Santacruz Macias v. Baltazar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-01046-SKC
YAIROVIS SANTACRUZ MACIAS,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner Yairovis Santacruz Macias is a citizen of Cuba who is currently
being detained at the Denver immigration detention facility. Dkt. 1, ¶¶1, 24; Dkt. 14-
1, ¶24. He arrived in the United States in June 2020 seeking asylum and he was
transferred into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody on June 2,
2020. Dkt.1, ¶24; Dkt. 14-1, ¶¶5-7. On August 25, 2020, an immigration judge (“IJ”)
denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and ordered him removed to Cuba. Dkt. 1,
¶25. Both sides waived their right to appeal the decision and it became final that
same day. Dkt. 14-1, ¶12. ICE then submitted a travel document request to the
government of Cuba on September 4, 2020.1 Id. ¶13.
1 Although Cuba apparently accepted Petitioner for repatriation, his transport was
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On October 1, 2020, ICE conducted a Post Order Custody Review (“POCR”)
under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. Id. ¶15. Based on the POCR, ICE determined that Petitioner
was not a candidate for release because he was a flight risk. Id. ¶19. Nevertheless,
ICE released Petitioner on an order of supervised release on January 13, 2021. Id.
¶20. He was in custody for a total of 141 days from the date his order of removal
became final. Five years later, January 7, 2026, when Petitioner appeared for a
scheduled supervised release appointment, ICE took him into custody, where he has
remained. Dkt. 1, ¶27. As of the date of this Order, he has been in custody again now
for 82 days.
Petitioner filed this action on March 13, 2026. He asserts that his continued
detention by ICE violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the Administrative Procedures
Act. Id. pp.17-20. He specifically claims that under Zadvydas v. Davis, 522 U.S. 678
(2001), his detention has exceeded the presumptively reasonable six-month period
and that his removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. See
generally Dkt. 1. In support, Petitioner alleges that (1) it has been over 2,000 days
since his order of removal became final, and (2) Respondents have failed to show that
removal to a third county is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id.
As relief, Petitioner seeks immediate release from ICE custody. Id.
delayed several times due to COVID-19. Dkt. 14-1, ¶¶16, 18. It is not clear why it was
further delayed such that five years have now passed.
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Respondents, for their part, acknowledge that “in the approximately 67 months
since his removal order became final, Petitioner has been detained for a total of about
seven months.” Dkt. 14, p.8. They also emphasize the fact that Petitioner has only
been in custody for two and a half months since his re-detention. Id. p.7. Respondents
further state that “they are working to remove Petitioner to either Cuba or Mexico.”
Id. p.8.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Section 2241 of Title 28,
which authorizes it to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon
the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “[T]he
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Id.
Noncitizens may properly challenge the lawfulness of their detention through habeas
proceedings. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001).
The Court has considered the Petition, the Response, the Reply, the various
attachments, and the governing law. Because Petitioner’s challenge is fundamentally
legal in nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. For the
reasons shared below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
ANALYSIS
The detention, release, and removal of noncitizens ordered removed from the
United States is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. When a noncitizen is ordered removed,
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removal should ordinally be effectuated within a period of 90 days, known as the
“removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1); see also Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d
1116, 1123, (10th Cir. 2005). During the removal period, the noncitizen must be
detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). After the removal period has expired, however, the
noncitizen “may be detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	determined 	that 	when 	“read 	in 	light 	of 	the
Constitution’s demands,” Section 1231(a)(6) “limits [a noncitizen’s] post-removal-
period 	[of] 	detention 	to 	a 	period 	reasonably 	necessary 	to 	bring 	about 	that
[noncitizen’s] removal from the United States.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689
(2001). It concluded that a six-month detention period is presumptively reasonable to
achieve that goal. Id. at 701. The Supreme Court then held that after six months, the
noncitizen challenging his detention bears the initial burden to “provide[] good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future” and once he does so, “the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. See also Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305,
1310-11 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating “the onus is on the [noncitizen] to ‘provide[] good
reason to believe that there is no [such] likelihood’ before ‘the Government must
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.’”) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701) (brackets in original). If the government meets its burden, continued
detention is permitted; but if the government fails to demonstrate a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the noncitizen must be
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released. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.2
Lastly, the government should remove noncitizens to either: (i) the country of
which the noncitizen is a citizen, subject, or national; (ii) the country in which the
noncitizen was born; or (iii) the country in which the noncitizen has a residence. 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii). If removal to any of those countries is impracticable,
inadvisable, or impossible, then removal can be to any country with a government
that will accept the noncitizen into its territory. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(C)(iv). However,
noncitizens may not be removed to a country if the Attorney General decides that
their life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the noncitizens’
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
A. 	Petitioner’s Detention Exceeds the Presumptively Reasonable Period.
Petitioner claims that his current detention is unlawful under Zadvydas and
violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Dkt. 1. To be sure, there
is 	no 	dispute 	that 	in 	the 	aggregate, 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	has 	exceeded 	the
presumptively reasonable six-month period for effectuating his removal established
2 Zadvydas dealt 	with 	a 	noncitizen 	who 	was 	deemed 	removable 	after 	gaining
admission to the United States. Id. at 682. But its holding has since been expanded
to apply to noncitizens who are deemed inadmissible. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371,
378-379 	(2005); see 	also Morales-Fernandez, 	418 	F.3d 	at 	1123-24 (noting
that Clark expanded the holding of Zadvydas to apply to inadmissible noncitizens
and granting an inadmissible noncitizen's habeas petition).
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by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas. See Dkt. 14, p.8 (“Petitioner has been detained
for a total of about seven months.”). As of the date of this Order, he has been in
detention for 223 days total.
The Court is not persuaded by Respondents’ argument that this Court should
disregard Petitioner’s original period of detention of 141 days and find he has only
been in custody for two and a half months. Dkt. 14, pp.7-8. While the Court recognizes
that other judges in the Tenth Circuit have found the six-month period must be
successive, the Court is more persuaded by the courts in this district that have
concluded otherwise. For example, in Tran v. Baltazar, 26-cv-00940-CNS, 2026 WL
764002, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2026), District Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney observed
that “district courts more often conclude that a detainee’s periods of detention should
be considered together in determining whether the detention has exceeded the
presumptively reasonable time under Zadvydas.” Id. (citing Aguilar v. Noem, 25-cv-
03463-NYW, 2025 WL 3514282, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 8, 2025) (collecting cases)). Judge
Sweeney then concluded that despite a 20-year gap between the petitioner’s periods
of confinement, he had in the aggregate been detained more than six months. Id.; see
also, e.g., Pena-Gil v. Lyons, 25-cv-03268-PAB-NRN, 2025 WL 3268333, at *2 (D.
Colo. Nov. 24, 2025) (concluding the same and collecting cases in support of its
determination that even though “petitioner’s 20-month and five-month periods of
detention [were] served nonconsecutively, petitioner has nonetheless been detained
longer than the six-month presumptively reasonable period”).
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In this case, Petitioner has been detained more than the presumptive six-
month period despite a five-year gap between the periods of detention. To conclude
otherwise 	would 	allow 	the 	government 	to 	detain 	non-citizens 	indefinitely 	by
continuously releasing them just prior to the six-month expiration and then re-
detaining them. Siguenza v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-11914-ADB, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3
(D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2025).
B. 	He is Not Likely to be Released in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future.
And Petitioner has provided the Court with good reason to believe that his
removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. It is undisputed
that it has been over five years since the IJ’s order that Petitioner be removed to
Cuba. 	Despite 	having 	obtained 	permission 	to 	repatriate 	Petitioner 	to 	Cuba,
Respondents’ have not done so and there is no indication that COVID-19 travel
restrictions have played any further role in the delay. To be sure, Respondents have
offered no explanation in this regard. And although Respondents have determined
they can also remove Petitioner to Mexico, they have not provided Petitioner with any
travel 	documents. 	Id. 	Accordingly, 	Petitioner 	has 	satisfied 	his 	burden 	under
Zadvydas. See e.g., Castellano v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 2026 WL 47273, at
*3-4 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2026) (petitioner satisfied his burden where petitioner could
not be removed to Cuba because immigration judge granted petitioner’s withholding
of removal and respondent’s only progress in deporting petitioner was to “nominate”
him for deportation to Mexico and respondent failed to deport him to Mexico on two
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separate occasions); Ahrach v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 3227529, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 19,
2025) (petitioner met her burden where she had been detained for over six months
and only effort made by respondents to remove her was to solicit acceptance from
other countries).
Because Petitioner has satisfied his burden under Zadvydas, it now shifts to
Respondents to present sufficient evidence to show that removal is likely. Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. Respondents state only that “ICE is working on removing Petitioner
to 	Cuba 	or 	Mexico.” 	Dkt. 	14-1, 	¶31. 	But 	without 	more, 	Respondents 	have
demonstrated only that Petitioner’s removal is possible. The possibility of removal
does not equate to a significant likelihood of removal. Tran, 2026 WL 764002, at *3.
Indeed, Zadvydas rejected the proposition that continued detention is permissible “as
long as good faith efforts to effectuate . . . deportation continue.” 533 U.S. at
702 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Instead, the government must make
legitimate progress towards removal. See Hassoun v. Sessions, 2019 WL 78984, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019) (“the reasonableness of Petitioner’s detention turns on
whether and to what extent the government’s efforts are likely to bear fruit. Diligent
efforts alone will not support continued detention.”).
Based on the record, the Court finds Petitioner has shown good reason to
believe that his removal to a third country is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future, and Respondents have not rebutted this showing. Accordingly, because the
Court finds that Respondents have detained Petitioner in violation of the Fifth
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Amendment and Zadvydas, the Court will grant Petitioner’s habeas petition and will
order his release from custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
* 	* 	*
For the reasons shared above, Mr. Yairovis Santacruz Macias’ Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is GRANTED and the Court
ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Respondents 	are 	ORDERED 	to 	release 	Petitioner 	from 	custody
immediately, but no later than within 12 hours of this Order. Respondents
may not impose on Petitioner any additional conditions of release or
supervision beyond those Petitioner was subject to in connection with his
preexisting 	order of 	supervision 	and immediately prior to his 	recent
detention.
2. 	If Petitioner resides outside of Colorado and is only in this state because
Respondents transferred him here, Petitioner shall remain in Respondents’
temporary custody for the sole purpose of Respondents effectuating his
return to his place of residence.
3. 	If necessary, and if Petitioner wishes, Respondents SHALL transport
Petitioner back to his place of residence outside of Colorado, at their own
expense, within 36 hours of the date and time of this Order.
4. 	To effectuate the purpose of this Court’s Order and allow Petitioner to
return home, Respondents are also temporarily enjoined from detaining
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Petitioner for a period of FOURTEEN DAYS.
5. 	Respondents SHALL FILE a status report within FIVE DAYS of this
Order certifying compliance. Because the Court’s ruling affords Petitioner
the relief he seeks, the Court need not address Petitioner’s arguments
regarding the Administrative Procedures Act.
6. 	The Court’s previous Order (Dkt. 9) enjoining Respondents from removing
Petitioner from Colorado or the United States is VACATED and replaced
with the present Order.
DATED: March 30, 2026, 1:10 PM.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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