GORECKI v. GARLAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARY GORECKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 24-3168 (RDM)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mary Gorecki brings this action against her former employer, the United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and age, and
retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq.1 Gorecki alleges that the DOJ unlawfully transferred her from her position as a
Regional Director in the DOJ Community Relations Service (“CRS”), subjected her to continued
harassment in her new position, retaliated against her when she objected to her treatment, and
constructively discharged her from the department entirely. See generally Dkt. 13-2 (Am.
Compl.). Defendant has now filed a partial motion to dismiss, see Dkt. 18, seeking to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims for age-based discriminatory reassignment, hostile work environment,
constructive discharge, and retaliation.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part
Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss.
1 Plaintiff brought this action against the U.S. Attorney General in his official capacity. The
current holder of the office was automatically substituted as defendant under Rule 25(d).
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I. BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s amended, operative
complaint, Dkt. 13-2 (Am. Compl.), which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of resolving
the pending motion to dismiss. See Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 163–64 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff Mary Gorecki, a white, 57-year-old woman, began working at the CRS in March
2010. Dkt. 13-2 at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). The CRS “works with community groups to resolve
community conflicts based upon race, color, and national origin and to prevent and to respond to
alleged hate crimes arising from differences of race, color, national origin, gender, gender
identity, sexual orientation, religion, or disability.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2). Within the CRS,
Gorecki worked as a “Regional Director” with responsibility for several geographic areas—
Regions I, V, and VII—and also occasionally served as the Acting Associate Director and Acting
Deputy Director. Id. at 5, 10 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9, 38). She was the only white woman to have
ever held the position of a CRS Regional Director. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 12).
The present case results from Gorecki’s conflict with Paul Monteiro, who was confirmed
by the United States Senate as the Director of the CRS in May 2022. Id. at 5–6 (Am. Compl.
¶ 13). That appointment was not Monteiro’s first experience with the CRS, or with Gorecki.
Prior to his 2022 appointment, Monteiro had served as Acting Director of the CRS from March
2016 to January 2017 and, during that time, temporarily transferred Gorecki from her Regional
Director post to a new job as the “CRS program and resource development coordinator.” Id. at
5–6, 6 n.1 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14). The Office of Special Counsel restored Gorecki to her
Regional Director position in September 2016, but Gorecki alleges, without further detail, that
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Monteiro continued to “retaliate[] and discriminate[] against [her]” during the remainder of his
2016–17 tenure at the CRS. Id. at 6 n.1 (Am. Compl. ¶ 14).
Upon his 2022 return to the CRS, Monteiro began placing men of color into temporary,
high-ranking positions without requiring competition for those roles or considering qualified
women candidates. Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–18). That included promoting Justin Lock, an
Asian/Latino male employee, from a GS-13 position to a GS-15 Chief of Staff role without
posting the position or allowing Gorecki or any other female candidate to apply. Id. at 6–7 (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 19–20). Monteiro then began preparing to once again transfer Gorecki from her role
as Regional Director, as part of a broader effort to remove all the white women holding
leadership roles at the CRS and to replace them with African American employees. Id. at 7–8
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 24). To create a pretext for her transfer, Monteiro first asked CRS Deputy
Director Gerri Ratliff to review Gorecki’s work and identify areas where she had “produced the
most casework for [the] CRS”—an exercise Gorecki portrays as pointless because, as the most
senior and highest-performing Regional Director, she necessarily had more casework experience
than her peers in any and all subject areas. Id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24–26). Consistent with that
theme, Ratliff’s review determined that Gorecki was the only CRS Regional Director to have
experience working on environmental justice or disability cases, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25), and in
August 2022 Gorecki was transferred to a newly created position as a subject matter expert
(“SME”) for environmental justice and disability work with the job title of “Program Manager,”
id. at 8–10 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 31, 38).
Gorecki alleges that her transfer was marked by repeated, unexplained irregularities.
First, Monteiro claimed that the new environmental justice and disabilities SME position was a
critical priority for the CRS even though neither environmental justice nor disability had
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previously been identified as a top CRS priority. Id. at 8–9 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 31); but see
Exec. Order No. 14008, § 222(c)(iii), 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7631 (Jan. 27, 2021); Exec. Order No.
14035, § 10, 86 Fed. Reg. 34593, 34599 (June 25, 2021). CRS leadership had instead identified
race, gender identity, and sexual orientation as the agency’s top priorities, Dkt. 13-2 at 8–9 (Am.
Compl. ¶ 28), but the CRS, including during Monteiro’s tenure, never hired any SMEs for those
areas, id. at 9 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30–32). Moreover, the environmental justice and disability SME
position was only announced internally, without being posted to USAJOBS.gov as would have
been customary for a “high priority position[].” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33–35). And after no CRS
GS-15 asked to be placed in the position, Monteiro “permanently removed . . . Gorecki from her
position as Regional Director of Regions I, V, and VII, and placed her in the position of Program
Manager for Environmental Justice and Disabilities,” id. at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 38), even though
she lacked any particular background in environmental justice or disability work or the
educational qualifications that were normally required for an SME role, id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36–
37).
As a result of the move, Gorecki was stripped of her supervisory duties, no longer
attended leadership meetings, and was ordered to resign from a position on the Federal Executive
Board. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 39). Gorecki’s prior responsibilities were divided among several CRS
employees. Her role on the CRS three-member interview panel went to Antoinette Barksdale, an
African American woman without comparable leadership experience. Id. at 11 (Am. Compl.
¶ 40). Her role as Regional Director for Region I went to Matthew Lattimer, a younger African
American man, who was later succeeded by another African American man, Darryck Dean. Id.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 42). Synthia Taylor, an African American woman, became Acting Regional
Director for Regions V and VII. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 41). Gorecki alleges that she had far more
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experience and relevant qualifications for the Regional Director role than Lattimer, Dean, or
Taylor. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43). Following the changes, Taylor began assigning Gorecki
administrative tasks far below Gorecki’s GS-level, including shredding, unpacking boxes, and
filing reports about the office Xerox machines. Id. at 11–12 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–48). Despite
her supposed new responsibilities for environmental justice and disability work, Gorecki was
also excluded from relevant leadership meetings of the DOJ environmental justice team and the
department ignored her efforts to refer new disability cases to the CRS. Id. at 12–13 (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 49–51).
On September 1, 2022, shortly after Gorecki’s transfer to her new role, the DOJ posted
her old Regions I and V Regional Director position on USAJOBS.gov to find a permanent
replacement. Id. at 13–14 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53–54, 56). Gorecki asked Ratliff to take down the
posting and, instead, to reinstate Gorecki to the position, but Monteiro denied that request on
September 9, 2022, telling Ratliff that “Gorecki would never be a Regional Director at [the] CRS
ever again.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56–58). A few weeks later, on September 27, 2022, Gorecki
contacted the DOJ Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office, complaining of race, gender,
and age discrimination by the CRS. Id. at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 61). Gorecki alleges that Monteiro,
Taylor, Barksdale, and Ratliff all learned of her EEO filing in October 2022, when they were
contacted to be interviewed as part of the process. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62–63).
Although Monteiro rejected Gorecki’s request to be reinstated in her prior position,
Gorecki applied for the posted Regional Director position and was interviewed on November 8,
2022. Id. at 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 65). The interview panel was composed of Ratliff, Taylor, and
Barksdale, whom, Gorecki alleges, Monteiro had directed to score African American applicants,
“particularly young African American males,” the highest. Id. According to Gorecki, Taylor
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then proceeded to sabotage her interview. Id. at 15–16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 70). First, on the day of
the interview, Taylor falsely accused Gorecki of having violated the DOJ telework policy as part
of a “conspiracy” with CRS Administrative Assistant Melissa Simmons. Id. at 15 (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 66–68). Simmons quit her job on the spot in protest of Taylor’s “harassment.” Id. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 69). Then, during the interview itself, Taylor asked Gorecki “smirking” questions
about professional integrity and related values. Id. at 15–16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 70). When Gorecki
nonetheless emerged from the application process (which involved both an interview and a
written exercise) as the highest-scoring applicant, Monteiro ordered Ratliff to throw out the
entire applicant list, and to decline to select anybody for the job. Id. at 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72–
73). Ratliff did so, but that same day she resigned from her CRS Deputy Director position. Id.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 73). Monteiro appointed Barksdale to replace her in an acting capacity, without
inviting Gorecki (who possessed superior experience) to apply, at which point CRS’s leadership
was entirely composed of African American employees. Id. at 16–17 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75–77).
Gorecki continued with the EEO process and filed a formal complaint on January 3,
2023. Id. at 2 (Am. Compl.); see Dkt. 1-3. Gorecki also filed another request to be restored to
the Regional Director position on that date, which was rejected. Dkt. 13-2 at 19 (Am. Compl.
¶ 89). When Monteiro learned of the formal complaint, he assigned Taylor to serve as Gorecki’s
first-line supervisor. Id. at 17 (Am. Compl. ¶ 79). Gorecki alleges that Taylor proceeded to
“bombard[] [her] with work at all hours of the night,” adding hundreds of hours’ worth of
additional assignments, and also berated Gorecki for not responding to communications outside
of work hours. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80–81). Another white subordinate of Taylor, Theressa
Segovia, received similar treatment, while Vince Plair, an African American employee, was
exempted. Id. at 17–18 (Am. Compl. ¶ 82). On March 15, 2023, Taylor resurfaced her prior,
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false accusation that Gorecki had violated the CRS telework policy and issued Gorecki a “Letter
of Reprimand.” Id. at 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 91). Gorecki responded by filing an administrative
grievance, which Barksdale oversaw despite Gorecki’s request for a different grievance official.
Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 92). Barksdale ultimately informed Gorecki that the letter of reprimand was
never placed in Gorecki’s file but did not allow Gorecki to verify that assertion. Id. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 93).
Gorecki further alleges that this pattern of “abuse and harassment,” id. at 22 (Am. Compl.
¶ 100), continued even after Monteiro resigned from the CRS in April 2023 and was replaced as
Acting Director by Justin Lock, id. at 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 94). Lock falsely criticized Gorecki’s
previous performance as a Regional Director at an all-staff conference, id. at 21 (Am. Compl.
¶ 95), and Barksdale repeatedly sent Gorecki “harassing emails” objecting to Gorecki’s tone in
workplace correspondence, id. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 96–97). Gorecki ultimately resigned from the
CRS on May 15, 2023. Id. at 22 (Am. Compl. ¶ 100). The CRS did not attempt to hire a
replacement for her supposedly high-priority environmental justice and disabilities SME
position. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 103). After her resignation, the CRS ultimately selected Kenneth
Bergeron, an African American man, to serve as the new Regional Director for Region V. Id. at
23 (Am. Compl. ¶ 106).
The DOJ continued to process Gorecki’s EEO complaint until August 2024, when
Gorecki informed the department’s Complaint Adjudication Office that she had decided to
proceed in district court instead. Id. at 3 (Am. Compl.); see Dkt. 1-10. Gorecki filed this suit
against the Attorney General in November 2024, asserting claims under Title VII and the ADEA.
See generally Dkt. 1 (Compl.). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, see
Dkt. 9, and Gorecki opposed the motion, see Dkt. 12, and sought leave to file an amended
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complaint, see Dkt. 13. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend, which mooted the then-
pending motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 17. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the
following claims:
First, Gorecki alleges that she was constructively discharged from the DOJ on the basis
of her race and gender in violation of Title VII (Counts I and II), Dkt. 13-2 at 25–26 (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 113–26), and on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA (Count VI), id. at 28–
29 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 144–47). Second, she alleges that the department reassigned her from her
Regional Director position on the basis of her race and gender in violation of Title VII (Counts
III and IV), id. at 26–28 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127–38), and on the basis of her age in violation of the
ADEA (Count VII), id. at 29 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 148–51). Third, she alleges that she was subjected
to a hostile work environment on the basis of her race and gender in violation of Title VII (Count
V). Id. at 28 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 139–43). Fourth, she alleges that the DOJ retaliated against her for
filing her EEO complaint in violation of both Title VII and the ADEA (Counts VIII and IX). Id.
at 29–31 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 152–64).
In response, Defendant renewed her motion to dismiss in part. See Dkt. 18. Notably, the
Attorney General does not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s discriminatory reassignment claims under
Title VII (Counts III and IV) but argues that all other claims should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim. Dkt. 18-1 at 7. That motion is now fully briefed, see Dkt. 19; Dkt. 20, and is ripe
for decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “test[] the legal
sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). This
examination requires the Court to “first ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state
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[the] claim’ to relief, and then determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded those elements with
adequate factual support to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Blue v. District
of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675, 678 (2009)). That “facial plausibility” standard requires that the plaintiff
“plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). A plaintiff need not make “detailed factual allegations” to withstand
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, but “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). Thus, a complaint may survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even
if “recovery is very remote and unlikely,” but the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citation modified).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Discriminatory Reassignment
The Court begins with Gorecki’s claim that she was unlawfully reassigned from her
Regional Director position. As noted above, Defendant has not moved to dismiss Counts III and
IV of the operative complaint, in which Gorecki alleges that the DOJ reassigned her from her
position on the basis of her race (Count III) and gender (Count IV) in violation of Title VII. Dkt.
18-1 at 7; see Dkt. 13-2 at 26–28 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127–38). Defendant does, however, seek to
dismiss Gorecki’s separate claim that she was reassigned based on her age (Count VII) in
violation of the ADEA. Dkt. 18-1 at 24–29; see Dkt. 13-2 at 29 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 148–51).
The ADEA prohibits the federal government from discriminating against its employees
aged forty or older on the basis of age, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), and claims brought under that statute
are generally resolved using “the same approach . . . as [in] Title VII cases,” Wilson v. Cox, 753
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F.3d 244, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because the relevant provision of the ADEA broadly declares
that “personnel actions affecting [federal] employees . . . shall be made free from any
discrimination based on age,” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), the D.C. Circuit has held that a plaintiff need
not show that her age was a but-for cause of a challenged employment action, only that “any
amount of discrimination taint[ed] a personnel action,” Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 206 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); see also Townsend v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 3d 280, 300 (D.D.C. 2017). To
prevail on an ADEA discrimination claim against a federal employer, the plaintiff must establish
(1) that she suffered an adverse employment action, Sagar v. Mnuchin, 305 F. Supp. 3d 99, 108
(D.D.C. 2018), and (2) that her “age was a factor in the employer’s decision,” Ford, 629 F.3d at
206 (emphasis in original).
The first element—a qualifying adverse employment action—requires only brief
discussion. Plaintiff alleges that she was transferred from her position as a CRS Regional
Director to a less desirable SME position with fewer responsibilities. Dkt. 13-2 at 10 (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 38–39). Defendant, correctly, does not dispute that this reassignment qualifies as an
adverse employment action, see generally Dkt. 18-1 at 24–29. See Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d
1286, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“adverse employment action” includes “reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities” (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
761 (1998)); Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354–55 (2024). Accordingly, the only
question is whether Plaintiff has met her burden of plausibly alleging that her transfer “gives rise
to an inference of discrimination.” Townsend, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 297 (quoting Chappell-
Johnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, . . . an
employment discrimination plaintiff need not anticipate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
that may be proffered by the employer for the adverse employment action nor allege pretext.”
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Id. at 298. Instead, “the guiding lodestar is whether, assuming the truth of the factual
allegations . . . the inferences of discrimination drawn by the plaintiff are reasonable and
plausibly supported.” Id. (citing Nurridin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
Plaintiff identifies only a handful of factual allegations in support of her claim of an age-
discriminatory transfer. See Dkt. 19 at 24–26. First, she alleges that sometime around May 2022
Monteiro promoted Lock—who, “at the time was approximately [41] years old”—to a GS-15
Chief of Staff position without posting the job or allowing Gorecki or any other female candidate
to apply, despite her superior qualifications. Dkt. 13-2 at 6–7 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20). Second,
she alleges that Monteiro “consistently made remarks about older staff members.” Id. at 23 (Am.
Compl. ¶ 107). Specifically, she highlights an October 26, 2022, all-staff conference at which
Monteiro objected to “the old staff poisoning the new staff,” id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 108), praised a
“young, African American male[]” for having “lived experience” and “understand[ing] what it is
like to live in the communities we serve,” id. at 24 (Am. Compl. ¶ 109) (citation modified), and
applauded a “youth advocate” for being “in his twenties and therefore” better able to “relate to
the people on the ground because he was the same age” as community members served by the
CRS, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 111).
Defendant contests Monteiro’s intent in making those statements, Dkt. 18-1 at 28, but the
Court concludes that those allegations, if read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, permit a
reasonable inference at the pleading stage that Monteiro, in general terms, praised characteristics
of younger employees and, implicitly or explicitly, critiqued older employees for having negative
attitudes and being unable to relate to certain communities. It is less clear, however, how those
statements connect to Gorecki’s transfer from her Regional Director position. As a general rule,
“isolated” comments “unrelated to the relevant employment decision” are an insufficient basis
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from which to infer discrimination, if not accompanied by other allegations. Morris v.
McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2016). For example, in Arnold v. Speer, 251 F. Supp.
3d 269 (D.D.C. 2017), the Court held that allegations that the plaintiff had been “called out” and
“laughed at because of his age” were insufficient to create a plausible inference that his
employer’s decision not to promote him was motivated by age-based discrimination, as the
plaintiff had not “allege[d] more specific facts that lay out what happened, who was involved
(including, e.g., the age of the person who was actually promoted), and how such conduct
constitutes age discrimination,” id. at 273 (emphasis added).
Gorecki does not allege that, following her transfer, her previous responsibilities were
consistently given to younger CRS employees.2 She does, however, allege that Lattimer, the
third person to take over her Regional Director responsibilities in an acting capacity, is “younger
than” she is. Dkt. 13-2 at 11 (Am. Compl. ¶ 42). And, as discussed above, she alleges that
Lock, who was also younger than Gorecki, was fast-tracked to a GS-15 Chief of Staff position
and that Gorecki was not given an opportunity to apply for that position. Id. at 6–7 (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 19–20). Although Plaintiff is not directly challenging the DOJ’s refusal to offer her an
opportunity to apply for that role as an instance of age discrimination, see id. at 29 (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 148–51), and, instead, merely portrays Lock’s preferential treatment as offering support for
her claims of race and gender discrimination, id. at 6–7 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–20), that allegation
2 Although outside the pleadings, Defendant represents that Kenneth Bergeron—who was
ultimately chosen as the new Region V Regional Director—is more than 14 years older than
Plaintiff and that two of the three individuals who took over Plaintiff’s positions in an acting
capacity—Synthia Taylor and Derrick Dean—are also older than Gorecki. Dkt. 18-1 at 29.
Plaintiff does not dispute those assertions in her opposition to the motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 19
at 23–26.
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does offer supporting context for Plaintiff’s claims that Monteiro intended to discriminate against
older employees.
Although a close question, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has proffered enough (albeit,
just barely enough) to proceed with her ADEA claim that her transfer from her Regional Director
position was motivated at least in part by age discrimination—that is, that age was “a factor” in
Monteiro’s decision to reassign her. Ford, 629 F.3d at 206 (emphasis in original). Reading the
complaint in the light most favorable to Gorecki, she has alleged that Monteiro was the
decisionmaker and that he expressed hostility to older employees, had previously given
preferential treatment to a younger employee at Gorecki’s expense, and replaced Gorecki, at
least in part, with a younger employee. Plaintiff will need much more to survive a motion for
summary judgment on the question. But she has alleged enough to survive a motion to dismiss.
The Court will, accordingly, deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s age-
discriminatory transfer claim (Count VII).
B. Hostile Work Environment
The Court next considers Plaintiff’s claim that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment on the basis of her race and gender in violation of Title VII. Dkt. 13-2 at 28 (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 139–43). To state a claim of a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, a
plaintiff must allege “that [her] employer subjected [her] to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d
1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation modified) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993)). In considering whether the alleged misconduct rises to the level of a hostile work
environment, the Court must consider the “totality of the circumstances, including the frequency
of the [alleged] discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it [allegedly]
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interfere[d] with an employee’s work performance.” Id. The bar for demonstrating a hostile
work environment is “a high one.” Nichols v. Young, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2017). The
analysis includes a subjective standard, which asks whether the plaintiff “subjectively
perceive[d] the environment to be abusive,” and an “objective” component, which is evaluated
“from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” Peters v. District of
Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 188 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation modified) (first quoting Harris, 510
U.S. at 21; and then quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)). As
the Supreme Court has cautioned, the standard for hostility is “sufficiently demanding” so that
“Title VII does not become a general civility code,” and that courts may “filter out complaints
attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998) (citation modified).
As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that she was stripped of
supervisory responsibilities; removed from the CRS interview panel; assigned menial,
administrative tasks such as “provid[ing] maintenance updates on the phones[,] maintain[ing] the
services for the cable television,” and “answering the telephones;” falsely accused of violating
the DOJ telework policy; “bombarded” with “abrupt and rude” messages assigning work outside
normal hours or expectations; had her requests for reimbursements for meeting expenses denied;
was “extremely humiliat[ed]” when her supervisors did not “participate substantively” in a
meeting she had organized; had the quality of her previous work falsely criticized during a staff
conference; and was criticized for her tone in workplace emails. Dkt. 13-2 at 10–12, 15, 17–19,
21 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39–40, 47–48, 66, 80–81, 85, 88, 95–97).
Plaintiff’s claim runs into immediate difficulty as she does not allege any evident
connection between those experiences and her race or gender. She does not allege that anyone
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“ever made any negative statements,” and certainly no objectively offensive statements, “relating
to [Plaintiff’s] or anyone else’s[] race [or gender].” Singh v. U.S. House of Representatives, 300
F. Supp. 2d 48, 57 (D.D.C. 2004). Plaintiff does not appear to allege any statements or other
expressions of hostility towards women made by Defendant whatsoever, and the only race-
related statements mentioned in the complaint—Monteiro’s assertion that an African American
man had “lived experience” that allowed him to better understand the communities served by the
CRS, Dkt. 13-2 at 24 (Am. Compl. ¶ 109) (citation modified)—does not constitute the type of
“discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” necessary to state a claim for a hostile work
environment, Kempthorne, 550 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Title VII is an
anti-discrimination statute, rather than a general workplace code of conduct, and courts have held
that even isolated comments expressing race- or gender-based hostility are insufficient to
plausibly allege a hostile work environment, let alone no such comments at all. See, e.g., George
v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 408, 416–17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding multiple comments telling
plaintiff to “go back to where she came from” and instances of being “shouted at,” told to “shut
up” and that she “should never have been hired” insufficient to state a hostile work environment
claim (citation modified)); Harris v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 419 F. App’x 1, 1–2 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (holding that “three racially motivated comments” towards the plaintiff over
the course of a year did not amount to a hostile work environment). Similarly, although Plaintiff
alleges that she was the only white woman to hold certain positions within the CRS, the fact that
a plaintiff is the only member of a protected class in an office does not “suffice to make the
necessary causal connection” between the plaintiff’s race or gender “and the alleged
mistreatment.” Singh, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 57; see also Bryant v. Brownlee, 265 F. Supp. 2d 52,
65 (D.D.C. 2003) (“In the absence of some greater indicator of race or age bias, the uniqueness
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of plaintiff’s race and age in her workplace cannot substantiate a claim that plaintiff’s workplace
was ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.’” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21)).
Instead, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim rests on her allegations that her job
responsibilities changed following her allegedly race- and gender-based reassignment from her
Regional Director position. Dkt. 13-2 at 28 (Am. Compl. ¶ 140). But Plaintiff is already
pursuing that theory of race and gender discrimination as a Title VII claim for discriminatory
reassignment, id. at 26–28 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127–38), and there is no basis for reframing the same
allegations as a hostile work environment claim where Plaintiff has failed to plead the essential
elements of the latter.
Even if the Court were to overlook Plaintiff’s failure to connect her treatment to any
expressions of hostility based on her race or gender, the claim for a hostile work environment
would still independently fail because she has not alleged any incidents that rise above the
“ordinary tribulations of the workplace.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citation modified).
Conduct such as “occasional name-calling, rude emails, lost tempers[,] and workplace
disagreements” falls well short of the high mark set by the objective hostility standard. Baird v.
Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Experiences such as having supervisors criticize
the tone of her emails, Dkt. 13-2 at 21 (Am. Compl. ¶ 96), being accused of violating a telework
policy, id. at 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 66), and not being acknowledged in meetings, id. at 8 (Am.
Compl. ¶ 23), while doubtlessly unpleasant, do not rise to the level of “extreme conduct”
necessary to support a hostile work environment claim. See Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broad. Bd.
of Governors, 774 F. Supp. 2d 76, 109–10 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that plaintiff’s allegation of
her employer not “interacting with her directly” coupled with a letter of “admonition” devoid of
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objectively offensive language was not sufficiently severe or pervasive). Instead, Plaintiff’s
allegations center on “work-related actions by supervisors,” which are typically considered
workplace grievances rather than fodder for a hostile work environment claim. Fields v. Vilsack,
207 F. Supp. 3d 80, 95 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified); see also Brooks v. Grundmann, 851 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 748 F.3d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“non-selection for a
desirable position, assignment to undesirable duties, . . . and being criticized by supervisors
do[es] not establish a hostile work environment”). Nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged that these
discrete incidents, involving “different people doing different things in different contexts,”
Baird, 792 F.3d at 171, amount to a “coherent hostile environment claim,” id. at 169 (citation
modified).
Plaintiff comes closest to stating a claim for hostile work environment in describing how
Taylor allegedly treated her after August 15, 2022. Dkt. 13-2 at 11–12 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44–48).
She alleges, for example, that “Taylor ordered [her] around like a secretary or a conciliation
specialist,” “made administrative demands of [her] which were at a GS-4 grade level,” and
ordered her to perform a series of menial tasks, like reporting to the General Services
Administration (“GSA”) on “vehicles” in the region, providing “maintenance updates on the
phones” and “maintain[ing] the services for the cable television,” reporting “on the Xerox
machines,” calling “GSA to make sure the office was vacuumed and cleaned[,] packing and
unpacking boxes[,] and shipping packages to Washington, D.C,” “answering the telephones,”
and shredding documents. Id. at 12 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46–48).
But these allegations nonetheless fail for three reasons. First, even if these allegations
might arguably support a claim for a retaliatory hostile work environment, Plaintiff alleges that
this mistreatment began in August 2022, before she “engaged in protected activity by filing her
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informal EEO complaint in September[] 2022.” Id. at 29 (Am. Compl. ¶ 153). Second,
Plaintiff’s standalone hostile work environment claim alleges only race and gender
discrimination, id. at 28 (Am. Compl. ¶ 140), and, as noted above, the complaint fails to allege
any nexus between claims of race or gender discrimination and the events occurring in Chicago
starting in August 2022—other than the allegation that Plaintiff had been transferred to her new
position in the first place based on her race and gender. Third, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s
claims of discriminatory reassignment are already proceeding in this case as challenging a
separate, discrete adverse employment action, and “this jurisdiction frowns on plaintiffs who
attempt to bootstrap their alleged discrete acts of [discrimination] into a broader hostile work
environment claim.” Boone v. MountainMade Found., 64 F. Supp. 3d 216, 240 (D.D.C. 2014)
(citation modified). Absent some nexus with race or gender discrimination and more detailed
allegations about how these menial tasks effected Plaintiff’s overall work experience—
distinguishable from her reassignment itself—Plaintiff has failed to clear the high hurdle for
stating a hostile work environment claim.
The Court will therefore grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the Title VII claim for
a hostile work environment (Count V).
C. Constructive Discharge
1. Title VII
Plaintiff also brings claims for constructive discharge based on race and gender under
Title VII. Dkt. 13-2 at 24–26 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 113–26). To prove constructive discharge based
on a hostile work environment, Plaintiff “must first establish a hostile [workplace] by showing
behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment.”
Clemmons v. Acad. for Educ. Dev., 70 F. Supp. 3d 282, 306 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation modified).
Then, she “must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her
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resignation qualified as a fitting response.” Steel v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004)).
Because, as the Court discussed above, Plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege that she
experienced a hostile work environment based on race or gender, beyond the reassignment that
Plaintiff challenges in separate counts of her complaint, the claims that she was constructively
discharged by exposure to such an environment necessarily fail as well. See McKeithan v.
Boarman, No. 11-5247, 2012 WL 1450565, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 12, 2012) (per curiam)
(“[A]ppellant failed to state a claim of constructive discharge[] because he failed to make out an
underlying predicate claim of hostile work environment.”); Nichols, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 11. The
Court will accordingly grant the motion to dismiss as to the Title VII constructive discharge
claims (Counts I–II), insofar as they allege that Plaintiff experienced an adverse employment
action, distinguishable from the transfer, that would have caused a reasonable employee in her
position to resign.
That does not, however, end the analysis. Although a constructive discharge is “most
often alleged in hostile-work-environment cases, almost any type of discrimination can trigger a
constructive discharge.” Joyce v. Off. of Architect of the Capitol, 966 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.
2013) (citing Suders, 542 U.S. at 142); see also Suders, 542 U.S. at 143 (describing constructive
discharge based on a hostile work environment as “one subset of Title VII constructive discharge
claims”). Courts have, for example, acknowledged that a failure to promote an employee can
qualify as a constructive discharge if the failure to receive a promotion can objectively be
described as “career-ending.” Kalinoski v. Gutierrez, 435 F. Supp. 2d 55, 78 (D.D.C. 2006)
(quoting Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1998)). Gorecki’s complaint,
which alleges that a veteran attorney with substantial management experience was sidelined,
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“stripped . . . of her supervisory responsibilities,” Dkt. 13-2 at 25 (Am. Compl. ¶ 114), and asked
to perform “a variety of . . . menial tasks” inappropriate for her experience and qualifications, id.
at 12 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47–48), states a plausible claim that her transfer itself amounted to a
constructive discharge. The constructive discharge standard is necessarily contextual, relying on
the employee’s own expectations and circumstances. See Joyce, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 25–26. At
least at the pleading stage, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that a reasonable employee in her
position, faced with such substantial, humiliating changes in responsibilities, had no option but to
resign. See Bayatfshar v. ARINC, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 206, 214 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Indeed,
because the plaintiff’s duties changed substantially, a reasonable factfinder could find that the
plaintiff’s new position was a significant demotion, and thus a constructive discharge.” (citation
modified)).
The Court will therefore deny the motion to dismiss the Title VII constructive discharge
claims (Counts I–II), insofar as they allege that Plaintiff’s transfer from her Regional Director
position amounted to a constructive discharge.
2. ADEA
Despite not separately asserting the predicate hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff
also brings a claim for age-based constructive discharge under the ADEA. Dkt. 13-2 at 28–29
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 144–47). As referenced above, the constructive discharge standard asks
“whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign
under the circumstances.” Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010). One basis for
such a conclusion is a finding that the employer “deliberately made [the plaintiff’s] working
conditions intolerable.” Hill v. Gray, 28 F. Supp. 3d 47, 61 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Clark v.
Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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As with the Title VII claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
that she experienced a qualifying age-based hostile work environment, separate from her
transfer, that made her working conditions “intolerable,” such that “resignation qualified as a
fitting response.” Steel, 535 F.3d at 695 (quoting Suders, 542 U.S. at 134). The precise contours
of Plaintiff’s allegations of age-based constructive discharge are unclear, as the operative
complaint’s discussion of the relevant count includes only general, conclusory allegations that
“Defendant’s constructive discharge of [Gorecki] was improperly based upon her age” and that
her age “played a role in the Defendant’s decision to [constructively] terminate her.” Dkt. 13-2
at 28 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145–46). And even considering the complaint in its entirety, Plaintiff
makes only cursory attempts to connect her treatment to any expressions of age-based hostility
by her employer.
Although Monteiro’s previously discussed remarks could be read as expressing a belief
that older employees had negative attitudes and less familiarity with the communities served by
the CRS, those statements do not amount to “‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’
that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.’”
Kempthorne, 550 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Moreover, as with the Title VII
analysis, allegations that Gorecki was unfairly reprimanded and treated rudely by supervisors do
not rise to the requisite level of hostility to require resignation as a response. See Grosdidier,
774 F. Supp. 2d at 109–10. The Court has ruled that Plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory
reassignment based on her age (barely) clears the bar under Rule 12(b)(6), but that does not
mean that the reassignment, by itself, also supports a hostile work environment claim. Aside
from the workplace tribulations discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegations of an age-based hostile
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work environment, resulting in constructive discharge, rely on little more than the allegations of
an “illegal reassignment.” Dkt. 19 at 20, 22.
As with the Title VII claims, the Court will therefore grant the motion to dismiss as to the
ADEA constructive discharge claim (Count VI) insofar as Plaintiff alleges a predicate hostile
work environment but will deny the motion as to the claim that Plaintiff’s age-based transfer
constituted a constructive discharge.
D. Retaliation
Plaintiff’s final two claims allege that Defendant unlawfully retaliated against her for
filing an EEO complaint objecting to her reassignment, in violation of Title VII and the ADEA.
Dkt. 13-2 at 29–31 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 152–64). Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from
“discriminat[ing]” against any employees because the employee has “opposed . . . an unlawful
employment practice . . . [or] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To state a
claim for retaliation, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that “she suffered (i) a materially adverse
action (ii) because . . . she had brought or threatened to bring a discrimination claim.”
Kempthorne, 550 F.3d at 1198. “[T]he test for determining retaliation under the ADEA and Title
VII is identical.” Tomasello v. Rubin, 167 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Defendant does not dispute that Gorecki’s EEO complaint, which alleged “race, gender,
and age discrimination,” Dkt. 13-2 at 14 (Am. Compl. ¶ 61), constitutes protected activity under
Title VII and the ADEA, Dkt. 18-1 at 33. The sole dispute, therefore, is whether Plaintiff has
alleged that she was subject to a materially adverse action that was plausibly taken in retaliation
for her EEO activities. “Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision . . . applies only when the
retaliatory action is ‘materially adverse,’ meaning that it causes ‘significant’ harm.” Muldrow,
601 U.S. at 348 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
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In the operative complaint, Gorecki alleges that, shortly after Monteiro and Ratliff first
learned of her EEO complaint, the CRS “began a baseless investigation into alleged misconduct
by [Gorecki] regarding her timekeeping” and also “began to harass and abuse [Gorecki]” by
“assigning her tasks unrelated to her fake program manager job,” issuing a letter of reprimand,
“not responding to [Gorecki’s] grievance contesting the [letter of reprimand],” and denying her
opportunities to speak to the CRS Director. Dkt. 13-2 at 29–30 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 155–56, 162–
63). She further alleges that her workload was tripled “with irrelevant and non-jurisdictional
work,” as well as repeating the claim that she was subject to a hostile work environment. Id. at
30–31 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 156, 163).
Several of those allegations do not meet the threshold for a materially adverse action. For
example, Plaintiff alleges that she was falsely accused of violating the CRS telework policy,
which ultimately resulted in a letter of reprimand. Id. at 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 91). Plaintiff
concedes, however, that she was told that the letter was “never placed in [her] file,” and, while
she was not able to verify the fact, she does not actually allege that the letter was placed in her
permanent file. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 93). The mere initiation of an investigation into an
employee’s performance, without any substantive consequences, typically does not constitute a
materially adverse action. See Jones v. Castro, 168 F. Supp. 3d 169, 180 (D.D.C. 2016).
Similarly, a letter of reprimand that does not result in “future punishment” also fails to clear the
bar. See Hyson v. Architect of the Capitol, 802 F. Supp. 2d 84, 102 (D.D.C. 2011); see also
Herbert v. Architect of the Capitol, 766 F. Supp. 2d 59, 75 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that a letter of
reprimand describing the employee’s failure to perform duties as directed and accusing the
employee of unprofessional and discourteous conduct was not materially adverse). Plaintiff does
not allege that any further consequences resulted from the letter. Nor do general “disagreements
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about management policies” suffice. Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d 54, 70 (D.D.C.
2012).
Plaintiff’s allegation that her workload was tripled, however, does plausibly allege a
materially adverse action. The D.C. Circuit has held that substantially increasing an employee’s
workload can give rise to a retaliation claim, as a reasonable employee “might well be dissuaded
from filing an EEO complaint if she thought her employer would retaliate by burying her in
work.” Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Although not every
increase in workload necessarily qualifies, Plaintiff’s allegation that the CRS “tripl[ed] her
workload with irrelevant and non-jurisdictional work,” Dkt. 13-2 at 22 (Am. Compl. ¶ 100), is
enough at the pleading stage to create a reasonable inference that she faced a sufficiently
“onerous” retaliatory increase in her responsibilities to qualify as a materially adverse action,
Morales v. Gotbaum, 42 F. Supp. 3d 175, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2014).
Plaintiff has also plausibly alleged that she received this treatment in retaliation for her
EEO activity. Although the timing is not entirely clear, Plaintiff’s complaint, when read in the
light most favorable to her claims, suggests that this harassment started around 30 days after her
supervisors learned of the EEO complaint. Dkt. 13-2 at 29–30 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 155–56). While
always a contextual inquiry, a lag of only one or two months between the protected activity and
the adverse action would be well under the three-month period that decisions in this district have
treated as “approaching the outer limit” of when temporal proximity may give rise to a
reasonable inference of discrimination. Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 113 F. Supp. 3d
297, 311 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
Notably, Defendant’s motion to dismiss does not argue that such treatment, if it qualified as
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materially adverse, would not support a plausible inference of retaliation. See Dkt. 18-1 at 30–
33.
In Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, she further argues that the CRS’s
failure to rehire her for her old position—by, she alleges, rigging the interview process to ensure
that she was not selected—also supports her retaliation claim. Dkt. 19 at 27. There is no doubt
that refusing to hire Gorecki for the Regional Director position would qualify as a materially
adverse action under Title VII and the ADEA. The operative complaint, however, does not
mention that failure to hire in support of either of Gorecki’s retaliation claims. Dkt. 13-2 at 29–
31 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 155–56, 162–63). Instead, it only discusses Gorecki’s extra workload, the
investigation into her timekeeping, mishandling her grievance, and other alleged misfeasance.
Id. The Court agrees with Defendant that Gorecki’s complaint, therefore, cannot fairly be read to
assert a claim of retaliation based on her non-selection for the Regional Director post. Dkt. 20 at
19. Plaintiff objects that the complaint does reference the CRS’s refusal to rehire her in the
narrative portion of the document and then, in the counts dealing with retaliation, states that all
prior paragraphs “are realleged and reincorporated herein.” Dkt. 13-2 at 29–30 (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 152, 159); Dkt. 19 at 27. But such “shotgun pleading” fails to comport with Rule 8’s
requirement that a pleading include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which is intended “to give fair notice” to the
defendants “of the claim being asserted,” Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1997).
That is particularly the case where, as here, Plaintiff does explicitly reference other, specified
incidents of alleged adverse actions that she presents as anchoring her retaliation claims.
The Court will therefore deny the motion to dismiss as to the retaliation claims (Counts
VIII–IX) but will not construe the complaint as alleging that the CRS’s refusal to rehire Gorecki
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was retaliatory. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed under that theory, she must file a motion for leave
to amend her complaint under Rule 15.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. 18, is hereby
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: March 31, 2026
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