KALANTARIPOUR v. GEORGE WASHINGTON MEDICAL FACULTY ASSOCIATES

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NASRIN KALANTARIPOUR,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEORGE WASHINGTON MEDICAL
FACULTY ASSOCIATES,
Defendant.
Case No. 21-cv-272 (JMC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Nasrin Kalantaripour sues her former employer, Medical Faculty Associates, Inc.
(“MFA”),1 for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. MFA terminated Kalantaripour, an Iranian-born woman, from her job as a Practice
Manager after ten months in the role. MFA claims that Kalantaripour was terminated for poor
performance. Kalantaripour alleges that her termination was discriminatory on the basis of her
race, national origin, and sex, and in retaliation for having complained about the discrimination
she was allegedly subjected to at MFA, which she also alleges amounted to a hostile work
environment. MFA has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court
will GRANT MFA’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss Kalantaripour’s case.2
1 Despite being named as “George Washington Medical Faculty Associates” in Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant states
that its correct name is “Medical Faculty Associates, Inc.” ECF 14 at 1. The Court refers to Defendant as such
throughout this opinion.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the
top of each page.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The facts discussed in this section are undisputed except where noted. Nasrin Kalantaripour
is an Iranian-born woman of Middle Eastern-descent. ECF 14-4 at 6.3 Kalantaripour has a “slight
accent,” but speaks perfect English. ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 34, 89. From May 2018 to March 2019, she was
employed by MFA, a physicians’ practice in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, to be the
Practice Manager for Neurology, Neurosurgery, Psychiatry, and Dermatology. Id. ¶¶ 1–2; ECF 14-
4 at 4. Her direct supervisor was Adrien Saks, a white male. ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 3, 107. Saks had recruited
her to apply and was also part of the team that hired Kalantaripour. Id. ¶ 4; ECF 14-4 at 66–68. As
a 	Practice 	Manager, 	Kalantaripour 	was 	responsible 	for 	the 	day-to-day 	operations 	and
administrative 	functions 	in 	the 	Neurology, 	Neurosurgery, 	Psychiatry, 	and 	Dermatology
departments. ECF 14-2 ¶ 7. Beginning in July 2018, following staff shake-ups at MFA,
Kalantaripour was assigned “responsibility for administrative functions in Dermatology.” ECF 15-
2 at 94.
1. 	Departmental Issues Regarding Scheduling
Kalantaripour’s responsibilities following July 2018 included determining daily staffing
for the Dermatology department at MFA’s various offices, including of the medical assistants who
assisted doctors at the practice.4 ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 8–9; ECF 14-5 at 14. As Saks testified, at the time
3 As to her race, Kalantaripour variously describes herself as “white,” “Middle Eastern,” and “Persian.” ECF 14-4 at
6–7.
4 In her response to MFA’s statement of facts, Kalantaripour disputes the fact that she was “responsible for managing
the schedules of medical assistan[ts].” ECF 15-1 ¶¶ 8–9. The Court finds that she has not genuinely disputed this fact.
Kalantaripour supports her assertion with the claim that “clinical managers were responsible for clinical staff and
clinical affairs,” the implication being that Kalantaripour, whose title was Practice Manager, was not responsible for
those duties. Id. Kalantaripour also points to materials, including an organizational chart, describing Kalantaripour as
a Practice Manager who supervised administrative staff, rather than the clinical staff in Dermatology whose schedules
are the basis of many of the complaints about Kalantaripour’s performance issues in this case. ECF 15-2 at 221. But
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MFA was very-short staffed, and it was a “challenge distributing staff in a way that met the needs
of the various providers.” ECF 15-2 at 17. Some of those providers included Dr. Vishal Patel, Dr.
Alison Ehrlich, Dr. Ilana DeLuca, and Dr. Adam Friedman. ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 11–13, 48.
Dr. Patel was hired in October 2018, and within a short time of his hiring voiced concerns
about staffing issues in Dermatology and Kalantaripour’s handling of her duties. ECF 14-2 ¶ 15.
On November 2, 2018, he sent an email to Saks, Kalantaripour, and Ehrlich, in which he noted
“multiple errors in scheduling,” a lack of “sufficient [medical assistants] for providers,” and a “lack
of authority and direction to help oversee the clinic.” ECF 14-4 at 73. The email mentioned that
Patel had received six complaints from patients about difficulty scheduling visits at the clinic, and
made recommendations about next steps for hiring medical assistants. Id. That same day, Patel
came to Kalantaripour’s office to share his frustration about the department’s failure to approve
hiring of additional staff. Kalantaripour claims—and MFA does not seriously dispute—that during
the meeting, Patel “got very upset,” and “slam[med] on [her] desk,” ECF 14-2 ¶ 99. He threatened
to go to Kalantaripour’s superiors and tell them that the current situation was “unacceptable.”
ECF 14-4 at 33.
On November 7, Patel emailed Kalantaripour, stating that she had failed to correct his
schedule as “discussed last week.” Id. at 76. He claimed that it was the “4th time we [had]
discussed this since I started,” but “patients [were] still being scheduled incorrectly.” Id. He also
emailed Jennifer Hoffpauir, a member of MFA’s human resources department to raise his concerns
about “dysfunction and unprofessionalism” in the Dermatology department and his “attempt[s] to
Kalantaripour’s assertions are misleading in multiple ways. First, Kalantaripour admits that there was no Clinical
Practice Manager for Dermatology at the time, and she had been asked by Saks to assist in the Dermatology department
until a new one was hired. ECF 15 at 3; ECF 15-2 at 94. Consistent with having assumed these duties in Dermatology,
Kalantaripour admitted in her deposition that one of her jobs was to “distribute staff among two offices,” ECF 14-4 at
31, and Saks testified at his deposition that Kalantaripour “manage[d] the schedules of certain MFA employees, such
as medical assistants,” ECF 14-5 at 10–11. Kalantaripour also describes herself in her deposition as “do[ing] my job
as the clinical manager.” ECF 14-4 at 41.
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address this with Dr. Ehrlich and Nasrin Kalantaripour without any changes or improvement.”
ECF 14-7 at 8. Sometime in November, he approached Kalantaripour in a hallway and started
“yelling” and “screaming” at her about alleged errors in his schedule. ECF 14-4 at 37–38. On
November 26, Patel complained in an email to Saks, Ehrlich, and Kalantaripour that there were no
staff at MFA’s Maryland office to assist with patients. Id. at 79. That day he separately emailed
Kalantaripour, claiming that she had incorrectly assigned him a medical assistant, despite
purportedly “discuss[ing] on several occasions that the [assistant] cannot be [his] primary [medical
assistant].” Id. at 77.
On December 4, 2018, after one of the medical assistants called out sick, Kalantaripour
assigned Tony Garcia—a medical assistant who worked closely with Patel—to cover the shift.
ECF 14-4 at 39–40; ECF 14-6 at 17. Upon learning that Garcia had been rescheduled, Patel called
Kalantaripour. He again yelled at Kalantaripour, saying that the last-minute schedule changes were
“inappropriate,” and that Kalantaripour was “moving [his medical assistants] to another clinic.”
ECF 14-4 at 40–41; see ECF 14-7 at 3. After this conversation, Kalantaripour spoke about the
incident with Jennifer Hoffpauir in human resources. See ECF 14-4 at 85. In a follow-up email to
Hoffpauir on December 6, she described the incident as follows: She noted that Patel “got very
upset,” and “raised his voice and threat[ened]” that he would go to Kalantaripour’s superiors. Id.
Kalantaripour noted that “this [was] not the first time” Patel raised his voice or threatened that “he
would go to a higher authority if he d[idn’t] get what he want[ed].” Id. Kalantaripour stated that
she believed that his behavior “humiliated and threat[ened] staff,” and was not “okay in any level
and degree.” Id. As for Patel’s side of the story, he claims that prior to this incident, he had spoken
with Kalantaripour “on three or four different occasions . . . that it was inappropriate for her to
pull” Garcia “away from [him] and assign him different tasks.” ECF 14-7 at 3. While Kalantaripour
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disputes that her scheduling decisions were inappropriate, and contests that Garcia was supposed
to only work with Patel, she does not dispute that Patel had spoken with her multiple times about
her scheduling of Garcia. Compare ECF 14-2 ¶ 27, with ECF 15-1 ¶ 27.
Patel voiced his criticisms not only to Kalantaripour, but to her superiors Saks and MFA’s
Chief Operating Officer Pamela McClain. He emailed them on December 7 claiming that
Kalantaripour was regularly failing to provide him his medical assistant schedules in advance.
ECF 14-7 at 15. He also copied Saks on a December 9 email to Kalantaripour asking her about
purported issues with his medical assistant scheduling. Id. at 19. Saks was also present when Patel
and Kalantaripour’s differences regarding scheduling again came to a head on December 18, after
Kalantaripour sent Tony Garcia to MFA’s Maryland office to assist a different doctor, while Garcia
was purportedly helping Patel prepare for a complicated surgical case the next day. ECF 14-2 ¶ 51;
see ECF 15-1 ¶ 51 (providing justifications for Kalantaripour’s decision but not disputing that
Garcia was assisting Patel in preparing for this procedure). At a meeting, which included Saks and
other staff members, Patel again yelled at Kalantaripour about her scheduling decisions. ECF 14-
4 at 43. A week later, Patel again emailed McClain and Dr. Adam Friedman about Kalantaripour,
stating that despite Patel’s “fifth request in [a] row now, we again did not receive a [medical
assistant] schedule,” and that the providers “had multiple unacceptable problems arise from
[Kalantaripour’s] failure to send ou[t] a schedule or inform involved faculty of changes.” ECF 14-
7 at 22. Patel’s verbal critiques also applied to more trivial errors or omissions by Kalantaripour.
He also raised his voice to her for reasons like failing to remember his prescription account number
and ordering lunch for staff in the D.C. office during a snow day but not for the staff in the
Maryland office. ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 103–04.
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During 	this 	time, 	Patel was 	not 	the only 	staff 	member 	who 	voiced 	issues 	with
Kalantaripour’s performance. Fadi Hachem, MFA’s Manager of Patient Experience, emailed
McClain on November 29 about “issues Dermatology has been having,” which included patient
complaints about scheduling, and that Hachem had “talked with [Kalantaripour] previously about
better utilizing . . . staff since the work is not evenly distributed.” ECF 14-3 at 6. On December 4,
Elizabeth Hazuka, the medical assistant to Dr. Friedman, complained to Jennifer Hoffpauir about
having to “organize medical assistants last minute,” because Kalantaripour was not “arriv[ing]
before clinic starts on days when we have new employees starting.” ECF 14-3 at 18–19. Dr.
Friedman later wrote Hoffpauir that he was “sorry to say [Kalantaripour] cannot do this job. Plain
and simple.” ECF 14-9 at 5. Dr. DeLuca emailed Kalantaripour about issues with her schedule,
and subsequently forwarded the exchange to Hoffpauir, saying that she had “continued staffing
issues” and “ha[d] now reached a point where I am unable to provide appropriate patient care given
the decisions being made.” ECF 14-4 at 87–88.
Dr. Ehrlich, then-chair of the department, was also critical of Kalantaripour. Kalantaripour
alleges that Ehrlich yelled at her three times between July 2018 and her termination in March 2019.
ECF 14-2 ¶ 96. On November 27, Ehrlich confronted her about scheduling in a “very disrespectful
tone,” which made Kalantaripour “feel very insecure.” ECF 14-3 at 22. Kalantaripour says that
Ehrlich was “very upset” and “yell[ed]” at her,” ECF 14-4 at 13, and that she acted “very
unprofessional.” ECF 14-3 at 22. Ehrlich again yelled at Kalantaripour during a faculty meeting
the next day, purportedly about scheduling and the need to order supplies. Kalantaripour described
the interaction to MFA’s human resources staff as “unpleasant and unprofessional.” ECF 14-4 at
83. Kalantaripour was not the only one who had complained about Ehrlich’s behavior. Patel had
complained to Hoffpauir on November 14 about Ehrlich’s behavior with staff. ECF 14-7 at 3;
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ECF 14-2 ¶ 22; ECF 15-1 ¶ 22 (failing to dispute that Patel complained about Ehrlich’s treatment
of staff). Elizabeth Hazuka also had previously complained about Ehrlich’s treatment of staff,
which MFA had investigated in July and August 2018, and found that Ehrlich “consistent[ly],
regular[ly], and nearly universal[ly]” “berat[ed] staff, providers, residents, and medical students.”
ECF 15-2 at 119.
2. 	Surgical Implement Ordering Incident
On January 10, 2019, Dr. Patel emailed Kalantaripour and Saks regarding an order of
surgical instruments. Saks was out of the office, but Patel stated to Kalantaripour that “[Saks]
instructed us to move forward with” the order, and asked Kalantaripour to “please let me know
how we can quickly move forward with placing the order.” ECF 17-2 at 5–6. Kalantaripour did
not respond to Patel, and Patel followed up on January 22, saying to Kalantaripour, “I have not
received a response or confirmation of this order from you.” ECF 14-4 at 93. He asked her whether
“you were able to speak with [Saks] and confirm and/or place the order.” Id. In her January 22
response to Patel, Kalantaripour stated that “I have placed the order,” but noted that “purchasing
h[ad] requested more information which we are working on.” Id. at 92. Patel asked Kalantaripour
to clarify “when the order was placed.” Id. She responded on January 23 saying, “[n]o need to bore
you with the process,” but that she “w[ould] try to rush the order.” Id. Patel again asked
Kalantaripour, now copying McClain, to “clarify the date the order was submitted.” Id. at 91. In
response, Kalantaripour again did not say when the order was submitted, but noted that it was a
“big order for a department that isn’t doing well financially,” and that she would inform Patel
when she heard an update. Id. McClain weighed in, and said that “[she] just spoke with
Purchasing,” and that the “order was just submitted on 1/23/19.” Id. at 90.
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Later that day, Patel forwarded an email to McClain which, according to Patel, regarded
“another example of the issues with [Kalantaripour],” where she had not “respond[ed] and d[id]
not address my questions.” ECF 14-7 at 24. Shortly afterwards, McClain sent Kalantaripour a letter
criticizing her handling of the supply order. McClain stated that Patel had asked Kalantaripour to
place the order two weeks prior, but “only after [Patel] asked for [the order’s] status, you responded
that the instruments had been ordered,” yet “[p]urchasing confirmed the order was just submitted
. . . almost two weeks later.” ECF 14-4 at 95. McClain stated that Kalantaripour’s handling of the
incident was “not acceptable,” and was an “example of similar behavior the physicians have
expressed to me—lack of responsiveness, poor follow-up[,] and communication.” Id.
3. 	Performance Improvement Plan and Termination
On February 14, Kalantaripour was placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP) by
Saks and McClain. ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 72–73. The memorandum assigning the PIP stated that
Kalantaripour was “not meeting the expectations of [her] position as Practice Manager,” and
identified 	two 	areas 	for 	improvement: 	(1) 	“Communication 	and 	Follow 	up” 	and 	(2)
“Collaboration.” ECF 14-5 at 26–27. As to communication, the memorandum stated that “[t]imely
communication and follow up is lacking,” and that there had been a “lack of full transparency in”
Kalantaripour’s communications, leading “the parties with whom [she] communicate[d] to believe
that actions or activities are complete or near completion when in reality they are not.” Id. at 26.
The memorandum cited, among other examples, Kalantaripour’s handling of the ordering of
Patel’s surgical implements, and claimed that because the order was not placed until “at least
January 22nd,” the delay had “jeopardized several cases [Patel] had scheduled for January 31,”
although the memorandum acknowledged the order did indeed arrive in time. Id. As to
collaboration, the memorandum stated that “many department members have lost respect for you,”
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and urged Kalantaripour to better “communicate with employees” and “build[] more positive
relationships with . . . staff.” Id. at 27.5
After the PIP was issued, staff continued to complain about Kalantaripour’s performance.
Elizabeth Hazuka emailed Dr. Friedman about “Continued Problems with Nasrin [Kalantaripour],”
which included several purported incidents where Kalantaripour had made mistakes regarding
scheduling, including issues regarding Kalantaripour’s opening of the “wrong resident’s schedule
for April.” ECF 14-8 at 8–9.6 Hazuka stated her belief that “[Kalantaripour] will lie to patients and
staff directly and will not admit to making any mistakes.” Id. Friedman forwarded these concerns
to Saks. Id.
McClain and Saks subsequently made the decision to fire Kalantaripour, and her
employment with MFA was terminated on March 22, 2019. ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 82–84. The termination
letter stated that she was terminated for a failure to “satisfactorily demonstrate the ability to meet
expectations as stipulated in [her PIP].” Id. ¶ 84. Saks and Hoffpauir met with Kalantaripour that
day to provide her the notice of termination. ECF 14-5 at 24. At the meeting, Saks told
Kalantaripour that MFA had not “seen the kind of . . . improvement we were looking for from you
during the period of this PIP,” and as a result, MFA had “to terminate [her] employment here
today.” Pl.’s Ex. 33 at 0:42–47, 1:27–33.7
5 While Kalantaripour disputes that the facts of her performance as stated in the PIP were accurate and claims that the
PIP was based on “false descriptions of [her] work performance and alleged untrustworthiness,” she does not dispute
that she was assigned the PIP and that it stated the above critiques about her performance. ECF 15-1 ¶¶ 76–78.
6 Kalantaripour argues that Hazuka’s criticism in this email was “false and inaccurate,” but she only offers evidence
to disprove Hazuka’s criticisms regarding the scheduling of one of the medical assistants. ECF 15-1 ¶ 81.
Kalantaripour does not provide any evidence to contest Hazuka’s critiques about the errors with the medical residents’
schedules.
7 Plaintiff originally included a link to an audio recording of this conversation as part of her summary judgment
opposition exhibits. See ECF 15-2 at 217 (citing this file as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 33). At the time of the Court’s review,
the link to the file was not operational. At the Court’s request, Plaintiff sent the Court and opposing counsel a copy of
this audio file, which the Court will refer to hereinafter as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 33. Plaintiff also sent a copy of another
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In response, Kalantaripour told Saks and Hoffpauir that she “th[ought] the whole thing was unfair,”
and that “I was discriminated against, and that’s all I can say.” Id. at 1:42–53.
B. Procedural History
At some time before this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission.8 Kalantaripour then filed suit against MFA in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia. ECF 1-2. Kalantaripour alleged race, sex, and national origin discrimination
and retaliation under Title VII, and race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See
ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 33–60. MFA removed the action to this Court based on diversity of citizenship and
answered the complaint. ECF 1; ECF 5. After the conclusion of discovery, MFA filed a motion
for summary judgment, ECF 14, which Kalantaripour opposes, ECF 15.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 56
The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
audio file featuring a discussion between Plaintiff and Dr. Friedman, which the Court refers to as Plaintiff’s Exhibit
25.
8 The EEOC charge does not appear in the summary judgment record. MFA admits that Kalantaripour filed an EEOC
charge regarding at least some of her treatment at MFA. See ECF 14-1 at 35–36. However, MFA asserts that the
EEOC charge does not contain any mention of Kalantaripour’s treatment by Dr. Ehrlich, and that any claims based on
Ehrlich’s conduct under Title VII are barred for failure to exhaust. Id. at 24 n.4; Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (requiring administrative exhaustion of Title VII claims). In response, Kalantaripour claims merely
that she “exhausted all administrative remedies prior to filing this suit.” ECF 15 at 15. The dispute is difficult to resolve
given that neither party has provided the EEOC charge as part of the summary judgment exhibits. See ECF 14-1 at 36
(citing to “SOMF, Ex. 2 pg. 243-244, Ex. 25 and 26,” documents that do not appear in the record in this case).
However, because Title VII exhaustion is a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense that MFA bears the burden of
pleading and proving, see Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997), MFA’s failure to put the
charge into the record means that the Court “will assume” for the purposes of resolving the motion that Kalantaripour
exhausted her remedies with respect to Ehrlich’s conduct, Martin v. District of Columbia, 78 F. Supp. 3d 279, 314
n.52 (D.D.C. 2015). The Court finds that this decision makes no practical difference to the resolution of this case
given that the Court dismisses all of Kalantaripour’s claims.
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law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating a
motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and the court must draw all reasonable inferences” in that party’s favor. Talavera
v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
A party that moves for summary judgment must support its factual positions by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). If the moving party meets that burden, it falls to the nonmoving party to establish that a
genuine dispute exists regarding a material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). To do so, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that “there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that
party.” Talavera, 638 F.3d at 308 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). The nonmoving party must
produce more than a “scintilla of evidence” in support of its positions, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252,
and its evidence must consist of more than unsupported allegations or denials, see Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322 n.3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). If the evidence the nonmoving party cites is
“merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment may be granted in favor
of the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
In making their arguments for or against summary judgment, both parties are responsible
for pointing the Court to specific evidence in the record that supports their positions. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
“[E]vidence laying dormant in the record is not enough.” Potter, 558 F.3d at 550. “[T]he district
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court is not obliged to sift through hundreds of pages of depositions, affidavits, and interrogatories
in order to make its own analysis . . . of what may, or may not, be a genuine issue of material
disputed fact.” Id.
B. Title VII
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and from retaliating
against an employee for “oppos[ing] any practice” made unlawful by Title VII, id. § 2000e-3(a).
Courts generally evaluate Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims using the burden-shifting
framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To make
out a prima facie discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that “(1) he is a member of a
protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the unfavorable action gives
rise to an inference of discrimination (that is, an inference that his employer took the action because
of his membership in the protected class).” Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1130 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). And to establish a Tile VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) she
engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)
there is a causal connection between the two.” Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to the employer to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory (or
nonretaliatory) justification for the challenged action. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
However, if the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action, the McDonnell Douglas framework falls away. Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d
1078, 1086–87 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Instead, the court simply asks: “[h]as the employee produced
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory
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reason was not the actual reason[,] and that the employer intentionally discriminated [or retaliated]
against the employee?” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see
also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying Brady to retaliation claims).
To show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual, a plaintiff may cite “the
employer’s better treatment of similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected group,
its inconsistent or dishonest explanations, its deviation from established procedures or criteria, or
[its] pattern of poor treatment of other employees in the same protected group . . . or other relevant
evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude evinces an illicit motive.” Walker v. Johnson,
798 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In the context of retaliation, “[t]he temporal proximity
between an employee’s protected activity and her employer’s adverse action is a common and
often probative form of evidence of retaliation,” id., although temporal proximity without more is
insufficient to survive summary judgment, see Minter v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 66, 71–72
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
Title VII also prohibits employers from “requiring people to work in a discriminatorily
hostile or abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To prevail
on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that “she was subjected to
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment.” Brooks v.
Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014). That requirement includes both a subjective
and objective element. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. In other words, even if an employee
subjectively views her environment as abusive, “[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough
to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Id. at 21. Neither the
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“ordinary tribulations of the workplace” nor “petty insults, vindictive behavior, and angry
recriminations” are sufficient. Brooks, 748 F.3d at 1277–78 (first quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); then quoting Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 74 (1st
Cir. 2011)). This analysis requires the Court to look “at all the circumstances, including the
frequency of the [alleged] discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88).
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Section 1981 protects the rights of all persons to “make and enforce contracts.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a). The statute’s “prohibition against racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of contracts applies to all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship, including
discriminatory contract terminations.” Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 302 (1994).
And as with Title VII, “Section 1981 can encompass employment discrimination and retaliation
claims.” Olatunji v. District of Columbia, 958 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2013); see CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 450–52 (2008).
“Courts analyze Title VII and Section 1981 employment discrimination claims under
similar legal standards,” Olatunji, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 31, and the McDonnell Douglas framework
also applies to Section 1981 race discrimination claims, Carter v. George Washington Univ.,
387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Like under Title VII, if the employer has presented evidence
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their action, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
showing that the defendant’s proffered reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Disparate Treatment
Kalantaripour first alleges that MFA subjected her to disparate treatment based on her race,
national origin, and sex. ECF 1-2 ¶ 37 (alleging race, national origin, and sex discrimination under
Title VII); id. ¶ 51 (alleging race discrimination under Section 1981).9
A plaintiff alleging discrimination must offer sufficient evidence to “permit a reasonable
jury to find that she suffered some adverse employment action,” meaning that she was “denied
‘the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship,’ or
was discriminated against in the ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’”
Yazzie v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 712 F. Supp. 3d 56, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2024) (first citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(b); then citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)); see also Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S.
346, 354–55 (2024) (“To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a [plaintiff] must show some
harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”).
Kalantaripour’s termination, including the PIP that ultimately led to her firing,10 is the
9 While Kalantaripour raises all three protected categories in her complaint, and puts forward evidence and arguments
regarding discrimination based on race and national origin, the Court finds the record to be devoid of evidence or
arguments regarding the claim that her sex was specifically a motivating factor of her disparate treatment.
10 In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, the Supreme Court held that an adverse employment action for Title VII
discrimination purposes need only represent “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment,”
601 U.S. at 354–55, a ruling consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Chambers v. District of Columbia, which
held that the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” standard is “capacious, and evince[s] [Congress’s]
intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment in employment,” 35 F.4th 870, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (en
banc). Nevertheless, “not everything that happens at the workplace affects an employee’s terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.” Id. Courts after Chambers and Muldrow have come to different conclusions regarding
whether placement on a PIP alone or similar negative feedback qualifies as an adverse action under this standard.
Compare CLASP v. Hassan, No. 25-cv-1197, 2025 WL 3062911, at *12 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding, post-
Muldrow, that while being placed on a PIP may increase stress and pressure on an employee, “that is presumably true
of every PIP and without more does not make the PIP an adverse employment action,” although not addressing whether
Muldrow or Chambers impacted the analysis), with Abdelhamid v. Lane Constr. Corp., 744 F. Supp. 3d 10, 18 (D.D.C.
2024) (stating that “placement on a PIP is an adverse employment action under Muldrow”), and Achoe v. Gensler,
No. 21- cv-1256, 2022 WL 16569241, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2022) (assuming, post-Chambers, that placement on a
PIP qualified as an adverse employment action, without deciding the issue). Some Courts have found, post-Chambers
and Muldrow, that while a formal reprimand alone is not necessarily actionable, “[a] formal reprimand can be an
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relevant adverse action in this case.11 The decision to place Kalantaripour on a PIP and to
subsequently terminate her was made jointly by McClain and Saks. ECF 14-3 ¶¶ 9, 12. MFA
argues that McClain and Saks had a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for” their decision:
Kalantaripour’s poor performance. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494; ECF 14-1 at 14; see ECF 14-3 ¶ 9
(stating that Kalantaripour was placed on a PIP “[b]ased on [her] poor performance”); ECF 14-4
at 99 (termination letter stating that Kalantaripour was terminated “due to a failure to satisfactorily
demonstrate the ability to meet expectations as stipulated in [her PIP]”); ECF 14-3 at 3. In light of
this asserted “non-discriminatory reason” for Kalantaripour’s termination, the Court must
determine whether Kalantaripour has “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find
that [MFA]’s” proffered reason “was not the actual reason and that [MFA] intentionally
discriminated against [Kalantaripour] on the basis of” protected characteristics.” Brady, 520 F.3d
at 494.
“When determining whether summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law is
warranted for the employer, the court considers all relevant evidence presented by the plaintiff and
defendant.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. As discussed above, there is substantial, uncontroverted
adverse action, however, if it serves as a ‘building block’ that justifies an adverse action down the road.” Holmes v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 723 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2024). The Court need not resolve this question here.
Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff’s placement on a PIP, which undisputedly led to her termination, is not an
adverse action giving rise to a disparate treatment claim. Further, it is not clear to the Court that Plaintiff is challenging
the PIP as a discrete action separate and apart from the termination. Both Parties talk about the PIP and Plaintiff’s
firing collectively—the PIP is part of the process that resulted in Plaintiff’s termination challenged in this lawsuit.
Defendant’s evidence regarding the reasons for its actions and Plaintiff’s evidence of pretext are the same for both the
PIP and termination, and the Court cannot reasonably analyze these actions separately. Accordingly, the Court’s
discussion of Plaintiff’s termination also incorporates the fact that she was placed on a PIP for alleged performance
issues before being fired.
11 The relevant paragraphs of the complaint also refer to MFA’s alleged “fail[ure] to take actions to investigate her
claims of discrimination and protect her against Dr. Ehrlich and Dr. Patel,” but the Court does not understand
Kalantaripour’s complaint to be challenging Defendant’s alleged failure to investigate her claims as a discrete, adverse
action. ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 37, 51. The Court understands Plaintiff’s reference to Defendant’s failures to investigate as
evidence that MFA’s stated reasons for firing Kalantaripour were pretextual. See, e.g., ECF 15 at 30–35. Indeed, the
Court notes that at least one court in this District has rejected the argument that such a failure to investigate would
qualify as an adverse action following Chambers and Muldrow. See Stewart v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 23-cv-1194,
2024 WL 4332618, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2024) (citing Holmes, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 17).
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evidence in the record demonstrating that Kalantaripour’s coworkers raised concerns about her job
performance after she began working with MFA’s Dermatology department, many of those
complaints which were specifically shared with Saks and McClain. See supra Section I.A. Saks
and McClain also personally noted problems with Kalantaripour’s performance, including her
communications issues while handling Patel’s surgical instrument order. ECF 14-4 at 95; ECF 14-
5 at 26–27. McClain and Saks submitted declarations to this effect, and Saks testified in his
deposition that their decision to terminate Kalantaripour was based on these performance issues,
complaints from providers in the department, and her handling of the surgical instrument order.
ECF 14-3 at 3; ECF 14-5 at 21; ECF 14-10 ¶ 4.
“Once the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action . . . the
issue is not the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer honestly
believes in the reasons it offers.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Kalantaripour fails to
show that MFA terminated her for reasons other than its assessment of her performance—let alone
for unlawful discrimination. First, the record contains no “direct evidence of discrimination” by
Saks and McClain that would undermine their proffered reason for terminating Kalantaripour.
Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Kalantaripour’s arguments
regarding Saks also “face[] a significant initial hurdle in that [Saks] himself” had recruited
Kalantaripour and been part of the team that hired her “less than a year before her dismissal.” Id.;
see Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the person
who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to
impute to that person an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire,
especially when the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring.”). Kalantaripour submits
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deposition testimony of another former employee, an African-American woman, who states that
“[Saks] is as nasty and mean as a racist.” ECF 15-2 at 38; ECF 15 at 5. While evidence of Saks’s
poor treatment of other employees in the same protected class could in theory be indirect evidence
of discrimination that might support a finding of pretext in Kalantaripour’s case, see Walker,
798 F.3d at 1092, the deposition testimony cited falls far short of doing so. The deponent’s general
opinion that Saks was racist is not substantiated by any specific statements attributed to Saks and
appears to be largely drawn from the opinions of unidentified third parties. ECF 15-2 at 39, 41.
Moreover, the sole cited specific example of personal treatment of the deponent by Saks—a failure
to meet one-on-one with her—is not evidence of discriminatory treatment against members of
Plaintiff’s protected class such that the testimony would be relevant at trial, let alone support a
reasonable inference of Saks’s discriminatory animus against Kalantaripour. Id. at 38. And to
return to the direct evidence regarding Saks’s treatment of Kalantaripour, it cuts the other way.
When asked at her deposition whether “Adrien Saks discriminated against [her],” Kalantaripour
answered: “[I] did not get the sense that he discriminated, based on my observation.” ECF 14-4 at
68.
Kalantaripour also focuses on her treatment by Patel and Ehrlich. While Ehrlich and Patel
did not make the decision to fire Kalantaripour, and “[o]rdinarily, a discrimination plaintiff must
show that the decisionmaker” did the discriminating, Onyebuchi v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 731 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2024), MFA may be liable if a “formal decision maker” is an “unwitting
conduit of another actor’s illicit motives,” Walker, 798 F.3d at 1095, or that biased actor was an
“integral part of the decision-making process that led to [the] discharge,” Griffin v. Wash.
Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Patel in particular provided many of the
critiques of Kalantaripour and was involved in the surgical implement incident. But Kalantaripour
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stated that she could not recall any instance of Ehrlich and Patel expressly mentioning her national
origin, race, or gender during their outbursts against her or at any other point. ECF 14-4 at 10–11,
50–51. Kalantaripour instead testified that Ehrlich and Patel repeatedly told her that she was not
“understanding[] what [they] were saying,” or that they were not “understand[ing] [her],” id. at
21, 50, which she construed as a veiled commentary on her accent or her national origin. In her
summary judgment briefing she claims that “Dr. Patel, in particular, would mock [her] when she
would speak and pretend that he did not understand her, using her accent as an excuse to
discriminate against her.” See ECF 15 at 6. But Kalantaripour never points to any evidence in the
record—including her own deposition testimony—supporting her conclusory characterization of
these conversations as Patel “mock[ing]” her accent.12 Id.; see Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 679 F.
Supp. 2d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] arguments are simply that; they are not evidence and
do not help her carry her burden on summary judgment.”), aff’d, 627 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
When reviewing Kalantaripour’s descriptions of her actual interactions with Patel and Ehrlich—
and even accepting all her descriptions of the interactions as true—the Court cannot reasonably
draw the inference that she desires. Absent some additional context regarding these conversations
(which Kalantaripour has not provided), a reasonable jury could not find that Ehrlich and Patel’s
references to miscommunications and understanding, alone, qualified as them mocking her accent
or blaming her national origin for the perceived communications failures.
.
12 To support this claim, Kalantaripour cites to “Pl.’s’ Ex. 1 ¶ 1,” which appears to be answers to a set of
interrogatories. In these interrogatories, she only mentions reference to her accent when stating that another employee
at MFA, Nancy McCormack, told her that she believed that “if Plaintiff were American and did not have an accent
she would have been treated differently.” ECF 15-2 at 65–66. Plaintiff provides no record evidence to support this
claim that could be put in admissible form, such as testimony of McCormick providing the basis for her belief.
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Again, Kalantaripour need not show direct evidence of discrimination to show that MFA’s
reason for terminating her was pretextual. She could show that MFA “is making up or lying about
the underlying facts that formed the predicate for the” decision to terminate her. Brady, 520 F.3d
at 495. But she still must contend with the fact that an “employer’s action may be justified by a
reasonable belief in the validity of the reason given even though that reason may turn out to be
false.” George, 407 F.3d at 415. Kalantaripour barely provides evidence to show that the many
concerns raised by her coworkers were false, let alone that McClain and Saks did not believe these
performance issues were true and merited her placement on the PIP and termination. See Brady,
520 F.3d at 495 (“If the employer’s stated belief about the underlying facts is reasonable in light
of the evidence, however, there ordinarily is no basis for permitting a jury to conclude that the
employer is lying about the underlying facts.”). She argues that the many critiques of her
performance were manufactured as part of “MFA’s plot to make [her] work performance look
poor,” and claims that she was “unfairly held responsible for staffing issues that were out of her
control and that negatively affected her own work as Practice Manager.” ECF 15 at 22. But she
fails to provide any evidence to contradict MFA’s version of the facts underlying many of her
performance critiques, such as Patel’s concerns regarding Kalantaripour’s handling of the
onboarding process for new staff and her non-responsiveness to his questions, compare ECF 14-2
¶ 16, with ECF 15-1 ¶ 16, and Elizabeth Hazuka’s allegation that following Kalantaripour’s
placement on a PIP, she opened the “wrong resident’s schedule for April,” ECF 14-8 at 8–9.13
13 Kalantaripour attempts to dispute the factual basis for Patel’s mid-November complaints about her scheduling. See,
e.g., ECF 14-4 at 76 (November 7 email from Patel claiming that “[m]y schedule for Thursday has still not been
corrected as we discussed last week”). Kalantaripour claims that in early November 2018, Patel wrote his preferred
schedule out for her, and that she followed the schedule as Patel presented it, ECF 14-4 at 39, with the implication
being that any issues with the schedule were either Patel’s fault or manufactured by him as a pretext to criticize
Kalantaripour, see ECF 15 at 7. As evidence, she cites to a document that she claims is the schedule as written by
Patel, but does not explain how the schedule disproves Patel’s claims about her scheduling decisions. See ECF 15-2
at 110. Nor is it clear from the face of the document as to why Patel’s account of events is false. While the Court views
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As to the incident regarding the ordering of surgical instruments, Kalantaripour denies that
she misled Patel about the date that the order for surgical implements was placed. In her response
to MFA’s statement of facts, she states that she “called and spoke to the purchasing Department
and later emailed a purchasing order” on “January 22” rather than on January 23 as McClain stated
in her January 23 email. See ECF 15-1 ¶ 66. But the only evidence Kalantaripour cites is the same
email chain between Patel, Kalantaripour, Saks, and McClain in which she states, on January 22,
that “I have placed the order.” ECF 15-2 at 158–59. And contemporaneous emails show that
following McClain’s January 23 email that the “order was just submitted on 1/23/19” and “was
rejected for wrong cost center,” Kalantaripour did not contest McClain’s description of the events
at the time, and simply responded, “[y]es, I rejected the order since the wrong cost center was
used.” ECF 14-3 at 8. The Court thus does not view the January 23 order submission date as being
genuinely in dispute. And even if Kalantaripour had indeed placed the order on January 22, the
record still demonstrates that Kalantaripour failed to respond to Patel’s initial email regarding the
status of the order for almost two weeks, and then seemingly avoided answering Patel’s direct
questions about when the order was placed, which is entirely consistent with McClain’s subsequent
assessment in her performance counseling letter that Kalantaripour 	exhibited a “lack of
responsiveness, poor follow-up and communication.” ECF 14-4 at 95. Again, the question is not
“whether [Kalantaripour’s performance] in fact” was poor, but whether MFA’s “decision-makers
the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to Kalantaripour as the nonmoving party, see Talavera, 638 F.3d
at 308, it must rely on her legal arguments to understand how her proffered evidence creates a genuine dispute. It
would be improper for the Court to speculate about how and why this difficult-to-decipher document contradicts
Patel’s version of the scheduling disputes. See Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The
court’s role is not to act as an advocate for the plaintiff and construct legal arguments on h[er] behalf.”); Potter, 558
F.3d at 553 (Williams, J., concurring) (“[J]udges ‘are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs’ or the record.”
(quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991))).
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honestly and reasonably believed it was.” Evans v. District of Columbia, 219 F. Supp. 3d 99, 107
(D.D.C. 2016).
Kalantaripour’s other attempts at showing pretext are not availing. She attempts to
rehabilitate her job performance by pointing to evidence that Saks told her in a text message on
November 27 that she was “doing great.” ECF 15-2 at 18. But the comment by Saks that she was
“doing great,” occurred before many of the purported incidents of her poor performance and cannot
serve to dispute those events—including critiques by Saks himself in the PIP. Kalantaripour also
points to a recording of a conversation she had with Dr. Friedman following her placement on the
PIP, where Friedman told Kalantaripour that she was “thrown into a really untenable situation,”
and that she was “handed the reins to a sinking ship,” and that this “wasn’t the job that [she was]
meant to do,” and that she had “handled [herself] pretty well given the situation.” Pl.’s Ex. 25 at
3:32–4:20. Friedman’s comments, even if construed as a positive evaluation of Kalantaripour’s
post-PIP performance, are insufficient to demonstrate pretext on the part of Saks and McClain,
“especially when the record contains numerous negative” statements about Kalantaripour’s
performance, including during the period of time that she was on the PIP. Ajisefinni v. KPMG LLP,
17 F. Supp. 3d 28, 41 (D.D.C. 2014). Kalantaripour also points to patient survey results that she
claims shows that MFA’s Dermatology department improved on certain metrics during her tenure.
ECF 15-2 at 104. These survey results, which rate the department’s performance overall on broad
categories, like “[e]ase of getting [the] clinic on [the] phone,” id., do not speak to Kalantaripour’s
personal performance, let alone address the concerns about communication and collaboration
between MFA staff that provided the basis for Kalantaripour’s PIP, ECF 14-4 at 96–97.
Kalantaripour also fails to show that Saks and McClain “treated other employees of a
different race, color, religion, sex, or national origin more favorably in the same factual
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circumstances.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. For the comparison to be apt, the “plaintiff must
demonstrate that all relevant aspects of [her] employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those
of the other employees. Clarke v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 904 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C.
2012) (quoting Royall v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 548 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), aff’d,
540 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Kalantaripour fails to identify similarly situated comparators. In
her deposition, she admits that she was not aware of any MFA employees who had a similar
number of complaints as her and were also not terminated. ECF 14-4 at 49–50. Kalantaripour
argues that she was treated less favorably than Elizabeth Hazuka, an MFA employee outside her
protected class, in that MFA more exhaustively investigated Hazuka’s complaints against Dr.
Ehrlich than it did Kalantaripour’s complaints. ECF 15 at 33. But even if true, this evidence does
not support an indirect finding of pretext regarding Kalantaripour’s termination—the relevant
employment decision—given that it speaks to an entirely different set of “factual circumstances.”
Brady, 520 F.3d at 495.
Relatedly, an employee may also show pretext by presenting evidence of “the employer’s
pattern of poor treatment of other employees in the same protected group as the plaintiff.” Dodson
v. U.S. Cap. Police, 633 F. Supp. 3d 235, 253 (D.D.C. 2022). Kalantaripour points to the
experience of two former MFA employees of purported “Middle Eastern Asian Descent,”
Azeddine Khechmoune and Shamsun Nahar, that she alleges were also mistreated by MFA.
ECF 15 at 26. Of the two, Khechmoune was also subject to performance-related criticism by Patel
and subsequently terminated. Id. But again, Patel was not the decisionmaker in Kalantaripour’s
case, and thus the termination of Khechmoune does not raise an inference of discrimination by
McClain and Saks. As for Nahar, Kalantaripour does not present evidence that she was either
terminated or placed on a PIP. See ECF 15-2 at 195; ECF 15 at 26 (stating that Nahar “submitted
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her resignation letter to MFA”). A bigger hurdle is that given the scant details provided about these
two employees, a “reasonable jury would be unable to assess whether [MFA] treated [these
employees] 	differently 	than 	[Kalantaripour’s] . . . 	counterparts, 	or 	even 	similarly 	to
[Kalantaripour],” and thus this evidence does not weigh in favor of denying summary judgment.
Huckstep v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 216 F. Supp. 3d 69, 83 (D.D.C. 2016); see also
Vatel, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (noting the “doubtful probative value to . . . a small sample size,” and
finding even that minimal probative value diminished when the sample size is “an incomplete
snapshot”) (citing Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620–21 (1974)).14
Finally, Kalantaripour argues that she has shown pretext because MFA failed to “follow
established procedures” in its treatment of her. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495 n.3. She raises as evidence
MFA’s alleged failure to investigate her complaints against Ehrlich and Patel to the same degree
that it did for the complaints by Hazuka against Ehrlich. ECF 15 at 34. But Kalantaripour does not
demonstrate that there were “established procedures” that dictated the form and scope necessary
for investigations of complaints such as the ones she made about Patel and Ehrlich. Brady,
520 F.3d at 495. MFA’s “Harassment Prevention Policy” states that MFA provides a “work
environment that is free from all forms of discrimination and conduct that can be considered
harassing, coercive, or disruptive.” ECF 14-4 at 71. However, as to investigations, it states merely
that “possible sexual or other unlawful harassment” will be “investigated in a timely and
confidential manner.” Id.15 Kalantaripour thus does not show that MFA failed to follow established
procedures.
14 An additional hurdle, at least with respect to the evidence regarding Nahar’s treatment, is that Plaintiff relies entirely
on statements that are inadmissible hearsay.
15 Kalantaripour also claims that Patel deviated from “standard MFA procedures” in his treatment of her “in order to
make [her] work performance look poor,” by contradicting his own instructions to her about scheduling and later
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When evaluating a discrimination claim at the summary judgment stage, a “court must
‘consider all the evidence, taken together,’ and assess whether it is sufficient to support a
reasonable inference of discrimination.” Williams v. Verizon Washington, D.C. Inc., 304 F. Supp.
3d 183, 200 (D.D.C. 2018) (K.B. Jackson, J.) (quoting Jones, 557 F.3d at 678). “Thus, even for
plaintiffs who create some genuine issue of material fact as to pretext, not every one ‘will always
be deemed to have presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment.’” Id. (quoting Aka
v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). Even when the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to Kalantaripour, the record “conclusively reveals some other,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision”—MFA’s genuine belief in her perceived
performance issues. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148
(2000)). Because Kalantaripour has not provided evidence that would be sufficient for a reasonable
jury to conclude that MFA’s purported reasons for her termination were mere pretext, her
discrimination claim based on her termination fails as a matter of law. See id.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Kalantaripour also alleges that MFA subjected her to a hostile work environment. ECF 1-
2 ¶¶ 37, 51. Kalantaripour’s complaint and briefing are not entirely clear upon which specific
treatment she premises her hostile work environment claim, but she frequently discusses Ehrlich
and Patel’s conduct—which, in her telling, involved repeatedly yelling at her, threatening her with
discipline, and criticizing her job performance—as “discriminatory and hostile” behavior. ECF 15
at 39; see also id. at 7 (describing Ehrlich’s treatment as “hostile and intimidating”); id. at 9
(describing a “hostile and abusive” interaction with Patel); id. at 12 (same).
blaming her for the errors. ECF 15 at 22. The Court does not find that Kalantaripour has presented evidence that MFA
or Patel had “established procedures” regarding scheduling such that Patel’s alleged deviation from the practices
establishes pretext for discrimination. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495.
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The Court does not find that this treatment amounted to “discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Brooks, 748 F.3d at 1276. An employer
may be held liable under Title VII and Section 1981 for harassment—but only harassment that
would itself violate Title VII. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 (2013) (“[A]n
employer is directly liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment if the employer was negligent
with respect to the offensive behavior.” (emphasis added)). As the Court has discussed above, it
has found no basis for a reasonable jury to find that Patel and Ehrlich’s treatment of Kalantaripour
was motivated by Kalantaripour’s protected status, rather than their dissatisfaction with her
perceived performance issues.
And even were Patel and Ehrich’s treatment motivated by Kalantaripour’s protected status,
“[t]he bar for demonstrating a hostile work environment claim is a high one.” Achagzai v. Broad.
Bd. of Governors, 170 F. Supp. 3d 164, 183 (D.D.C. 2016). Even construing the facts in the light
most favorable to Kalantaripour, the Court cannot find that being yelled at about her job
performance, both privately and in public, see supra Section I.A, meets the high standard required
to show “intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [Kalantaripour’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Brooks,
748 F.3d at 1276). MFA is entitled to summary judgment on the hostile working environment
claims.16
16 Kalantaripour’s complaint also mentions the PIP, termination, and failure to investigate her complaints in the same
paragraph as her allegation that MFA “subjected her to . . . a hostile work environment.” ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 37, 51. The Court
does not find that these actions can support her hostile work environment claim, either on their own or in conjunction
with Ehrlich and Patel’s conduct. This jurisdiction generally “frowns on plaintiffs who attempt to bootstrap their
alleged discrete acts of [discrimination] and retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim,” Baloch v.
Norton, 517 F. Supp. 2d 345, 364 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2008), although a court may not “dismiss a hostile work environment claim merely because it contains discrete acts
that the plaintiff claims (correctly or incorrectly) are actionable on their own,” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1252
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C. Retaliation
Kalantaripour also argues that MFA retaliated against her in violation of Title VII and
Section 1981 by placing her on a PIP and terminating her employment in retaliation for her
complaints about Patel and Ehrlich. ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 44, 58. To state a retaliation claim, she must allege
that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action
by her employer; and (3) that a causal link connects the two. Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy Shaw
Found. ex rel. Black Emps. of Libr. of Cong., Inc. v. Billington, 737 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
The Court will grant summary judgment on these claims because Kalantaripour has not
presented any evidence that she engaged in statutorily protected activity before her termination.
“An activity is protected for the purposes of a retaliation claim if it involves opposing alleged
discriminatory treatment by the employer or participating in legal efforts against the alleged
treatment.” Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 76, 91 (D.D.C. 2006). “Not
every complaint garners its author protection under Title VII.” Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d
1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “While no ‘magic words’ are required, the complaint must in some
way allege unlawful discrimination.” Id.
Before she was placed on a PIP and terminated on March 22, 2019, Kalantaripour raised
the issue of her treatment by Patel and Ehrlich with Human Resources on several occasions. See,
e.g., ECF 15-2 at 108, 114–15, 146, 147–48; ECF 14-2 ¶¶ 30, 33, 39, 41, 54. But of the complaints
for which evidence exists in the record, Kalantaripour has failed to provide any basis to find that
(D.C. Cir. 2011). “Acts giving rise to a hostile work environment claim must collectively meet the independent
requirements of that claim.” Id. These remaining putative actions do not meet the standard in that plaintiff has not
provided evidence that they were discriminatory, let alone that they were part of the sufficiently “severe or pervasive”
discriminatory environment necessary to support a hostile work environment claim. Id. (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at
21); see Holmes, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 29 (finding that an employer’s reprimands, reassignments, and failures to
investigate complaints, were “work-related actions by supervisors that courts typically do not find to be sufficient for
a hostile work environment claim”); see also Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The removal
of important assignments, lowered performance evaluations, and close scrutiny of assignments by management
[cannot] be characterized as sufficiently intimidating or offensive in an ordinary workplace context.”).
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these complaints put MFA on notice that the conduct complained about involved discrimination
on the basis of race, national origin, or sex.17 Clemmons v. Acad. for Educ. Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d
100, 128 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[A]mbiguous complaints that do not make the employer aware of alleged
discriminatory misconduct do not constitute protected activity.”).
Take Kalantaripour’s complaints about Ehrlich: In her November 28, 2018 email to
Jennifer Hoffpauir in MFA’s human resources department, Kalantaripour describes Ehrlich as
acting “unprofessional toward me,” speaking in a “very disrespectful tone,” all of which had the
result of making Kalantaripour “feel very insecure.” ECF 14-3 at 22. Kalantaripour discussed the
interaction with Hoffpauir the next day, but there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that
Kalantaripour discussed unlawful discrimination as the basis for her complaint. Moreover, she sent
a follow-up email to Hoffpauir where she merely described herself as being “wrongfully attacked
and accused.” ECF 14-4 at 82. In an email on December 2, 2018, Kalantaripour told Hoffpauir that
she had an “unpleasant and unprofessional interaction,” where Ehrlich slammed a catalog on a
table in front of her and said, “[y]ou take care of this!” which left Kalantaripour “stunned.”
ECF 14-4 at 83. Kalantaripour stated that Ehrlich’s actions were “not okay or acceptable” and that
the Dermatology department was “not a healthy work environment.” Id. None of these complaints
or discussions raised Kalantaripour’s protected characteristics as a basis for her treatment by
Ehrlich, and they therefore amount to complaints about “unprofessional and abusive behavior,”
17 Kalantaripour’s complaint in this action mentions other times that she spoke with human resources staff regarding
Patel that are not discussed previously in this opinion. See ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 14–15 (mentioning November 2 and November
5 emails to human resources staff about Patel, and stating that Kalantaripour had by that point “complained about his
unacceptable behavior three previous times”). However, her materials in opposition to MFA’s summary judgment
motion provides no evidence as to the contents of those complaints and whether they raised unlawful discrimination
as the basis for her treatment. See ECF 15-2 at 108 (November 5 email to HR referring to Kalantaripour’s “interaction
with Dr. Patel” and mentioning a discussion about the interaction, but providing no details about the contents of that
discussion, including whether Kalantaripour raised the issue of unlawful discrimination). Similarly, Kalantaripour’s
opposition memorandum states that she met with Hoffpauir on March 4, 2019, to discuss her PIP and “raised concerns
about discrimination,” but in support merely cites to the memorandum assigning Kalantaripour the PIP. See ECF 15
at 14.
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which are not themselves protected activity under Title VII and Section 1981. See Welzel v.
Bernstein, 436 F. Supp. 2d 110, 122 (D.D.C. 2006).
The complaints about Patel suffer from the same defect. The record demonstrates that
Kalantaripour informed Hoffpauir about Patel’s December 4 outburst regarding her scheduling of
Tony Garcia, the medical assistant. The record does not demonstrate exactly what Kalantaripour
said to Hoffpauir, but Kalantaripour subsequently sent an email to Hoffpauir to “remind [her] of
the incident t[hat] happened on Tuesday morning,” in which she noted that Patel “got very upset,”
“raised his voice[,] and threat[ened]” that he would go to Kalantaripour’s superiors. ECF 14-4 at
85. Kalantaripour noted that “this [was] not the first time” Patel raised his voice or threatened that
“he would go to a higher authority if he d[idn’t] get what he want[ed].” Id. Kalantaripour stated
that she believed that his behavior “[wa]sn’t acceptable,” amounted to “humiliating and
threat[en]ing staff,” and was not “okay in any level and degree.” Id. Like the complaints about
Ehrlich, Kalantaripour’s complaints do not qualify as protected activity because they do not
indicate that her race, national origin, or sex was implicated in her treatment. Broderick, 437 F.3d
at 1232 (noting that “complaining about being ‘picked on,’ without mentioning discrimination or
otherwise indicating that gender was an issue, does not constitute protected activity, even if the
employee honestly believes she is the subject of [unlawful] discrimination” (citing Sitar v. Ind.
Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Kalantaripour presents evidence that she told at least one person, a fellow employee, that
she believed that her treatment was due to her accent and national origin. ECF 15-2 at 35. But
Kalantaripour presents no evidence that this employee ever spoke with anyone else on her behalf—
let alone anyone involved in Kalantaripour’s adverse employment actions—about the supposedly
discriminatory nature of the treatment. Even if Kalantaripour genuinely believed that the treatment
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by Patel and Ehrlich was based on her protected characteristics, “absent any indication that she
communicated this belief to” individuals at MFA who later took adverse action, she has failed to
show that her complaints constituted protected activity. Clemmons, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 130. Nor
does the Court find that the details of the interactions with Patel and Ehrlich as relayed to the
human resources staff would on their own infer or imply to Hoffpauir that Kalantaripour was really
complaining about discrimination. See Mazloum v. District of Columbia, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13
(D.D.C. 2006) (“The communication of a complaint of unlawful discrimination may be inferred
or implied from the surrounding facts.”).
Kalantaripour identifies a single instance where she complained about discrimination: a
meeting on March 22, 2019 with Hoffpauir and Saks. The problem for Kalantaripour is that this
meeting occurred after the decision had been made to terminate her and after she had indeed been
told that she was terminated. A plaintiff “cannot make out a . . . case of retaliation [where] the only
protected activity identified in the record . . . did not occur until after plaintiff had been terminated”
because “there can be no inference of causality.” Marshall v. Potter, 634 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73
(D.D.C. 2009). The decision to terminate Kalantaripour was made by McClain and Saks, ECF 14-
3 at 3, and was formalized by the time Kalantaripour met with Saks and Hoffpauir on March 22.
See ECF 14-4 at 99 (termination letter delivered to Kalantaripour on March 22, stating that “your
employment relationship with [MFA] will end effective March 22, 2019”). At the March 22
meeting, Saks and Hoffpauir told Kalantaripour her employment was terminated. ECF 14-10 ¶ 7.
It was only after the termination that Kalantaripour told Saks and Hoffpauir that she thought she
had been discriminated against, by saying “I was discriminated against, and that’s all I can say.”
Pl.’s Ex. 33 at 1:27–53. Kalantaripour followed up her statement by saying to Saks: “you know
the conversation we had and everything so . . . nothing else to say.” Id. at 1:54–2:05. Even
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construed most favorably to Kalantaripour, her reference to a prior conversation does not make
clear what the content of the prior conversation was and whether it even involved discrimination.
And Kalantaripour does not affirmatively argue that this statement was referring to some prior
complaint of discrimination she made to Saks. Kalantaripour thus does not genuinely dispute that
her only discrimination complaint to her employer came after she was terminated.18
Because Kalantaripour cannot identify any protected complaints made while she was
employed, and because the only arguable protected activity “followed all the alleged retaliatory
acts,” Kalantaripour cannot claim retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981. Marshall, 634 F.
Supp. 2d at 73.
* 	* 	*
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF 14, is
GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum
opinion.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
Date: February 9, 2026
18 In response to MFA’s evidence regarding the timeline of her complaints, including the argument that she raised her
concerns about discrimination only after she was terminated, Kalantaripour states that “Mr. Saks confirmed in his
deposition that Plaintiff reported to him that she believed she was being discriminated against due to her race and
national origin prior to her termination.” ECF 15-1 ¶ 114. This misrepresents the record. The deposition testimony
cited by Kalantaripour says nothing about any prior complaints of discrimination. Instead, it confirms that the only
time Kalantaripour raised the issue of discrimination to Saks was in the termination meeting. See ECF 17-1 at 4–5.
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