Linda Ann Lee

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
NEW HAVEN DIVISION
In re:
Linda Ann Lee
Debtor
Case No. 25-30738 (AMN)
Chapter 13
ECF No. 22
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN REM RELIEF
AND DISMISSING THE CHAPTER 13 CASE FOR CAUSE
On August 1, 2025, Linda Ann Lee (the “Debtor”) filed a petition under Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code. On September 30, 2025, creditor Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(the “Movant” or “Wells Fargo”) filed and served upon the Debtor a motion seeking relief
from the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(4). ECF No. 22
(the “Motion for Relief from Stay”). The Court entered a separate order granting relief
under § 362(d)(1) on December 16, 2025. ECF No. 61.
The Movant holds a note and mortgage on real property owned by the Debtor
known as 42 Morehouse Avenue, Milford, Connecticut (the “Property”). The Movant is
also a plaintiff in a 2013 foreclosure action against the Debtor in Connecticut Superior
Court, in which a judgment of foreclosure by sale was entered for the Property on
August 28, 2015. S ee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Linda Ann Lee, et al., Connecticut
Superior Court Case No. AAN-CV13-6014345-S (the “Foreclosure Case”); Foreclosure
Case Doc. 131.
Pursuant to this Court’s contested matter procedure, the Debtor was required to
file any response to the Motion for Relief from Stay on or before October 14, 2025.
Local Bankr.R. 9014-1. On October 8, 2025, the Debtor filed a request to extend this
deadline to January 4, 2026, stating she had not received a copy of the Motion and
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needed additional time to respond due to an unspecified disability. ECF No. 23. The
Court issued an Order granting, in part, the Debtor’s motion, extending the deadline to
November 14, 2025. ECF No. 29. The Debtor filed an Objection to the Motion for Relief
from Stay on November 13, 2025 (the “Objection”). ECF No. 39. In her Objection, the
Debtor claimed the Movant was not entitled to relief under § 362(d)(4) because she had
not engaged in serial filings for the sole purpose of delaying the foreclosure action and
disputed, without providing additional evidence and in contradiction to the Court’s
records, that she had filed a total of six Chapter 13 cases in this Court. ECF No. 39.
The original hearing on the Motion was scheduled for December 4, 2025. ECF No. 40.
Separately, on October 14, 2025, the Chapter 13 Trustee (the “Trustee”) filed a
Motion to Dismiss Case for Inability to Propose a Confirmable Plan. ECF No. 26. The
Trustee then filed an amended Motion (the “Motion to Dismiss”) on November 6, 2025.
ECF No. 36. In support of dismissal, the Trustee cited the Debtor’s failure to make pre-
confirmation payments and failure to propose any payments to creditors in the initial
Chapter 13 Plan filed August 14, 2025. ECF Nos. 36, 15. Though the Debtor was given
opportunity to correct this, the Second Amended Plan filed December 3, 2025, also
failed to propose any payments to creditors. ECF No. 56.
A copy of the Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Hearing for the matter
was served upon the Debtor via first class mail. ECF No. 44. The Debtor filed
objections both to the original and the amended Motion to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 33, 50. In
support of these objections, the Debtor acknowledged that she did not propose
payments to creditors in her plan, stating that the payment amount was yet to be
determined. ECF No. 50. The original hearing on the Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss was
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scheduled for November 6, 2025, ECF No. 27, and continued to December 4, 2025.
ECF Nos. 34, 40.
Standing
The Court concludes that Wells Fargo has standing to seek relief from the
automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The state court’s final judgment in the
Foreclosure Case serves as a determination as to the Movant’s standing to enforce
both the note and mortgage. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Bankruptcy
Court cannot act as an appellate court for the Foreclosure Case. Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine jurisdictionally bars federal courts from
hearing "cases that function as de facto appeals of state-court judgments." Sung Cho v.
City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018). This Court’s review of the result in
the Foreclosure Case is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The state court
necessarily determined the Movant has standing to enforce the note and mortgage in
the Foreclosure Case. The Bankruptcy Court cannot now serve as an appellate court to
review that determination and will therefore abide by the state court’s findings. Smith v.
Bendett & McHugh, P.C., No. 3:22-cv-239 (JAM), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10792, at *6-
10 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2023).
The Debtor has contended that the Movant’s claim is based on a prior 30-year
mortgage, rather than the current 15-year mortgage on the Property. See, ECF No. 39,
p.14. However, the Movant’s filings reference a 15-year mortgage. See, ECF No. 22, p.
18. Furthermore, the Debtor’s argument on this point does not affect the requirement
for this Court to adhere to the state court’s findings in the Foreclosure Case.
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Because the Movant has sufficiently established standing the Court may proceed
to consider the merits of the Motion.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) – In rem Relief from Stay
Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(4) authorizes the bankruptcy court to enter an Order
granting in rem relief and preventing the imposition of a stay in any future bankruptcy
filings relating to real property for a period of two years, when, among other things, “a
creditor has demonstrated that the bankruptcy petition was filed as part of a scheme to
delay, hinder, and defraud creditors,” In re O’Farrill, 569 B.R. 586, 591 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2017), and involves multiple bankruptcy filings affecting real property, In re Muhaimin,
343 B.R. 159, 167 (Bankr.D. Md. 2006). 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).
The current case is the sixth bankruptcy case since 2016 filed by this Debtor and
affecting the Property. As in the prior cases, the current case was filed on the eve of a
foreclosure sale date, as summarized in the following table comparing the filing dates in
bankruptcy case numbers 16-31398, 17-31297, 18-30952, 19-30052, 19-31747, and 25-
30738.
Bankruptcy
Case No.
Date Bankruptcy Filed 	Foreclosure Sale Date
16-31398 	September 7, 2016 	September 10, 2016
AAN-CV13-6014345-S, Doc. 131
17-31297 	August 24, 2017 	August 26, 2017
AAN-CV13-6014345-S, Doc. 157
18-30952 	June 4, 2018 	June 9, 2018
AAN-CV13-6014345-S, Doc. 196
19-30052 	January 10, 2019 	February 9, 2019
AAN-CV13-6014345-S, Doc. 203
19-31747 	October 23, 2019 	October 26, 2019
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AAN-CV13-6014345-S, Doc. 218
25-30738 	August 1, 2025 	August 2, 2025
AAN-CV13-6014345-S, Doc. 333
Bankruptcy courts may “infer an intent to hider, delay, and defraud creditors from
the fact of serial filings alone,” In re Procel, 467 B.R. 297, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal
citation omitted); see also In re Magnale Farms, LLC, No. 17-61344, 2018 WL 1664849,
at *6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2018) (explaining a court can draw such inferences “based
on the mere timing and filing of several bankruptcy cases.”); In re Montalvo, 416 B.R. 381,
387 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing the timing and sequencing of the filings as
significant to finding a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud).
The Court is permitted to take judicial notice of public filings on its own docket in a
bankruptcy case, as well as those filed in other cases. Fed. R. Evid. 201; Teamsters Nat'l
Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. et al. v. Howard's Express, Inc. (In re Howard's
Express, Inc.), 151 F. App'x 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that courts are empowered to
take judicial notice of public filings, including a court's docket); Mei Guo v. Despins (In re
Kwok), No. 3:24-CV-724 (KAD), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10092, at *22 (D. Conn. Jan. 21,
2025); In re Spirit Airlines, Inc., 668 B.R. 689, 695 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025); Harrington
v. Racki (In re Bishop), 578 B.R. 158, 164 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017); Katzenstein v. VIII
SV5556 Lender, LLC (In re St. Vincent's Cath. Med. Ctrs. of New York), 440 B.R. 587,
599 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); American Tissue, Inc. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec.
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 79, 96 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The Court can take judicial notice
of matters of public record . . . including filings in related lawsuits ....") (citing Rothman v.
Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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As detailed above, it is well-settled that bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction
to review the final judgments of state courts. See In re Cody, Inc., 281 B.R. 182, 189
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 338 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003)
(determining that the bankruptcy court could not disturb the final order of a state court
regarding a tax debt) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Based on
the timing and filing of these six bankruptcy cases in relation to foreclosure dates for the
Property, the Court draws the inference the serial filings are part of a scheme to hinder
and delay the creditor without cause.
Multiple of the Debtor’s prior cases were dismissed, in essence due to an inability
or refusal by the Debtor to participate in the bankruptcy process as required by the
Bankruptcy Code and Rules, or to file required information. See, Case No. 18-30952,
ECF No. 14; Case No. 17-31297, ECF No. 11 (orders dismissing Debtor’s prior case for
failure to file required documents and pay the filing fee). This case does not appear to
be any different. In the Debtor’s current case, she has failed to make payments to the
Chapter 13 Trustee or to propose a plan that makes any payments to creditors. ECF
Nos. 15, 56; see also ECF No. 42.
Based on this record, the Court concludes the Debtor filed this petition as part of
a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving multiple bankruptcy filings
affecting the property, within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). Accordingly, the
Movant is entitled to in rem relief regarding the Property for a period of two years.
11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) – Dismissal for Cause
Section 1307(c) of the Bankruptcy Code permits dismissal “for cause,” including
for “failure to commence making timely payments under Section 1326.” 11 U.S.C. §
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1307(c)(4). Section 1326(a)(1) mandates that a debtor “shall commence making
payments not later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the plan or the order for
relief, whichever is earlier.” 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). Here, the Debtor has not made any
payments to the Trustee, as required. Courts consistently hold that nonpayment or
delinquency in plan payments constitutes “cause” to dismiss under § 1307(c)(4). In re
Mitrany, No. 08-BK-40034, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1659, 2008 WL 2128162, at *6 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008); Tenore v. Frost (In re Tenore), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116958
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2025). Accordingly, cause exists to dismiss under §§ 1307(c)(4)
and 1326(a).
Section 1307(c) also authorizes dismissal for “unreasonable delay by the debtor
that is prejudicial to creditors” and “denial of confirmation of a plan”. 11 U.S.C. §§
1307(c)(1), (5). A debtor bears the burden to propose a plan that is feasible and
otherwise confirmable within the statutory framework. In re Felberman, 196 B.R. 678,
685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). Here the Debtor has not carried that burden. A plan has
not been confirmed despite the case pending since August, and the Debtor’s proposed
plan is not confirmable due to both the lack of proposed payments to any creditor and
the Debtor’s ineligibility under Chapter 13 as discussed below. Continued pendency of
this case without a confirmable plan constitutes unreasonable delay prejudicial to
creditors and supports dismissal.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), to qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code at the time of filing, an individual must have “regular income”. By the
Debtor’s own admissions, she does not currently have income, nor did she at the time
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of filing. ECF No. 60 12/4/25 Hearing Audio 00:19:10 – 00:19:36. 1 Though the Court
understands Ms. Lee is facing difficult circumstances, her case cannot proceed without
meeting the eligibility requirements to be a Chapter 13 debtor under the Bankruptcy
Code. Thus, the Debtor’s failure to qualify as an individual with regular income is an
independent basis for dismissal of the case for cause, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
Considering all of the Debtor’s arguments and these factors, the Court concludes
there is cause to dismiss this case. See, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).
Accordingly, it is hereby;
ORDERED: The Motion for Relief from Stay, ECF No.22, is GRANTED pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). An order which may be recorded upon the land records will be
entered separately. And it is further;
ORDERED: The Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36, is GRANTED
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) without prejudice. An order dismissing the case shall
be entered separately.
1 Audio recordings for the hearings are available on the Court’s electronic docket as an attachment to the
PDFs docketed ECF No. 60.
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