AYYADURAI v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHIVA AYYADURAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 23-3766 (CKK)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(March 31, 2026)
In this action, pro se Plaintiff Shiva Ayyadurai presses a variety of speech- and election-
related claims against a collection of social media platforms and federal and state government
agencies and officials (collectively, the “Defendants”). Ayyadurai claims that the Defendants
conspired to suppress his speech across various online platforms to the detriment of his various
electoral campaigns and in violation of a host of statutory and constitutional provisions. Two
separate groups of social media platforms and a group of federal officer and agency defendants
in this action have each moved to dismiss Ayyadurai’s claims against them. Upon consideration
of the parties’ submissions,1 the relevant legal authority, and the entire record, the Court shall
GRANT the pending motions to dismiss. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court
1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto:
• the Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 39;
• the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Google, LLC and YouTube, LLC (“YouTube’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 40;
• the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), Jen Easterly,
and the United States (collectively, “Federal Defendants”) (“Federal Defs.’ Mot.”), Dkt. No. 42;
• Plaintiff Ayyadurai’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 45;
• the Reply by Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 47;
• the Reply by Defendants Google, LLC and YouTube, LLC (“YouTube’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 48; and
• the Reply by the Federal Defendants (“Federal Defs.’ Mot.”), Dkt. No. 49.
In an exercise of discretion, the Court concludes that holding oral argument is not necessary to resolving the issues
presented in the pending motions. See LCvR 7(f).
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shall also DISMISS the remainder of Ayyadurai’s Complaint because it plainly fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shiva Ayyadurai, a three-time candidate for federal elected office, alleges in this
case that a variety of government officials and private actors have conspired to suppress his
speech on major social media platforms. Read liberally, Ayyadurai’s 75-page Complaint alleges
that various Massachusetts state officials—none of whom are named as Defendants in this
case—federal officials at the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), and other
government officials unknown to him have coordinated with private companies to regulate and
censor his speech by “deplatforming” or “shadowbanning” him—that is, suspending his social
media accounts or limiting the reach of his posts.2 Ayyadurai alleges that the Defendants took
these actions in retaliation for posts in which he “articulat[ed] a government employee’s role in
destroying the digital ballot images used to tabulate votes” in a prior election. Compl. ¶¶ 2–3.
For this conduct, Ayyadurai alleges that the United States, the Cybersecurity
Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), former CISA Director Jen Easterly, in her official
capacity,3 and unnamed CISA officials (collectively, the “Federal Defendants”) are liable for
violations of Ayyadurai’s First Amendment rights (Count 1), Compl. ¶¶ 185–204, exceeding
their statutory authority (Count 2), id. ¶¶ 205–11, violations of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) (Count 3), id. ¶¶ 212–22, violations of a range of federal civil rights and criminal
statutes (Counts 4, 5, and 6), id. ¶¶ 223–52, intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 7),
id. ¶¶ 253–61, defamation (Count 9), id. ¶¶ 266–72, additional tort claims under the Federal Tort
2 Some of Ayyadurai’s allegations in this case appear to overlap with allegations in a suit that he brought and later
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in the District of Massachusetts. See Ayyadurai v. Galvin, No. 20-cv-11889-
MLW (D. Mass. filed Oct. 20, 2020); see id. Dkt. No. 196 (Aug. 10, 2021) (notice of voluntary dismissal).
3 Because Ayyadurai named Easterly as a Defendant in her official capacity, the current head of CISA, Acting
Director Nicholas M. Andersen, is automatically substituted for Easterly as a party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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Claims Act (“FTCA”) (Counts 11, 12, and 13), id. ¶¶ 282–302, and Bivens damages (Count 14),
id. ¶¶ 303–07. Ayyadurai also alleges unlawful acts by 10 unidentified “Doe” Defendants,
whom he describes simply as “State Actors,” in Counts 4, 5, and 6.
Ayyadurai next alleges that Twitter, Inc. and “X.com, Inc.”—a mischaracterization of
Twitter’s rebrand into X Corp.—(together, “X”), Google LLC and YouTube LLC (together,
“YouTube”), and Facebook Inc. (now “Meta Platforms, Inc.” or “Meta”) (collectively, the
“Social Media Defendants”) are similarly liable for the conduct alleged in Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7,
and 9, including violations of the First Amendment, violations of various federal statutes, and
related torts. Id. ¶¶ 185–211, 223–61, 266–72. Ayyadurai further alleges that the Social Media
Defendants are liable for breach of contract (Count 15). Id. ¶¶ 308–11. Ayyadurai also alleges
that X is individually liable for interfering in a federal election (Count 10). Id. ¶¶ 273–81.
Finally, Ayyadurai requests a permanent injunction against all Defendants, which he
styles as a separate cause of action (Count 8). Id. ¶¶ 262–65.
All Defendants except for X and the unnamed Doe Defendants timely responded to
Ayyadurai’s Complaint. (X and the Doe Defendants have not responded at all.) Meta,
YouTube, and the Federal Defendants each filed motions to dismiss. Meta’s Mot., Dkt. No. 39;
YouTube’s Mot., Dkt. No. 40; Federal Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 42. In their motions, the
Defendants argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain many of Ayyadurai’s claims, that
his claims against the Social Media Defendants are barred by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, and that his pleading falls short of the standards of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). See generally Defs.’ Mots., Dkt. Nos. 39, 40, 42. Ayyadurai
filed an opposition to the Defendants’ motions, and Meta, YouTube, and the Federal Defendants
each filed replies. Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 45; Meta’s Reply, Dkt. No. 47; YouTube’s Reply, Dkt.
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No. 48; Federal Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 49. The parties’ submissions are now ripe for this
Court’s review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In evaluating the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the factual
allegations in Ayyadurai’s Complaint. The Court does “not accept as true, however, the
plaintiff’s legal conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” Ralls
Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court also
need not accept the truth of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court may
consider not only “the facts alleged in the complaint” but also “documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial
notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002) (RBW) (citing
EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment
for the relief the pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The purpose of the minimum standard of
Rule 8 is to give fair notice to the defendants of the claim being asserted, sufficient to prepare a
responsive answer, to prepare an adequate defense, and to determine whether the doctrine of res
judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
A party may move under 12(b)(1) to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that the court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Further, this Court
“must dismiss” an action if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “A court should only dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter
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jurisdiction if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.” Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (quoting Caribbean Broadcasting System, Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d
1080, 1086 (D.C.Cir.1998)) (internal quotations omitted). “Under Rule 12(b)(1), the party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court—plaintiff in the present action—bears the
burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd.,
503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169–70 (D.D.C. 2007) (JDB), aff’d, No. 07-cv-5328, 2008 WL 4068606
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2008). Because a court has an affirmative obligation to determine whether it
has subject-matter jurisdiction, “factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny
in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.”
Wright, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grand Lodge of
Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001) (RMU)).
A party may move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A]
complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
(2007)). Instead, a complaint must contain factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When a plaintiff files an opposition to a motion to dismiss and addresses only certain
arguments raised in the motion, the court may, in its discretion, treat the arguments that the
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plaintiff failed to address as conceded. Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob. Ministries,
284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (RBW), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Ayyadurai proceeds in this matter pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to
less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C.
Cir. 2008). When evaluating Ayyadurai’s allegations, the Court considers not only the facts
alleged in Ayyadurai’s Complaint, but also the facts alleged in his brief filed in response to the
Motions to Dismiss. See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (“[A] district court errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s complaint ‘in light of’ all
filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.”) (quoting Richardson v. United
States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Fillmore v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 140 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2015) (JEB). However, like all pleadings, pro se pleadings must satisfy
the minimal requirement of alleging sufficient “factual matter” to permit a court “to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Brown, 789 F.3d at 150 (quoting Atherton v. District
of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681– 82 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against the
Federal Defendants in Counts 4–7, 9 and 11–14.
1. This Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against the Federal Defendants
for which the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity
(Counts 4–7 and 9).
Count 4 purports to state a claim against the Federal Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for “violations of a constitutional right under color of law.” Compl. ¶¶ 223–233. Count 5
purports to state a claim against the same Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiracy to
violate Ayyadurai’s civil rights. Id. ¶ 236. Count 6 purports to state a similar claim against the
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Federal Defendants and others under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), alleging violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Id. ¶ 243. Counts 7 and 9 purport to state
tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. See Compl. ¶¶ 253–
61, 266–72. The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to any of
these claims. As a result, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims,
and each one must be dismissed.
First, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Ayyadurai’s claim of
alleged “violations of a constitutional right under color of law” in Count 4. Compl. ¶¶ 223–233.
“If the United States has not consented to being sued under [Section] 1983, sovereign immunity
requires the court to dismiss [a plaintiff’s Section 1983] claim for lack of jurisdiction.” Settles v.
U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Section 1983 does not mention the
United States or any federal government entity as a viable defendant, and it does not waive the
federal government’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 1105–06.
Second, this Court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ayyadurai’s allegations of
conspiracy to violate his civil rights in Count 5. Like Section 1983, “[Section] 1985 does not
waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity, so federal employees acting in their official
capacities are immune from liability for alleged violations of [Section] 1985.” Boling v. Parole
Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 3d 37, 47 (D.D.C. 2017) (BAH) (quoting Roum v. Bush, 461 F. Supp. 2d
40, 46 (D.D.C. 2006) (RMC), aff’d, No. 17-5285, 2018 WL 6721354 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2018)).
Third, with respect to Federal Defendants, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over the RICO violations Ayyadurai alleges in Count 6. “The United States has not waived
sovereign immunity for claims brought under the RICO Act.” Klayman v. Obama, 125 F. Supp.
3d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 2015) (TSC) (citing Abou-Hussein v. Mabus, 953 F. Supp. 2d 251, 262–63
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(D.D.C. 2013) (RBW)).
Fourth, and finally, With respect to Federal Defendants, this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over Ayyadurai’s tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation against the Federal Defendants in Counts 7 and 9 because the “exclusive waiver of
sovereign immunity for suits sounding in tort against the United States or its employees” is the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Wilburn v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, 771 F. Supp. 3d 950, 961 (E.D. Mich. 2025); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2679(b)(1). Accordingly, Ayyadurai’s freestanding tort claims against the Federal Defendants
are barred by sovereign immunity, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide them. In apparent
recognition of this fact, Ayyadurai also alleges similar claims under the FTCA later in his
Complaint. The Court addresses these claims in the following section.
2. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ayyadurai’s FTCA
claims (Counts 11, 12, and 13).
Ayyadurai levies claims against Federal Defendants under the FTCA in Counts 11
(intentional infliction of emotional distress), 12 (negligence), and 13 (“wrongful action”). See
Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 282–302. Although the FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign
immunity in certain cases, it does so subject to specific conditions. Because Ayyadurai’s FTCA
claims do not satisfy these conditions, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide those
claims, and they must be dismissed.
a. The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims
levied under the FTCA against government agencies and officials.
The first relevant condition to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is that “the
United States is the only proper defendant” in an FTCA action. Springer v. Supreme Court, No.
04-5140, 2004 WL 2348134, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 2004) (per curiam); Dorman v.
Thornburgh, 740 F. Supp. 875, 879 (D.D.C. 1990) (GHR) (explaining that the exclusive remedy
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available under the FTCA “is an action against the United States rather than against the
individuals or the particular government agencies.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (“The authority of any
federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits
against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title,
and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall be exclusive.”). Put another way, the
United States retains its sovereign immunity with respect to suits filed pursuant to the FTCA
against individual government agencies or officials. All Federal Defendants in this action are
named in their official capacities. See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Accordingly, this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain FTCA claims levied against any of the Federal
Defendants other than the United States—including CISA, its Director, and the “Unknown CISA
Officials.” The Court shall therefore dismiss Ayyadurai’s FTCA claims against these
Defendants.
b. Ayyadurai failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as
required by the FTCA.
Another condition of the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is that plaintiffs are
barred from bringing suit under the FTCA until they have exhausted all available administrative
remedies. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)
(“[A]n action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States … unless the claimant
shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.”). To satisfy this
requirement, a plaintiff must have presented the agency with “(1) a written statement sufficiently
describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain
damages claim.” GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Ayyadurai
does not claim to have made the requisite presentment. Without it, this Court lacks subject-
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matter jurisdiction to consider any of Ayyadurai’s FTCA claims, and each of those claims must
be dismissed.
c. The FTCA does not waive the sovereign immunity of the United
States for the kinds of acts alleged in Ayyadurai’s Complaint.
Finally, even apart from the threshold defects in Ayyadurai’s FTCA claims, the FTCA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to his specific claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligence, or “wrongful action.”
District courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against the United States that
fall within a statutory exception to the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Sloan v.
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001). One such exception rules
out any claim based on alleged “interference with contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). At their
core, Ayyadurai’s FTCA claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence
arise out of his allegation that the Federal Government caused the Social Media Defendants to
breach their contracts with him by “deplatform[ing]” and “shadowbann[ing]” him. See e.g.,
Compl. ¶¶ 181–83, 259, 282–302. Accordingly, both of these claims fall within the exception to
the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for alleged interference with contract rights.
Meanwhile, Ayyadurai’s FTCA claim of “wrongful action” rests on Federal Defendants’
alleged violation of his First Amendment right to the freedom of speech. See Compl. Dkt. No.
¶ 300. However, the FTCA does not apply to a civil action “which is brought for a violation of
the Constitution of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, Ayyadurai’s
claim for “wrongful action” falls outside the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
For all these reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Ayyadurai’s FTCA claims, and
those claims must be dismissed.
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3. The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for Ayyadurai’s
Bivens claims against the Federal Defendants (Count 14).
Finally, in Count 15, Ayyadurai levies a Bivens claim against “CISA, Jen Easterly, and
Unknown CISA agents,” each in their official capacities, for “violat[ing] Dr. Shiva’s First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.”4 Compl. ¶ 305; see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971). Although a Bivens action
may be available to a plaintiff suing a federal official in his or her individual capacity, Ayyadurai
has not named any defendants in their individual capacities. Instead, the Federal Defendants are
all named in their official capacities. See Compl. ¶¶ 39, 41; Clark v. Libr. of Cong., 750 F.2d 89,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The federal government’s sovereign immunity bars Bivens suits for money
damages against federal officials acting in their official capacities. Clark, 750 F.2d at 103. “[I]t
is well settled ‘that Congress has not waived immunity for suits seeking monetary damages that
arise under the Constitution.’” Zinda v. Johnson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48–49 (D.D.C. 2006)
(ESH) (quoting Jackson v. Bush, 448 F. Supp. 2d 198, 201 (D.D.C. 2006) (RJL)). Ayyadurai’s
claims against federal officials—namely, the CISA Director and “Unknown CISA agents”—are
therefore barred by the federal government’s sovereign immunity. See Compl. ¶¶ 39, 41.
Accordingly, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ayyadurai’s claims for Bivens
damages from the Federal Defendants in their official capacities. (The Court recognizes that
Ayyadurai, who is proceeding pro se and entitled to liberal construction of his pleadings, may
have intended to name these Defendants in their individual capacities. The Court addresses
Ayyadurai’s potential individual-capacity claims below, in Section III.D.2.)
* * *
4 As noted above, supra note 3, Acting CISA Director Andersen is automatically substituted for Easterly as a
Defendant in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide many of
Ayyadurai’s claims against the Federal Defendants. Accordingly, these claims must be
dismissed without prejudice. See N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (explaining that “a dismissal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction can only be without
prejudice”).
B. Ayyadurai lacks standing to obtain the injunctive relief he seeks in Count 8.
In Count 8, Ayyadurai requests injunctive relief for alleged violations of his First
Amendment rights, but he lacks standing to obtain this relief. To show Article III standing for
injunctive relief, a plaintiff like Ayyadurai must plausibly allege that he has “suffered, or will
suffer, an injury that is . . . fairly traceable to the challenged action.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 57
(quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). When a plaintiff alleges that
a government actor has violated the First Amendment by colluding with a private platform to
censor speech, the plaintiff must make a threshold showing that a “particular defendant pressured
a particular platform to censor a particular topic before that platform suppressed a particular
plaintiff’s speech on that topic.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 61 (emphasis in original). Ayyadurai fails
to carry this burden.
First, none of Ayyadurai’s filings include facially plausible allegations connecting
Federal Defendants to the Social Media Defendants’ decisions to moderate his social media
accounts and posts. See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1; Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 42. Ayyadurai
points to no specific acts or communications, and, above all, no instances of “pressure[]”
between the Federal Defendants and the Social Media Defendants to support his claims of past
harm. See 603 U.S. at 61. Instead, Ayyadurai’s complaint is replete with mere conclusory
allegations of general collusion between Federal Defendants, unidentified “State Actors,”
platform companies, foreign governments, and non-governmental organizations. See, e.g.,
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Compl. ¶ 24 (“The Atlantic Council along with foreign agents e.g. UK, Israel, etc. with close
relationships to intelligence agencies, who do not believe in the First Amendment, funded and/or
coerced directly and indirectly members of U.S. Congress to pass CISA unanimously so as to
allow surveillance and censoring of Americans through these Backdoor Portals.”). Ayyadurai
does not have standing to seek injunctive relief for alleged injuries that his Complaint does not
plausibly attribute to the Defendants.
Second, Ayyadurai’s pleadings fail to include more than mere conclusory allegations that
he is at risk of future content moderation stemming from an “ongoing pressure campaign” by the
Federal Defendants, which is a prerequisite to standing to seek forward-looking relief. See
Murthy, 603 U.S. at 69. Indeed, without proof of such a pressure campaign, “it is entirely
speculative that the platforms’ future moderation decisions will be attributable, even in part,” to
the Federal Defendants. Id.
Because Ayyadurai fails to offer any plausible, non-conclusory allegations of an existing
or future “pressure campaign” by the Federal Defendants against the Social Media Defendants,
he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief for any alleged violation of his First Amendment
rights. Accordingly, the Court shall deny his request for that relief.
C. Counts 1–10 and 15 fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
1. Ayyadurai’s claims against the Social Media Defendants arising from their
content-moderation decisions are barred by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (Counts 1, 2, 4–10, and 15).
Ayyadurai’s claims against the Social Media Defendants center on the platforms’ alleged
content moderation decisions. Specifically, Ayyadurai alleges the Social Media Defendants
“deplatformed” or “shadowbanned” him by suspending his accounts or limiting the reach of his
posts. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 13, 181. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars these
claims, and they must be dismissed. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (e)(3).
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Section 230 affords the Social Media Defendants a two-part immunity to claims arising
from their content-moderation decisions.5 First, Section 230(c)(1) forecloses claims seeking to
hold an “interactive computer service” provider liable “as the publisher or speaker” of content
provided by a third party, such as a user. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753
F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Second, Section 230(c)(2) provides that no “interactive
computer service” provider may be “held liable on account of “any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider . . . considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); see Klayman,
753 F.3d at 1358.
These immunities are available to the Social Media Defendants because each of them is a
paradigmatic “interactive computer service” provider. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (defining
“interactive computer service” to mean “any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server”); see
also Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Lynch, 217 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105 (D.D.C. 2016) (JEB)
(noting that other courts have held that Facebook, YouTube, and X’s predecessor, Twitter, are
each interactive computer service providers), aff’d sub nom. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v.
Sessions, 697 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Ayyadurai’s claims directly implicate the second part of the Social Media Defendants’
Section 230 immunity: the shield in Section 230(c)(2) for “good faith” actions to remove content
that a provider “considers to be . . . otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
Ayyadurai’s Complaint fails to state a claim against the Social Media Defendants based on their
content-moderation decisions because he does not plausibly allege that any of those decisions
5 This immunity is subject to exceptions that are not at issue in this case. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
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were made in the absence of “good faith” or that they were made for a purpose other than
removing content that they “consider[] to be . . . objectionable.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
Although Ayyadurai levels conclusory allegations of bad faith against “Twitter” (now X),
Compl. ¶¶ 275–77, he has not made any such allegations against any of the remaining Social
Media Defendants. Moreover, courts have held that conclusory allegations of bad faith are
insufficient to state a claim against a platform based on activity within the reach of Section
230(c)(2). See, e.g., e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (N.D. Ill.
2008); Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Google, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-01904-DJC-JBP, 2023 WL 5487311, at *5
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023). Relying on the principles that a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “allow[] the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” courts
have demanded reasonably specific factual allegations before finding an absence of good faith.
See Republican Nat’l Comm., 2023 WL 5487311, at *5 (first quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
and then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); e360Insight, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (similar,
citing Twombly). Measured against these standards, Ayyadurai’s allegations are insufficient to
overcome any of the Social Media Defendants’ Section 230(c)(2) immunity by stating a
plausible claim of absence of good faith. Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss each of
Ayyadurai’s claims against the Social Media Defendants that arise from content-moderation
decisions protected by Section 230(c)(2).
The Social Media Defendants also invoke the first part of the Section 230 immunity—
Section 230(c)(1)—arguing that Ayyadurai’s claims improperly seek to hold them liable as
publishers. See YouTube’s Mot. at 10–11; Meta’s Mot. at 12–14. Specifically, the Social Media
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Defendants argue that Section 230(c)(1) shields them from liability arising from their exercise of
any of the “traditional editorial functions” performed by publishers, including “deciding whether
to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” YouTube’s Mot. at 1 (indirectly quoting
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)); Meta’s Mot. at 13 (same).
The Social Media Defendants’ Section 230(c)(1) arguments rest on an influential line of
dicta from the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327, 330 (1997), which the D.C. Circuit and other courts in this District have cited with
approval: Under Section 230, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise
of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content—are barred.”6 Nearly every other Circuit has now repeated this same
broad statement, holding or implying that Section 230(c)(1) categorically immunizes platforms
from liability for any action that involves the exercise of “traditional editorial functions.”7
However, only a few of the decisions restating this broad dictum have grappled with its
implications when the challenged conduct is a platform’s decision to remove objectionable
content—such as a plaintiff’s own posts—rather than a decision to leave other objectionable
content in place. Extending immunity under Section 230(c)(1) to cover direct challenges to the
removal of user content is an uneasy fit with the language of the provision, which says only that
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
6 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, as quoted in, e.g., Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359; Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 217 F. Supp.
3d at 105; see also Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (concluding that “the decision to
print or retract is fundamentally a publishing decision for which the CDA provides explicit immunity”).
7 See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016); FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC,
838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); A.B. v. Salesforce,
Inc., 123 F.4th 788, 795 (5th Cir. 2024); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir.
2014); Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2016); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010);
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009); McCall v. Zotos, No. 22-
11725, 2023 WL 3946827, at *3 (11th Cir. June 12, 2023); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (concluding that “any activity that can be
boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under
section 230”).
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speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1). A broad reading of Section 230(c)(1) that immunizes all content-removal decisions
also risks “swallo[wing] the more specific immunity in (c)(2),” which applies only to content-
moderation decisions that are made in “good faith.” See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software
Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2020) (Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari)
(quoting e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029, *3 (M.D. Fla., Feb. 8,
2017)); see also Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1161–62 (N.D. Cal. 2023)
(suggesting that the best reading of Section 230(c)(1) would not extend immunity to all decisions
to restrict or remove user content, but concluding that Ninth Circuit precedent required a broader
interpretation that does immunize content-removal decisions).
There is little reason to strain the reach of the immunity in Section 230(c)(1) when, as in
this case, the immunity in Section 230(c)(2) leads to the same result. Accordingly, the Court
declines the Defendants’ invitation to hold that Section 230(c)(1) bars Ayyadurai’s claims arising
from their content-moderation decisions. Instead, the Court holds that those claims are barred by
the more specific immunity in Section 230(c)(2) for “good faith” actions to remove
“objectionable” content.
Accordingly, each of Ayyadurai’s claims against the Social Media Defendants arising
from those Defendants’ content-moderations decisions is barred by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, and the Court shall dismiss each of those claims.
2. Ayyadurai does not allege a factual basis for plausibly inferring that his
First Amendment rights have been violated (Count 1).
In Count 1, Ayyadurai alleges that all Defendants have violated his First Amendment
rights. Because Ayyadurai fails to allege sufficient facts to support an inference that the Federal
Defendants and the Social Media Defendants interacted at all about the subject of his claims, let
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alone sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that the Defendants colluded to violate his
First Amendment rights, this Court shall dismiss Count 1.
Because the First Amendment “prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech,” the
Social Media Defendants, acting alone, cannot be liable for violating Ayyadurai’s First
Amendment right to the freedom of speech. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S.
802, 808 (2019). To the extent that Ayyadurai’s Complaint purports to assert First Amendment
claims against the Social Media Defendants for their own, independent actions, those claims
must be dismissed.
Read liberally, Ayyadurai’s Complaint appears to allege that the Defendants violated his
First Amendment rights under either a “coercion” or “joint action” theory. See Meta’s Mot. at
14–17; Compl. ¶ 146. But see O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2023)
(outlining the “demanding” standards applicable to coercion and joint action claims), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 2715 (2024). Under a “coercion” theory, the Federal Defendants could be
liable for pressuring the Social Media Defendants to restrict Ayyadurai’s freedom of expression.
See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 587 U.S. at 809. Under a “joint action” theory, the Federal
Defendants could be liable for coordinating with the Social Media Defendants Ayyadurai’s
rights, and the Social Media Defendants could be liable as state actors because of their
coordination with the Federal Defendants. See id.
However, Ayyadurai does not plausibly allege sufficient facts to support either theory.
Ayyadurai fails to allege any specific communication between Federal and Social Media
Defendants, let alone any activity that could reasonably be construed as either coercive by the
Federal Defendants or indicative that the Defendants were acting in tandem. Instead, Ayyadurai
offers only vague, unsubstantiated claims of collusion. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 1–2 (alleging a
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“coordinated infrastructure of governmental and ostensibly private actors” conspiring to suppress
political speech, of which Ayyadurai was the “first victim”). It is well-settled that “an allegation
of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice” to withstand a motion to
dismiss when an actual agreement is a prerequisite to liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
“Without more, . . . a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not
supply facts adequate to show illegality.” Id. Similarly, in the absence of supporting facts,
Ayyadurai’s conclusory allegations of coercion do not state a plausible claim.
In the absence of specific allegations raising a plausible inference of coercion or joint
action among the Federal Defendants and the Social Media Defendants who allegedly restricted
Ayyadurai’s accounts and posts, his Complaint fails to state plausible claims for relief under the
First Amendment against either group of Defendants, and those claims must be dismissed.
3. Ayyadurai does not allege a factual basis for plausibly inferring that any
Defendants acted in excess of statutory authority (Count 2).
In Count 2, Ayyadurai alleges that all Defendants acted in excess of their statutory
authority. Because Ayyadurai has failed to plausibly allege that any of the Defendants took any
specific action in excess of any identified statutory authority, this claim must be dismissed.
First, the Social Media Defendants are private entities and do not act pursuant to statutory
authority. This Court cannot find that the Social Media Defendants took any action in excess of
statutory authority they do not have and on which they do not rely.
Second, Ayyadurai fails to identify any relevant actions by CISA or Federal Defendants
constituting “censorship” or “conspiracy to censor . . . Plaintiff’s free-speech rights,” that
Ayyadurai alleges exceeded Federal Defendants’ statutory authority. Compl. ¶ 206.
Third, even if Ayyadurai had identified relevant actions by Federal Defendants—which
he has not—he fails to cite any statutory authority Federal Defendants are alleged to have
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exceeded. Ayyadurai instead merely asserts, erroneously and without evidence, that no statute
authorizes CISA (and Federal Defendants broadly) to conduct activity that falls plainly within its
statutory authority to “understand, manage, and reduce risk to the nation’s cyber and physical
critical infrastructure, to include election infrastructure.” Federal Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 42, 24;
see also 6 U.S.C. § 652. Altogether, Ayyadurai has not plausibly alleged Defendants have
exceeded any relevant statutory authority. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim.
4. Ayyadurai does not identify any final agency action against which to levy
his APA violation claim (Count 3).
In Count 3, Ayyadurai alleges that the Federal Defendants violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) by “adopt[ing] an unlawful social-media censorship program.” Compl.
¶ 217. However, because Ayyadurai fails to plausibly allege any final agency action reviewable
under the APA, this claim must be dismissed.
The APA provides a statutory cause of action to challenge only “final agency action.”
Trudeau v. FTC 456 F.3d 178, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 5 U.S.C. § 704. an agency action is “final”
and judicially reviewable only if it both (1) “mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s
decisionmaking process,” meaning that it is not “of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature,”
and (2) is an action “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will flow.” MediNatura, Inc. v. FDA, 998 F.3d 931, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178, (1997)).
Ayyadurai’s Complaint does not plausibly allege any final agency action by the Federal
Defendants. Despite claiming that his cause of action stems from an “specific, discrete, and
identifiable decision” by Federal Defendants, Ayyadurai fails to identify any such violation in his
Complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 217–21. His allegations are therefore insufficient to support his APA
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claim, and that claim must be dismissed.
5. Ayyadurai does not allege a plausible basis for holding the Social Media
Defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 4).
In Count 4, Ayyadurai alleges that the Social Media Defendants violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by purportedly assisting Federal Defendants in violating Ayyadurai’s First Amendment
rights. Although Ayyadurai alleges only infractions by X with any specificity, he brings this
claim against all Social Media Defendants. See Compl. ¶¶ 223–24. Like Ayyadurai’s First
Amendment claim against the Social Media Defendants, this claim fails at the outset because the
Social Media Defendants are private entities, and Section 1983 provides a cause of action only
for actions taken “under color of” law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As discussed above, Ayyadurai fails
to allege sufficient facts to support finding that this case is one of the “exceptional cases” under
which state action can be attributed to private actors. O’Handley, 62 F.4th at 1156 (describing
“demanding” state action tests and affirming dismissal of similar First Amendment claims
against X’s predecessor, Twitter). Accordingly, Ayyadurai’s claim against the Social Media
Defendants must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
6. Ayyadurai does not allege a factual basis for plausibly inferring that the
Social Media Defendants were involved in a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §
1985 and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Counts 5 and 6).
In Counts 5 and 6, Ayyadurai alleges that the Social Media Defendants were involved in
a conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (the “Ku Klux Klan Act”) and 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“RICO”). Notwithstanding the inapplicability of this Act to Ayyadurai’s
alleged claim, see 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1)–(3) (requiring interference with a plaintiff’s official
duties or testimony, or a deprivation of equal protection based upon membership in a protected
class), Ayyadurai’s Section 1985 claims fail at the outset because liability under this statute
requires the existence of a conspiracy, and Ayyadurai has not alleged any facts that support the
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plausible inference of an agreement among the Defendants. In the absence of such allegations,
Counts 5 and 6 must be dismissed.
7. Ayyadurai does not allege a factual basis for plausibly inferring that the
Social Media Defendants committed torts against him (Counts 7 and 9).
In Counts 7 and 9, Ayyadurai alleges that Defendants are liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress (Count 7) and defamation (Count 9). With respect to the Social Media
Defendants, Ayyadurai fails to allege any actions that could support viable claims for either
intentional infliction of emotional distress or defamation.
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show
extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant that, either intentionally or
recklessly, causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress. See Johnson v. Paragon Sys., Inc., 195
F. Supp. 3d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2016) (EGS).3
Ayyadurai asserts that the termination of his X account, the Social Media Defendants’
alleged limits on his social media posts, and Wikipedia’s reference to Ayyadurai as a “pseudo-
scientist” are actionable through claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
they amounted to “cold, heartless, intentional, infliction of extreme anguish on Dr. Shiva” by
Social Media Defendants. Compl. ¶ 259.
Ayyadurai’s allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress fail to state a claim.
To qualify as “extreme and outrageous,” conduct must be “regarded as atrocious and utterly
3 The Court is mindful that these common-law tort claims may be controlled by the substantive law of other
jurisdictions: Although Ayyadurai chose to file suit in this District, the Social Media Defendants presumably made
the relevant content-moderation decisions in California, and Ayyadurai presumably felt the effects of those decisions
in Massachusetts. However, the Court need not resolve the choice-of-law question to resolve the pending motions.
Regardless of whether this Court applies D.C., California, or Massachusetts law to determine the relevant standards
for Ayyadurai’s defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims: All three jurisdictions apply
similar tests. See Crouch v. Trinity Christian Ctr. of Santa Ana, Inc., 39 Cal. App. 5th 995 (2019) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress standard); Howell v. Enter. Publ’g Co., LLC, 455 Mass. 641 (2010) (same); John
Doe 2 v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. App. 5th 1300 (2016) (defamation standard); Phelan v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 443
Mass. 52, 55–56 (2004) (same). Because Ayyadurai’s Complaint fails to state a claim under the law of all three
jurisdictions, the Court does not reach the choice-of-law question. See Daisy Const. Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 527 F.
App’x 1, 3 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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intolerable in a civilized community.” Kurd v. Republic of Turkey, 374 F. Supp. 3d 37, 53
(D.D.C. 2019) (CKK) (quoting Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d 158, 163 (D.C. 2013)).
Other courts have determined that decisions to terminate or suspend online accounts do not rise
to the level of outrageous conduct sufficient to support an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. See, e.g., King, 572 F. Supp. 3d at 786 (N.D. Cal. 2021); Haymore v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 24-cv-729, 2024 WL 4825253, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2024), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 24-cv-729, 2025 WL 565499 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2025).
Ayyadurai gives this Court no reason to find otherwise. Accordingly, a lesser offense than
termination or suspension—such as limiting the reach of Ayyadurai’s posts, as alleged here—
cannot be considered sufficiently outrageous to support an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. Moreover, because none of the Defendants in this case are plausibly alleged to
have had anything to do with Wikipedia’s description of Ayyadurai, his allegations about that
description do not state a claim against the Defendants.
Ayyadurai’s claim for defamation fares no better. To state a claim for defamation, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant made a false and defamatory statement about the
plaintiff; (2) the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) the
defendant’s fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) the
statement was actionable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Bell-Bos. v. Manpower Int’l Staffing
Agency, 61 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2014) (ABJ).
Ayyadurai’s defamation claim fails at the threshold because he does not allege
Defendants made any statements—let alone any false and defamatory statements—about him.
Instead, Ayyadurai appears to refer only to statements allegedly made by individuals who are not
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Defendants in this action. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 268. In the absence of allegations of statements
made by the Defendants, Ayyadurai’s defamation claim must be dismissed.
Even if this Court construed Ayyadurai’s Complaint to include statements made by the
Defendants about Ayyadurai, “public figures” can only state a claim for defamation if the
allegedly defamatory statement was made with “actual malice.” Salem Media Grp., Inc. v.
Awan, 301 A.3d 633, 640 (D.C. 2023); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964). Ayyadurai repeatedly asserts that he is a public figure, Compl. ¶¶ 100, 177–79, but he
fails to identify any allegedly defamatory statements made with anything approaching actual
malice. Ayyadurai’s Complaint therefore fails to state a claim for defamation.
Because Ayyadurai has not stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
or defamation, the Court shall dismiss Counts 7 and 9.
8. Ayyadurai’s request for a permanent injunction is a request for a remedy,
not a separate cause of action or viable independent claim (Count 8).
In Count 8, Ayyadurai seeks a permanent injunction “enjoining Defendants from
violating Dr. Shiva’s or anyone’s political speech.” Compl. ¶ 262. Although Ayyadurai styles
this request as a separate cause of action, injunctive relief “is not a freestanding cause of action,
but rather—as its moniker makes clear—a form of relief” that is available when a plaintiff makes
a sufficient showing on the merits of a specific claim arising from an equitable right or a statute.
Base One Techs., Inc. v. Ali, 78 F. Supp. 3d 186, 199 (D.D.C. 2015) (JEB). Accordingly, to the
extent that Count 8 purports to state an independent ground for relief, the Court shall dismiss it
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
On its own terms, Ayyadurai’s request for a permanent injunction is both premature and
futile. To obtain a permanent injunction, a party must first succeed on the merits of its claim.
See Nichols v. Truscott, 424 F. Supp. 2d 124, 143 (D.D.C. 2006) (PLF). As the Court has
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already explained, Ayyadurai lacks standing to seek injunctive relief on his First Amendment
claims. See supra Section III.B. He therefore cannot succeed on the merits of these claims, and
the Court must deny his request for a permanent injunction.
To the extent that Count 8 can be fairly read to seek a preliminary injunction to redress
the First Amendment violations that Ayyadurai has alleged, the Court shall deny the request for
an injunction because Ayyadurai has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his
challenge. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008) (holding that likelihood of success on
the merits is a prerequisite to a preliminary injunction).
In sum, Count 8 fails to state a claim and must be dismissed, and Ayyadurai’s request for
an injunction must be denied.
9. Ayyadurai fails to allege a factual basis for plausibly inferring that the
Social Media Defendants violated their respective Terms of Service,
Community Guidelines, or other contracts with Ayyadurai (Count 15).
In Count 15, Ayyadurai seeks to hold Social Media Defendants liable for breaching the
terms of their respective Terms of Service or Community Guidelines (“terms of service”).
Compl. ¶ 310. Specifically, Ayyadurai alleges that Social Media Defendants censored, flagged,
and otherwise suppressed his content on their platforms in breach of their terms of service. Id.
Ayyadurai fails, however, to successfully plead that such actions constitute a breach of contract.
Ayyadurai’s failure to allege specific violations of his agreements with the Social Media
Defendants requires dismissal of his breach-of-contract claims. Beyond naming the agreements
themselves, Ayyadurai makes no mention of any provision that the Social Media Defendants’
actions are alleged to have violated. When a plaintiff fails to “identify[] any duty under the
contract to forbear from taking any of the actions alleged,” the plaintiff “has not stated a claim
for breach of contract.” Ihebereme v. Cap. One, N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 40, 48 (D.D.C. 2010)
(ESH), aff’d, 573 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Accordingly, Ayyadurai’s breach-of-contract
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claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Meta also identifies an additional basis for dismissing Ayyadurai’s breach-of-contract
claim against it: Contrary to Ayyadurai’s conclusory assertions, the content-moderation
decisions that Ayyadurai challenges in this case are directly contemplated by and squarely within
Meta’s terms of service. See Meta’s Mot. at 23–24. Ayyadurai does not address this argument
in his opposition to Meta’s motion, and it is therefore conceded. See Hopkins, 284 F. Supp. 2d at
25. Ayyadurai’s claim against Meta in Count 15 is also subject to dismissal on this basis.
* * *
In sum, each of Ayyadurai’s remaining claims against those Defendants that have
appeared must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Although the Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss these claims with prejudice on the
grounds that amendment would be futile, the Court declines to do so. In this Circuit, trial courts
must apply the rules regarding the amendment of complaints liberally, especially when the
plaintiff is proceeding pro se and the complaint is dismissed for pleading deficiencies. See
Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548–49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Because Ayyadurai may
be able to amend his complaint to allege facts sufficient to state a claim, the Court shall dismiss
the relevant claims without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint.
D. The remaining claims in Ayyadurai’s Complaint are subject to dismissal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Finally, the Court turns to Ayyadurai’s claims against X and the ten unnamed Doe
Defendants, who have not appeared or responded to the Complaint. This Court is of the opinion
that each of these claims must be dismissed, sua sponte, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for
failure to state a non-frivolous and plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.
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Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of Title 28 provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any
portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous . . . [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).8
An action is “frivolous” within the meaning of Section 1915(e)(2)(B) if it “lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A
complaint may be dismissed as frivolous either because its theory of relief is contrary to an
“inarguable legal conclusion” or because it rests on a “fanciful factual allegation.” Id.
Even if an action is not “frivolous,” a court may dismiss sua sponte any part of a
complaint that plainly fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Such a dismissal is proper if it is “patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot prevail based on the
facts alleged in the complaint. Baker, 916 F.2d at 727. For example, sua sponte dismissal is
proper when a complaint provides “no factual or legal basis for alleged wrongdoing by
defendants.” See Perry v. Gray, 515 F. Supp. 2d 157, 158 (D.D.C. 2007) (ESH) (dismissing
complaint sua sponte where the complaint provided “no factual or legal basis for alleged
wrongdoing by defendants”). Sua sponte dismissal may also be appropriate when a complaint
fails to allege facts necessary to establish jurisdiction over a defendant. See Ghayoori v.
8 Although most of Section 1915 addresses procedures for in forma pauperis proceedings in which the court excuses
the payment of ordinary filing fees, this specific provision expressly applies “[n]otwithstanding” the payment of
“any filing fee, or any portion thereof.” See id. Therefore, courts must apply this provision even when, as in this
case, a pro se plaintiff paid the ordinary filing fee at the outset of the case. See, e.g., Harbison v. U.S. Senate Comm.
on Foreign Rels., 839 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D.D.C. 2012) (BAH); McCreary v. Heath, No. 04-cv-0623, 2005 WL
975736, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2005) (PLF); Gambill v. Jacobs, No. 23-cv-3283, Dkt. No. 40 at 3 n.3 (D.D.C. Sept.
9, 2024) (CKK); see also Woodhouse v. Meta Platforms Inc., No. 23-5188, 2023 WL 7268255 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30,
2023) (summarily affirming dismissal based on Section 1915(e)(2)(B) in cases in which the pro se plaintiff was not
proceeding in forma pauperis); Rojas v. Connecticut, No. 23-7179, 2024 WL 4370045, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2,
2024) (same), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 329 (2025), reh’g denied, No. 25-206, 2026 WL 490716 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2026).
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Sultanate of Oman, No. 24-cv-2263, 2024 WL 3837833, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2024), aff’d, No.
24-7119, 2024 WL 5074463 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2024) (RDM).
In this case, each of Ayyadurai’s claims against X and the ten unnamed Doe Defendants
are either frivolous or subject to sua sponte dismissal because it is “patently obvious” that
Ayyadurai cannot prevail on the facts alleged. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Baker, 916 F.2d
at 726–27. For the reasons explained in the preceding sections, none of the counts of
Ayyadurai’s Complaint in which he named “Twitter” (X) or the unnamed Doe Defendants
alongside other Defendants states a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted. See supra
Section III.C. Each of these counts, including Ayyadurai’s claims against the Defendants who
have not appeared, is subject to dismissal in full. For the following reasons, Ayyadurai’s claims
against only “Twitter” (X) and the Doe Defendants are each subject to dismissal, as well.
1. Ayyadurai has not plausibly alleged a basis for any private right of action
against X based on alleged election interference (Count 10).
In Count 10, Ayyadurai purports to assert a private right of action against “Twitter” (X)
for allegedly interfering in a federal election and functioning as an “undeclared [and]
unregistered Super-PAC.” See Compl. ¶¶ 274–81. Because Ayyadurai lacks any express or
implied right of action to press these claims, Count 10 must be dismissed.
Although Ayyadurai urges the Court to recognize an “implied private cause of action” to
support his claims, it cannot do so here. See Compl. ¶ 279. Ayyadurai does not cite any relevant
statute that could plausibly give rise to an implied private right of action to press his election-
interference claims. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (holding that “private
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress” through statute). He also
has not alleged any plausible basis on which he might be entitled to non-statutory, equitable
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relief against X or any other Defendant. Accordingly, Ayyadurai lacks a private right to proceed
with his election-interference claim against X, and that claim must be dismissed.
2. Ayyadurai’s Complaint does not state a viable Bivens claim against any of
the unnamed Doe Defendants, even if the Court construes his Complaint
as naming those Defendants in their individual capacities (Count 14).
In Count 14, Ayyadurai purports to assert a Bivens claim against unnamed Doe
Defendants for violating his First Amendment rights. See Compl. ¶¶ 303–07. As the Court has
already explained, Ayyadurai’s Bivens claim fails because he has named the relevant Defendants
only in their official capacities, rather than in their personal capacities. See supra
Section III.A.3. However, even if Ayyadurai had named these Defendants in their individual
capacities, his Bivens claims would not be viable, and the Court would dismiss them for failure
to state a claim. Although the Supreme Court has not “dispense[d] with Bivens altogether,” it
has warned lower courts that “recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial
activity.’” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120,
121 (2017)). Ayyadurai’s allegations do not support the recognition of a Bivens cause of action
in this case.
Courts evaluating Bivens claims must apply a two-step test, beginning by determining
whether the case presents “a new Bivens context.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492 (quoting Ziglar, 582
U.S. at 122). If so, the court proceeds to the second step, at which it must ask “if there are
‘special factors’ indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to
‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Id. (quoting Ziglar,
582 U.S. at 122). The Supreme Court has directed that “even a single ‘reason to pause before
applying Bivens in a new context’” precludes a lower court from recognizing a Bivens remedy.
Id. (quoting Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 102 (2020)).
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Under these standards, the factual allegations in Ayyadurai’s complaint cannot support a
Bivens claim. Ayyadurai’s claim is based on allegations of government involvement in social
media companies’ content-moderation decisions. Because this alleged conduct is quite different
from the conduct at issue in any prior Bivens case, Ayyadurai’s claim clearly arises in a “new
context.” See Buchanan v. Barr, 71 F.4th 1003, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (explaining that the
concept of a “new context” is “exceedingly broad”). There are also numerous “special factors”
that weigh against judicial recognition of a Bivens remedy here, including the potential national
security implications of allowing suits for damages against federal cybersecurity officials based
on allegations about their work with private technology companies, including major social media
platforms. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 494 (holding that “a Bivens cause of action may not lie
where . . . national security is at issue”). Accordingly, Ayyadurai’s allegations fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Bivens, and his allegations in Count 14 against the
unnamed Doe Defendants must be dismissed.
* * *
For these reasons, the Court shall dismiss each of Ayyadurai’s remaining claims sua
sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Each of these dismissals shall be without
prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint. As the Court has noted, courts in this Circuit
must apply the rules regarding the amendment of complaints liberally to pro se plaintiffs whose
complaints are dismissed for pleading deficiencies. See Richardson, 193 F.3d at 548–49.
Moreover, when a court dismisses part of an action sua sponte for failure to state a claim, it must
grant the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint unless “the claimant cannot possibly win relief.”
Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Baker, 916 F.2d at
726). Applying these principles, the Court shall not foreclose the filing of an amended complaint
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against the Defendants who have not appeared. 	Accordingly, the relevant claims shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing re~sons, the Court shall GRANT the [39] Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendant "Facebook" (Meta Platforms, Inc.); GRANT the [40] Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Google LLC and YouTube LLC; GRANT the [42] Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants the United States, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ("CISA"),
and the Director of CISA, in an official capacity; and DISMISS the remaining claims in this
action WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: March 31, 2026
31
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELL Y
United States District Judge
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