JACKSON v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JACQUELINE JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-302 (EGS)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jacqueline Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”) worked as an
educational aid/paraprofessional at Marie Reed Elementary School
(“Marie Reed), a District of Columbia Public School. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 20, 22. Ms. Jackson brings this suit against
the District of Columbia (“the District”), Katie Lundgren (“Ms.
Lungren”), the Principal of Marie Reed; and Doris Peña (“Ms.
Peña”), a colleague at Marie Reed (collectively, “Defendants”).
Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Ms. Jackson does not state whether she sues the
individual defendants in their official capacities, their
individual capacities, or both. See generally id. Ms. Jackson
brings the following Counts: (1) Sexual Harassment in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) et seq.; (2) Disability Harassment in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et
seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (3) Reprisal Harassment
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
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et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et
seq.; (4) Racial Discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a), et seq.; (5) Disability Discrimination in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C.
Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (6) Reprisal based on prior EEO
Activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-
507, et seq.; (7) Wrongful discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794,
et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (8) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress; (10) Negligence; and (11) Violation of Hate
Crime Statute, D.C. Code § 22-3704. Id. at 15-36.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. See Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“MPSJ”), ECF
No. 14. Defendants seek partial summary judgment as to Ms.
Jackson’s claims under District of Columbia Law; specifically
Counts 8, 9, 10, and 11 on the ground that they are barred by
Ms. Jackson’s failure to comply with the notice requirements set
forth in D.C. Code § 12-309. Defendants state that Section 12-
309 also bars these Counts as to Ms. Lundgren and Ms. Peña, to
the extent Ms. Jackson sues them in their official capacities.
Ms. Jackson did not respond to the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Rather, in her Motion for Extension of Time to Respond
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to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. Extension of Time”), she
states the following: 	“Plaintiff will not be offering any
opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Defendants for Claims 8-11.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff has a police report that she believes
would satisfy the notice provision of D.C. Code § 12-309.” Mot.
Extension of Time, ECF No. 15 at 1 n.1.
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). The
nonmoving party must utilize affirmative evidence and “come
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029,
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
Relevant to the claims in this case, D.C. Code § 12–309(a)
provides that:
an action may not be maintained against the District of
Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property
unless, within six months after the injury or damage was
sustained, 	the 	claimant, 	his 	agent, 	or 	attorney 	has
given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of
Columbia 	of 	the 	approximate 	time, 	place, 	cause, 	and
circumstances 	of 	the 	injury 	or 	damage. 	A 	report 	in
writing 	by 	the 	Metropolitan 	Police 	Department, 	in
regular 	course 	of 	duty, 	is 	a 	sufficient 	notice 	under
this section.
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“Th[is] notice requirement is a prerequisite to a suit
against the District of Columbia ‘because it represents a waiver
of sovereign immunity.’” Blocker-Burnette v. District of
Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Faison
v. District of Columbia, 664 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2009)).
Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, id.; and
“‘is to be strictly construed[.]’” Barnhardt v. District of
Columbia, 601 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Gwinn
v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981)).
Defendants’ 	Statement 	of 	Undisputed 	Facts 	accompanying
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment states as follows:
1. The 	District 	of 	Columbia 	Office 	of 	Risk
Management 	(ORM) 	is 	responsible 	for
receiving, 	processing, 	and 	maintaining
records of claim notices served pursuant to
D.C. 	Code 	§ 	12-309. 	Declaration 	of 	Lana
Craven ¶ 3, attached as Exhibit 1.
2. ORM receives written notices of claims from
the 	Mayor’s 	Office 	or 	directly 	from
claimants 	and 	records 	them 	in 	its 	claims
management system. Id. ¶ 4.
3. ORM 	conducted 	a 	diligent 	search 	of 	its
records 	for 	any 	written 	claim 	notices
received 	from 	or 	on 	behalf 	of 	Plaintiff
regarding 	any 	claims 	against 	the 	District.
Id. ¶ 6.
4. This 	search 	did 	not 	reveal 	any 	letters 	or
notices from or on behalf of Plaintiff. Id.
¶ 7.
5. When ORM receives a claim notice, it issues
an 	acknowledgment 	letter 	to 	the 	sender 	and
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assigns 	a 	claim 	number 	for 	tracking 	and
investigation. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
6. ORM’s 	search 	did 	not 	identify 	an
acknowledgment letter, claim number, or any
record 	of 	a 	notice 	from 	or 	on 	behalf 	of
Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10-11.
7. ORM’s 	established 	practice 	is 	to 	store 	all
claim 	notices 	in 	a 	searchable 	system. 	The
absence 	of 	any 	record 	for 	Jacqueline
Jackson 	confirms 	that 	she 	did 	not 	serve
notice 	of 	her 	claims 	pursuant 	to 	D.C. 	Code
§ 12-309.
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 14-1 at
1-2. Ms. Jackson did not respond to the Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Facts. See Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 15 at 1
n.1; see generally Dkt. for Civil Action No. 25-302.
Accordingly, the Court considers the statement of facts
undisputed for the purpose of this motion. See F ED. R. C IV. P.
65(e)(2).
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Jackson failed to
comply with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-
309. Accordingly, Ms. Jackson’s claims in Counts 8, 9, 10, and
11 against the District are barred. See District of Columbia v.
Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1362 (D.C. 1995).
Ms. Jackson does not state whether she sues the individual
defendants in their official capacities, their individual
capacities, or both. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. To the
extent she sues them in their official capacities, her suit is
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treated as a suit against the District and so her failure to
comply with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-
309 also bars her claims against the individual defendants sued
in their official capacities. See Crockett v. District of
Columbia, Civil Action No. 16-1357, 2020 WL 1821121, at *7
(D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2020).
For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: 	Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
February 23, 2026
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