AINSWORTH et al v. ISLAMIC REPBULIC OF IRAN et al

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Case 1:23-cv-02424-RCL Document 25 Filed 02/10/26 Page 1 of 6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JEFFREY A. AINSWORTH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:23-cv-2424-RCL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this case, 144 individual plaintiffs bring 348 claims pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") against the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ministry of Information and Security for direct and indirect injuries sustained due to the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. Because the defendants have not appeared or defended this action, the plaintiffs now move for default judgment as to the defendants' liability and, in support of the motion, ask the Court to take judicial notice of its previous factual findings establishing Iran's liability for the Beirut attack in Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran. See ECF No. 23. For the reasons addressed below, the Motion is hereby GRANTED.
I. £ BACKGROUND
The facts concerning the 1983 Beirut bombing have been described at length in earlier related cases. See, e.g., Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48-59 (D.D.C. 2003). The Court therefore recites only the key facts here. The 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was perpetrated by Hezbollah, a designated foreign terrorist organization that operates in Lebanon. Id. at 51. On the morning of October 23, 1983, Hezbollah members drove an explosive-laden truck disguised as a water delivery vehicle into the U.S. Marine barracks near Beirut International Airport, where they detonated the equivalent of
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AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

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15,000 to 21,000 pounds of dynamite. Id. at 56. As a result of the bombing, 241 United States
servicemembers died and many others suffered injuries. Id. at 58. At the time of the bombing,
Hezbollah received a variety of political, financial, and operational support from Iran, including
support tied directly to the attack. Id. at 53–54, 58.
The plaintiffs in this case are 144 direct and indirect victims of the bombing. The
operative complaint was filed on September 13, 2023. See ECF No. 5. The State Department
effectuated diplomatic service on the defendants on July 2, 2024. See ECF No. 20. After the
defendants failed to answer, the plaintiffs filed a default affidavit and the Clerk entered the
defendants’ default. See ECF Nos. 21–22. The plaintiffs now move for default judgment and
the taking of judicial notice of the evidence in Peterson. See ECF No. 23.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
a. Motion for Default Judgment
The Clerk of the Court must enter a party’s default when the party “against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure
is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). But even after a defendant has failed
to appear, “the entry of a default judgment is not automatic.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6
(D.C. Cir. 2005). Rather, the FSIA provides that “[n]o judgment by default shall be entered . . .
against a foreign state . . . unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).
The evidentiary showing needed to satisfy the default-judgment standard under § 1608(e)
“can be less than that normally required.” See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Opati v.
Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020). The core of § 1608(e) is that courts may not “simply
accept a complaint’s unsupported allegations as true.” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750
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F. Supp. 2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010). But “the FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely
how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide, requiring only that it be
‘satisfactory to the court.’” Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044,
1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)). As a corollary, the FSIA “does not require
a court to step into the shoes of the defaulting party and pursue every possible evidentiary
challenge.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 785.
b. Judicial Notice
Federal courts may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are “not subject to
reasonable dispute” and that are “either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction . . .
or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “This rule permits courts to take judicial
notice of court records in related proceedings.” Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F. Supp. 2d
109, 115 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109
n.6 (D.D.C. 2005). The Court still must “reach its own, independent findings of fact”
notwithstanding the findings made in prior cases implicating the same issues, but it “may review
evidence considered in an opinion that is judicially noticed, without necessitating the re-
presentment of such evidence.” Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172 (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
i. Jurisdiction
The FSIA is “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in [U.S.]
courts.” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). The
statute establishes a presumption of immunity subject to enumerated exceptions. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1604–07. “Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdiction usually follows,”
because the statute tethers “both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to the exceptions.”
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CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, 230 (2025). For purposes of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, district courts enjoy “original jurisdiction” over “any claim for relief
in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity” under an
enumerated exception. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)).
In cases premised on the FSIA, personal jurisdiction flows from the existence of subject-
matter jurisdiction and proper service of process. “Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall
exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have [subject-matter] jurisdiction
under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.” Id. at 232
(alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (identifying
service procedures for foreign-sovereign defendants). Thus, “personal jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign is ‘automatic’ whenever (1) ‘an exception to immunity applies’ and (2) ‘service of
process has been accomplished.’” CC/Devas, 605 U.S. at 232 (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560
U.S. 305, 324 n.20 (2010)). The exceptions thus have the dual effect of establishing subject-
matter jurisdiction while supplying, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, “varying degrees of
suit-related domestic contact before a case may proceed.” Id. at 233.
The Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute and personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. This case fits within the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism
exception. The terrorism exception strips immunity in cases seeking “money damages . . .
against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by . . . the provision of
material support [for terrorism],” where such support was provided by an officer, employee, or
agent of the foreign state within the scope of his or her employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(1).
Such is the case here. The Amended Complaint alleges personal injuries stemming from Iran’s
material support for Hezbollah in perpetrating the Beirut bombing. The applicability of the state-
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sponsored terrorism exception thus places this matter within the Court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. And paired with proof of diplomatic service on the defendants on July 2, 2024, see
ECF No. 20, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants as well.
CC/Devas, 605 U.S. at 233 (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal
jurisdiction.” (quoting GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012))).
ii. Default Judgment
The Court now turns to the merits of the plaintiffs’ request for default judgment as to
liability. Under the FSIA, a Court must ensure that plaintiffs “establish [their] claim or right to
relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). The evidence presented
in Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran provides much of the factual basis necessary to establish
the plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief. Although earlier judicial findings of fact “represent merely a
court’s probabilistic determination as to what happened” and thus constitute hearsay and are
ordinarily inadmissible, the FSIA “permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the
evidence presented in earlier litigation . . . without necessitating the formality of having that
evidence reproduced.” Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C.
2010); see also Goldberg-Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No 1:12-cv-1292, 2013 WL
1343663, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2013). This case concerns the same subject matter as
Peterson: the terrorist attack upon the headquarters of Marine unit in Beirut on October 23, 1983.
It also concerns the same actors: the Islamic Republic of Iran and its intelligence service. The
evidence presented in the Peterson case pertaining to the Beirut attack meets the requirements of
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states that judicially noticeable facts are those
that are “capable of ready and accurate determination” based on the judicial records maintained
in that case. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). And the evidence — albeit not the findings of fact drawn
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from them in the prior cases - is "not subject to reasonable dispute." Id .; see also Fain, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (distinguishing judicial notice of "factual findings," which constitute hearsay, from that of "evidence presented in their earlier cases," from which subsequent "courts may reach their own independent findings of fact"). This Court and other sessions in this District have "frequently taken judicial notice of earlier, related proceedings" based on the same reasoning, including in prior cases against Iran and its affiliates stemming from the Beirut attack. Fain, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 115. The Court concludes that judicial notice is appropriate here.
The taking of judicial notice in conjunction with the plaintiffs' affidavits asserting that each suffered direct or indirect injuries stemming from the by the attack, see ECF No. 23-3, establishes the defendants' liability in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Compare Fain, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 118-19 (granting default judgment as to liability based on Peterson evidence and plaintiffs' affidavits), with Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 922 F. Supp. 2d 108, 109-10 (D.D.C. 2013). In particular, the affidavits satisfactorily establish both causation and status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1), (c)(1)-(4). Because the plaintiffs have only moved for default judgment as to liability and not damages, the Court need not address whether the evidence presented demonstrates that each individual plaintiff is entitled to damages, which will instead be reserved for a special master.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Motion is hereby GRANTED. A separate order and judgment shall issue this date.
SO ORDERED.
Date:
20/10/20
Royce C. Lamberth United States District Judge
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