Guevara Garcia v. Baltasar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-01012-SKC
EMERSON ADALBERTO GUEVARA GARCIA,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner Emerson Adalberto Guevara Garcia is a citizen of El Salvador and
a green-card applicant who is currently being detained at the Aurora Contract
Detention Facility. Dkt. 1, ¶¶1, 2. He entered the United States as an unaccompanied
minor without inspection in July 2014, and he has resided here continuously since
then. Id. ¶18. Mr. Guevara Garcia is married, gainfully employed, and his wife is his
willing immigration sponsor. Id. ¶¶2, 3.
On January 13, 2026, Mr. Guevara Garcia was at work when ICE officers
approached him. Id. ¶24. Upon discovering that Mr. Guevara Garcia did not presently
have any legal status in the United States, the officers obtained an I-200 warrant for
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Mr. Guevara Garcia’s arrest and took him into custody. Dkt. 1-7, p.4.1 According to
DHS, Mr. Guevara Garcia is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a). See Dkt. 7.
Mr. Guevara Garcia filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 12,
2026, seeking an order from this Court directing Respondents to affect his immediate
release or provide him a bond hearing. Dkt. 1. He contends he is subject to detention,
if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. This Court ordered Respondents2 to respond to
the Petition within five days of service and show cause why it should not be granted
based on this Court’s previous analysis in Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-
cv-3688-SKC-SBP, 2025 WL 3718159, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025). Dkt. 4.
Respondents filed their Answer to the Petition on March 23, 2026. Dkt. 7.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Section 2241 of Title 28,
which authorizes it to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon
the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “[T]he
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Id.
1 This is according to the DHS’s I-213 form (Dkt. 1-7), although there is no warrant
included in the materials. But because Mr. Guevara Garcia does not contend he was
arrested without a warrant, the Court accepts what is represented in form I-213.
2 “Respondents” refers to Pamela Bondi, the United States Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; George
Valdez, the Director of the Denver ICE Field Office; and Juan Baltazar, the Warden
of the Aurora Contract ICE Detention Center.
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Noncitizens may properly challenge the lawfulness of their detention through habeas
proceedings. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001).
The Court has considered the Petition, the Answer, the various attachments,
and the governing law. Because Mr. Guevara Garcia’s challenge is fundamentally
legal in nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. For the
reasons shared in the following discussion, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
ANALYSIS
This matter presents a similar factual background and procedural posture to
another of the Court’s recent cases, Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-3688-
SKC-SBP, 2025 WL 3718159, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025). In Aleman Hernandez,
this Court conducted a review of the governing statutes relied on by the parties here
and concluded that when 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226 are read together, they “cover
[noncitizens] presenting at arrival (under § 1225) and then everybody else (under
§ 1226).” Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *6 (citing J.G.O. v. Francis, No.
25-CV-7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025)) (emphasis in
original). Because Mr. Aleman Hernandez had been present in the United States for
more than a decade, the Court found that Respondents were unlawfully detaining
him under § 1225, and that he was only properly detained under § 1226. Id.
In much appreciated candor, Respondents acknowledge that the facts and legal
issues in this case are materially indistinguishable from those in Aleman Hernandez.
Dkt. 7, pp.2-3. Although they disagree with the Court’s previous conclusions, they
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recognize that the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit have not yet offered guidance
on these legal questions. Id. Respondents also cite the Fifth Circuit’s recent order in
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502-508 (5th. Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), wherein
that court agreed with Respondents’ interpretation of the relevant statutes and they
have attached their response brief in Guiterrez v. Baltazar, 25-cv-2720-RMR, which
explains their positions on these matters. Dkt. 7-1.
As the Court has stated in other of its Orders on the matter, it respectfully
disagrees with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion and instead adopts District Judge Charlotte
N. Sweeney’s analysis in Singh v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp.3d ---, 2026 WL 352870, at
**3-6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026), wherein she surgically dismantles the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning. Like Judge Sweeney, this Court is not persuaded that its own analysis in
Aleman 	Hernandez 	must 	be 	upended. 	Consequently, 	the 	Court 	adopts 	and
incorporates its statutory analysis and conclusions from Aleman Hernandez, supra,
as though stated fully herein.
Mr. Guevara Garcia has been in the United States for nearly twelve years, and
therefore, it cannot be said that he is seeking admission as described under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A); rather, he is only properly detained under § 1226. See Aleman
Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at **2-7. To be sure, on Mr. Guevara Garcia’s Notice
to Appear, the immigration official checked the box stating, “You are [a noncitizen]
present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,” rather than the
box 	stating 	Mr. 	Guevara 	Garcia 	was 	“an 	arriving 	[noncitizen].” 	Dkt. 	1-3, 	p.1
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(emphasis added). In addition, the ICE officers obtained and arrested Petitioner on a
warrant, a procedure only applicable under § 1226. See Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-
11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025) (“[T]he plain text of
Sections 1225 and 1226, together with the structure of the larger statutory scheme,
indicates that Section 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens who are arrested on a
warrant issued by the Attorney General while residing in the United States.”). And
Mr. Guevara Garcia has been given an authorization to work. Dkt. 1-7, p.4. A
noncitizen cannot be given a work authorization, “unless the [noncitizen] is lawfully
admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal
proceedings) be provided such authorization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Because “the Government has affirmatively decided to treat [Petitioner] as
being detained under Section 1226(a)[,] it cannot now be heard to change its position
to claim that he is detained under Section 1225(b).” Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C 11180,
2025 WL 2996787, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025). See also Kennedy v. Kijakazi, No.
22-2258, 2023 WL 1990303, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023), quoting DHS v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 24 (2020) (the “[SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95
(1943)] doctrine requires an agency to ‘defend its actions based on the reasons it gave
when it acted’ in the interest of promoting agency accountability, instilling confidence
in agency decisions, and maintaining an orderly process of review.”). Therefore, Mr.
Guevara Garcia’s continued detention pursuant to § 1225 is unlawful.
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REMEDY
The Court turns now to the question of relief. In his prayer for relief, Mr.
Guevara Garcia requests an order of release or, alternatively, an order compelling a
bond hearing. The Court notes, however, that § 1226(a) does not require release of
those noncitizens arrested on a warrant but instead provides the Department of
Homeland Security with the discretion to grant a noncitizen release on bond. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). Thus, the Court orders that Petitioner be given a bond hearing before an
immigration judge, who—in the first instance—“is better suited to consider whether
Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the community. . . .” Loa Caballero v.
Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025).
In addition, Mr. Guevara Garcia asks this Court to place the burden of proof
at the bond hearing on Respondents and require them demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Dkt. 1,
¶¶33-36. Respondents do not directly engage in an analysis of the issue, but rather
cite De La Cruz v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB, 2026 WL 439217 (D. Colo. Feb. 17,
2026), wherein District Judge Philip A. Brimmer noted that the statute’s silence
regarding burdens of proof in a § 1226(a) bond hearing “did not mean that a court
should preemptively fill the gap.” Id. at *4. Respondents have offered to further brief
the issue if the Court decides to address the matter. Dkt. 7, pp.5-6.
The Court will not delay these proceedings by ordering additional briefing on
the issue—Respondent’s reliance on De La Cruz is sufficient to convey their position—
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and 	instead 	looks 	to 	the 	other 	cases 	in 	this 	District 	that 	have 	required 	the
Government to bear the burden of proof at a § 1226(a) bond hearing. To be sure, the
Court is particularly persuaded by District Judge Nina Y. Wang’s analysis in Diaz-
Ceja v. McAleenan, No. 19-cv-00824-NYW, 2019 WL 2774211 (D. Colo. July 2, 2019).
Although Diaz-Ceja predates those factual scenarios presently inundating district
courts nationwide, its analysis is nevertheless applicable to the present case.
In Diaz-Ceja, Judge Wang undertook an exquisitely detailed and thoughtful
analysis of this issue. After reviewing the relevant authority, including BIA decisions,
Supreme Court precedent, and decisions from other courts across the country, Judge
Wang took note of the burdens and protections applicable in non-immigration
contexts. 2019 WL 2774211, at **6-8. Specifically, under the Bail Reform Act—which
governs non-punitive pre-trial detentions in criminal proceedings—the government
“must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any
person.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, (1987). Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (in the context of detention for those found seriously mentally
ill, striking down a provision placing the burden on the detainee to rebut a
presumption of insanity). Judge Wang then engaged in a through due process
balancing analysis3 and concluded the burden of persuasion should be placed on the
3 Judge Wang applied the due process framework applicable to involuntary civil
detention pending trial or mental health treatment, where she considered the parties’
respective interests and whether the existing process balanced and protected the two.
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government. Diaz-Ceja, 2019 WL 2774211, at **9-10. This Court follows suit.
Doing that due process analysis here, at the outset, there is no question that
Mr. Guevara Garcia has a significant interest at stake. Freedom from physical
detention “is the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 529 (2004) (directing courts, when assessing the first Mathews factor, to consider
only the petitioner’s interests at stake in ongoing detention without consideration of
the respondents’ justifications for the detention). Despite not being accused of any
crime, Petitioner is being held in a detention facility that “strongly resemble[s] penal
confinement,” Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 940 (D. Colo.
2025), is away from his family, and is unable to maintain any employment. Thus, the
first Matthews factor favors Mr. Guevara Garcia.
Turning to the second Mathews factor—the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards—the Court finds that requiring Mr.
Guevara Garcia to bear the burden would create a great risk of erroneous deprivation.
In 	this 	instance, 	it 	is 	not 	clear 	whether 	Mr. 	Guevara 	Garcia 	would 	have
representation at his bond hearing, but even if he did, he would still face the difficulty
in proving a negative. To be sure, “proving a negative (especially a lack of danger) can
Diaz-Ceja, 2019 WL 2774211, at *9. In a recent case, Judge Wang applied the
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) framework, but observed that the Mathews
test was functionally equivalent to that applied in involuntary detention cases.
Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-00881-NYW, 2025 WL 3653158, at *13 n.4
(D. Colo. Dec. 17, 2025). This Court also applies the Mathews framework.
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often be more difficult than proving a cause for concern.” L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp.
3d 1172, 1183–84 (D. Colo. 2024) (quoting Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 31
(1st Cir. 2021)). By contrast, the government has substantial resources and “the
Court has no reason to doubt that information establishing those risks is within the
Government’s possession and control.” Vizguerra-Ramirez, 2025 WL 3653158, at *14.
Finally, the Court considers “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Although the Court
does not have argument from the Respondents on this factor, it “discerns no
significant administrative or fiscal burden associated with placing the burden of proof
with the Government.” Vizguerra-Ramirez, 2025 WL 3653158, at *14. The additional
cost, if any, from shifting the burden of proof to the government is negligible. See
Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 943 (D. Colo. 2025) (“[The
administrative burden of a bond hearing is minimal.”).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that placing the burden on Mr.
Guevara Garcia to prove he should be released would assign the risk of error to the
party 	with the 	greater interest. 	Doing so 	would contravene due 	process, 	and
therefore, the Government must bear the burden of proof.
As to the applicable burden, the Court is again persuaded by the analysis in
Diaz-Ceja, and finds that the appropriate standard mirrors that required under the
Bail Reform Act: “The government must prove risk of flight by a preponderance of the
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evidence, and it must prove dangerousness to any other person or to the community
by clear and convincing evidence.” Diaz-Ceja, 2019 WL 2774211, at *11 (cleaned up)
(quoting United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003)). The Court
“finds no persuasive justification to conclude that [a] noncitizen must face different
standards for the same actions, depending upon the forum, i.e., an administrative
charge for removal versus a criminal charge of illegal reentry.” Id.4 See also Barreno
v. Baltasar, No. 025-cv-03017-GPG-TPO, 2025 WL 3190936, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 14,
2025) (“There is, likewise, no reason that the government should bear a greater
burden depending on the forum for detention in relation to the same actions.”).
* 	* 	*
For the reasons shared above, Emerson Adalberto Guevara Garcia’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED5 and the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Mr. Guevara Garcia is not subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED
from re-detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
4 In Vizguerra-Ramirez, 2025 WL 3653158, Judge Wang was persuaded by the more
recent weight of authority requiring the government to demonstrate both flight risk
and danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at *15. This Court,
however, remains persuaded by her original conclusion that the Bail Reform Act
provides the appropriate standard. See Barreno, 2025 WL 3190936, at *3.
5 To the extent Petitioner’s Counsel seeks an award of attorney’s fees, she must file a
separate motion for fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules of Practice for this District.
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2. 	Respondents shall provide Mr. Guevara Garcia with a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within SEVEN DAYS of the date of this Court’s order.
3. 	At the hearing Respondents shall bear the burden of proving risk of flight
by a preponderance of the evidence and dangerousness to any other person
or to the community by clear and convincing evidence.
4. 	Respondents shall file a status report within TEN DAYS of the date of this
Court’s order to certify compliance. The status report shall include if and
when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond
was denied, the reasons for the denial.
DATED: March 26, 2026.
BY THE COURT
_____________________________
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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