Lara Mejia v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO
JOSE LARA MEJIA,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
GEORGE VALDEZ, in his official capacity,1
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity,
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
SIRCE OWEN, in her official capacity, and
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the
“Petition”). 	[Doc. 1].2 The Petition is fully briefed. 	[Doc. 12; Doc. 14]. 	For the reasons
set forth in this Order, the Petition is respectfully GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jose Lara Mejia (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Lara Mejia”) is a citizen of Mexico
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), George Valdez is automatically substituted into this
case as the acting Field Office Director of the Aurora Field Office.
2 The Petition was filed on January 30, 2026 and was assigned to the Honorable Daniel
D. Domenico. [Doc. 1; Doc. 2]. On March 17, 2026, Chief Judge Domenico entered an
Order of Recusal, [Doc. 15], and the case was then reassigned to the undersigned,
[Doc. 16].
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 10

2
who has been present in the United States since 1999. [Id. at ¶¶ 1, 24]. He was detained
by ICE officers on January 26, 2026 and is currently detained in the Aurora Contract
Detention Facility. [Id. at ¶¶ 1, 13]. He has not been given a bond hearing. [Id. at ¶ 24].
The Government purports to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). See [id.
at ¶ 13; Doc. 12 at 1–2]. Petitioner disputes the Government’s interpretation of § 1225(b)
and contends that he is actually detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which would entitle
him to a bond hearing. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 13, 57–59].
The Petition asserts two claims for relief: (1) one count asserting a violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) (“Count One”), [id. at ¶¶ 62–64]; and (2) one count
asserting a violation of Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights (“Count Two”),
[id. at ¶¶ 65–68]. 	Mr. Lara Mejia asks this Court to, among other things, issue a writ of
habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release him immediately or, alternatively,
requiring Respondents to provide him bond hearing within seven days. [Id. at 18].
On March 16, 2026, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Expedited Decision
on Petition for Habeas Corpus and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction (the “Emergency Motion”). 	[Doc. 13]. In that Emergency Motion,
Petitioner argues that he has an upcoming hearing in immigration court on March 19,
2026, and “without direction from this Court, it appears likely that Petitioner will continue
to be deprived of the bond hearing to which he is entitled to under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”
[Id. at 1–2].
This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. 	No Party has requested an
evidentiary hearing or oral argument, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 10

3
16, 2025) (declining to hold a hearing where the petitioner’s habeas challenge was
“fundamentally legal in nature”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
Mr. Lara Mejia’s claims turn on whether Respondents may detain him pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), such that he is not entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). The Court
summarizes the statutory framework before turning to the claims asserted in this case.
I. 	Statutory Framework
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Section 1226 “sets forth
‘the default rule’ for detaining noncitizens ‘already present in the United States.’” Quispe-
Ardiles v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept.
30, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303). This section permits, but does not require,
the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending removal proceedings, subject to
certain exceptions not applicable here. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 10

4
(2) (the Attorney General “may continue to detain” or “may release” the noncitizen
(emphasis added)). 	Section 1226(a) thus establishes a discretionary framework for the
detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings.
Section 1225(b) “supplement[s] § 1226’s detention scheme.” 	Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022)). 	Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to
[noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States,” i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. This section provides, in relevant part, that “in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added).3 Under § 1225(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” is
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival
and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters).
Absent an exception for urgent humanitarian reasons not implicated in this case,
“detention under § 1225(b)(2) is considered mandatory,” and “[i]ndividuals detained under
§ 1225 are not entitled to a bond hearing.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
3 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), “certain applicants for admission who are deemed
inadmissible are subject to expedited removal, unless they express a fear of persecution
or an intent to apply for asylum.” Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 802 F. Supp. 3d 297, 304
(D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-2152 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2025); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (directing an immigration officer to “order [a person deemed
inadmissible] removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless
[the person] indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution”).
Respondents assert that “Petitioner does not qualify for detention under § 1225(b)(1)”
and do not argue that he is detained under this subsection, see [Doc. 12 at 7], so the
Court does not substantively address detention under this subsection.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 10

5
475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
II. 	Application to Petitioner’s Claims
The Court’s analysis begins with Count One, the statutory claim. 	Respondents
argue that Mr. Lara Mejia is an “applicant for admission” under the INA, triggering
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision and rendering Petitioner unentitled to a
bond hearing. See [Doc. 12 at 4–11].
This 	Court 	has 	previously 	addressed 	Respondents’ 	statutory 	interpretation
arguments in detail and, like the majority of courts across the country, has found them
unpersuasive. See Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650,
at *2–7 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025) (interpreting the relevant provisions of §§ 1225 and 1226);
see also id. at *5 (“[F]ederal courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ ‘broad
interpretation of section 1225(b)(2).’” (collecting cases)).4 	In Loa Caballero, this Court
reviewed a similar habeas petition filed by a noncitizen who had resided in the United
States for nearly 20 years before he was detained by ICE. See id. at *1. Like Petitioner
here, the Government did not provide the petitioner in Loa Caballero with a bond hearing
4 In addition to this Court’s ruling in Loa Caballero, a majority of other judges in this District
have concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like to Petitioner who
have been present in the country for some time and are not actively “seeking admission.”
See, e.g., Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02720-RMR, 2025 WL 2962908 (D.
Colo. Oct. 17, 2024) (Rodriguez, J.), appeal docketed, No. 25-1460 (10th Cir. Dec. 16,
2025); Moya Pineda v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02955-GPG, 2025 WL 3516291 (D. Colo. Oct.
20, 2025) (Gallagher, J.); Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL
2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (Sweeney, J.); Florez Marin v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-
03697-PAB, 	2025 	WL 3677019 	(D. 	Colo. 	Dec. 	18, 	2025) 	(Brimmer, 	J.); 	Aleman
Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03688-SKC-SBP, 2025 WL 3718159 (D. Colo. Dec. 23,
2025) (Crews, J.); Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 100587 (D.
Colo. Jan. 14, 2026) (Martinez, J.).
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 10

6
because it claimed that § 1225 mandated his detention. 	See id. 	This Court disagreed,
emphasizing that § 1225(b)(2)(A) only provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens
“seeking admission” to the country. Id. at *6. “The plain meaning of the phrase ‘seeking
admission’ requires that the applicant must be presently and actively seeking lawful entry
into the United States.” Id. Thus, noncitizens who are merely “present”—and have been
for “years upon years” without obtaining legal status—are not “seeking admission” under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. (quoting Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (E.D.
Mich. 2025)).
The Court also explained that interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate detention
for 	all 	“applicants for admission” 	would 	render 	the “seeking 	admission” 	language
superfluous. 	Id. at *7. 	The Court concluded that both the plain text of § 1225 and
applicable canons of statutory interpretation demonstrated that the petitioner in Loa
Caballero was detained under § 1226, not § 1225. See id. at *5–8. The Court has since
reaffirmed its ruling in Loa Caballero in several other similar habeas cases. 	See, e.g.,
Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03439-NYW, 2026 WL 35227, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan.
6, 2026); Bautista v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00272-NYW, 2026 WL 532427, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb.
26, 2026).
Consistent with the Court’s prior rulings and the weight of authority in this District,
the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not authorize Petitioner’s detention. The
“default rule” of discretionary detention under § 1226(a) therefore applies. 	See, e.g.,
Quispe-Ardiles, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5, *7. 	And because Respondents have not
provided the required bond hearing, Mr. Lara Mejia’s continued detention without a bond
hearing violates § 1226(a).
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 10

7
Furthermore, having determined that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention, the
Court concludes that his detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights.
Because Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a), at a minimum “the process due to him is
that which is afforded under [§ 1226(a)].” Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 785. And
as explained above, that process is an individualized bond determination. See, e.g.,
Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1241 (D.N.M. 2025) (describing the
process owed under § 1226 as “an individualized bond hearing before an [immigration
judge]”); Hyppolite v. Noem, 808 F. Supp. 3d 474, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[Section] 1226(a)
requires an individualized bond determination.”). 	The Court thus concurs with the
numerous other district courts that have held that denying a bond hearing to a noncitizen
detained under § 1226(a) violates the noncitizen’s due process rights. See, e.g., Garcia
Cortes, 2025 WL 2652880, at *4; Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784–85; Garcia
Abanil v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 100587, at *6–7 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026).
The Court will GRANT the Petition as to Counts One and Two.
III. 	Appropriate Remedy
In the Petition, Mr. Lara Mejia requests that this Court order him immediately
released. [Doc. 1 at 18]. Alternatively, he asks the Court to order Respondents to provide
him with a bond hearing within seven days at which “they will bear the burden to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to the community or a
flight risk.” [Id.].
Because § 1226(a) “does not require release,” but instead “provides DHS the
discretion to grant an alien release on bond,” Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-
03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025), the Court finds it
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 7 of 10

8
appropriate to order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an
immigration judge, who “is better suited to consider whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and a danger to the community,” Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9.
As for the burden of proof applicable at the hearing, although Petitioner asks the
Court to order that Respondents shall bear the burden to justify Petitioner’s continued
detention by clear and convincing evidence, [Doc. 1 at 18], his Petition does not raise
substantive arguments in support, see generally [id.]. 	Respondents do not address the
applicable burden at all. 	See [Doc. 12]. The Court declines to undertake a sua sponte
analysis of this issue without developed arguments from the Parties. Instead, the Court
continues to concur with other cases in this District that have required the Government to
bear the burden of proof at a § 1226(a) bond hearing where, as here, the petitioner is
initially erroneously detained under § 1225. See Diaz Lopez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-04089-
NYW, 2026 WL 206220, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2025) (this Court taking the same
approach in absence of substantive briefing on burden-shifting issue); see also, e.g.,
Garcia Abanil, 2026 WL 100587, at *8 (“[T]he weight of authority in this District is clear: it
is the Government’s burden to justify a noncitizen’s continued detention at a bond
hearing.” (cleaned up) (collecting cases)). 	But see De La Cruz v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-
00360-PAB, 2026 WL 439217, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026) (declining to shift burden to
the Government in a similar case). The Court also concurs with the decisions concluding
that “the clear and convincing standard that generally applies to civil detention where
liberty is at stake is appropriate here as well.” 	Arredondo v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03040-
RBJ, 2025 WL 4083607, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025) (quotation omitted); see also, e.g.,
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 8 of 10

9
Garcia Abanil, 2026 WL 100587, at *8 (finding clear and convincing standard appropriate
where noncitizen’s “liberty interest hangs in the balance”)
Accordingly, Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner a bond hearing no
later than March 24, 2026. At the bond hearing, the Government shall bear the burden
of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner’s continued detention is
justified. If Respondents to not do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, he must be immediately released from
detention. 	On or before March 31, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no hearing was
held, advise the Court of the date Petitioner was released from custody; and (2) whether
any additional proceedings in this matter are required.5
Because this Court has granted the relief Petitioner seeks, the Petitioner’s Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, [Doc. 5], which asks the
Court to (1) prohibit Respondents from relocating him outside of the Court’s jurisdiction
and (2) order Respondents to release him or provide him a bond hearing, [id. at 27], is
respectfully DENIED as moot. 	In addition, the Emergency Motion, [Doc. 13], is also
DENIED as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is GRANTED;
(2) 	Respondents shall provide Petitioner a bond hearing no later than March
5 Petitioner also asks the Court to award him attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act. 	[Doc. 1 at 18]. 	However, this District's Local Rules require that those
requests be made by separate motion. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 9 of 10

10
24, 2026. 	At the bond hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner’s continued
detention is justified. 	If Respondents to not do not provide Petitioner
with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein,
Petitioner must be immediately released from detention;
(3) 	On or before March 31, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no
hearing was held, advise the Court of the date Petitioner was released from
custody; and (2) whether any additional proceedings in this matter are
required;
(4) 	Petitioner’s 	Motion 	for 	Temporary 	Restraining 	Order 	and 	Preliminary
Injunction [Doc. 5] DENIED as moot; and
(5) 	The Emergency Motion for Expedited Decision on Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction [Doc. 13] is DENIED as moot.
DATED: March 17, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
Case No. 1:26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO Document 17 filed 03/17/26 USDC Colorado
pg 10 of 10