AMARA v. DEJOY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAURIETTA AMARA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 23-cv-03423 (CJN)
DAVID STEINER, Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2019, Plaintiff Maurietta Amara was offered a job as a City Carrier Assistant with the
United States Postal Service. Shortly after her training began, the agency discovered she was not
properly onboarded and discontinued her training. Amara claims here that these actions
constituted unlawful disability discrimination. See generally ECF No. 1 (Compl.). Both parties
move for summary judgment; for the reasons explained below, the Court denies Amara’s motion
and grants the agency’s.
I. Background
Amara was initially employed by the Postal Service beginning in 1998. Compl. ¶ 15. By
2007, she was working at the Processing and Distribution Center in Tampa, Florida. Id. ¶ 16. Two
years later, the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs accepted her claim that she had
developed an aggravated depressive disorder as a result of suffering workplace harassment and
placed her on workers’ compensation. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
After ten years of receiving benefits, the Postal Service required Amara to participate in a
work rehabilitation program, which she promptly complied with. Id. ¶ 19. Amara was assigned
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to a vocational counselor, id.; see ECF No. 67, Ex. L, and in early July 2019, applied to work for
the Postal Service again by filling out and submitting the standard application located on its
website. See generally ECF No. 84-2; id. at 8. When Amara applied, she was still receiving
workers’ compensation benefits, but she did not disclose that information to the Postal Service.
ECF No. 84-1 (Hunter Decl.) ¶ 5; see generally ECF No. 84-2.
On October 3, 2019, the Postal Service extended Amara an offer to be a City Carrier
Assistant at its Brentwood Road location in Washington, DC. Compl. ¶ 20; ECF No. 67, Ex. D.
From October 15 through October 17, 2019, Amara attended training and orientation. ECF No.
67, Ex. C. On the second day of training, the Postal Service discovered that Amara was still
receiving workers’ compensation benefits, ECF No. 67, Ex. H, and discontinued her training two
days later, id., Ex. L; see Compl. ¶ 24. Shortly thereafter, the vocational counselor spoke with a
Postal Service human resources specialist, who indicated that she was trying to determine the
correct process for hiring Amara. See ECF No. 67, Ex. L. The human resources specialist stated
that she could not follow the agency’s typical onboarding procedures because Amara was still
receiving workers’ compensation benefits. See id.; Hunter Decl. ¶ 7.
As it turns out, hiring (really, rehiring) a former Postal Service employee receiving
workers’ compensation benefits is a unique and distinct process from hiring a new employee.
Hunter Decl. ¶ 7. Among other things, for example, the agency’s Employee Labor Manual
instructs that employees who fully overcome an injury or disability more than one year after their
workers’ compensation begins shall be given priority consideration for reassignment or
reemployment into their former position or an equivalent one. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8 (citing Section 546.131,
Reassignment or Reemployment of Employees Injured on Duty,
https://about.usps.com/manuals/elm/html/elmc5_034.htm (last accessed February 9, 2026)). Also,
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an appointing official determines whether to make a reassignment or reemployment offer only
after receiving and evaluating a referral from the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs that
includes documented medical limitations and recommendations from the postal physician or
occupational health nurse administrator. Section 546.631, Reassignment or Reemployment of
Employees Injured on Duty, https://about.usps.com/manuals/elm/html/elmc5_034.htm (last
accessed February 9, 2026).
The record is not entirely clear as to what transpired after Amara’s training was
discontinued. See ECF No. 67, Exs. A–M. By mid-November, Kay Hunter, a human resources
manager, emailed other employees that she was “not in support for hiring [Amara].” Id., Ex. K.
In the weeks that followed, human resources personnel discussed whether and how the agency
might pay Amara for the days she attended orientation. See id. Despite those discussions, the
record does not reflect that Amara was ever fully onboarded or paid by the Postal Service. See id.;
see also id., Ex. L.
After pursuing administrative remedies without success, see Compl. ¶¶ 8–12, Amara filed
this action, alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and disability discrimination and
retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, see generally id. The Court previously dismissed her
ADEA and retaliation claims. ECF No. 12. The parties now cross-move for summary judgment
on Amara’s only remaining claim: disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. ECF
No. 67; ECF No. 84.
II. Legal Standard
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that “a
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it could “affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Id. at 247–48. If the movant meets its burden of showing that no genuine dispute
of material fact exits, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), the nonmoving party
must then come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court evaluates the
record evidence and draws all reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).1
III. Analysis
The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability”
may “be subjected to discrimination” by a federal agency “solely by reason of her . . . disability.”
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act are subject to the burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Kersey
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 586 F.3d 13, 16–17 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Under that framework,
the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Id. at 17; Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–253 (1981); see Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191,
1 Amara asserts that the sworn declaration of Kay Hunter (who, again, was a human resources
manager in 2019) should be disregarded because it is “a litigation-driven attempt to manufacture
a defense after extensive evidence had already been submitted.” ECF No. 89 at 5–6. But courts
only disregard an “affidavit that is submitted to withstand a motion for summary judgment when
the affidavit contradicts prior deposition testimony without adequate explanation and creates only
a sham issue of material fact.” St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., 573
F. Supp. 2d 152, 160 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest
Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 217 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Hunter
has not previously been deposed, nor made any other statements under oath, her declaration does
not create “only a sham issue of material fact” and therefore should be considered. See id.
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1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiff’s . . . disability.”).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce
evidence of “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its action. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)). If the employer does so, “the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove that the [employer’s] proffered reason is pretextual.” Cong. v. Gruenberg, 643
F. Supp. 3d 203, 229 (D.D.C. 2022) (citing Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
This burden-shifting framework is simplified when an employer has moved for summary
judgment and proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the alleged adverse
employment action. See Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493–94 (D.C. Cir.
2008).2 In such cases, the Court “need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually
made out a prima facie case under McDonell Douglas.” Id. at 494. Instead, the Court “must
resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury
to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that
the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of” disability? Id. at
494. If the employee “is unable to adduce evidence that could allow a reasonable trier of fact to
conclude that [the employer’s] proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination, summary
judgment must be entered against” the employee. Paquin v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
2 Although Brady delt with a Title VII claim, the “simplified McDonnell Douglas framework”
announced in that case also applies to “discrimination claims brought under the Rehabilitation
Act.” Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 267 F. Supp. 3d 246, 259 (D.D.C. 2017).
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Here, the Postal Service asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discontinuing
Amara’s training3: because she was a former employee receiving workers’ compensation benefits,
the agency could not onboard her through its standard procedures. ECF No. 84 at 4. Instead, as
stated in the Hunter declaration, the Postal Service has different procedures for former employees
with job-related disabilities who are receiving workers’ compensation benefits. See Hunter Decl.
¶ 6. For example, as noted above, a former employee who fully overcomes a disability more than
one year after beginning to receive compensation is entitled to priority consideration for
reassignment or reemployment. Id. ¶ 8; see 5 U.S.C. § 8151(b)(2). As also noted above, an
appointing official determines whether to make a reassignment or reemployment offer only after
receiving and evaluating a referral from the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
containing documented medical limitations and the recommendations of the postal physician or
occupational health nurse administrator. See Section 546.631, Reassignment or Reemployment of
Employees Inured on Duty, https://about.usps.com/manuals/elm/html/elmc5_034.htm (last
accessed February 9, 2026).4
It is undisputed that when Amara applied for the City Carrier position, she was still
receiving workers’ compensation benefits for a job-related disability that began in 2009, but did
not disclose that fact during the application or onboarding process. Id. ¶ 5; see also ECF No. 67,
3 The parties use imprecise terminology to describe Amara’s employment status. Both assert that
she was “hired” and later “terminated” or “separated.” But the record appears to suggest that
Amara was not fully onboarded and that her training was discontinued. In any event, these
distinctions are immaterial because it is undisputed that Amara was subject to an adverse
employment action in October 2019 (whether it is described as a termination, a separation, or a
discontinuation of the training).
4 The Court takes judicial notice of information on official public websites of government agencies.
Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 43 F. Supp. 3d 28, 33–34
(D.D.C. 2014).
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Ex. K. It is also undisputed that the Postal Service’s hiring personnel did not learn of Amara’s
status until October 16, 2019, while she was in the middle of orientation and training. See ECF
No. 67, Exs. H, L. Because they are were unaware of Amara’s status at the time of her application
and onboarding, those personnel did not initially follow the required procedures for hiring former
employees receiving workers’ compensation benefits; and when they became aware of her status,
they discontinued her training. See Hunter Decl. ¶ 10; ECF No. 67, Ex. L.
Because the Postal Service has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
action, the Court “turn[s] directly to the central issue: whether [the employee has] produced
evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s stated reason was not the actual
reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against [the employee] based on” her
disability. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. In this case, Amara has not produced sufficient evidence to
establish that the Postal Service’s asserted reason was pretextual and that disability discrimination
“was the real reason for her termination.” See Doak v. Johnson, 19 F. Supp. 3d 259, 273 (D.D.C.
2014), aff’d, 798 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Amara relies primarily on a November 29, 2019 email in which Hunter stated that she did
not support hiring Amara. Amara contends that this communication reflects that her disability was
a motivating factor in the decision to discontinue her training. ECF No. 67 at 4. But the email
does not mention Amara’s disability, and nothing in the surrounding correspondence suggests that
Hunter’s position was based on discriminatory animus. See id., Ex. K. To be sure, a separate
email in the chain noted that Amara had “been on [Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs]
periodic rolls since 2009,” but that message was sent after Ms. Hunter expressed her opposition to
hiring Amara. Id.
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Amara advances additional arguments to establish pretext. She contends that the Postal
Service’s stated reason for discontinuing her training is illegitimate because the agency allegedly
knew that she was receiving workers’ compensation benefits before offering her a job. ECF No
89 at 2–4 (citing ECF No. 67, Exs. B-1, B-2, H, I, L). But the record does not support that assertion.
The letter from the Department of Labor informing Amara of her disability benefits was neither
addressed to nor shown to have been received by Postal Service hiring personnel. See ECF No.
67, Exs. B-1, B-2. The email acknowledging the Postal Service’s discovery of Amara’s status was
sent on November 1, 2019—weeks after Amara’s training was discontinued. Id., Ex. L. And all
of the relevant email communications regarding the fact that Amara was receiving workers’
compensation were sent between October 16, 2019, and March 3, 2020—dates after her
onboarding began. Id., Exs. H, I, K. None of this evidence demonstrates that those responsible
for hiring Amara knew of her status prior to her being offered a position or starting the onboarding
process. Id., Ex. D. To the contrary, the record indicates that the agency discovered that Amara
was receiving workers’ compensation benefits only after she reported for training. See id., Ex. L
(email stating that “[Amara] reported for training as instructed and[,] upon arrival, [the Postal
Service] learned she was on OWCP.” (emphasis added)); Hunter Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10 (stating that Amara
had not indicated that she was receiving disability payments when she applied to the Postal
Service).
Amara next argues that the agency’s stated reason for its action was pretextual because it
knew she was receiving workers’ compensation, and therefore knew about her disability, before
discontinuing her training. ECF No. 89 at 3. But the agency’s knowledge of that fact, without
more, does not show that its proffered non-discriminatory rationale is a pretext for discrimination.
The Postal Service has explained that it discontinued Amara’s training after learning that she was
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still receiving workers’ compensation benefits and that required hiring procedures had not been
followed. Amara offers no evidence that this explanation is false, nor does she point to anything
in the record that suggests that discrimination, rather than a failure to properly onboard her, was
the real reason for discontinuing the training.
Finally, Amara argues that the Postal Service’s allegedly inconsistent statements about her
employment status demonstrate pretext. ECF No. 89 at 3–4. It is true that “the falsity of [an]
employer’s explanation” can be “probative of intentional discrimination.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at
147. But Amara has not identified any such inconsistency here. See Hunter Decl. ¶ 4; ECF No.
67, Exs. J-1, J-2; ECF No. 42. She points to the Postal Service’s representation in a Joint Status
Report that it had “no official record of Ms. Amara’s employment or termination, as she was not
successfully onboarded,” ECF No. 42 at 2, and contrasts that statement with her employment
application, employee badge, and an email scheduling her for processing on October 3, 2019, ECF
No. 67, Exs. D, E, F. See ECF No. 89 at 4. In her view, these materials contradict the agency’s
prior assertion that there was no record of her employment. The cited documents, however, show
only that Amara had started the onboarding process; they do not establish that she was successfully
onboarded or placed on the payroll.
In sum, the Postal Service has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for ending
Amara’s training: she was not being properly onboarded because she was a former employee
receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Amara has produced no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that this explanation is false or masks discriminatory intent. To
the contrary, she has offered evidence that reinforces the agency’s stated rationale. See, e.g., ECF
No. 67, Ex. L (email from her vocational counselor mentioning the agency’s efforts to determine
the proper process for hiring Amara “given her current status.”). On this record, no reasonable
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jury could find that “the [Postal Service’s] asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual
reason” for its decision to discontinue Amara’s training. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Amara’s motion for summary judgment and
grants the agency’s cross-motion for summary judgment. A separate Order will accompany this
Memorandum Opinion.
DATE: February 13, 2026
CARL J. NICHOLS
United States District Judge
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