BEVIRT et al v. USA

TYSON LEE BEVIRT, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
No. 24-622
(Filed: February 2, 2026)
Lindsay S.C. Brinton, Meghan S. Largent, Michael Armstrong, Marlee L. Rowe, Lewis
Rice, LLC, St. Louis, Missouri, for Plaintiffs.
LeeAnn Kim, Trial Attorney, Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
HADJI, Judge.
Plaintiffs move, pursuant to Court of Federal Claims Rule 59(a)(1), for
reconsideration of the Court’s opinion (ECF 57) ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. See ECF 59. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND1
On April 19, 2024, Plaintiffs—owners of property adjacent to and underlying a
railroad corridor in Western North Carolina (the Corridor)—filed the instant action alleging
that the Government had effectuated an uncompensated taking of their property when it
converted the corridor for recreational trail use under the National Trail Systems Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1241-51. ECF 1; see generally ECF 10. After completing limited discovery on
title issues, in January 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ECF
24. Thereafter, the Government filed its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 27.
In disputing the nature of property interest held by the Blue Ridge Southern
Railroad, LLC (the Railroad) at the time of the alleged taking, the parties principally
disagreed about the nature of the original interest conveyed to the Hendersonville and
1 The underlying facts are provided in the Court’s summary judgment ruling and need not be repeated
herein. See ECF 57 at 1-3.
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
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Brevard Railway, Telegraph, and Telephone Company (HBR) in the late 1800s. Plaintiffs
argued that HBR obtained an easement, based on the language of the source deeds,
Plaintiffs’ modern deeds, and modern plats describing Plaintiffs’ fee simple interests. See
ECF 24 at 25-33. The Government argued that the source deeds gave HBR the land in fee
simple, which would negate Plaintiffs’ property interests in that land at the time of the
alleged taking. See ECF 27 at 16-23. Both parties agreed that the Railroad possessed the
same interest as HBR. ECF 24 at 18 (“At each step of this process, the successor railroad
obtained the same rights as its predecessor, such that the rights possessed by [the Railroad]
in 2014 are the same as those obtained by HBR in 1894 and 1895.”); see ECF 27 at 23
(“Blue Ridge Southern, as the successor in interest, possessed fee simple interest in the
corridor….”).
Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and granted the Government’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment. ECF 57 at 1. The central holding of the Court’s opinion was the legal conclusion
that “the Source Deeds granted HBR a fee simple conveyance, to which Plaintiffs retained
no reversionary interest.” ECF 57 at 9. Following from that conclusion, the Court found
that “Plaintiffs ha[d] not established the existence of an essential element to their case for
which they bear the burden of proof at trial.” ECF 57 at 9 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Specifically, Plaintiffs had not “provided any connected
chain of title or grant from the state, argued adverse possession, nor asserted title by
estoppel or that was derived through a tenant.” ECF 57 at 5-6. Absent any facts in the
record that Plaintiffs, or their predecessors-in-interest, had somehow reacquired fee simple
interest, the Court held that Plaintiffs lacked a property interest in the land at issue, thus
ending the takings inquiry. See ECF 57 at 9.
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. See generally ECF 59. Plaintiffs
request only reconsideration of the Court’s grant of the Government’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, not of the Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. ECF 59 at 9. In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs submitted new evidence of
title documentation to the Court. Specifically, in the months since the Court’s decision,
Plaintiffs engaged in a thorough chain of title search for two “representative properties.”
See ECF 59 at 22-23. For Agudas Israel Congregation Parcels A and B, Plaintiffs obtained
chain of title back to 1909 and 1937, respectively. ECF 59 at 23. For the Cagle property,
Plaintiffs obtained chain of title documents back to 1946. ECF 59 at 23. Plaintiffs attached
these documents as exhibits to their Motion for Reconsideration. See generally ECF 59.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 59 of the Court of Federal Claims governs motions for reconsideration and
provides that the Court may grant a new trial or motion for reconsideration:
(A) for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
granted in an action at law in federal court; (B) for any reason
for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in
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equity in federal court; or (C) upon the showing of satisfactory
evidence, cumulative or otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or
injustice has been done to the United States.
Rule 59(a)(1). This Court has discretion to “grant a motion for reconsideration when there
has been an intervening change in the controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a
need to correct clear factual or legal error or prevent manifest injustice.” Biery v. United
States, 818 F.3d 704, 711 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Young v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 671,
674 (2010)). “Newly discovered evidence is only such evidence as could not have been
discovered by exercise of due diligence prior to rendition of decision.” Parsons ex rel.
Linmar Prop. Mgmt. Tr. v. United States, 174 F. App’x 561, 563 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing
Girault v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 521, 524 (Ct. Cl. 1955)). A plaintiff seeking
reconsideration must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances,” Caldwell v. United
States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and may not use the motion as a tool to
“relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008)
(quoting 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127–128
(2d ed. 1995))
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs raise two objections to the Court’s grant of the Government’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment. First, based on the record at the time of the Court’s
decision, Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred by using an incorrect summary judgment
standard and finding no genuine dispute of material fact in this case. See ECF 59 at 13.
According to Plaintiffs, the modern deeds and boundary evidence raised a factual dispute
that should not have been resolved in the Government’s favor on summary judgment. ECF
59 at 21-22. Second, Plaintiffs provide new title search evidence not before the Court at
the summary judgment stage, which Plaintiffs argue “confirm[s] that the Court’s
conclusion—that Plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence of ownership—was mistaken, and
that the dispute over ownership is well-documented, contested, and inappropriate for
resolution at summary judgment.” ECF 59 at 22. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
concludes that neither argument meets the high bar to succeed on a Motion for
Reconsideration.
I. The Court applied the correct summary judgment standard to conclude
that Plaintiffs had not shown a genuine dispute of material fact.
Plaintiffs argue that the Court misapplied the applicable legal standard when
granting the Government’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. See ECF 59 at 24.
Plaintiffs further argue that their modern deeds and boundary evidence raise a factual
dispute that should not have been resolved in the Government’s favor on summary
judgment. ECF 59 at 21-22. The Government argues that the Court correctly applied the
standard, holding Plaintiffs to the burden of proving facts sufficient to support a finding in
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Plaintiffs’ favor on the issue of ownership. ECF 62 at 16. The Court addresses each of
Plaintiffs’ claims in turn.
The Court begins by restating the summary judgment standard laid out in the Court’s
opinion:
Rule 56(a) of the United States Court of Federal Claims
states that summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2
“[A]ll evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and all reasonable factual inferences
should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Dairyland
Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
The Supreme Court has instructed that “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Disputes over
facts that are not outcome-determinative will not preclude the
entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248. A dispute about a
material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id.
A summary judgment motion is properly granted
“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an essential element to that party’s
case and for which that party bears the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A
nonmovant will not defeat a motion for summary judgment
“unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
party for [the fact-finder] to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “A nonmoving party’s failure of
proof concerning the existence of an element essential to its
case on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of
proof at trial necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and
2 Court of Federal Claims Rule 56(a) is the same as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Compare
RCFC 56(a) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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entitles the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of
law.” Dairyland Power, 16 F.3d at 1202.
ECF 57 at 3-4.
Plaintiffs do not identify any misstatement of law in the Court’s description of the
legal standard for summary judgment. Rather, they take issue with the Court’s application
of the relevant standard when granting the Government’s Cross-Motion. Plaintiffs first
point to the Court’s statement that “Plaintiffs had failed to ‘adequately allege, let alone
prove’ their claims under Mobley.” ECF 59 at 15 (quoting ECF 57 at 5).
Plaintiffs’ complaint overlooks the procedural posture of this case and the context
of the statement. Because the Court was resolving cross-motions for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs wore two hats at the summary judgment stage—one as movants and one as non-
movants. As movants, Plaintiffs had to “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact” as to the issue of ownership. Rule 56(a). But Plaintiffs went even further than
that standard in their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that their modern deeds left
“no question” as to ownership. ECF 24 at 25; see also ECF 57 at 5 (quoting this language).
They maintained that their “deeds to their property definitively prove they own the land”
at issue. ECF 24 at 10 (emphasis added). The Court’s use of the phrase “let alone prove”
was in response to these bold claims and in rejection of Plaintiffs’ request for summary
judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ complaint is misguided because it is directed at the
Court’s decision not to grant summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor, a conclusion Plaintiffs
explicitly are not challenging.3 ECF 59 at 9.
Turning to the Court’s treatment of Plaintiffs as non-movants, Plaintiffs bore a
different burden. When considering the Government’s Cross-Motion, the Court concluded
as a matter of law that the source deeds conveyed a fee simple interest to HBR in the late
1800s. ECF 57 at 9. The burden then shifted to Plaintiffs to “make a showing sufficient to
establish” present ownership, because Plaintiffs would “bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. As the Court explained, Plaintiffs’ modern evidence did not meet
that burden. Once the Court concluded that HBR had been granted a fee simple interest,
Plaintiffs could only prove present ownership by defeating the Railroad’s title.
Unfortunately, for Plaintiffs, the Court noted that “Plaintiffs ha[d] not provided any
connected chain of title or grant from the state, argued adverse possession, nor asserted
title by estoppel or that was derived through a tenant.” ECF 57 at 5-6. The Court also found
that Plaintiffs “offer[ed] no proof of any common source of title.” ECF 57 at 6. Plaintiffs
now claim that the Government did not show that HBR’s interest “remains with its
successor.” ECF 59 at 15. But Plaintiffs conceded that argument at summary judgment
when they conceded that “[a]t each step of this process, the successor railroad obtained the
3 Notably, despite complaining of the Court’s language, Plaintiffs acknowledged that they bore the burden
to demonstrate that they held a Fifth Amendment property interest. ECF 31 at 11-12 (“Plaintiffs are firmly
aware of their burden to establish an ownership interest in the relevant parcels of land” and “[h]aving agreed
to the burden, the Parties now disagree as to whether … Plaintiffs own the property ….”)
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same rights as its predecessor, such that the rights possessed by [the Railroad] in 2014 are
the same as those obtained by HBR in 1894 and 1895.” ECF 24 at 18. In that light, the
record lacked sufficient facts for the Court to find Plaintiffs had legally defeated the
Railroad’s ownership, and the Government was entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also claim that the Court evaluated the parties’ burdens asymmetrically,
arguing that the Court applied an incorrect heightened burden by concluding that Plaintiffs
“failed to prove ownership.” ECF 59 at 15 (citing ECF 57 at 5). This assertion is incorrect.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs incorrectly attribute this quote to the Court’s opinion. This
phrase is nowhere to be found in the opinion. The Court’s only relevant use of the word
“prove” was the use discussed in detail above, which Plaintiffs have mischaracterized. See
ECF 57 at 5. And again, the Court understands this complaint from Plaintiffs to be about
the Court’s decision not to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
Substantively, the Court did not require that Plaintiffs prove ownership in order to
defeat the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court concluded, as a matter
of law, that the applicable source deeds conveyed a fee simple interest to HBR. ECF 57 at
7-9. This legal conclusion is the target of Plaintiffs’ true complaint, as it constrained the
range of material facts on which Plaintiffs could raise a genuine dispute. As the Court
described, “Plaintiffs have not provided any connected chain of title or grant from the state,
argued adverse possession, nor asserted title by estoppel or that was derived through a
tenant.” ECF 57 at 5-6. Plaintiffs’ modern deeds and other related evidence did not generate
a genuine dispute of any material facts because they do not displace the dispositive legal
conclusion at issue—that the original deeds conveyed a fee simple interest to HBR.
Specifically, Plaintiffs’ modern deeds and related evidence appear to be undisputed records
of what is recorded in “deeds, plats, GIS renderings…, and corresponding tax records.”
ECF 59 at 16. But those facts alone—even construed in Plaintiffs’ favor—are insufficient
for a fact-finder to conclude that they held valid title against the Railroad’s fee simple
interest. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (1986).
Plaintiffs point to Abbott, a rails-to-trails case from a different jurisdiction
(Missouri), for the proposition that conflicts between modern deeds and source deeds raise
a genuine dispute of material fact. ECF 59 at 16 (citing Abbott v. United States, 162 Fed.
Cl. 445 (2022)). In that case, the Court found source deeds insufficient to justify summary
judgment in the Government’s favor because “[a]bsent more facts in Defendant’s favor, …
the source deeds are insufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
Railroad interest in these parcels did not change over time.” Abbott, 162 Fed. Cl. at 458.
But that uncertainty does not exist in this case. At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs
conceded that “the rights possessed by [the Railroad] in 2014 are the same as those obtained
by HBR in 1894 and 1895.” ECF 24 at 18. Plaintiffs, having chosen to only contest the
validity and nature of that original interest, cannot now complain that the Court did not
grant them an inference they expressly disclaimed.
But even if Plaintiffs’ concession is not as broad as it seems, the Court finds Abbott
unpersuasive on the facts of this case. Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiffs were not
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entitled to an inference that the Railroad’s interest had changed from a fee simple to an
easement. At the summary judgment stage, the Court must “draw reasonable inferences ‘in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.’” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,
655 (1962)). Here, the Court concluded as a matter of law that the source deeds conveyed
a fee simple interest. ECF 57 at 9. At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs did not allege
or identify any transaction purporting to convey part of that interest back to Plaintiffs,
choosing instead to rely on arguments that the source deeds conveyed only an easement or
were somehow infirm. See ECF 24 at 27-32; ECF 31 at 21-24. For this Court to have
granted Plaintiffs an inference they did not ask for, in the face of no evidence, would not
have been reasonable. The Court would have had to look past Plaintiffs’ representations to
conclude that a predecessor of the Railroad had ceded its fee simple interest to some or all
Plaintiffs, in exchange for a mere easement. The logical leap required for this conclusion
is a bridge too far for this Court. At a minimum, the fact that the Court did not make this
inference sua sponte was not clear legal error under the circumstances. Biery, 818 F.3d at
711.
Finally, to the extent this question presents a close call, Plaintiffs’ additional
evidence introduced at the reconsideration stage confirms that the Railroad’s interest did
not change over time. As discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiffs’ additional evidence
is not appropriate at the reconsideration stage. But even so, Plaintiffs’ chain of title
evidence does not show any intervening change in the fee simple interest conveyed by the
source deeds. This confirms that there is no manifest injustice stemming from the Court’s
grant of summary judgment.
In short, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs chose to contest only the validity
and nature of the Railroad’s original interest from the source deeds. Once the Court
concluded that the source deeds conveyed a fee simple interest to the Railroad’s
predecessor, Plaintiffs failed to provide facts to enable the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs
obtained any of that interest. As a result, the Court was correct to grant summary judgment
in favor of the Government. At the very least, this conclusion involved neither clear legal
error nor manifest injustice, as required to grant a Motion for Reconsideration. See Biery,
818 F.3d at 711.
II. Plaintiffs’ new title search evidence is not appropriate for the
reconsideration stage, but none of the evidence supports an inference
that Plaintiffs defeat the Railroad’s fee simple title.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration includes almost 150 pages of additional
evidence not presented prior to summary judgment. See ECF 59 at 22-23 (referencing
Exhibits MM and NN). In apparent recognition that the Court cannot properly consider this
evidence, Plaintiffs say that “[t]hese documents are not presented as new evidence for
reconsideration’s sake, but to clarify and substantiate what was already in the record.” ECF
59 at 23. In response, the Government argues that this evidence cannot be considered at
this stage, and alternatively that none of the additional evidence shows a reconveyance of
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the Railroad’s title to any Plaintiffs. See ECF 62 at 16. The Court agrees with the
Government that this evidence is not appropriate for introduction at the reconsideration
stage, but nonetheless the evidence does not enable the Court to infer that Plaintiffs defeat
the Railroad’s fee simple title. Therefore, the Court’s grant of summary judgment was
proper and involved neither clear legal error nor manifest injustice.
At the reconsideration stage, Plaintiffs can only raise new evidence that “could not
have been discovered by exercise of due diligence prior to rendition of decision.” Parsons,
174 F. App’x at 563 (citing Girault, 135 F.Supp. at 524). “Litigants should not, on a motion
for reconsideration, be permitted to attempt an extensive retrial based on evidence which
was manifestly available at [the] time of the hearing.” Parsons, 174 F. App’x at 563
(alteration in original) (quoting Gelco Builders & Burjay Constr. Corp. v. United States,
177 Ct. Cl. 1025, 1036 n. 7 (1966)).
Plaintiffs’ chain of title evidence is precisely the kind of evidence that is not proper
for the reconsideration stage. It certainly could “have been discovered by exercise of due
diligence prior to” summary judgment. See Parsons, 174 F. App’x at 563 (citing Girault,
135 F.Supp. at 524). Plaintiffs do not dispute the evidence’s prior availability. See ECF 59
at 22. In fact, Plaintiffs confess that they did not seek out this evidence because it is not
usually required in rails-to-trails cases and is expensive to obtain. See ECF 59 at 22. The
Court is sympathetic to these reasons, but the fact remains that this evidence is not
appropriate for introduction at the reconsideration stage.
Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs’ new chain of title evidence, the Court
does not find that any of the new evidence permits the Court to infer that Plaintiffs either
obtained the Railroad’s interest or hold superior title to the Railroad. Plaintiffs present two
chains of title for the Agudas Israel Congregation parcels, dating to 1937 and 1909. ECF
59 at 23. The 1937 deed refers to the “Southern Railroad Right of Way,” and the 1909 deed
refers to a right of way “12½ feet wide from center of R.R.” ECF 59 at 23. Plaintiffs also
submitted a 1946 deed for the Cagle property, which describes a similar property boundary
“beginning 12½ feet from the centerline.” ECF 59 at 23. Plaintiffs represent that the Cagle
title search was not yet complete as of the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. ECF
59 at 23.
“[A]lthough ‘discerning the intent of the parties is the ultimate goal in construing a
deed,’ we look to the language of the deed for evidence of this intent.” Cnty. of Moore v.
Humane Soc’y of Moore Cnty., Inc., 578 S.E.2d 682, 685 (N.C. App. 2003) (quoting
Station Assocs., Inc. v. Dare Cnty., 513 S.E.2d 789, 794 (N.C. 1999)); see also Dull v. Dull,
61 S.E.2d 255, 257 (N.C. 1950) (“In the interpretation of a deed, the intention of the grantor
must be gathered from the four corners of the instrument.”). As the Court explained in its
Opinion, the language of the Source Deeds reflects an intent to convey—and the actual
conveyance of—a fee simple interest to the Railroad over the land in the Corridor. See ECF
57 at 7-9. Plaintiffs’ additional evidence includes only deeds by parties purporting to have
ownership of the Corridor, yet none of the deeds show a conveyance by the Railroad to any
Plaintiffs. Having concluded as a matter of law that the source deeds conveyed the Corridor
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in fee simple, the Court cannot grant deference to deeds by other parties purporting to
convey easements on that land where the conveyors did not have title to convey in the first
place. See Miller v. Tharel, 75 N.C. 148, 152 (1876) (“The general rule of law is undoubted
that no one can transfer a better title than he himself possesses.”). The newly submitted
deeds do not raise a dispute of a material fact, because they are legally insufficient to defeat
the Railroad’s fee simple interest. Therefore, even considering Plaintiffs’ late-submitted
evidence, the Court concludes that reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment for
the Government is unwarranted. At the very least, this evidence does not reflect the
presence of clear legal error or manifest injustice.
In their Reply, Plaintiffs urged the Court to reopen discovery, based on a
discretionary judgment in a similar case. ECF 63 at 19-20. In that case, the Court initially
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Government on the question of
adjacency, see Loveridge v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 64, 82 (2020), but on a motion for
reconsideration made the discretionary choice to reopen discovery on the limited basis of
proving adjacency, see Loveridge v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 123, 127 (2020). In
deciding to reopen discovery, the Court noted that it “previously left similar ownership
issues open following summary judgment briefing where the record ‘lack[ed] any evidence
regarding’ ownership, but where ‘it appear[ed] that such evidence could be produced.’”
Loveridge, 150 Fed. Cl. at 127 (quoting Anderson v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 661, 688
& n.26 (2020)). Here, for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that reopening
discovery would not be in the interest of judicial efficiency and efficient resolution of the
matter at hand. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to reopen
discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 59) is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PHILIP S. HADJI
Judge
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