the baseline rule is that declaratory judgments
are generally available in federal actions, even if an injunction is not. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 72 (1985) (“[W]e have held that under this Act declaratory relief may be available even though
an injunction is not.”).
The Defendants argue that Section 1252(f)(1) disrupts this baseline because the declaration
sought—i.e., that the Defendants’ policy of holding immigration detainees at Guantanamo is
unlawful—would impermissibly “restrain the government’s operation of § 1231” by “requir[ing]
the government to not detain aliens ordered removed” there. Opp’n 17–18. But that argument is
foreclosed by D.C. Circuit precedent. The D.C. Circuit has held that “Section 1252(f) prohibits
only injunctions against ‘the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter’ as amended
by IIRIRA. It does not proscribe issuance of a declaratory judgment[.]” Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf,
962 F.3d 612, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); N.S., 141 F.4th at 290 n.7 (same). That
holding accords with every other circuit to have answered the question. See Brito v. Garland, 22
13 In a footnote, the Named Plaintiffs argue that Section 1252(f)(1) is inapplicable here. They
contend that because “nothing in the INA authorizes detention extraterritorially,” “any injunction
would not affect the ‘provisions of part IV’ of the INA,” which is a triggering condition for
Section 1252(f)(1). Reply at 10 n.6. Because the Court concludes that it can certify a class
assuming that Section 1252(f)(1) does apply, it does not resolve this question. But the Court notes
that the Named Plaintiffs’ argument appears to be in tension with Aleman Gonzalez. There, the
Court rejected the argument that Section 1251(f)(1) only forbids classwide relief restraining “the
operation of [the relevant INA] provisions ‘as properly interpreted.’” 596 U.S. at 552.
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F.4th 240, 252 (1st Cir. 2021) (“[W]e conclude that declaratory relief remains available under
section 1252(f)(1).”); Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1013 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is apparent that the
jurisdictional limitations in § 1252(f)(1) do not encompass declaratory relief.”); Rodriguez v.
Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Section 1252(f) was not meant to bar classwide
declaratory relief.”). Indeed, the Defendants do not point to one case holding that declaratory relief
is unavailable under Section 1252(f)(1).14
Further, the Government’s argument elides the distinction between declaratory relief and
injunctive relief. “[W]hile declaratory relief can sometimes have much the same practical effect as
injunctive relief, it differs legally and materially.” Brito, 22 F.4th at 251. “A declaratory judgment
does not, for example, set the stage for a finding of contempt—a distinction of special note in cases
in which the government is a party.” Id. If the Plaintiffs prevail, the Defendants may well cease
any conduct that the Court declares unlawful. But the Defendants choosing to comply in good faith
with the law as announced by this Court is not equivalent to the Court entering coercive relief that
comes with the potential of contempt.
The Named Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is not the appropriate vehicle for
definitively resolving the relief that Section 1252(f)(1) would permit should the Plaintiffs
ultimately prevail in this case. Here, the Named Plaintiffs seek a remedy that would apply
indivisibly to the entire class. Regardless of whether Section 1252(f)(1) allows more, at a
14 The Sixth Circuit has noted in dicta that although “the issue of declaratory relief” was “not
before [it],” it was “skeptical” that the habeas petitioners there would be permitted a classwide
declaratory judgment under Section 1252(f)(1) because that would be “the functional equivalent”
of classwide injunctive relief. Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 880 n.8 (6th Cir. 2018). The
circuit did not, however, explain why—it said only that “[t]he practical effect of a grant of
declaratory relief as to Petitioners’ detention would be a class-wide injunction against the detention
provisions.” Id.
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minimum, declaratory relief on each of the Plaintiffs’ claims is appropriate and (assuming it is
required for certification) legally available. Rule 23(b)(2) is thus satisfied.15
3. 	Class Definition
With the strictures of Rule 23 satisfied, the Court must define the class being certified. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Accordingly, the Court proceeds to define the class and address the
Defendants’ arguments that such a class definition is defective.
15 The Court further notes that even if Section § 1252(f)(1) forbids the Court from granting
injunctive or APA relief in this proceeding, that provision would expressly authorize individual
class members to bring individual follow-on claims for coercive relief to effectuate a favorable
declaratory judgment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (permitting courts to enjoin the covered statutory
provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien”). And a core
purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) is to allow courts to issue an indivisible declaratory judgment that paves
the way for follow-on individual proceedings seeking further (non-monetary) relief. See Advisory
Committee Note (1966), Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (“Declaratory relief ‘corresponds’ to injunctive relief
when [it] . . . serves as a basis for later injunctive relief. The subdivision does not extend to cases
in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages.”);
2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 4:31 (6th ed. Dec. 2025
Update) (same); Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 530–31 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(applying this principle to reject a declaratory-judgment claim that would set up later monetary
relief); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 499 (1969) (“A declaratory judgment can
then be used as a predicate to further relief, including an injunction.”).
The Defendants argue that if Section 1252(f)(1) ultimately forbids the Court from granting
coercive relief in this action, the final judgment granting declaratory relief will have a preclusive
effect on any class member’s future claim seeking coercive relief. Opp’n 20–21. But it is
black- letter law that preclusion “does not apply to extinguish the claim” if “[t]he plaintiff was
unable to . . . seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of . . . restrictions
on [the court’s] authority to entertain . . . demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a
single action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) (A.L.I. 1982); Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, 18 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4412 (3d ed. Sept. 2025 Update) (“Claim
preclusion is readily denied when the remedies sought in the second action could not have been
sought in the first action, so long as there was good reason to maintain the first action . . . in a form
of proceeding that could not afford full relief.”). When there are “formal barriers in the way of a
litigant’s presenting to a court in one action the entire claim including any theories of recovery or
demands for relief,” “it is unfair to preclude him from a second action in which he can present
those phases of the claim which he was disabled from presenting in the first.” Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 26 cmt. c.
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a. 	Redefining the Class
As mentioned above, the Named Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition is:
All immigration detainees originally apprehended and detained in the United
States, and who are, or will be held at Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Mot. at 2. The Court largely adopts this definition with two modifications. First, as previewed
above, the class definition will exclude individuals subject to expedited removal orders under
8 U.S.C. § 1225. Second, the class definition will explicitly state that class members are
individuals who have been ordered removed from the United States. The Parties’ filings in this
case have thus far indicated that both sides already understand the class at issue to be made up of
such individuals. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 62–64, Opp’n at 18.
Accordingly, the class definition this Court adopts is: All immigration detainees originally
apprehended and detained in the United States who have been ordered removed, except those
ordered removed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and who are, or will be, held at Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
b. 	The Defendants’ Arguments
The Defendants contend that a class definition such as this one is defective. Their argument
draws on cases from this District testing class definitions against standards “that [are] not explicit
in the text of Rule 23,” including “that the class be susceptible to precise definition,” Lewis v. Nat’l
Football League, 146 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.D.C. 1992)—i.e., a definition that is “neither amorphous, nor
imprecise,” id. (quoting Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)), and not “overly broad,” In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp.
3d 14, 92 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Cnty. of Monroe v. Priceline.com, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 659, 666
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(S.D. Fla. 2010)). Some courts term this inquiry “ascertainability.” See O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at
159–60.16
Even if such a requirement exists, it is satisfied here. See id. at 160 (“Out of an abundance
of caution, the Court will assume for present purposes that such a requirement exists.”). “‘[T]he
general outlines of the members of the class are determinable at the outset of the litigation’ without
engaging 	in 	burdensome 	individualized 	determinations.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Brewer 	v. 	Lynch,
No. 08- cv- 1747, 2015 WL 13604257, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2015)). To be a class member, an
individual must be (1) an immigration detainee (2) who was originally apprehended and detained
in the United States, and who (3) has been ordered removed (except under 8 U.S.C. § 1225) and
(4) is currently (or at a future point will be) held at Guantanamo. These are “clear and objective
criteria on which to show membership in the . . . class.” See Ramirez, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 49.
The Defendants make two pertinent arguments to the contrary, but neither is persuasive.
First, the Defendants object that the proposed class “would necessarily encompass individuals who
are not yet (and may never be) transferred to” Guantanamo, rendering the proposed class
“amorphous.” Opp’n at 22. The Defendants likely have in mind the portion of the class definition
that brings in future members—that the class includes individuals who “will be” detained at
Guantanamo. But this misapprehends the proposed definition. Immigration detainees who meet
the other criteria “will only become members of the class if and when they” are detained at
16 The D.C. Circuit “has not addressed whether Rule 23 contains an ascertainability requirement
for class certification.” J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2019). It “has been recently
disavowed by four federal appellate circuits.” Hoye v. District of Columbia, 325 F.R.D. 485, 489
n.3 (D.D.C. 2017). And courts in this District have recently expressed particular skepticism about
the applicability of this purported requirement in the context of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. See,
e.g., O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 159 (D.D.C. 2019); Ramirez v. ICE, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1,
48 (D.D.C. 2018); DL v. District of Columbia, 302 F.R.D. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2013).
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Guantanamo. See O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 160. And it is not “at all unusual or improper for a Rule
23(b)(2) class to include future members.” Id. (collecting cases).17
Second, the Defendants contend that the class definition is overbroad to the extent it
“includes those who were previously transferred to [Guantanamo] but have already been
removed.” Opp’n at 24. But as the Named Plaintiffs note, this too reflects a misunderstanding of
the class definition. Reply at 18. The class includes only individuals who “are” or “will be”
detained at Guantanamo. It does not include individuals simply because they were previously
detained there. And to the extent the Defendants are making arguments that go to mootness or
standing, see Opp’n at 24–25, they are addressed by the Court’s analysis of those issues above and
in the Court’s contemporaneously filed Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 53, at 10–11.
In sum, even assuming that Rule 23 imposes implicit restrictions on class definitions, those
restrictions pose no problem for the class definition adopted here. That definition is sufficiently
definite and not overbroad.
* 	* 	*
The Named Plaintiffs have established compliance with Rule 23 on their APA and
constitutional claims. The Court will grant the Motion for Class Certification with respect to these
claims.
C. 	Class Certification on Habeas Claim
With respect to their habeas claim, however, the Named Plaintiffs have not “affirmatively
demonstrate[d] . . . compliance with” Rule 23. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. As an initial matter, the
17 The class is further limited by the nature of the claims the Court is certifying. The Court is
certifying claims challenging the Defendants’ recent policy of housing immigration detainees at
Guantanamo. Future policies or occurrences separate from the ones challenged here that may cause
immigration detainees to be held at Guantanamo are not the target of those claims.
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nature of the Named Plaintiffs’ habeas claim is unclear. The Complaint alleges only that “[t]he
transfer of immigration detainees from the United States to Guantánamo has violated and continues
to violate their right to habeas corpus.” Compl. ¶ 75. The “right to habeas corpus,” however, refers
to the right to seek the writ—which is embodied in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Our duty . . . is to determine
the reach of the right to habeas corpus and therefore of the Suspension Clause[.]”). And even a
meritorious Suspension Clause challenge does not establish entitlement to the writ itself. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“Their access to the writ is a necessity to determine
the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek.”). The
Parties’ briefing on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss does not address the claim at all, so neither
side has articulated their understanding of the claim’s basis.
Nor does the briefing on the Motion for Class Certification clarify things. The Motion itself
does not attempt to demonstrate compliance with Rule 23 on the habeas claim separately from the
Named Plaintiffs’ other claims (indeed, the Motion does not even use the word “habeas” once).
And in their Reply, the Named Plaintiffs state that “the availability of class habeas” is “a question
the Court need not reach because the Plaintiffs’ claims are reviewable under the APA and in
equity.” Reply at 21. This suggests that the Named Plaintiffs have essentially abandoned an
attempt to certify their habeas claim under Rule 23.
The Court notes that the Supreme Court has “never addressed whether habeas relief can be
pursued in a class action,” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 324 n.7 (Thomas, J. concurring), although the
Court has addressed the merits of some class action habeas claims, see, e.g., Nielsen v. Preap, 586
U.S. 392, 400–01 (2019); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 290; cf. Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523,
532 n.3 (2021) (acknowledging that the Court was not addressing the district court’s decision to
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certify the class). In the 1970s, several circuit courts held that habeas claims cannot be certified
under Rule 23 per se—but that courts could instead fashion class- action- like procedures in
appropriate cases using authority under the All Writs Act. See United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser,
506 F.2d 1115, 1125–26 (2d Cir. 1974); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975);
Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 827 n.2 (10th Cir. 1976).18 Two decades later, the D.C. Circuit
cited these cases to acknowledge that “courts have . . . developed . . . equivalents” to “class actions
in habeas.” LoBue v. Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Relying on these cases, the Named Plaintiffs suggest that even if Rule 23 is not available
for their habeas claim, the Court can use a “similar procedure available at equity.” Reply at 22; see
also Pls.’ Suppl. Br. at 3. But the Named Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification invokes only
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Mot. at 2. By essentially abandoning Rule 23 in favor of other
grounds of authority, the Named Plaintiffs have not affirmatively shown compliance with that rule
“by a preponderance of the evidence.” Molock, 2025 WL 1913231, at *7. Further, the Court will
not take the Named Plaintiffs’ terse, open-ended invitation to invoke equity or All Writs Act
authority to pronounce that the habeas claim will proceed under a facsimile of Rule 23. If the
Plaintiffs want the Court to certify their habeas claim under Rule 23—or to invoke another
authority—they may file an appropriate motion. Until then, the Court will deny without prejudice
the instant Motion for Class Certification with respect to the Named Plaintiffs’ habeas claim.
18 Other circuits around this time made more ambiguous statements. Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Nor can we agree that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can never
be treated as a class action.”); see also Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973)
(similar).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part, as modified, and DENIES in part
the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel, ECF No. 4.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: 	December 5, 2025
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